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PREFACE
This book is divided into three parts. While it would be possible to read
each part as a more or less self-contained unit, dealing with its own par-
ticular set of questions, taken together they form a single study. Each
part plays its own role in achieving the book’s main aim. That aim is to
present a critical discussion of D. Z. Phillips’s philosophy of religion.
Reading Phillips’s work, one can hardly fail to be impressed both by its
sheer volume, as well as by the breadth of its scope. Phillips’s first book
appeared in 1965, and the past four decades or so have seen the publication
of well over fifteen titles. In addition, he has edited and annotated various
works, including two collections of Rush Rhees’s papers, and has con-
tributed numerous articles to philosophical journals. The subjects Phillips
engages with cover a wide range of philosophy: from logic to ethics, from
the philosophy of literature to the philosophy of education. By far the
larger part of his writings, however, is concerned with the philosophy of
religion, and it is for his work in this area that Phillips is best known.
Despite the differences in the problems and questions Phillips addresses,
his work reflects a unified approach, an approach which is derived, first
and foremost, from Ludwig Wittgenstein. The extent to which Phillips’s
work is inspired by Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy can hardly be exag-
gerated. To be sure, Phillips makes no secret of this. He readily acknowl-
edges that his conception of philosophy has been shaped by Wittgenstein’s
work. He repeatedly refers his audience to Wittgenstein, quoting at length
from his writings. Time and again he urges us to recognise the importance
of Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods and insights. In part, he sees his
task as one of promoting a Wittgensteinian approach within philosophy in
general, and philosophy of religion in particular. This is true from his ear-
liest to his latest work. The Concept of Prayer (1965) presents itself as the
first extended essay in the philosophy of religion influenced by Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy. In Phillips’s latest offerings, Philosophy’s Cool Place
(1999) and Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (2001) it is
still Wittgenstein’s voice which is heard most forcefully.1
1 Since research on this book was completed, Phillips has published two further titles:
Religion and Friendly Fire (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) and The Problem of Evil and The
Problem of God (London: SCM Press, 2004). Unfortunately, these could not be taken into
consideration for the present study.
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Quite a few commentators have remarked upon the manner in which
Phillips has appropriated Wittgenstein’s philosophical legacy. Unfortu-
nately, their reviews have tended to be rather narrow and one-sided. First,
they have focused almost exclusively on the question whether Phillips
can be said correctly to apply Wittgenstein’s later methods to the philo-
sophical study of religion. This underestimates the fact that what counts
as a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a matter of
some dispute. If Phillips has appropriated Wittgenstein’s views, he has
done so in a critical way, taking them in new directions, developing,
expanding and transforming them. One of the merits of Phillips’s work
is that it has contributed to our understanding both of the significance of
Wittgenstein’s own writings on matters religious, as well as to our under-
standing of what a correct application of Wittgenstein’s methods to the
study of religion might involve.
Secondly, to date, and with few notable exceptions, discussions of
Phillips’s work have been content to treat it as paradigmatic of a distinct
and clearly identifiable approach within contemporary philosophy of
religion. Discussions of ‘the Wittgensteinian interpretation of religion’,
the ‘neo-Wittgensteinian School’ and ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ readily
come to mind. While such discussions are not without merit, they have
tended to underplay the originality and uniqueness of Phillips’s work.
The ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’ label may have served a useful purpose in
referring to those authors who prepared the way for a more thorough
investigation of the significance of Wittgenstein’s methods for the philo-
sophical study of religion. By now, however, the term has become too
imprecise and too heavily burdened with derogatory connotations. All
too often, commentators have shied away from the task of properly
examining Phillips’s own analyses, too readily assuming them to be in
agreement with the perceived character of ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’ philos-
ophy of religion. Where Phillips’s writings are explicitly referred to, dis-
cussion has concentrated primarily on his earlier writings, displaying too
little awareness of the way in which Phillips has, over the years, amended
and developed his position. A more comprehensive and balanced study
of Phillips’s work has not been forthcoming. This book hopes to fill 
that gap.
In the first part, I explore Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief 
in the context both of his earlier and his later philosophy. By carefully
arranging Wittgenstein’s observations on matters religious against the
background of his broader philosophical methodology, I hope to achieve
a fair assessment of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion, as well as to
XII PREFACE
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set a standard by which to measure any attempt at propounding a more
comprehensive Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion.
In the second part of the book, I examine the way in which, in the late
fifties and early sixties, Wittgenstein’s philosophy was made to bear on
the philosophy of religion. After a brief discussion of the earlier works of
Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, and Norman Malcolm, I turn to Phillips’s first
published work, The Concept of Prayer. Here, my interest lies mainly in
the book’s efforts at developing a more comprehensive Wittgensteinian
philosophy of religion.
In the third and by far the larger part of this book, I turn away from
the discussion of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, focusing on
Phillips’s philosophy of religion instead. Phillips’s mature understanding
of philosophical enquiry as a form of contemplation is examined, and his
descriptive accounts of religious beliefs are subjected to closer scrutiny.
It is my sincere hope that this study may contribute to a more balanced
evaluation of Phillips’s contribution to contemporary philosophy of reli-
gion, and may advance the debate concerning the significance of Wittgen-
stein’s methods and insights for the study of religion. While I believe that
the conclusions I reach show a number of dead-ends, as well as point out
several directions that may be more fruitfully explored, they are in no way
meant to be decisive. Rather, I hope that they shall be taken as an invita-
tion to further discussion.
PREFACE XIII
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PART I
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I
Wittgenstein once remarked to his friend and former student M. O’C. Drury
‘I am not a religious man’.1 However, one might, as did Norman Malcolm,
express some doubt as to whether that assessment of himself was true.2 Or,
at least, as to how it should be understood. Wittgenstein’s remark cannot be
taken to mean that religion played no role in his life. Although it seems
clear that he saw himself quite unambiguously as an unbeliever,3 Wittgen-
stein nevertheless had a great and abiding interest in religion and religious
belief; certainly on a personal level, and, perhaps to a somewhat lesser
extent, on a professional level.
The following two chapters set themselves the task of clarifying 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts on matters religious — a task by no means easy
or straightforward. There are a number of factors contributing to its dif-
ficulty. First, Wittgenstein discussed religion only sporadically. Remarks
which deal explicitly with religious belief, with religious worship and
ritual, or with God, are few and far between, and are certainly not orde-
red into anything remotely resembling a systematic account. Anyone
hoping to recover Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion — if such a thing
can be said to exist at all — has very little indeed to go on.
Secondly, where Wittgenstein does explicitly address the topic of reli-
gious belief, his remarks are often difficult to understand, if not obscure.
This difficulty becomes all the more pronounced where Wittgenstein’s
personal and professional interests merge, as is not seldom the case.
Thirdly, Wittgenstein’s views on religious belief did not remain the
same throughout his life. There is a marked difference between remarks
written during the First World War and those written, for example, shortly
after the Second World War. To some extent, these changes might reflect
changes in Wittgenstein’s personal circumstances, and may thus be explai-
ned biographically. More importantly, however, they reflect the transfor-
mation Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole underwent. Wittgenstein is
unique in the history of philosophy in having produced two diametrically
1 See Rhees 1981, p. 94.
2 In his memoir Malcolm remarks that, although Wittgenstein was not religious, “there
was in him, in some sense, the possibility of religion.” (Malcolm 1984, p. 60; cf. Malcolm
1993, pp. 4ff.)
3 See Hudson 1975, p. 10.
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opposed philosophies.4 The differences between Wittgenstein’s earlier and
later remarks on religious belief must be understood against the back-
ground of these two distinct philosophical world-pictures, crystallized,
respectively, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the Phi-
losophical Investigations (1953). One’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy of religion will thus betray certain prior interpretative choi-
ces with respect to Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole. Here, one faces
a further problem. For Wittgenstein is, perhaps, also unique in the history
of philosophy in that his writings, more than those of any other classical
philosopher, have been treated to wildly differing, and sometimes out-
right contradictory, interpretations.5
These difficulties notwithstanding, the task of mapping out Wittgen-
stein’s remarks on religious belief is an important one. Not just with a
view to current debates concerning ‘Wittgensteinian’ philosophy of reli-
gion. But also because they make up an, admittedly small, but significant
part of Wittgenstein’s philosophical heritage. Whatever conclusions one
may draw, questions of value — be they religious, ethical or aesthetic —
played an important role for Wittgenstein and, as such, deserve our atten-
tion. Of course, I am not the first to make that point. Although early com-
mentators may have tended largely to ignore Wittgenstein’s remarks on
such matters, the past few decades have seen the publication of a number
of works explicitly addressing these issues.6 While none of these deny the
relevance of clarifying Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief, some
have gone further, suggesting that these remarks provide the essential 
key to understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole or, even more
controversially, that Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings are fundamen-
tally religious as they stand.7
4 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
4 See Hacker 2001, pp. viii, 1.
5 See Biletzki 2003, p. 7. In fact, although it is common practice to distinguish between
‘Wittgenstein one’ (Tractatus) and ‘Wittgenstein two’ (Investigations), this procedure has not
gone unchallenged. It has been argued that such a distinction underplays the natural and obvi-
ous continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings. Conversely, in a number of recent
publications, arguments have been adduced in favour of recognising a ‘third’ Wittgenstein,
referring primarily to Wittgenstein’s last work, On Certainty. (See Biletzki 2003, pp. 24ff.) My
speaking of an ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ period in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not meant to deny
the fact that there are important continuities in Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole. Nor, yet
again, to deny that Wittgenstein’s latest writings may contain certain modifications, or at the
least additions, to his earlier work. Where necessary and possible, I have remarked on these
matters. Any further discussion is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this investigation.
6 The first comprehensive study of Wittgenstein’s writings on religion was W. Donald
Hudson’s Wittgenstein and Religious Belief (1975). Since then, various full length studies,
as well as numerous articles, have been published.
7 See, respectively, Weiberg 1997, p. 9 and Shields 1993, p. 2.
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Our conclusions shall be somewhat more modest. It cannot be denied
that matters religious were important to Wittgenstein. What can and should
be denied, however, is that the philosophy of religion constitutes one of
the main themes in his philosophical oeuvre. In fact, as we shall see, the
claim that there is such a thing as ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion’
is a dubious one, at best. To arrive at this conclusion, the first chapter dis-
cusses Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and his Lecture on Ethics. The second
chapter turns to the later period, focusing primarily on the Remarks on
Frazer and the Lectures on Religious Belief. 
INTRODUCTION TO PART I 5
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1. THE EARLIER PERIOD
By far the larger part of this chapter is taken up by an examination of 
the only book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime, the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. At first sight, religion seems to play a minor role,
if any, in this logically and metaphysically orientated work. Along with
ethical and aesthetical expressions, religious expressions are condemned
to the realm of the nonsensical. There are, however, strong indications
that matters are not so straightforward. Wittgenstein himself once insisted
that the main point of the Tractatus was an ethical one; and a closer look
at his notebooks, diary and correspondence from this period shows him to
be much taken up by religious and moral questions. This taken into con-
sideration it is, perhaps, not surprising that when Wittgenstein returned to
Cambridge in 1929 the first lecture he gave was on ethics. In this lecture
light is thrown on certain remarks of the Tractatus, lending some sup-
port to a more ethically or religiously orientated interpretation. At the
same time, it is clear that Wittgenstein had already moved some distance
from the position held in the Tractatus. The way in which the Lecture on
Ethics not only looks back but also points forwards, paving the way for
Wittgenstein’s later dealings with religion (and ethics), is the subject of
the second part of this chapter.
1.1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
When the Tractatus was published in 1921 it was hailed by most as a
clear and forceful expression of what later came to be called Logical
Positivism. Many, most noticeably the members of the Wiener Kreis,
believed it to be the final deathblow to metaphysics and a solid basis on
which to build a positivist philosophy. The final five or so pages of the
Tractatus, in which we are suddenly confronted with a string of apho-
risms dealing with the ‘mystical’, with ethics, God and the meaning of
life, were simply ignored or explained away.
“Given the sheer disproportion in the space allotted respectively to the
logico-philosophical preliminaries and these last moral-theological apho-
risms, the temptation has been to dismiss the final propositions as obiter
dicta — like the casual afterthoughts which are put in for effect at the end
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of some legal judgment and have no subsequent binding force, since they
have no juridical bearing on the case in hand.”1
Early commentators, with very few exceptions, tended “to follow the
injunction of the final paragraph and pass over the last pages of the
Tractatus in silence.”2 In later studies of the Tractatus, however, this
tendency has been questioned. There are, so it is argued, numerous indi-
cations that matters are not so straightforward. First, there is the text
itself — the final pages of the Tractatus. Sections 6.4 to 7 in particular
prove embarrassing to anyone intent on reading Wittgenstein in a strictly
positivist mien. These remarks do not seem to be a feeble appendage 
and an aberration, to be ignored or somehow explained away. They are
certainly relevant and, so it is said, may well constitute the climax or
culmination of the whole work.
In support of this view, certain selected passages from Wittgenstein’s
notebooks from the period prior to the publication of the Tractatus are
adduced. These supply us with an insight into Wittgenstein’s personal life
while he was working on the Tractatus, revealing a man much taken up by
moral and religious questions. More importantly, they were used in compo-
sition — quite a few of the remarks in the notebooks found their way, more
or less unaltered, into the Tractatus. As such they are an invaluable source
of material, providing a wider background to the terse remarks of the Trac-
tatus. Moreover, so it is argued, they show the importance of ethics and
religion — the mystical — within Wittgenstein’s earlier thought.
Finally, we are reminded of the fact that Wittgenstein himself con-
firmed this conclusion. In conversation and in letters he often expressed
dissatisfaction with the way the Tractatus was received, claiming that all
the leading philosophers of his day misunderstood it to varying degrees —
Frege, Russell, Moore and, most of all, the Logical Positivists. In a letter
to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein says the following of the Tractatus:
“The sense of the book is an ethical one. I once wanted to include in the
preface a sentence which actually is not now in it but which I will write out
for you here since it will perhaps be a key (to the book) for you. I wanted,
then, to write: my work consists of two parts: of that which is under con-
sideration here and of all that I have not written. And it is precisely this
second part which is the important one […] I would now recommend you
to read the preface and the conclusion, since these carry the sense to its
most immediate expression.”3
8 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
1 Janik & Toulmin 1973, p. 23.
2 Barrett, 1991, p. x.
3 Engelmann 1967, pp. 143-144.
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For Wittgenstein, then, it appears the Tractatus is not only a work on
logic and language. It is also an ethical book. Now, at first blush, this
may seem a somewhat puzzling claim. The Tractatus certainly is not
what one might expect a work on ethics or a religious treatise to be like.4
In fact, it argues that, in a very important sense, ethical and religious
‘propositions’ are nonsensical. Ethics cannot be put into words.5 And
this means, really, that we should consign it to silence. We should say
nothing except what can be said.6 But, as Russell noted, not without
irony, Wittgenstein “manages to say a good deal about what cannot be
said.”7 Therefore, in the second part of this section, we take a closer
look at the Tractatus in an attempt to understand what sense there is in
the nonsensical; how, as Wittgenstein put it, it is possible to put every-
thing in its place by being silent about it.8 Of course, as noted above,
there is no simple answer as to what constitutes the correct reading of
the Tractatus. Solutions and interpretations offered are diverse and not
seldom incompatible. Within the confines of this work, it cannot be my
aim, even if I could fulfil it, to offer a critical appraisal. The best I can
do is provide a rough indication of some of the main thoughts, to serve
as a background against which the place of the religious and ethical in
the Tractatus may become more readily intelligible.9 This should allow
us, in the third part, to assess such claims as to the essentially ethico-
religious nature of the book.
Let us begin on a more personal level, though, and focus our atten-
tion on Wittgenstein’s notebooks as well as on a number of biographi-
cal references. These provide an invaluable insight into Wittgenstein’s
thought whilst he was working on the Tractatus and facilitate its inter-
pretation.
THE EARLIER PERIOD 9
4 It has been suggested, however, that both the design and structure of the Tractatus bear
affinity to Christian mystical literature. See, for example, Kroß 1993, p. 101; Clack 1999(a),
p. 35: “The Tractatus can thus be read as a modern via negativa.” Likewise, Creegan
1989, p. 129 n. 29: “The negative part of Wittgenstein’s method is clearly reminiscent 
of the via negativa of theology.” However, as Creegan rightly points out, there is no evi-
dence that Wittgenstein had studied the classic sources in this area.
5 See Wittgenstein 1995, 6.421.
6 See Wittgenstein 1995, 6.53.
7 Wittgenstein 1995, Introduction, p. xxi.
8 See Engelmann 1967, p. 143.
9 Our ‘rough sketch’ stays close to what Biletzki calls ‘an analytic’ or ‘a reasonable’
reading of the Tractatus, of which P. M. S. Hacker is, perhaps, the most outspoken pro-
ponent. (See Biletzki 2003, in particular chapter 4.) This line of interpretation has recently
been challenged by a competing reading, originally propounded by Cora Diamond. (See
Diamond 1991.) Although the — ongoing — debate is an interesting one, I cannot go into
it here. (For Hacker’s reply to his critics, see Hacker 2001, chapters 4 through 6.)
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1.1.1 Das Leben der Erkenntnis
Although the young Ludwig Wittgenstein received instruction in Roman
Catholicism, formal religion played little part in his family life, and, as
Wittgenstein told his friend Arvid Sjögren, he lost his childish faith after
conversations with his sister Gretl.10 If anything, Wittgenstein became
contemptuous of religion. However, he later told Norman Malcolm that,
at about the age of twenty-one, something caused a change in him:
“In Vienna he saw a play that was mediocre drama, but in it one of the
characters expressed the thought that no matter what happened in the world,
nothing bad could happen to him — he was independent of fate and circum-
stance. Wittgenstein was struck by this stoic thought; for the first time he
saw the possibility of religion.”11
It is not likely that Wittgenstein was instantly converted to Christianity;
in fact, he steered clear of formal religion during the whole of his life. It
is clear, though, that religion, and in particular the Christian faith, began
to play a large role in his life, as is evident from his choice of reading
material which turned “intensely Christian”.12
“Most of his favourite authors were suggestive and moral, rather than rigor-
ous and logical, in their writings; in addition to Kierkegaard, Saint Augustine,
Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy are often mentioned. […] He read, and was excited
by, William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience as early as 1912.”13
Particularly the latter two authors, Tolstoy and James, made a great impres-
sion on Wittgenstein. During the First World War, in September 1914,
Wittgenstein discovered Tolstoy’s abridgement of the Gospels — The
Gospel in Brief — in a bookstore. He read and reread it, keeping it with
him at all times, and became known by the other soldiers as ‘the one with
the Gospels’.14 As far as James’ Varieties of Religious Experience is con-
cerned, Wittgenstein believed it morally improved him — it may well
have played a role in his decision to volunteer for active duty upon the
declaration of the war, even though he could easily have been exempted.
Wittgenstein’s motives for doing so were not so much nationalistic but,
rather, personal. He felt that the experience of facing death would, in
some sense, improve him. During the war, he volunteered for the extremely
10 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
10 See McGuinness 1990, pp. 25, 43.
11 Malcolm 1984, p. 70. The play was L. Anzengruber’s Die Kreuzelschreiber; see
McGuinness 1990, p. 94.
12 McGuinness 1990, p. 43.
13 Creegan 1989, p. 11.
14 See McGuinness 1990, p. 220.
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dangerous post of artillery observer in an advanced position, hoping that
nearness to death would bring light into his life.15 Such a notion, the
spiritual value of heroically facing death, is also touched upon by James.
He writes that, if a man is willing to risk death, and suffer it heroically,
this fact consecrates him forever.16 According to Ray Monk, there are
signs that Wittgenstein wished for precisely this kind of consecration:
“What Wittgenstein wanted from the war, then, was a transformation of his
whole personality, a ‘variety of religious experience’ that would change his
life irrevocably.”17
This change, perhaps, did occur.18 When, at the end of the war, Wittgen-
stein found himself a prisoner of war in a prison camp near Monte Cassino,
he and a fellow prisoner, Franz Parak, read Dostoevsky together. Parak
believed that Wittgenstein had gone through a religious conversion during
the war and that this played a part in his subsequently giving away his
inherited wealth. Also, Wittgenstein entertained the idea of entering the
priesthood; the four years study of theology would have been too much,
however, and he planned, instead, to become a school teacher. “I’d most
like to be a priest”, he told Parak, “but when I’m a teacher I can read
the Gospel with the children.”19
Wittgenstein’s concern with religious belief is perhaps most strikingly
encountered in the notes he kept during the latter years of the war. These
consist of two parts: one part, written in code, reads as a diary, contain-
ing remarks which are predominantly of a personal nature, while the
other, non-coded part, consists mainly of philosophical thought, much of
which found its way into the Tractatus. The former have been published
bearing the title Geheime Tagebücher and are of particular interest. In
the Vorwort, Hans Albert comments that they show Wittgenstein
“als ein durch die christliche Tradition geprägter religiöser Denker, der
zum moralischen Rigorismus neigt und der Kierkegaard und Tolstoi näher
stehen dürfte als denjenigen, die von ihm Anregungen für die Entwicklung
des Programms der logischen Analyse erhalten haben.”20
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15 See McGuinness 1990, p. 240; cf. Wittgenstein 1991, p. 22.
16 See James 1982, p. 364.
17 Ray Monk 1991, p. 112. Cf. McGuinness 1990, p. 211; Weiberg 1997, p. 22; Kroß
1993, p. 35.
18 When Wittgenstein returned from the war, Russell was astonished to find that he 
had become a ‘complete mystic’. And Wittgenstein himself would later remark of the war:
“It saved my life; I don’t know what I’d have done without it.” (See McGuinness 1990,
pp. 279 and 204.)
19 See McGuinness 1990, pp. 273-274.
20 Wittgenstein 1991, Vorwort, p. 7. 
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The coded notes reveal Wittgenstein’s intense struggle for moral and
religious purity in all spheres of his life. His ideal was to detach himself
from ‘externalities’, to be able to enjoy the good hours of life thankfully,
as a boon, and otherwise face life with indifference.21 As noted above,
Wittgenstein believed that the war provided the ideal circumstances 
for him to achieve this goal, confronting him “with the simple task of
preparing himself for a good death.”22 Often, before going into battle,
Wittgenstein prayed, not so much that he should be spared from death,
but that he should meet it in the right spirit, without cowardice or loss of
himself. However, it was not only from the dangers of the war that
Wittgenstein sought to detach himself. In his dealings with his fellow
soldiers, he strove after the same goal. This proved particularly difficult
for him. Wittgenstein found it almost impossible to relate to his com-
rades in arms, exclaiming that there was not a decent man among them.23
The only way to deal with the situation, he decided, was to distance him-
self as much as possible. One must renounce the flesh and live for the
spirit; a resolve not easily sustained:
“Es ist unendlich schwer, sich dem Bösen immerzu zu widersetzen. Es ist
schwer, mit leerem Magen und unausgeschlafen dem Geiste zu dienen!
Aber was wäre ich, wenn ich es nicht könnte.”24
In his philosophical work, Wittgenstein seems to have found some form of
refuge. In the middle of hardship he could retreat into himself and his work.
But, here as well, moral purity was of paramount importance. The work
must not “be simply a way of getting through the time but must be under-
taken in a devout spirit”.25 As Wittgenstein said to Engelmann: ‘How can
I be a good philosopher when I can’t manage to be a good man?’26 It is,
says Monk, “as if the personal and the philosophical had become fused;
ethics and logic […] had finally come together, not merely as two aspects
of the same personal task, but as two parts of the same philosophical
work.”27 Clearly, Wittgenstein did not sharply distinguish between his var-
ious problems and tasks. His duties as a soldier, his philosophical work,
his dealings with others: all these intertwined to make up a single life:28
12 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
21 See McGuinness 1990, p. 222.
22 McGuinness 1990, p. 220.
23 See Wittgenstein 1991, p. 19.
24 Wittgenstein 1991, p. 23.
25 McGuinness 1990, p. 226.
26 See McGuinness 1990, p. 227.
27 Monk 1991, p. 141.
28 This is strikingly illustrated by the way in which his philosophical task was assimilated
to military situations. The circumstances of war led to a ‘Militarisierung’ of Wittgenstein’s
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“Nicht nur das selbstgenügsame, gottgefällige Leben, sondern ebenso die
philosophische Arbeit werden als unbedingte Pflicht im Zusammenhang
mit dem für Wittgenstein richtigen Leben betrachtet. Die Philosophie ist
damit untrennbar mit dem Leben verbunden und der in den Geheimen
Tagebüchern so häufig angerufene Geist sowohl philosophisch als auch
religiös zu verstehen.”29
Wittgenstein’s religious understanding of ‘living for the spirit’ was
informed first and foremost by Tolstoy. As already mentioned, his The
Gospel in Brief greatly impressed Wittgenstein. He kept it with him at
all times and, with an almost evangelical zeal, recommended it to any-
one in distress.30 References to the work abound in his notebooks.
“Immer wieder sage ich mir im Geiste die Worte Tolstois vor: >Der
Mensch ist ohnmächtig im Fleische aber frei durch den Geist<”31
To become free, one must renounce the flesh, the gratification of one’s
own will and, thus, make oneself independent of outward circumstances.
The happy life, the only true life, is the life of the present, without any
concern for the past or the future. Whatever happens ‘externally’, one’s
innermost self remains untouched, absolutely safe: a thought which, as
we have seen, had already struck Wittgenstein some time earlier, when
watching Die Kreuzelschreiber in Vienna.
It is difficult not to read these remarks as evincing a form of stoicism.32
But one should tread carefully here. First, Wittgenstein’s renunciation 
is not mere resignation to whatever happens. We are not required to
believe that whatever happens is good just because it does happen but,
rather, that whatever happens is neither good nor bad — only the ethical
will is good or bad. Secondly, there is a strong religious dimension to
Wittgenstein’s view. His ‘stoic attitude’ derives not from ancient sources
but from a certain kind of Christianity; the Christianity he found in 
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philosophy. (See Kroß 1993, p. 35.) He speaks of ‘laying siege to his problems’, ‘storming
them’, ‘capturing and retaining forts’, and so on. (See McGuinness 1990, pp. 226-227.)
And, what is more, here, too, he calls upon the spirit to help and inspire him. (See Monk
1991, p. 126.)
29 Weiberg 1997, pp. 27-28.
30 See Monk 1991, p. 116.
31 Wittgenstein 1991, p. 21.
32 Clack, for example, believes Wittgenstein’s religious and ethical doctrines to 
be close to those of Spinoza, both prescribing a form of stoicism. (See Clack 1999(a), 
p. 45.) Despite some similarities, this is a doubtful claim. Henry Leroy Finch warns us
that Wittgenstein’s treatment of ethics as ‘supernatural’, as ‘outside the world’, belonging
to a transcendental subject and altering the boundaries of the world, is scarcely congenial
to Spinoza. (See Finch 1971, pp. 171-172.)
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Tolstoy. If one wants to speak of submission here, it is not so much to
fate but to the will of God:
“In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that
is what ‘being happy’ means.
I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I
appear dependent. That is to say: ‘I am doing the will of God’.”33
These themes occur in Wittgenstein’s notebooks throughout the latter
years of the war: “Tolstoy’s Christianity with a particular stamp given
to it by Wittgenstein.”34 Wittgenstein adds the following entry to his
notebooks in August 1916:
“How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this
world?
Through the life of knowledge.
The good conscience is the happiness that the life of knowledge preserves.
The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of
the world.
The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of
the world.
To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate.”35
It is no coincidence that these sentiments are also expressed by Tolstoy, in
his introduction to The Gospel in Brief. The Christianity Wittgenstein
found there seemed to him the only sure way to happiness. To live the life
of knowledge36 — Das Leben der Erkenntnis — is to transform one’s whole
being. Such a life would constitute the redemption — morally, religiously
and philosophically — that Wittgenstein so desperately sought after.
1.1.2 Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches
As we have seen, Wittgenstein drew no strict boundaries between his
philosophy, his ethical and religious beliefs and aspirations, his worldly
duties — all these make up a single integrated life and cannot fail but
bear upon one another. It would be surprising, then, to say the least, if
Wittgenstein’s religious and moral thought had not found its way into
the Tractatus. Says Monk:
14 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
33 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 75.
34 McGuinness 1990, p. 221.
35 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 81.
36 The German word ‘Erkenntnis’ translates as ‘knowledge’, ‘insight’, ‘understanding’
— in this context ‘knowledge’ should not be understood as scientific knowledge but,
rather, as spiritual or philosophical understanding.
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“His logic and his thinking about himself being but two aspects of the single
‘duty to oneself’, this fervently held faith was bound to have an influence
on his work. And eventually it did — transforming it from an analysis of
logical symbolism in the spirit of Frege and Russell into the curiously
hybrid work which we know today, combining as it does logical theory
with religious mysticism.”37
In the following, we examine the role of the mystical in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus. We begin by giving a rough indication of some of the main
‘logical’ thoughts of the work. In this context, the sudden emergence of
the mystical, presents itself as, indeed, mystifying. I hope to show that
the mystical becomes more readily intelligible when viewed against the
background of Wittgenstein’s ethical and religious beliefs, as presented
in the preceding section. In doing so, I hope to arrive at an interpretation
which is neither exclusively ethical nor exclusively logical, but which
can award both these aspects their proper place.
The Tractatus presents the world as the totality not so much of
things, but of facts (Tatsachen). A fact is the existence of states of affairs
(Sachverhalte) which, in turn, consist of certain determinate combina-
tions of objects (Gegenstände). These objects make up the substance of
the world which exists independently of what is the case, ensuring that
the world shall have an unalterable form. Although objects are, in this
sense, independent — they can occur in all possible situations — they
are not independent of the possibility of being combined to make up
states of affairs. The totality of existing states of affairs — which, at the
same time determines which states of affairs do not exist — is the world.
Man makes models of reality in picturing the facts to himself. The
elements of such a picture (Bild) and the way in which they are related
to one another, represent the objects and their relatedness in reality. For
this to be possible, a picture and that of which it purports to be a pic-
ture, must have something in common. This common element is what
Wittgenstein calls pictorial form (Form der Abbildung). A picture can
depict any reality whose form it has; a spatial picture, for example, can
depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, and so on.
Now, a picture can be more or less like what it depicts, its pictorial form
can be, so to speak, more or less rich. Any picture of whatever form,
however, must have something in common with reality in order to be
able to depict it in any way at all. This necessary common element
Wittgenstein calls logical form (logische Form), which is the form of
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reality (Form der Wirklichkeit). Any picture must have logical form 
in common with what it depicts; every picture is a logical picture in
addition to whatever particular kind of picture it may be (for example,
a spatial one). By means of their logico-pictorial form, pictures represent
possible states of affairs, which may be called their sense. A picture may
agree or fail to agree with reality, thereby constituting its truth or falsity.
Whether any given picture is, in fact, true, cannot be decided by the 
picture itself; for this it must be compared to reality.
Wittgenstein then goes on to apply this, which has been termed, ‘pic-
ture theory’ briefly to thought and, at greater length, to propositions. 
A thought is a logical picture of facts. Only possible states of affairs 
can be thought of; what is thinkable is possible too. In a proposition, a
thought is expressed in a manner perceptible to the senses. Propositions,
too, should be understood as pictures: a proposition is a picture of
reality, a model of reality as we imagine it. By means of a correlation
between the elements of the proposition and the objects in reality, a
proposition depicts a possible state of affairs.38 If this state of affairs
actually holds, if the proposition agrees with reality, with what is the
case, it is true; if not, it is false. For a proposition to have sense, it need
not be true, nor do we need to know whether it is in order to understand
it. However, although the sense of a proposition is independent of its
being true or false, it is by no means independent of this possibility. That
is to say, the possibility of being true or false belongs to the essence of
(genuine) propositions. Propositions are, so to speak, bipolar in nature.
Consequently, the only real propositions, those that can actually say some-
thing, are factual, statements of what is or is not the case; all genuine
propositions are empirical and contingent.
The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science of
which philosophy is not a part.39 It cannot be the philosopher’s task to
add to our body of knowledge. Philosophy does not result in ‘philosoph-
ical propositions’ but rather in the clarification of propositions; it is not
a body of doctrine but an activity, aimed at setting limits to what can be
thought and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It will signify what
cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.
16 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
38 In the last analysis, the elements of a proposition are simple unanalysable names
(logically proper names), the meaning of which are the simple sempiternal objects in real-
ity for which they stand. In this way language is directly linked to reality.
39 This should not be taken too strictly. That is to say, such propositions as, for exam-
ple, ‘It is raining’, ‘The book is on the table’, etc. can hardly be considered to partake of
‘natural science’. Nevertheless, these propositions depict possible states of affairs, they
are factual, and may be true or false; they are clearly genuine propositions.
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This latter distinction, between what can be said (gesagt) and what
cannot be said but only shown (gezeigt), is an important one. Hacker
argues that
“It provides the rationale for the conception of philosophy propounded in
the Tractatus, in particular for the view that there are no philosophical
propositions, that philosophy does not aim at achieving new knowledge,
that philosophy is not a kind of science. The distinction is held to be vindi-
cated by a variety of strands interwoven in the argument of the book,
namely the bipolarity of the proposition, the picture theory of meaning, the
distinctions between a name and a variable, a material property and a for-
mal property, a genuine concept and a formal concept.”40
The distinction between genuine and formal concepts plays an important
role in demarcating the sayable and the unsayable. As we have seen, the
Tractatus presents the world as composed of facts which are conceived
as concatenations of objects. Objects have both internal and external
properties. The former determine with what kind of other objects a given
object can combine to make up a fact, constituting its ontological type.
The latter are the contingent concatenations into which the object, as 
a matter of fact, enters. Something similar holds for the names which, 
in propositions, go proxy for objects. A given name can combine with
other names to make up a proposition. The grammatical combinatorial
possibilities of a name correspond precisely to the metaphysical combi-
natorial possibilities of the object which is the meaning of the name.
And, just as the combinatorial possibilities of an object constitute its
ontological type, so too the grammatical combinatorial possibilities of a
name constitute its logico-syntactical category. Names of different objects
of the same ontological type belong to the same logico-syntactical cate-
gory; their shared syntactical form is the variable (‘colour’) of which they
are substitution instances (‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’). The variable is there-
fore the formal concept of the type. But variables cannot occur in well-
formed propositions. It makes no sense to say that red is a colour; this is
something that is shown by the logical syntax of colour names. The form
of an object cannot be described; rather, it is shown by the fact that the
name of the object is a substitution instance of a given kind of variable:
“Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only
speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say
how things are, not what they are.”41
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This is but one variation upon the theme of the picture theory of lan-
guage. As noted, the possibility of picturing depends on there being a
common feature between picture and pictured. A picture depicts reality
by means of its logico-pictorial form. But, Wittgenstein argues, no pic-
ture can depict its means of picturing, much as a painter could not paint
his way of painting, although the latter will be shown by each of his
paintings.42 This holds true for propositions as well. As pictures, they
can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they
must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it: log-
ical form. Yet, although a proposition cannot depict logical form, it does
show it. Every genuine proposition, in addition to saying what it says,
shows the logical, ineffable, form of reality:
“Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
They display it. […]
What can be shown, cannot be said.”43
To repeat, genuine proposition are descriptions of possible states of
affairs. They show how things stand if they are true and they say that
things do so stand. There are, however, other, would-be propositions
which do not picture reality. As such, they cannot or, perhaps better, do
not, say anything; they have no sense. First among these are tautologies
and contradictions. The propositions of logic, being, in Wittgenstein’s
view, tautologous, also belong to this category. Although they do not
violate the rules of logical syntax — that is to say, they are not nonsen-
sical — neither do they picture possible states of affairs. They do not say
anything; lacking sense, they can be neither affirmed nor negated. How-
ever, although they are sinnlos (lacking in sense, or senseless), they are
not unsinnig (nonsensical). They say nothing, nor do they, in fact, try to
say anything. But they do show something, namely, the (logical) struc-
ture of language and, hence, the world.
Next up are expressions which are not so much sinnlos as unsinnig.
These pseudo-propositions (Scheinsätze) not only fail to say anything,
they show nothing either; they fail to accord with the rules of logical
syntax. Within this domain of the nonsensical there are sentences which
can be seen to be nonsense (bedeutungslos) straight away, such as, for
example, ‘Socrates is identical’.44 On the other hand, there are also
18 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
42 The example is Hudson’s. (See Hudson 1975, pp. 70-71.)
43 Wittgenstein 1995, 4.121, 4.1212.
44 See Wittgenstein 1995, 5.4733.
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propositions which are not so easily recognised as nonsensical. Such
pseudo-propositions do appear to say something, and often something
very profound. This is the case, according to Wittgenstein, both with
the would-be propositions of philosophy (in its metaphysical doctrinal
guise) and expressions of value. The pseudo-propositions of philoso-
phy fail to accord with the rules of logical syntax. They employ for-
mal concepts as if they were genuine concepts in an attempt to say
what can only be shown — and what they say, being nonsense, does
not even show what they try to say. Likewise, expressions of value, 
be it ethical, aesthetical or religious, are deemed nonsensical. Propo-
sitions can express nothing that is higher. Ethics cannot be put into
words; God does not reveal himself in the world. The traditional meta-
physical subjects of God and the Good lie beyond the boundaries of
language.
In this way, a venerable philosophical tradition has, for Wittgen-
stein, come to a radical end. Any attempt to describe the essence of
things, to attain knowledge about the essential, metaphysical nature 
of the world, about God and the Good, will unavoidably transgress the
bounds of sense, misuse language, and produce nonsense. When con-
fronted with such a venture, the philosopher can only point out its non-
sensicality:
“The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to 
say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science 
— i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy — and then,
whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demon-
strate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his
propositions.”45
“All philosophy”, Wittgenstein wrote, “is a ‘critique of language’”.46 Its
main task is to set limits to what can and cannot be said. The essential
nature of representation determines these limits; beyond them, nothing
can be said. Wittgenstein’s movement along the boundaries of sense
results in the renouncing of any kind of metaphysical, religious or ethi-
cal knowledge. But, where Kant’s critique of speculative reason denied
knowledge to make room for faith, Wittgenstein’s critique of language
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46 Wittgenstein 1995, 4.0031. “Though not in Mauthner’s sense”, Wittgenstein adds.
Fritz Mauthner was an Austrian journalist and philosopher. In his philosophical work
Mauthner sets out to show the ways in which language misrepresents thought and reality.
This in direct opposition to Wittgenstein who believed that the general nature of thought
and reality is identical with the possibilities afforded by language.
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allows no such opportunity.47 Here, knowledge is denied to make room
for naught but silence: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over
in silence.”48
Yet, having read the Tractatus, one might well be left, as was Russell,
with “a certain sense of intellectual discomfort.”49 For Wittgenstein seems
unable or unwilling to heed his own decree. After all, the propositions in
the Tractatus are not clarifications of ordinary empirical propositions,
nor can they be conceived of as part of natural science. In fact, the book
is riddled with statements which are, strictly speaking, nonsensical — as
Wittgenstein himself explicitly recognised.50 These concern not only the
sphere of the philosophical but also that of the ethical and religious as,
in the latter pages of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein, far from being silent,
presents his notion of the mystical. Clearly, when he wrote the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein believed that, although one can not meaningfully discuss it,
the ineffable is manifestly there:
“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make them-
selves manifest. They are what is mystical.”51
In the remainder of this section we shall attempt to clarify a number of
aspects of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the mystical.52 We shall see
that the pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus, though nonsensical, are
nevertheless instrumental in acquiring a correct view of the world. To
attain such a view is to have solved the problem of life. It is to partake
of the mystical in which ethical, religious and philosophical elements
combine to constitute the life of knowledge.
“All propositions”, Wittgenstein wrote, “are of equal value.”53 All
genuine propositions are empirical and contingent. They can only state
20 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
47 Many authors have noticed and commented upon the relationship between Wittgen-
stein and Kant. Erik Stenius’ work Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. A Critical Exposition of 
Its Main Lines of Thought (1960) is perhaps best known for interpreting Wittgenstein’s
early thought along Kantian lines. For an insightful discussion, not only of the similarities,
but also the differences between Kant and Wittgenstein see Hacker 1986, in particular
Chapters I and VII.
48 Wittgenstein 1995, 7.
49 Wittgenstein 1995, Introduction, p. xxi.
50 See Wittgenstein 1995, 6.54.
51 Wittgenstein 1995, 6.522
52 Wittgenstein’s notion of the mystical has, in the last decades, been discussed 
in numerous publications and articles. Once again, we can only touch upon one or two
aspects, in line with our immediate goal. Consequently, our account is by no means 
complete, nor is it intended to be. It will highlight certain elements, by necessity leaving
others unexamined.
53 Wittgenstein 1995, 6.4.
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how things are in the world. But this is of complete indifference for what
is higher. In the world, no value exists:
“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything
is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists
— and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole
sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case
is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did
it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.”54
What lies outside the world, beyond the sphere of the empirical and con-
tingent, lies beyond the sphere of language too. Questions concerning
value and the meaning of life cannot be put into words. Ethics — and
aesthetics, for they are one and the same — is transcendental.55 About
the bearer of the ethical, the will, nothing can be said. As the subject of
ethical attributes, it is assigned to the metaphysical subject which “does
not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.”56 Accordingly,
the good or bad exercise of the will cannot have any influence upon 
the facts; if it can be said to alter anything at all, “it can alter only the
limits of the world, not the facts — not what can be expressed by lan-
guage.”57 Likewise, religion — which is closely connected to ethics —
has nothing to do with how things stand in the world:
“How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what
is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.”58
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. They can only say how
things happen to be — not what value they possess or what sense they
make. Such questions, constituting the problem of life, cannot be posed,
let alone answered, within the sphere of the sayable, i.e. within the sphere
of natural science:
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such that, from an ethical point of view, the consequences of our actions are unimpor-
tant (see Wittgenstein 1995, 6.422) can be encountered in Tolstoy’s work as well. In
his novel Anna Karenina the figure of Konstantin Levin draws the same conclusion:
“If goodness has a cause, it is no longer goodness; if it has a consequence — a
reward — it is also not goodness. Therefore goodness is beyond the chain of cause
and effect.”
55 See Wittgenstein 1995, 6.421.
56 Wittgenstein 1995, 5.632.
57 Wittgenstein 1995, 6.43.
58 Wittgenstein 1995, 6.432.
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“The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.
[…] We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been
answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched.”59
The problem of life can only be solved by transforming one’s whole life
and view of the world. The world “must, so to speak, wax and wane as
a whole. As if by accession or loss of meaning.”60 To solve the problem
is to see the world aright, which has nothing to do with seeing new or
previously hidden facts: “It is not how things are in the world that is
mystical.”61 Rather, it involves seeing the world as a whole in a new
light, under the form of eternity:
“To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole — a limited
whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole — it is this that is mystical.”62
It is at this point that the merit of the pseudo-propositions of the Trac-
tatus finally becomes apparent. For although they are nonsensical, they
are not worthless. Rightly understood, they are a way of indicating 
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62 Wittgenstein 1995, 6.45. Wittgenstein’s adoption of the Latin phrase sub specie
aeterni may lead one to believe he was referring to Spinoza’s Ethics in which the same
terminology can be encountered: Mens aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie
concipit. This belief may be further strengthened by the title Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
— suggested by Moore — which is an allusion to Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-
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hauer’s quotation of Spinoza he is echoing rather than the original. (See Hacker 1986, 
p. 98; McGuinness 1990, p. 299.) In fact, the influence of Schopenhauer, particularly
upon the latter part of the Tractatus, is profound. According to Hacker “it moulded
[Wittgenstein’s] conception of the metaphysical self and his notion of the mystical.” To
trace the connections between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein would, however, take us
too far. (For a detailed examination, see Hacker, 1986, Chapter IV). Also, we should not
forget that even if, as is evidently the case, Wittgenstein drew greatly upon Schopenhauer,
in the end, the notion of the mystical is married to a way of life which has a distinctly Chris-
tian flavour. As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s understanding of such a life was informed
not only by Schopenhauer but also, and even more so, by such authors as Kierkegaard,
Saint Augustine, Dostoevsky, James and, most importantly, Tolstoy. Consider, for exam-
ple, Tolstoy’s belief that the essence of religion lies in the establishing of “a relation to
the immediate issues of life, a relation to the entire infinite universe in time and space,
conceiving of it as a whole.” (Quoted in Clack 1999(a), p. 110; italics added.)
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— showing — the ineffable. The ‘language’ of the metaphysical and
mystical may act as rungs of a ladder that lead the reader to see the
world aright:
“My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has
used them — as steps — to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak,
throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world
aright.”63
In the end, the various pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus serve a
common purpose: that of enabling the reader, by transcending them, 
to gain the correct, mystical, view of the world in which philosophical,
religious and ethical aspects are incorporated. To achieve this goal is to
transform one’s life; one’s world becomes an altogether different one.
No longer will one be vexed by questions of meaning and value, nor
attempt to provide nonsensical and inadequate answers to them. The
problem of life will have been solved in the view sub specie aeterni in
which the world presents itself as a limited, meaningful, whole.64
Of course, this solution cannot be put into words. It is seen, rather, in
the vanishing of the problem. Which is why, says Wittgenstein, those to
whom the sense of life became clear have been unable to state what con-
stituted that sense.65 Nor can Wittgenstein. Consequently, in the Tracta-
tus there is no attempt at describing the meaning of life. However, in his
notebooks some indication of its content and the kind of life it engenders
can be found. In the entry for the eleventh of June, 1916, Wittgenstein
asks himself what he knows about God and the purpose of life. His
answer shows the intimate connection between ethics, religion and the
meaning of life:
“What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists. […]
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
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That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of
the world.
The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God. […]
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.
I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely
powerless.”66
In the world, such as it is, there can be no value. “The riddle does not
exist”, for, if any “question can be framed at all, it is also possible to
answer it.”67 Yet, when all possible questions have been answered, some-
thing remains problematic — the meaning of life. Enter religious belief:
“to believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end
of the matter.”68 The meaning of life we can call God; that is to say: “to
believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of
life […] to see that life has a meaning.”69 In grasping the meaning of life,
the problem vanishes. About a month later, Wittgenstein wonders whether
such a life is possible.70 We have already observed his answer: it is; it is
the life of knowledge — das Leben der Erkenntnis — “that can renounce
the amenities of the world.”71 One must make oneself “independent of the
world — and so in a certain sense master it — by renouncing any influ-
ence on happenings.”72 In doing so, one’s world becomes that of the happy
man which is altogether different from that of the unhappy man.73 The
happy man “no longer needs to have any purpose except to live. That is to
say, [he] is content.”74 He “is living in eternity and not in time.”75 For
“only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy.”76 This is to
see the world sub specie aeterni, to partake of the mystical. Its consum-
mation is the happy life, in which the purpose of existence is fulfilled.77
Can we be happy at all? Only through the life of knowledge.78
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69 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 74.
70 See Wittgenstein 1969, p. 74.
71 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 81.
72 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 73.
73 See Wittgenstein 1995, 6.43.
74 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 73.
75 Wittgenstein 1969, p. 74.
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We have travelled different routes to arrive at the same destination:
the spiritual life, the life of knowledge. This constitutes a main theme in
Wittgenstein’s earlier years, unavoidably leaving its mark upon his ear-
lier thought. There are indeed things that cannot be put into words; they
can only show themselves. And one might well say that Wittgenstein
aspired to do just that: to show the mystical. Both existentially and
philosophically — for Wittgenstein, perhaps more so than for any other
philosopher, the personal and the professional are inseparable.79
The Tractatus does not present us with an ethical theory, it does 
not seek to describe or explain the mystical. It can only, nonsensically,
gesture at it. There are no scientific (still less philosophical) answers to
the problems of life. Paradoxically, to realise this — as the Tractatus
enables one to do — is to take the first step towards answering them. In
this way “the book serves to produce a kind of docta ignorantia and
who reads it will be able to say in the right spirit: What we cannot speak
about we must pass over in silence.”80
1.1.3 The fusion of the logical and the ethical
The Tractatus is a book on logic. And in this department, its achieve-
ments are not inconsiderable. Yet, the innocent positivist reader may
well experience something of an intellectual shock when, having trav-
elled almost the whole distance, the theses he holds dear are suddenly
invalidated and that which can be said must make room for that which
can only be shown. The sting, so to speak, is in the tail. For the Tracta-
tus is also a book on the mystical. And, as Russell realised, it is quite
possibly this latter part on which Wittgenstein himself would wish to lay
most stress.81
For his earlier audience this proved unacceptable. Wittgenstein’s insis-
tence that whoever understood him would recognise the nonsensicality of
by far the larger part of the Tractatus was greeted by philosophers with
incredulous indignation.82 Frank Ramsey argued that either philosophy is
of some use, or else it is a disposition we should check. If philosophy is
nonsense, then it is useless and we should not pretend, as Wittgenstein
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80 McGuinness 1990, p. 313.
81 See Wittgenstein 1995, Introduction, p. xxii.
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did, that it is important nonsense.83 In the middle years of the 1920s,
when the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle was taking shape, those
involved commonly prefaced their work with acknowledgements to
Wittgenstein (and his Tractatus) whose authority they deeply respected.
Little were they inclined to conceive of the book which was to serve as
the basic logical structure for their new positivism as, for the main part,
nonsensical.
Worse yet were Wittgenstein’s remarks on the mystical. The meta-
physical streak of the Tractatus, ineffable or not, was anathema to the
positivist point of view. That Wittgenstein, after so resolutely showing
metaphysics to be nonsense, should proceed to let the metaphysician
back in through the backdoor of the mystical, was completely unac-
ceptable. Again we may refer to a remark made by Ramsey: “If you
can’t say it, you can’t say it — and you can’t whistle it either”.84 Neu-
rath was even more explicit: “One must indeed be silent but not about
anything”.85
It is striking that its most influential readers rejected so much of the
Tractatus and misread it so extensively. According to Janik and Toulmin,
what for Wittgenstein was to be an end to philosophy, the positivists
transformed into the coming of a new dawn:
“The logical positivists were overlooking the very difficulties about language
which the Tractatus had been meant to reveal; and they were turning an
argument designed to circumvent all philosophical doctrines into a source
of new doctrines, meanwhile leaving the original difficulties unresolved.”86
This may be somewhat overstated. True, Wittgenstein was strongly
opposed to any philosophy which seeks to construct theories: there are
no ‘philosophical propositions’. Any attempt to say what can only be
shown will unavoidably transgress the bounds of sense and result in
nonsense. But this does not mean that philosophy as such has come 
to an end. Philosophy as an activity, as the elucidation of genuine
propositions, may and must still continue. There was still a lot of work
to be done. The Tractatus was, as it were, only the first step, showing
philosophy’s actual task. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s paper Some
Remarks on Logical Form is important, as it shows Wittgenstein took
this task quite seriously.
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Still, much of what was presented under the guise of logical positivism
was inimical to Wittgenstein’s point of view. That he wanted to have 
little to do with the positivist enterprise should have been a sign on the
wall. From 1922 onward, seminars were held at the University of Vienna
to discuss the Tractatus and its wider implications, without Wittgenstein’s
participation. He remained an onlooker, and an increasingly sceptical
one. It was not until 1927 that Wittgenstein agreed to meet with Moritz
Schlick, and that a series of discussions was inaugurated. There was,
Janik and Toulmin report, “a touch of irony about these encounters from
the beginning.”87 Schlick approached the first meeting with Wittgenstein
with “the reverential attitude of a pilgrim”, returning in an “ecstatic
state”. For his part, Wittgenstein reported to Engelmann that “each of us
must have thought that the other was crazy”.88
The differences between Wittgenstein and the more fervently positivist
members of the Circle were real enough; a fact which has long since
been recognised. The ongoing publication of Wittgenstein’s papers has
led to commentators paying more and more attention to the ethico-reli-
gious aspects of the Tractatus. At times, one feels, taking us too far. If
the book was first discussed mainly as a work on logic with a mystical
appendage, now it is just as often presented as a treatise on the mystical
with some logical preliminaries. A few examples may serve to illustrate
this tendency.
For Clack, there can be little doubt that Wittgenstein’s consideration
of the mystical represents “the very heart of his early philosophy”.89
The Tractatus should be read as a modern via negativa, an attempt to
respectfully evoke the “glorious ineffability of the mystical”.90 The log-
ical doctrines of the Tractatus, so we are led to believe, were construed
with this end in view:
“The picture theory of meaning […] is designed to protect ‘what is higher’
from the perverting, all-too-human encroaches of language. [T]he Tracta-
tus sets a limit to what can be spoken (and therefore thought) in order to
respect the awesome power of the mystical.”91
Cyril Barrett should have little to disagree with. He, too, is convinced that,
for Wittgenstein, questions of value were “of the utmost importance, if
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not of sole importance.”92 The whole thrust of the Tractatus is an ethi-
cal one; it was “designed to expose the logical status of expressions of
value”.93 Clearly, the book is “not primarily a work on logic and lan-
guage [but] an ethical book”,94 and we would do well to regard its latter
pages not as a feeble appendage but, rather, as “the climax and culmina-
tion of the book”.95
Likewise, Janik and Toulmin assert that the point of the Tractatus
is an ethical one. Its final pages are by no means idle chatter. Rather,
“they are — as their position suggests — meant to be the climax of the
book.”96 The logical considerations leading up to this ethico-religious
pinnacle are merely a means to an end:
“True, without the example of Russell and Frege before him, Wittgenstein
could never have written the Tractatus as we have it. But what Frege and
Russell did for him was to provide new techniques, using which he was
able to solve his own preconceived problems. If this diagnosis is once
accepted, no difficulty remains in reconciling the “logical” and the “ethi-
cal” aspects of Wittgenstein’s ideas. The point of his book — as he him-
self was in due course to insist — is an ethical one; its formal techniques
alone are drawn from propositional logic.”97
Matthias Kroß, finally, wastes little time in affirming the ethical nature
of the Tractatus. As Wittgenstein himself indicated, its central problem
is that of the possibility of a philosophical ethics.98 From this premise,
Kroß draws a more radical conclusion. Once the primacy of the ethical
is realised, new light is shed upon the logical considerations preceding
the ethical conclusion. Indeed, no difficulty remains in reconciling the
two for, rightly viewed, they can be said to coincide:
“Die Untersuchung der Logik der Sprache koinzidiert mit einem dieser
Untersuchung zugrunde liegenden ethischen Impuls, der die Textualität des
Traktates bestimmt und die Anordnung seiner Sätze wesentlich bestimmt.
Wenn man davon ausgehen muß, daß das ‘Ethische’ den textuellen Gra-
vitationspunkt des Traktates darstellt, dann erscheinen seine einzelnen
Sätze alles andere denn als Glieder einer Argmentationskette, sondern als
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Variationen des einen Themas (nämlich des Problems der Ethik), das unter
verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten paraphrasiert wird.”99
For Kroß, the Tractatus is not a book on propositional logic, nor is it a
book about ethics. Rather, as a whole, it is a manifestation of the higher:
“Der Traktat ist Ethik”.100
We have here a number of forceful arguments advancing a more
ethically inclined reading of the Tractatus. And, of course, our own
investigation has likewise emphasised the importance of the ethico-
religious aspects of Wittgenstein’s earlier work. However, to say that
the final pages of the Tractatus, dealing with the mystical, were impor-
tant to Wittgenstein and should not be ignored is one thing. To say that
they are the key to understanding the whole of the book is something
else. The latter, more radical view, gives rise to some serious problems.
Wittgenstein, we are led to believe, entered into philosophy with his own
preconceived problems. He wanted to expose the logical status of expres-
sions of value and designed the Tractatus to do just that, using Frege’s
and Russell’s logical techniques as a means of achieving this goal.
Clearly then, his motive in writing the Tractatus was an ethical one.
These claims, however, sit uneasily with the biographical evidence, such
as there is, showing too little awareness of the way in which Wittgen-
stein’s interests changed and his thought developed during the years in
which he was working on the book. From 1911 onwards, Wittgenstein
worked hard on logic — but a logic not yet fused with ethics and religion.
In a letter to Russell dated 22 October 1915, Wittgenstein tells Russell
that he is in the process of writing the results of his work down in the
form of a treatise, with the intention of publishing it.101 This, the first
version of the Tractatus, has not survived. But, had it been published, 
it would have been, in many ways, similar to the work we now know 
as the Tractatus, but for one very important distinction: “it would have
contained almost everything the Tractatus now contains — except the
remarks at the end of the book on ethics, aesthetics, the soul, and the
meaning of life.”102 Up until 1915 then, there appears to be little or no
indication of an allegedly ethico-religious thrust underlying the book. It
was only later that the transformation of Wittgenstein’s work took place,
extending his subject matter from the foundations of logic to the essence
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of the world and ethics.103 This change was, not in the last place, occa-
sioned by Wittgenstein’s experiences during the latter years of the war.
Monk suggests that, had Wittgenstein spent the entire war behind the
lines,
“the Tractatus would have remained what it almost certainly was in its 
first inception of 1915: a treatise on the nature of logic. The remarks in it
about ethics, aesthetics, the soul and the meaning of life have their origin
in precisely the ‘impulse to philosophical reflection’ that Schopenhauer
describes, an impulse that has as its stimulus a knowledge of death, suffer-
ing and misery.”104
The war had a profound effect on Wittgenstein, as on so many others.
The implications of his technical philosophy for the ‘philosophy of life’
“were not always apparent to him, though no doubt they were uncon-
sciously part of his motivation.”105 But, in the summer of 1916, they
struck him so forcefully that they transformed his life and work.106
“But now, in this the worst summer of danger and defeat, somewhere
between the shells and the bullets, he began to feel that the two were con-
nected; that grasping the essence of propositions or of an operation had
something to do with adopting the right attitude towards life. No longer
does his attitude towards his philosophy merely exhibit the same structure
as his attitude towards life: the two are now identified. The critic of Rus-
sell is fused in the reader of Dostoevsky.”107
It would appear, then, that the Tractatus’ turn toward the mystical
occurred after Wittgenstein had already completed the larger part of his
logical investigations. This alone should cast some doubt on the more
radical claims presented above. But, of course, an historical argument
such as this presents no conclusive evidence. After all, there is no reason
why a book which began in a certain way cannot develop into something
quite different. Proponents of a more radically ethical interpretation
might well claim that, even if Wittgenstein himself realised it only at a
later date — note his letter to von Ficker — the point of the Tractatus is
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8558-05_Bloemendaal_01  01-02-2006  11:09  Pagina 30
still an ethical one. The genesis of a work need not reflect its systematic
value or meaning.
Agreed, there is the letter to von Ficker. And yes, in it Wittgenstein
does mention that the point of the Tractatus is an ethical one. But we
should not forget that when Wittgenstein wrote his letter he was in a
desperate state. Not only was his life in turmoil, but his hopes for getting
his work published were rapidly vanishing. It had already been rejected
by a number of philosophical journals, and Wittgenstein was pinning 
his hopes on von Ficker’s literary journal, Der Brenner. Surely it is not
unthinkable that Wittgenstein exaggerated slightly, emphasising the ethi-
cal dimension of the Tractatus in the hope of convincing von Ficker that
its message “was, despite appearances, consonant with the aims of Der
Brenner.”108
But let us put such speculation aside. The real question is whether 
the final ethico-religious sections of the Tractatus can be said to follow
from the logical preliminaries in such a way that they may rightfully be
said to be both their climax and realisation. This question has, for good
reasons, been answered in the negative by Hacker: 
“It is common to view the Tractatus as a complete and wholly integrated
work, and hence to think that the so-called ‘mystical’ parts of the book are
a ‘culmination of the work reflecting back on everything that went before’.
This is, I think, at best misleading, at worst erroneous. It is true that these
sections of the Tractatus are connected with what went before, although
the connection is tenuous. It is also true that they were of great importance
to Wittgenstein. It is not obvious, however, that they follow from the ear-
lier sections of the book.”109
Proponents of the more radically ethical interpretation commonly set great
store by a number of features common to the logical and the ethico-reli-
gious. First, there are no logical or ethico-religious propositions; in both
cases we are dealing with pseudo-propositions. Secondly, both logic and
ethics are transcendental. Thirdly, the logical and the ethico-religious are
both said to show themselves. These supposedly common features, so it
is argued, forge the link between the logical and the ethico-religious,
integrating Wittgenstein’s thought. On closer examination, though, the
connections turn out to be rather weak. Both what is meant by the inef-
fable as well as how it can be said to show itself are quite dissimilar for
the logical and the ethico-religious respectively.
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Although both logical and ethico-religious expressions are said to 
be pseudo-propositions this fails to bring them any closer together. For
ethico-religious pseudo-propositions bear little resemblance to their log-
ical counterparts. The propositions of logic are senseless; consisting of
tautologies or contradictions they fail to say anything. Again, categorial
necessities cannot be expressed in language because any attempt to do
so would involve the use of formal concepts and, hence, fail to accord
with the rules of logical syntax. But expressions of value
“are not tautologies or contradictions, and certainly it is not obvious that
ethical predicates are formal concepts. If they were, then it would be clear
why putative ethical propositions are pseudo-propositions. But equally, if
they were, they would incorporate variables taking a range of objects of a
given category as their values. But if ethical predicates are formal concepts,
what are their correlative ‘material’ concepts, i.e. the substitution instances
of such variables? No clue is given us as to what these might be.”110
This brings us to the second point: both logic and ethics are said to be
transcendental. Now, as far as logic is concerned, we can understand
what Wittgenstein meant. As we have seen, the reason why, in Wittgen-
stein’s view, logical form cannot be expressed in language is because it
is a necessary condition of language. This can only be shown; it cannot
be explained because any explanation would, by necessity, already be
dependent upon that which it seeks to explain. There is no such thing 
as a non-logical or illogical language. This is why Wittgenstein can say 
that language itself prevents every logical mistake: “What makes logic
a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.”111 Whether or not we
agree with Wittgenstein is another matter. At least we can understand
what he means when he says that logic is transcendental.
According to section 6.421 of the Tractatus, ethics, too, is transcenden-
tal. Here, however, it is far more difficult to discover what Wittgenstein
had in mind. It may be that, in calling ethics transcendental, Wittgenstein
meant to say no more than that ethics does not treat of the world. In the
world there can be only facts, never any value. If so, the transcenden-
tality of the ethico-religious has little in common with that of the logi-
cal. Whereas the latter is connected with the a priori status of logic, 
the ineffability of ethics, by contrast, would seem to hang “on nothing
more than the non-contingency of the ethical, a point asserted rather
than argued.”112
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On this reading, there is quite a gap opening up between the logical
and the ethico-religious. But perhaps there is more to the transcendental-
ity of ethics than first meets the eye. In his Introduction to Wittgenstein’s
Philosophy of Religion, Clack offers us two possible interpretations of the
mystical.113 The first, ‘anthropological’ interpretation emphasises human
experience; our desires, religious impulses, and ways of looking at the
world. The second ‘transcendental’ interpretation, which concerns us here,
sees Wittgenstein positing a transcendent, extra-human reality. Wittgen-
stein, we are told, is “aware of a higher order of realities” and is stress-
ing our desire “to gain communion with these realities”.114 The mystical
elements of his philosophy should be seen as “attempts to articulate
what lies beyond the world.”115
It is difficult to see how this should help us. First, within the context
of the Tractatus it is nonsense to speak of ‘a world beyond this world’ or
‘a higher order of realities’. How might a piece of nonsense explain any-
thing? Rather then clarifying the notion of the mystical, such remarks
would seem to be part of the mystical themselves. Secondly, Clack’s
interpretation neglects to address that which would seem to be the central
issue. In calling logic transcendental, rather than transcendent, Wittgen-
stein is drawing our attention to its a priori nature: logic is a condition of
the world. His notebooks show that this is what he had in mind for ethics
as well: “Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.”116 Even if
Clack is right and Wittgenstein did want to posit a higher order of reali-
ties, it still remains to be shown in what way this ‘higher order reality’
constitutes a necessary condition for the ‘lower order world’. Wittgen-
stein gives us no clue as to how this might be done.
So far, our investigation has failed to bridge the gap between the logi-
cal and the ethico-religious. A consideration of the final point does little to
change matters. For although both the logical and the ethico-religious are
said to show themselves, what this amounts to is not at all the same thing.
Logical form shows itself in propositions, or their components, regarded
as symbols. Logically necessary truths show themselves in the senseless
propositions of logic, and categorial necessities, though inexpressible in
language, are reflected in the formation rules of language.117 In what way,
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by contrast, the ethico-religious shows itself is far from clear. Certainly
there is no such thing as ‘ethical form’ which shows itself in ethical or
religious propositions. In fact, there are no such propositions. Unlike the
pseudo-propositions of logic, which are senseless, ethico-religious pseudo-
propositions are nonsensical. They fail to say anything and Wittgenstein
gives us no clue as to what, if anything, they can be said to show.
How then does the ethico-religious show itself? One possible answer
is that it shows itself in art and in action. But, even if Wittgenstein did
entertain this as a possibility, which does not seem unlikely,118 it is an
answer not found in the Tractatus. Here, the best we can do is say that
the ethico-religious shows itself as the mystical, which, as we have seen,
is best understood as realised in certain experiences or feelings. To par-
take of the mystical is to acquire the correct view of the world, the feel-
ing of the world as a limited, meaningful whole. The ethico-religious
might be said to show itself in one’s attitude to the world, in one’s life
being happy (or unhappy). But, if this is the correct answer, the differ-
ence between the ethico-religious and the logical has become all the
more pronounced.
At this point, there is one final attempt to reconcile the logical and the
ethico-religious we should consider. For although the mystical is com-
monly associated with the latter exclusively, one might well argue that
logical ineffability is as much part of the mystical as ethico-religious
ineffability.119 One might even go further and claim that Wittgenstein’s
logical investigations have a decidedly moral impact.120 Even if this
view is correct, and it has much to recommend itself, it does little to
solve our problem. It would not make the logical and the ethico-religious
any more alike. Rather, it would show the mystical to be composed of
several elements, which, though all conducive to attaining a correct view
of the world, are distinct nonetheless.
It seems we must conclude, then, that the supposedly common fea-
tures fail to point towards some essential connection between the logical
and the ethico-religious.121 There is a genuine difficulty in reconciling
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the logical and the ethical aspects of the book. This difficulty is not
resolved by claiming, as Janik and Toulmin do, that Wittgenstein did no
more than use the formal techniques, provided by Russell and Frege, to
further his own ethical goals. First, Wittgenstein did not simply borrow
these techniques. He criticised and developed them. And, pace Kroß,
there is certainly a good deal of argument here. More importantly, as we
have seen, there is no clear-cut path from the logical considerations to
the supposedly ethical conclusion. To imply, as Kroß does, that no such
path is needed because, rightly viewed, the logical and the ethical coin-
cide, is equally unsatisfactory. For although Kroß boldly states that the
remarks in the Tractatus can be taken as variations upon the theme of
the ethical, he offers little in the way of support. Nor is it at all obvious
to see how such a claim could be supported.
To be sure, there is a connection between the logical and the ethico-
religious. By far the larger part of our investigation has sought to show
the nature of this connection, affirming the importance of the ethico-reli-
gious aspects of the Tractatus for an understanding not only of the book
itself, but also of its author. Our present argument is certainly not meant
to deny this. On the contrary, I agree with Hacker that there can be no
doubt that when Wittgenstein compiled the Tractatus “it was the very
fact that the philosophy of logic which he propounded drew the limits of
language at the boundary of all that is ‘higher’ […] which seemed the
main achievement of the book.”122 To fail to realise this, is to fail to
appreciate an important aspect of Wittgenstein’s earlier thought. Be this
as it may, we should not overlook the fact that the latter ethico-religious
aphorisms do not flow from the preceding logical doctrines as naturally
as Wittgenstein may have wanted them to. The tension between the log-
ical and the mystical remains. It is a tension which Wittgenstein was not
able — nor, perhaps, inclined — to resolve. To fail to realise this, is the
opposite but equal error.
1.2 A Lecture on Ethics
Wittgenstein returned from the war a changed and troubled man. Like
many war veterans before and since, he found it almost impossible to
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adjust to peace-time conditions. In a very real sense, there was nothing
for him to return to. To take refuge in the comfort and security which his
family’s wealth could provide was out of the question. Within a month,
Wittgenstein had disposed of his entire estate. Nor could he return to
philosophy. With the completion of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed
himself “to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the
problems.”123 Everything he really had to say, he had said, and he no
longer felt any strong inner drive towards that sort of activity.124 Follow-
ing up on a resolution made a year or so earlier, during his stay as a pris-
oner of war in Italy, Wittgenstein enrolled at the Lehrerbildungsanstalt
in Vienna. Autumn 1920 saw him on his way to the small village of
Trattenbach, in Lower Austria, where he was to become a schoolmaster.
Wittgenstein entered the teaching profession with “a rather romantic,
Tolstoyan conception of what it would be like to live and work among
the rural poor.”125 As might be expected, his idealistic intentions were to
remain largely unfulfilled. Although he enjoyed better than average suc-
cess in the classroom, his eccentricity and uncompromising nature did not
endear him to the parents of his students. Having taught for several years
at three different schools, Wittgenstein gave up teaching in April 1926
and, after spending some time as a gardener at a monastery, returned to
Vienna. Here, he was asked by his sister Gretl and Paul Engelmann to
become Engelmann’s partner in the design and construction of Gretl’s
new house. Wittgenstein took a great interest in the project — so much so
that Engelmann felt that the result was not so much his but Wittgenstein’s
achievement.126 Wittgenstein approached his task with the same rigor and
austerity he applied to his philosophy.127 Bernhard Leitner has suggested
that Wittgenstein was an architect by virtue of (and not in addition to) his
being a philosopher.128 And Creegan has, somewhat cryptically, remarked
that the “connection between ethics, aesthetics, and logic expressed in the
Tractatus is made manifest in the house.”129
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Round about this time, Wittgenstein once again began to take a more
active interest in philosophy. During the years spent as a schoolmaster,
he had, by mail, discussed the Tractatus with both Russell and Frege,
and had met with Frank Ramsey, but little came of this. Wittgenstein
was certainly not inspired to start philosophising anew. The late 1920’s
saw a gradual change — Wittgenstein participated in discussions of his
work with Schlick and some carefully chosen members of his Circle,
and sought to renew contact with old acquaintances in England, reading
and commenting upon a paper by Ramsey. In March 1928, Wittgenstein
attended a lecture given by the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer.
This, in particular, seems to have sparked his philosophical interest.
Although he found much to disagree with, it may still have convinced
him that the Tractatus was after all not the final word on the subject.130
When, in the autumn of 1928, work on Gretl’s house was finished,
Wittgenstein felt he might return not only to England, but to philosophy
as well. In 1929 he did both.
Wittgenstein arrived in England in January 1929. He was received in
Cambridge in a manner both cordial and respectful. After all, unbeknownst
to himself, Wittgenstein had become “an almost legendary figure among
the Cambridge elite, and the Tractatus the centre of fashionable intellectual
discussion.”131 His official status was that of an ‘Advanced Student’ read-
ing for a Ph D, with Ramsey as his supervisor. In June of the same year,
Wittgenstein was, in fact, awarded his Ph D for his ‘thesis’ the Tractatus,
which was instrumental in his acquiring a grant, allowing him to continue
his philosophical research. In November, Wittgenstein was invited by 
C. K. Ogden, the translator of the Tractatus, to deliver a paper to ‘The
Heretics’, one of Cambridge’s societies. This lecture, the only popular
lecture Wittgenstein was ever to give, is the subject of our investigation
for the remainder of this chapter.
1.2.1 Absolute and relative value
Wittgenstein chose to speak on ethics — a topic that perhaps came as a
surprise for many. A lecture about logic, Wittgenstein felt, would have
required a course of lectures, and not an hour’s paper. Another alterna-
tive, to give a so-called popular-scientific lecture, was likewise rejected.
Such a lecture, Wittgenstein opined, is intended
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“to make you believe that you understand a thing which actually you don’t
understand, and to gratify what I believe to be one of the lowest desires of
modern people, namely the superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries
of science.”132
Instead, Wittgenstein decided to speak about something which he was
“keen on communicating” and which is “of general importance”.133 The
paper starts off with Moore’s definition of ethics as ‘the general enquiry
into what is good’ but immediately goes on to use the term in a somewhat
wider sense — which includes “the essential part of what is generally
called Aesthetics”134 — by offering a number of, according to Wittgen-
stein, more or less synonymous expressions each of which could be sub-
stituted for this definition:
“Now instead of saying ‘Ethics is the enquiry into what is good’ I could
have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is
really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the mean-
ing of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of
living.”135
The thing about all these expressions is that they can be used in two very
different senses: a trivial or relative sense, and an ethical or absolute
sense. Wittgenstein tries to clarify the difference between relative and
absolute judgements by means of the following example:
“Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and
said ‘Well, you play pretty badly’ and suppose I answered ‘I know, I’m
playing badly but I don’t want to play any better,’ all the other man could
say would be ‘Ah, then that’s all right.’ But suppose I had told one of you
a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said ‘You’re behaving like a
beast’ and then I were to say ‘I know I behave badly, but then I don’t want
to behave any better,’ could he then say ‘Ah, then that’s all right’? Cer-
tainly not; he would say ‘Well, you ought to want to behave better.’ Here
you have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one
of a relative judgment.”136
The essence of the difference is that relative judgements are mere
statements of facts — they can be rephrased in such a way that they
lose all the appearance of a judgement of value. In a relative sense, the
word ‘good’ or the word ‘right’ “simply means coming up to a certain
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predetermined standard.”137 The right road is the right road relative to 
a certain goal, the road that gets me where I want to go. Something is
good in a relative sense when it satisfies certain predetermined, contin-
gent criteria. Such expressions as these do not present any difficulties.
But in ethics we are concerned with absolute judgements of value. The
right road in an absolute sense would be the road “which everybody on
seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not
going.”138 Similarly, the absolute good would be the one “which every-
body, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring
about or feel guilty for not bringing about.”139 Here, problems do arise,
for “such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself,
what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge.”140
Wittgenstein’s argument at this point clearly echoes that of the Tractatus:
in the world there can be no value; propositions can express nothing that
is higher.141 In the Lecture on Ethics he argues:
“Now what I wish to contend is that, although all judgments of relative
value can be shown to be mere statements of fact, no statement of fact can
ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value. [A]ll the facts […] stand
on the same level and in the same way all propositions stand on the same
level. There are no propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime,
important, or trivial.”142
As it was in the Tractatus, so it remains; ethics cannot be put into
words:
“Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of
containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense.
Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express
facts.”143
The fact remains, however, that people are tempted to use such expressions
of absolute value — Wittgenstein himself among them. In an attempt to
get clear about what one tries to express by doing so, Wittgenstein sug-
gests we might investigate certain situations in which we actually use
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these expressions. Three examples are offered (the first two of which 
we have encountered before): the experience of wondering at the exis-
tence of the world, the experience of feeling absolutely safe, and the
experience of (absolute) guilt. But, again, the first thing to note is that
“the verbal expression we give to these experiences is nonsense!”144
To say that one wonders at the existence of the world or that one feels
absolutely safe is to misuse language. One can only wonder, Wittgenstein
argues, at something being the case which one can conceive not to be the
case; for example, I might wonder at the sky being blue as opposed to it
being clouded. But it makes no sense to wonder at the sky whatever it is.
Similarly, to be safe means that it is physically impossible that certain
things should happen to one, but to say that one is safe whatever hap-
pens is simply nonsense.
According to Wittgenstein “a certain characteristic misuse of our 
language runs through all ethical and religious expressions.”145 It seems
as if they are just similes; as if, when we use the word ‘right’ in an
absolute, ethical sense, what we mean, though not ‘right’ in its trivial
sense, is something similar. This is true for religious expressions as well.
For when we talk about God and when we kneel and pray to Him, “all
our terms and actions seem to be parts of a great and elaborate allegory
which represents him as a human being of great power whose grace 
we try to win, etc., etc.”146 In fact, the experiences mentioned above are
easily transferred to the religious domain:
“For the first of them is, I believe, exactly what people were referring to
when they said that God had created the world; and the experience of
absolute safety has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands
of God. A third experience of the same kind is that of feeling guilty and
again this was described by the phrase that God disapproves of our con-
duct.”147
It seems, then, as if in ethical and religious language we are constantly
using similes. But, Wittgenstein hastens to add, this does not mean that
we are any closer to the possibility of ascribing meaning to them. After
all, a simile must be a simile for something:
“[I]f I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to drop
the simile and to describe the facts without it. Now in our case as soon as
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we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stand behind
it, we find that there are no such facts. And so, what at first appeared to be
a simile now seems to be mere nonsense.”148
The road setting out from certain experiences which seem to have an
intrinsic, absolute value leads nowhere. Or, at least, it does not lead to
the expressibility of the ethico-religious. This should have been clear
right from the beginning. For, after all, to call these ‘experiences’ expe-
riences is to admit that they are facts, that they “have taken place then
and there, lasted a certain definite time and consequently are describ-
able.”149 And, bearing in mind that no statement of fact can ever be, 
or imply, a judgement of absolute value, we are forced to admit it is
nonsense to say that they have absolute value. This, says Wittgenstein,
is the paradox; “the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem 
to have supernatural value.”150 Any attempt to resolve the paradox is
rejected. It is not a matter of yet having to find the correct logical analy-
sis of what we mean by our ethical and religious expressions but, rather,
of recognising that their nonsensicality is of their very essence. They are
attempts “to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant
language.”151
In the end, then, the Lecture on Ethics reiterates the view of the 
Tractatus that any attempt to express the ethico-religious leads only to
nonsense. Still, as Monk points out, at the same time it makes clearer the
fact that Wittgenstein’s attitude to this was radically different from that
of a positivist anti-metaphysician.152 Says Wittgenstein:
“My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried
to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of 
language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely
hopeless. […] But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which
I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life
ridicule it.”153
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1.2.2 Talking nonsense
Evidently, come 1929, Wittgenstein’s account of the ethico-religious
was not too far removed from that offered some ten years earlier. Many
of the views expressed so starkly and, perhaps, mystifyingly, in the Trac-
tatus reappear somewhat more elaborately in the Lecture on Ethics. It
may well be, as Monk suggests, that Wittgenstein saw in the Lecture on
Ethics an opportunity “to try and correct the most prevalent and serious
misunderstanding of the Tractatus: the idea that it is a work written in a
positivist, anti-metaphysical spirit.”154 As such, the lecture sheds some
light on some of the more obscure remarks of the Tractatus and affirms
the importance of its ethico-religious aspects.
There are certainly a fair number of similarities between the Tractatus
and the Lecture on Ethics, the most striking of which are the close con-
nection between ethics, religion and aesthetics and the reaffirmation
of the nonsensicality of their expression in language. As we have seen
above, in the Tractatus the ethical, religious and aesthetical are inter-
twined to such an extent that to speak of one is, perforce, to speak of 
the other. In the Lecture on Ethics matters are no different. Wittgenstein
wastes little time in designating aesthetics as part of his subject matter,
and the connection between ethics and religion is established when
Wittgenstein shows how his prime examples of ethical experiences can
just as easily be described in religious terms. More importantly, ethics
and religion are one with regards to their inexpressibility; a certain char-
acteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious
expressions. Ethics, understood in this wide sense, is an attempt to go
beyond the world, beyond language. As such, it can only lead to non-
sense; it can be no science and adds nothing to our knowledge in any
sense. These theses can all be found in the Tractatus; the Lecture on
Ethics does nothing to dispute them.
Still, these similarities should not make us overlook the fact that
there are differences as well. Above all, the connection of the ethico-
religious to the Tractatus’ doctrine of saying/showing has vanished.
Like the Tractatus, the Lecture on Ethics asserts the inexpressibility of
the ethico-religious. But, unlike the Tractatus, the ineffable does not
emerge as the showable. In the Lecture on Ethics there is no talk of 
the mystical in (or as) which the ineffable shows itself. This brings us to
our second point. Both the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics maintain,
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it is true, that expressions of (absolute) value are nonsensical. But where
the former culminates, so to speak, in a vow of silence, in the closing
remarks of the Lecture on Ethics we find Wittgenstein paying his respects
to those seeking to express the inexpressible. What is more, Wittgenstein
confesses that he himself yields to the temptation of trying to do so. We
may even go further and say that, at this point in his life, Wittgenstein
considered it important not to remain silent. In conversation with Wais-
mann and Schlick he repeated the general lines of his lecture, affirming
the nonsensicality of expressions of value and remarking upon the impor-
tance of putting “an end to all the chatter about ethics.”155 Even so, for
Wittgenstein it did not follow that one should not oneself thrust against
the limits of language, and speak nonsense. Wittgenstein was particularly
fond of a passage in St. Augustine’s Confessions which reads: “Yet woe
to those who are silent about you because, though loquacious with ver-
bosity, they have nothing to say.”156 In conversations with Waismann and
Schlick, Monk reports, the text was translated, rather freely, as: ‘What,
you swine, you want not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense,
it does not matter!’157 One may readily agree with Monk that
“These free translations, even if they fail to capture Augustine’s intended
meaning, certainly capture Wittgenstein’s view. One should put a stop to
the nonsense of chatterboxes, but that does not mean that one should refuse
to talk nonsense oneself.”158
Of course, if one does talk nonsense, one is indeed speaking for oneself.
What one has is not some general description or explanation, still less an
ethical theory — but, rather, if one may say so, a personal confession. In
1930 Wittgenstein remarked to Waismann:
“At the end of my lecture on ethics, I spoke in the first person. I believe
that is quite essential. Here, nothing more can be established, I can only
appear as a person speaking for myself. For me the theory has no value. A
theory gives me nothing.”159
Perhaps Wittgenstein’s tentative approval of speaking nonsense helps
explain his interests in the actual circumstances in which one is inclined
to use such expressions of absolute value. For this interest points to 
a final important difference between the Tractatus and the Lecture on
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Ethics. Whereas in the former Wittgenstein argues, as it were, from a log-
ical point of view, in the latter examples play an important role — and
not just an illustrative but, rather, a demonstrative one. They provide a
context which is instrumental in making the point Wittgenstein is trying
to establish.160 This attention to the surroundings in which language is
being put to use, as well as the use of examples as a methodological tool,
constitutes a step away from the philosophy of the Tractatus. And a
promise for what was yet to come. For precisely these issues would play
a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The consequences this
had for his discussions of religious belief is the topic of the following
chapter.
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2. THE LATER PERIOD
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, as elaborated in the Philosophical Inves-
tigations, constitutes a decisive break with the central doctrines of the
Tractatus. Although there are certainly continuities between the earlier
and later thought, it is safe to say that, in general, the two philosophies
represent fundamentally different philosophical methods and ways of
viewing things.1 Our examination of the Investigations in the first part of
this chapter will highlight some of these differences. For the purposes of
our discussion, however, one crucial difference should be mentioned
from the outset. As far as the ethico-religious is concerned, the earlier
Wittgenstein argued, we had best remain silent. Nevertheless, although
nothing can be said, something can be shown; religion enters into the
Tractatus through ‘the backdoor of the mystical’. By contrast, the later
Wittgenstein does not seek to integrate the ethico-religious into his phi-
losophy. That is to say, the Investigations does not contain any discussion
of religion or religious belief, nor, for that matter, of ethics or aesthetics.2
Fortunately, there are other sources to which one may turn for an indica-
tion of how the later Wittgenstein would have applied his philosophical
methods to religious belief, as well as of the results he thought should
flow from doing so: the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough and the
Lectures on Religious Belief. These are discussed in the second and third
part of this chapter.
2.1 Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein’s return to England in 1929 marked the beginning of a pro-
longed period of philosophical activity at Cambridge. Until the outbreak of
the Second World War, Wittgenstein worked, more or less uninterrupted,
1 See Hacker 2001, p. 4.
2 As to religious belief, the most the Investigations has to offer is the inclusion 
of ‘praying’ in a list of examples meant to demonstrate the multiplicity of possible lan-
guage-games (see Wittgenstein 1994, I, 23), and the parenthetical remark “Theology as
grammar” in paragraph 373. While these remarks are interesting — their relevance is
discussed below — they obviously cannot be said to constitute a discussion of the nature
of religious belief.
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on his philosophy. The early 1930s show him moving away from his
earlier thought, dismantling the philosophical vision of the Tractatus.
Slowly but surely, a new philosophical method, and a new conception 
of language and the relation between language and reality emerged. Suc-
cessive efforts to compose a book elaborating his transformed philoso-
phy culminated in the composition of the Philosophical Investigations,
published posthumously in 1953.3
The Investigations constitutes the most comprehensive exposition of
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Like the Tractatus, it was composed by
the repeated rephrasing and rearranging of paragraphs from notebooks.
Despite the similar method of composition, the Investigations stands 
in stark contrast to its predecessor, both in form and content. The Trac-
tatus was possessed by a vision of ‘the crystalline purity of logic’;4 a
purity reflected in the austere style of the book, in its carefully num-
bered sequence of aphorisms. The Investigations, by contrast, provides
a string of paragraphs in a conversational tone, rich in illustrations and
metaphor, reflecting Wittgenstein’s sharpened awareness of the diver-
sity of our forms of language. Where the Tractatus sought to reveal the
ineffable essence of reality, the Investigations hopes to disentangle the
knots in our understanding by having us return to ‘the rough ground’,5
to a careful weighing of familiar linguistic facts.
In preparing the Investigations for publication, Wittgenstein toyed
with the idea of publishing his old thoughts together with the new ones.
He was convinced that “the latter could be seen in the right light only by
contrast with and against the background of [his] old way of thinking.”6
Not as if the Investigations were merely a reformulation of the Tractatus;
a slight adjustment to an otherwise sound philosophy. On the contrary,
Wittgenstein remarks that he was forced to recognise grave mistakes in
his earlier book.7 As noted above, this does not mean that there are no
continuities between the later and the earlier philosophy. Indeed, it may
be argued that many of the fundamental insights that informed the Trac-
tatus are retained in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Nevertheless, “the
insights that are thus retained undergo transformation, are relocated in
the web of our conceptual scheme, and are differently elucidated, and
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quite different consequences derive from them.”8 Wittgenstein may well
have been right that it is only over and against his earlier ‘mistakes’ that
the merit of his later thought can come to the fore.
In what follows, we discuss some of the main themes and key con-
cepts of the Philosophical Investigations, highlighting both divergence
from and continuity with Wittgenstein’s earlier philosophy. Once again,
our aim cannot be to provide a comprehensive analysis and evaluation.
Rather, our investigation seeks to provide a rough sketch of Wittgen-
stein’s position, against the background of which his later writings on
matters religious can be more fruitfully examined.
2.1.1 The nature of philosophy
Already in the Notebooks 1914-1916 Wittgenstein sharply distinguishes
philosophy from natural science. Philosophy is not some kind of science,
distinguished from it merely by, e.g., the generality of its subject matter.
Nor should philosophy be regarded as the queen — or, for that matter,
the underlabourer — of science, in the sense that it could provide the
natural sciences with their foundation or ultimate unification. Truth be
told, philosophy is of little practical use to the scientist; it “gives no pic-
tures of reality and can neither confirm nor confute scientific investiga-
tions.”9 The Tractatus, as we have seen, upholds this distinction between
philosophy and natural science. It advocates a radically non-cognitive
conception of philosophy, denying that there can be any philosophical
propositions, any philosophical knowledge. Rather than an attempt to
add to our body of knowledge, philosophy should be an activity of elu-
cidation by means of analysis.
Paragraphs 89 through 133 of the Philosophical Investigations pro-
vide the most detailed statement of Wittgenstein’s later understanding 
of the nature of philosophy. They show that, despite the transformation
his philosophy underwent, in this area at least, Wittgenstein’s views
remained relatively stable. The non-cognitive conception of philosophy
evinced in the Notebooks 1914-1916 and advocated by the Tractatus
was certainly modified and deepened, but never abandoned. During the
whole of his philosophical career Wittgenstein remained convinced that
philosophy does not so much contribute to human knowledge but to
human understanding — an understanding of our forms of language. If
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anything, this conviction is more strongly expressed in his later work
than in his earlier.10
Philosophical problems, the later Wittgenstein argues, arise out of a
misunderstanding of our forms of language. This is not because there
is anything wrong with our ordinary, everyday language. The author
of the Investigations agrees with the author of the Tractatus that, from 
a logical point of view, “every sentence in our language is ‘in order as it
is’.”11 Language is, nonetheless, deeply deceptive. Important differences
in kinds of expression, their role and use, are concealed by superficial
similarities of form; different grammatical structures may have the same
use whereas, often enough, the same grammatical structure is put to a
wholly different use. What confuses us, Wittgenstein argues,
“is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet
them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so
clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!”12
Unfortunately, rather than looking at the application of our language, at
the use made of words, the philosopher is mesmerised by their form.13
The ensuing confusions may take many shapes and forms. All kinds 
of similes — or ‘pictures’ — absorbed into the forms of our language
produce false appearances and lead us astray.14 For example, we mistake
certain experiences contingently related to our understanding of expres-
sions with understanding itself and start theorising about the relation 
of these mental occurrences to the spoken word.15 Projecting our forms
of representation onto reality we start asking such questions as ‘What is
time really?’ and ‘How can I ever really know what someone else’s pain
is like?’.16
Simply put, philosophy’s task is not so much to replace imperfect 
theories of understanding by better ones, nor to attempt to answer such
questions but, rather, to make us stop constructing such theories and ask-
ing such questions in the first place. This can be achieved be describing
those parts of language that prove troublesome. Philosophy’s task is that
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form of words.”
14 See Wittgenstein 1994, I, 112-115.
15 See Wittgenstein 1994, I, 143-155.
16 See Wittgenstein 1994, I, 104.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_01  01-02-2006  11:09  Pagina 48
of obtaining an Übersicht, a perspicuous representation, of a particular
segment of our language:
“A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a
clear view of the use of our words. — Our grammar is lacking in this sort of
perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding
which consists in ‘seeing connections’. […] The concept of a perspicuous
representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of
account we give, the way we look at things.”17
Philosophy, then, is essentially descriptive. It aims to describe (parts of)
our language in order to command a clear view of the use of words 
— of the grammar which constitutes their meaning. In this manner it
seeks to resolve our philosophical perplexity by dissolving it. Clearly
then, it would be misguided to think of philosophy as a kind of science.
For one thing, philosophy is not a theoretical enterprise. The correct philo-
sophical method is not hypothetico-deductive but, rather, descriptive.
Referring to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein says that “It was true that our
investigations could not be scientific ones.” He continues:
“And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation,
and description alone must take its place.”18
Philosophical problems are conceptual rather than empirical in nature.
They arise out of our existing forms of language. Hence, they can be 
neither solved nor advanced by new information or scientific discovery,
but only “by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such
a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to
misunderstand them.”19 Thus, whereas science searches for new truths,
within philosophy there are no discoveries. Philosophical analysis merely
reminds us of what we already knew, of the rules by which we proceed
in applying language. Philosophy sets to work within the realm of the
grammar of our language; there is nothing new to be revealed. For any-
thing that is, in fact, unknown is irrelevant; it cannot play any role in our
rule-governed practice of using language. Certainly, we can invent new
rules, but it makes no sense to speak of discovering them:
“The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arrang-
ing what we have always known. […] Philosophy simply puts everything
before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything
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lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for exam-
ple, is of no interest to us. […] The work of the philosopher consists in
assembling reminders for a particular purpose.”20
Finally, whereas science is progressive, solving old problems and mov-
ing on to new ones, philosophy, by comparison, is static. Of course,
certain philosophical methods can be ruled out as illegitimate; certain
philosophical doctrines can be shown to be nonsense. Philosophical
problems can be (dis)solved. One can call this progress, if one pleases.
But if by progress “we mean the accumulation of knowledge, discovery
of new facts and construction of novel theories to explain them, then
there is no progress in philosophy.”21 There is no such thing as philo-
sophical knowledge, there are no philosophical propositions. Philo-
sophical analysis does nothing more than remind us of what we already
knew: the rules of grammar. The only possible philosophical proposi-
tions would be expressions of these rules, for example, ‘Every rod has
length’, ‘Human beings have bodies’, ‘We know things happened thus
and so because we remember them so occurring’, and so on. But this is
news from nowhere; ‘a synopsis of trivialities’,22 known long and well
before the philosopher came to the scene. If one were to advance such
propositions as philosophical theses, one would never be able to debate
them; everyone would agree to them.23 Although cognitive claims may
well be the subject of philosophical investigation, they can never be its
result. In other words, strictly speaking, philosophy is not a cognitive
discipline. 
Clearly, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy adheres to the radical non-
cognitivism advocated by the Tractatus. However, there is a crucial dif-
ference one should not overlook. Although the Tractatus deprives phi-
losophy of the possibility of stating essential truths, these very truths
were held to be shown by the well-formed propositions of a language.
To arrive at the correct logical point of view would include apprehension
and appreciation of what cannot be said but shows itself, including the
truths of the ethico-religious. While the Investigations agrees that there
is no philosophical knowledge, it also rejects the Tractarian doctrine of
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‘linguistically manifest ineffabilia’.24 The correct logical point of view 
is no longer held to include the disclosure of the metaphysically neces-
sary structure of the world.25 It consists of no more than the clarity that
comes from a perspicuous representation of our forms of language. By
providing a descriptive account — an Übersicht — of (that part of) the
language that confuses us, our problems can be dissolved. This is the
only real achievement the philosopher may hope for — that of dissolv-
ing our philosophical problems, that of curing us of talking nonsense:
“The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace, so that
it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.”26
The above remark, which marks the end of the sequence of paragraphs
dealing primarily with the nature of philosophy, may make it appear 
as if philosophy’s task were wholly negative. An impression which is
only strengthened by the fact that Wittgenstein sometimes compared his
philosophical method of clarification to psychoanalysis.27 Philosophy is
a cure for diseases of the understanding. Philosophical problems require,
not a resolution, but therapy: “The philosopher’s treatment of a question
is like the treatment of an illness.”28
To be sure, it cannot be denied that the Investigations has a destructive
aspect. Philosophy, in its therapeutic guise, is concerned with dispelling
philosophical illusion, with the dissolution of philosophical confusion.
However, the Investigations also has a complementary constructive aspect
to it. After all, when we are cured of a disease, surely this is a positive
achievement. That is to say, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is also a
quest for a surveyable representation of segments of our language. Such
surviews may not contribute to human knowledge. But they do achieve
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a further understanding — a philosophical understanding “of our forms
of representation and their articulations, an overview of the forms of our
thought.”29
2.1.2 Grammar, language-game, form of life
The previous section discussed Wittgenstein’s conception of the nature
and task of philosophical enquiry. This section seeks to elucidate some
of the results of Wittgenstein’s descriptive approach by means of an
examination of the concepts of grammar, a language-game, and a form
of life. Not only do these concepts play a crucial role in the Investiga-
tions, they have also taken centre stage in discussions and applications
of Wittgenstein’s writings on religious belief. We head off our investiga-
tion by taking a closer look at the notion of grammar. Next, we shall ask
the question ‘What is a language-game?’, to arrive finally at the concept
of a form of life. One should bear in mind, however, that these concepts
are interconnected, the one presupposing and informing the other; they
cannot be strictly separated. Discussing them one after the other is some-
what artificial and will, by necessity, suffer from some repetition.
Grammar
One of the fundamental principles informing Wittgenstein’s earlier
thought is that language functions as a calculus. Language is a logico-
syntactical system of rules which, together with assignments of meaning
to the indefinables, determines the meaning of every well-formed sen-
tence of the language. In support of this view, Wittgenstein often drew
upon the analogy of language and chess. By means of this analogy many
aspects of the rule-bound character of linguistic activity may be revealed.
For example, like the rules of chess, the rules of language are, rightly
understood, autonomous and arbitrary. Furthermore, the use of a word in
an utterance is like the use of a chess piece in a move. Again, the mean-
ing of a word is analogous to the powers of a chess piece. And so on.
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During the mid-thirties, however, Wittgenstein came first to criticise,
and later abandon the calculus model. This is not to say that every 
feature of the model was jettisoned; certain analogies remain valid. But
Wittgenstein started more strongly to emphasise the disanalogies. For
one thing, he abandoned the notion, inspired by the calculus model,
that behind the motley appearance of language some rigid, precise, and
definite order must be hidden. At the same time, chess is joined by less
rigid games, such as ring-a-ring o’ roses, as an object of comparison
with language.
To repeat, not every insight derived from the calculus model of 
language was abandoned. In particular, Wittgenstein never gave up on
the idea that language is rule-guided. To speak a language, so he main-
tained, is to engage in a rule-guided activity. Using and understanding
language involves mastery of techniques concerning the application of
rules. As in the calculus model, questions about rules are closely con-
nected to questions about meaning: “there exists a correspondence
between the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘meaning’.”30 In the Investigations,
Wittgenstein states that “the meaning of a word is its use in the lan-
guage.”31 He presents this view as opposed to what he calls a primitive
conception of language in which, in brief, words are treated as stand-
ing for properties or objects to which they are correlated by means of
ostensive definition. It follows that the meaning of a particular word or
expression is the object for which it stands.
Wittgenstein spends considerable time criticising this ‘theory of mean-
ing’. He points out, for instance, that certainly not all words are used to
signify objects.32 In fact, people do many different things with language.
There are many different types of words, different uses of language. By
means of illustration, Wittgenstein employs a number of similes and
metaphors. The best known of these is probably that in which he com-
pares words to the tools in a toolbox:
“Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-
driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. — The functions of words
are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”33
It is interesting, Wittgenstein says, to compare the multiplicity of tools
in language and of the ways they are used with what logicians have said
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about the structure of the language. Including, he adds, the author of 
the Tractatus.34 In order to grasp the meaning of words, we should not
look for objects for which they supposedly stand but instead study the
diversity of their functions in language. Assertions about meaning are
equivalent to assertions about use; consequently, the meaning of a word
can be shown by purely linguistic-analytical investigations into the use
of a word.
Having said this, there is of course the question as to what constitutes
the use of a word. Clearly, Wittgenstein cannot understand ‘the use of 
a word’ as the totality of all uses or modes of use of a word in a lan-
guage. After all, a word can have several meanings, whereas there can
be only one totality of uses. Again, ‘use’ cannot refer to any specific use
of a word. We are continually using words in new combinations, con-
structing new expressions and propositions with them; the list would be
endless. Furthermore, the accidental and false uses of a word must be
excluded. When a parrot calls out its name we would certainly hesitate
to call this meaningful conversation. Again, when one uses a word
falsely, this does not constitute a new meaning of the word. Rather, this
(mis)use is meaningless.
The latter point in particular pushes us in the right direction. Wittgen-
stein’s view on meaning and use must be understood normatively. Among
the myriad of individual uses of a word, a number of regular modes 
of use can be distinguished. There are, in other words, certain rules
that underlie the various modes of use. In equating meaning and use,
Wittgenstein always thinks of the modes of use of a word or sign as laid
down by rules.35 These rules are standards for the correct use of an
expression which determine its meaning. Wittgenstein used the term
‘grammar’ to denote these constitutive rules of language (as well as
philosophical investigation or tabulation of these rules). He speaks of the
grammar of words, expressions, phrases, propositions, and so forth.36 To
give the meaning of a word or expression is to specify its grammar. The
philosopher’s main task is to clarify grammar, to provide an Übersicht.
A task which is by no means easy, for, as noted above, the grammar of
a certain expression may be far from perspicuous.
Now, in assessing Wittgenstein’s normative view of language, there
are a number of misunderstandings which must be avoided. The first has
to do with the nature of a rule (functionality), the second with what it is
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to know and follow a rule (practices), the third with whether the rules of
grammar can be justified (the autonomy of language).
a) Functionality — Wittgenstein’s understanding of rules could be
termed a functional one. The logical status of any expression is due, 
not to its linguistic form, but to the way it is used. Whether a certain 
sentence expresses a rule depends on its role or function within our lin-
guistic practice. A grammatical proposition — i.e. the expression of a
rule — functions as a standard of correctness; it plays an active role in
our linguistic practices. That is to say, it is used normatively: to explain,
justify and criticise uses of words.
Rules, thus understood, do not form some a priori realm which is
given once and for all and which provides the foundations of our linguis-
tic practices. Rather, it is the other way round: the rules are grounded 
in our linguistic practices. Again, as their function is the determining
factor, rules may take various shapes or forms. The domain of the gram-
matical comprises not only definitions, but also explanations of mean-
ing, colour-charts and conversion-tables, ostensive definitions, explana-
tions by exemplification, etc.
b) Practices — It might be objected that Wittgenstein goes too far in
stressing the importance of rule-following in language. Even in Wittgen-
stein’s very liberal sense, rules are not that prominent in our everyday
linguistic activities. After all, it is not as if we ‘check the rules first’
before uttering a sentence. Furthermore, if knowledge of all the rules
were required for the ability to speak a language, no-one would be able
to speak at all. For there must be an enormous amount of rules; surely
no man is able to learn and retain all these. Besides, when did we ever
learn the rules?
These objections, however, should not bother Wittgenstein to any
great extent. He does not insist that rules are essential to learning a lan-
guage, nor that we actually consult the rules before engaging in conver-
sation. What counts is that our linguistic practices can be characterised
as rule-governed. Not because, in fact, we have learnt all the rules and
continually consult them, but because we could explain, criticise and
justify our use of words by reference to rules,37 and do so when the
occasion demands it. Rules play a role in a host of practices: in the
THE LATER PERIOD 55
37 This is somewhat misleading. In the practice of explaining, criticising, justifying,
etc., our use of words we are not ‘pointing’ to the rules — a turn of phrase which suggests
that we might imagine these rules as lying beyond these practices, in some Platonic realm
of their own. That is to say, in explaining a word we are not so much referring to a rule.
Rather, the explanation as such functions as a rule.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_01  01-02-2006  11:09  Pagina 55
teaching of a language, in the correction of mistakes, in explaining, crit-
icising, evaluating, and justifying. Whether someone ‘knows the rules of
the game’ is shown by how he plays the game: by whether he makes the
right moves, by how, when challenged, he justifies his moves, by how
he explains the game to others. In other words, the connection between
rule and use is internal and normative, in that understanding an expres-
sion is manifested both in the ability to correctly explain it (i.e. citing a
rule) and in correctly applying it.
c) The autonomy of language — We have seen how, according to
Wittgenstein, a certain use of words can be justified by reference to cer-
tain grammatical rules. It seems only natural that the next question should
be how these rules themselves can be justified. A tempting answer to this
question, one to which the earlier Wittgenstein was clearly drawn, is that
the rules of our language can be justified by reference to reality: language
mirrors the essence of the world. For example, the rules determining the
meaning of, say, the word ‘gold’ should be formulated by reference to the
‘reality of gold’; they should express the essence of gold. Clearly then,
the more we learn about the nature of reality, the better our rules can be
formulated. Captivated by such a view, philosophers and scientists alike
may commence the search for an ideal language, a language which repre-
sents the structure of reality more accurately than ordinary language can.
The later Wittgenstein rejects any such attempts, arguing incessantly
against the view that language should mirror the essence of the world.
Language is autonomous; our grammar is arbitrary, in this sense that it
does not pay heed to any putative essence or form of reality; it cannot be
said to be (metaphysically) correct or incorrect. If there is to be such a
thing as ‘essence’, it is expressed by grammar, for it is grammar which
determines “what kind of object something is.”38
Once again, we must be careful not to misconstrue Wittgenstein’s
remarks. Calling language autonomous does not mean that we could not
invent or refine language for a specific purpose. We can, and often we
do.39 But language as a whole is not an instrument for a particular pur-
pose specifiable outside language, and it is in this sense that language is
autonomous:
“The rules of grammar may be called “arbitrary”, if that is to mean that the
aim of grammar is nothing but that of language.”40
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Again, to say that our grammar is arbitrary is not to say that it is irrele-
vant, easily alterable or a matter of individual choice. Quite the contrary,
the constitutive rules of language are intimately connected to our lives.
Language is embedded in a form of life.41
What it does mean is that it makes no sense to suppose that we might
justify our grammar by reference to reality. One cannot call a rule ‘true’
or ‘false’; rather, it is the rules which allow us to distinguish between
true and false, which show us what this distinction amounts to. The
essential structure of reality, so desperately sought after by the meta-
physician, is, to Wittgenstein’s mind, nothing but a ‘shadow’ of gram-
mar. Grammar constitutes our ‘form of representation’, laying down
what counts as a description of reality. Thus, from Wittgenstein’s later
point of view, the Tractarian claim that the world consists of facts, 
not of things amounts to no more than the grammatical statement that
what counts as a description of the world is a list of facts, rather than a
list of things.
Language-game
Although the term ‘language-game’ is introduced at a relatively late 
time — its first occurrence is in the Blue Book, compiled in the early
thirties — it has a clear ancestry in Wittgenstein’s earlier thought.
More specifically, its origins can be traced back to the calculus model
of language and the analogy between chess and language. As we have
seen, Wittgenstein did not completely abandon these earlier ideas. For
one thing, the notion that language is a rule-guided activity remained 
his for the rest of his life. Furthermore, the analogy between chess 
and language continued to play an important role in Wittgenstein’s later
work. Not so much because language is like chess, but, rather, because
chess is a game and the analogy between games and language is a very
fruitful one. It can exemplify many of the features of language as dis-
cussed above. For example, like the rules of language, the rules of a
game need not always take the same form. Again, just as applying an
expression correctly counts as a criterion for understanding it, so too
making the correct moves in a game counts as a criterion for knowing
the rules of the game. Further, like the rules of language, the rules of a
game are autonomous. It is the rules which decide what is and what is
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not a valid move. By changing the rules one will not get nearer to the
‘essence’ of the game, one will simply end up playing a different game.
Perhaps most importantly, Wittgenstein gave up the idea that there must
be some uniform structure underlying all forms of language. Language
differs from a calculus in that it does not have a uniform and well defined
structure. Such concepts as ‘language’, ‘proposition’, ‘word’, etc. are
vague concepts. They embrace many different phenomena which are held
together by certain analogies and which are not uniformly describable:
“Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes
us use the same word for all, — but that they are related to one another in
many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these rela-
tionships, that we call them all ‘language’.”42
Once again, this can be brought out by means of the analogy between
language and games. When one compares a number of games to each
other — for instance: chess, tennis, ring-a-ring o’ roses — one will be
hard pressed to find any single feature they all share. Rather, one finds a
“complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”.43
These similarities Wittgenstein calls ‘family resemblances’44 and, just 
as the variety of games form a family called ‘games’, so too the variety
of linguistic phenomena may be said to make up one big family called
‘language’.
All this, the realisation of the flaws in the calculus model, together
with the emergence of the game analogy in the broader sense, eventually
led to the development of the concept of a language-game (Sprachspiel).
To repeat, the term ‘language-game’ is first introduced in the Blue Book:
“I shall in future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call
language-games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which
we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language-
games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use 
of words. The study of language-games is the study of primitive forms of
language or primitive languages.”45
At this stage of the development of the notion of a language-game
Wittgenstein seems to suggest an analytic-genetic method. Language-
games are conceived of as the forms of language with which a child
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8558-05_Bloemendaal_01  01-02-2006  11:09  Pagina 58
begins to make use of words. By analysing these primitive forms of
language we can come to understand our more complex, mature use of
language.
Surprisingly, although this method is suggested in the Blue Book, it 
is not employed. And, when something like a ‘language-game method’
does emerge in Wittgenstein’s writings, it is a far cry from that con-
ceived of in the Blue Book. The first extended employment of the method
can be seen in the Brown Book (1934-35) — but at this point the ana-
lytic-genetic approach has already been abandoned, and it is no part of
the conception of a language-game that it is a form of language with
which a child begins to make use of words.46 Rather, Wittgenstein is
busily inventing language-games which are to serve as objects of com-
parison. This is the approach dominating the Brown Book, perhaps to the
point of tedium.
In the Philosophical Investigations the language-game method has
fully matured and is employed to gain a clear view of our use of language.
By studying “the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of applica-
tion [i.e. language-games] one can command a clear view of the aim and
functioning of the words.”47 Clearly, ‘language-game’ here refers not so
much to our actual linguistic practices but to fictional practices. Such
‘clear and simple language-games’ serve as ‘objects of comparison’.48
They are supposed to shed light on our actual use of language by way of
bringing into sharp relief some of the latter’s features. However, the term
‘language-game’ is not used solely in this capacity. Wittgenstein also dis-
cusses actual linguistic activities in terms of language-games. And at one
point he even calls the whole of our language the language-game. Let us
take a closer look at these various usages.
First, ‘language-game’ may refer to primitive forms of language with
which a child begins to make use of words. As we have seen, this is the
way in which Wittgenstein first introduced the notion in the Blue Book.
This use of the term, however, plays no role in the Philosophical Inves-
tigations. One of the important features of the (imaginary) language-
games in the Investigations is that we are asked to conceive of them 
as ‘complete’, something which cannot be said of the language-games
children use in learning language.49 If we are to solve our philosophical
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puzzlement about our language by comparing it to primitive forms of
language we should not look towards these child-learning situations. For
these are simply fragments of a larger whole which is itself the source 
of our puzzlement. In the Investigations, the emphasis rightly shifts to
(imaginary) primitive languages and away from how a child learns a part
of our language.50
Secondly, then, ‘language-game’ refers to these fictional primitive
languages. It is very important to realise that these are not intended as
‘first approximations’ of our actual linguistic practices.51 They are not
meant to capture their reality. Rather, as noted above, they are set up 
as objects of comparison “which are meant to throw light on the facts 
of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilari-
ties.”52 These invented language-games may display various features
which are given varying prominence, depending upon the philosophical
purposes at hand.
Thirdly, ‘language-games’ may designate fragments of our actual lin-
guistic practices. Now, Wittgenstein maintained that, for the purposes of
understanding our own concepts, nothing is more important than the
construction of fictitious ones. Nevertheless, after the Investigations, he
focuses more on our actual linguistic activities, describing them against
the background of our non-linguistic practices. In the same vein, in 
the Investigations, Wittgenstein speaks of our language-games with such
words as, for example, ‘game’, ‘thought’, ‘pain’, etc.; as well as of lan-
guage-games surrounding certain linguistic activities such as, for exam-
ple, praying, lying, giving orders and obeying them, etc.; and also of
more complex activities which are not merely speech-acts, although lan-
guage does play a role, such as, for example, constructing an object from
a description, forming and testing a hypothesis, and so on.
This use of the notion of a language-game — as designating an actual
or natural part of our language — plays a fairly prominent role in 
the Investigations. Unfortunately, it is also this use which is most likely
to engender misunderstanding. Taking one’s cue from Wittgenstein’s
designation of philosophy as descriptive, one might try to tackle the
question as to what, precisely, Wittgenstein would have us describe. It is
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tempting to answer this question by invoking the notion of a language-
game. In the course of their activities people engage in numerous lan-
guage-games. Although these language-games are connected in a myriad
of ways they are nevertheless distinct units. The best way to think of them
is as “partial language systems, functional entities or applicational con-
texts that constitute part of an organic whole”.53 Our task is to describe
these entities so that the rules underlying them — their grammar — can
be laid bare.
On such a reading, the notion of a language-game starts to play a 
theoretical, or even a metaphysical role.54 Language-games are construed
as entities which are, so to speak, already there. They constitute the
given, the philosophical data. All that needs to be done is to describe
them. Thus, for example, Specht suggests that by creating the concept of
a language-game, “Wittgenstein analyses language into definite concrete
entities that can be examined in relative isolation.”55 Haikola is even
more explicit; in his view a language-game is “to be compared with a
thing. Things and language-games exist and can be described.”56
There can be little doubt that such suggestions misconstrue Wittgen-
stein’s notion of a language-game. Wittgenstein did not coin the term 
to name certain (metaphysical) entities he had discovered. Language-
games are not entities which are given independently and which we 
can then describe — employing well-known methods — as we would
describe objects. It would be better to say that the notions of ‘descrip-
tion’ and ‘language-game’ are internally related, i.e., it is by its employ-
ment as a tool in the course of a philosophical description that the
notion of a language-game gets its sense. Henry Leroy Finch expresses
this quite clearly:
“The shift from logical pictures to language-games is a shift from the
requirement of final analysis (logical simplicity) to an instrument of descrip-
tion. Ordinary language cannot be analyzed into language-games (as it can
be analyzed into elementary propositions in the Tractatus); it can only be
analyzed by means of language-games. While elementary propositions were,
in a certain sense, internal to ordinary language, or presupposed by it, lan-
guage-games remain external to language, merely to be used to see more
clearly the way language works.”57
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Language-games have no ontological status; they are not themselves
facts to be explained. Rather, they are introduced as a heuristic device,
which may be employed pretty much as we choose, to bring out simi-
larities and dissimilarities in the functionings of language to prevent 
us from being misled by apparent similarities and apparent dissimilari-
ties.58 Misapprehension of this fact misconstrues Wittgenstein’s philo-
sophical method and leads to all sorts of misconceptions. For one
thing, it casts doubt on Wittgenstein’s designation of his philosophy as
descriptive. Specht, for example, argues that the fundamental concepts
of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, such as that of a language-game,
expose Wittgenstein’s commitment to “a whole theory of language […]
which goes far beyond what could have been discovered by analytical
description.”59 But, as Finch rightly points out, language-games are not
part of any theory of language; they are simply one way of looking at
language as a phenomenon.60
The hypostatization of the concept of a language-game has also led 
to the demand for a more precise definition which will allow us to for-
mulate criteria of individuation for the diversity of language-games.
However, once it is understood that language-games are not distinct
entities it should become obvious that such an endeavour is pointless. As
an instrument of description, Wittgenstein employs the notion of a lan-
guage-game at different levels of generality. What counts as the same or
a different game depends on the level concerned, and on all levels there
will be borderline cases.61 In other words, the vagueness of the concept
is a precondition of its applicability;62 indeterminacy is an essential 
part of Wittgenstein’s methodology. Creegan eloquently drives the point
home when he says that if language-games are to be accepted as “more
broadly useful ways of grasping the world and thus have continued life,
they cannot be sclerosed into schemata of distinct regions, permanently
separated by quasi-physical boundaries.”63
The relevance of Creegan’s point becomes clear when we turn to
consider the fourth and final way in which Wittgenstein employs the
notion of a language-game: “I shall also call the whole, consisting of
language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game’.”64
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In this context Wittgenstein also speaks of ‘our language-game’ or ‘the
human language-game’.65 These remarks are important because they
show one point where the analogy between language and a game breaks
down. Unlike games, the fragments of our language are interrelated,
they form part of an overall system.66 Our linguistic activities are inter-
woven with, and embedded in, our non-linguistic practices — our lan-
guage-game with pain, for example, is interwoven with commiseration,
care, and what have you. In this sense, language is less trivial than many
games are.67
This insight, that our linguistic practices are embedded in a larger
whole which encompasses more than language as such, plays an impor-
tant role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. With the development of the
notion of a language-game, he came to stress that the meaning of a word
is dependent upon the larger practice in which it is embedded. Conse-
quently, he began to focus more sharply on the way language is inter-
woven with non-linguistic practices. Earlier, Wittgenstein had argued
that a word has meaning only in the context of a proposition. Later, 
he wrote that “words have meaning only in the stream of life”.68 Our
language-games are embedded in the overall practices of a linguistic
community, in a form of life:
“Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact
that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”69
The notion of a form of life is an important one. It serves as a reminder
of the broader context, ‘the stream of life’, in which our linguistic prac-
tices — or language-games, if one pleases — are embedded. Unfortu-
nately, like that of a language-game, the notion of a form of life has
given rise to a multitude of misinterpretations. This is, no doubt, partly
due to Wittgenstein’s rather nonchalant use of the term. It occurs only
about half a dozen times in his published work; an extensive account of
its meaning is not provided. Nevertheless, a correct grasp of Wittgen-
stein’s use of the term is crucial to an understanding of his later thought.
Let us therefore take a somewhat closer look at it.
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Form of life
Wittgenstein is not the first to employ the term ‘form of life’ (Lebensform).
Indeed, it has a long history in German philosophy, occurring in the works
of Hamann, Herder, Hegel and von Humboldt. It also plays a role in
Spengler’s Decline of the West, which may have influenced Wittgenstein.
One would be hard-pressed, however, to assimilate Wittgenstein’s use of
the term to any of these uses. We shall be better served by looking at
Wittgenstein’s own remarks on the matter, however sporadic they may be.
As we have seen, in his later work, Wittgenstein argued vehemently
against any attempt to justify language by reference to reality. Grammar,
the rules that constitute our conceptual scheme, is arbitrary. This does
not mean, however, that there are no constraints upon our conceptual
scheme. Earlier, Wittgenstein conceived of language as a self-contained,
abstract system of rules, a calculus. Later, Wittgenstein came to recog-
nise the importance of the surroundings of language. Language func-
tions within a certain framework; a framework which, rightly under-
stood, conditions the concepts we (can) use. Wittgenstein develops this
insight in two directions, the first of which might be termed contextual,
the second naturalistic.
Language functions within a certain context. That is to say, a word has
meaning only within a context of application, which is itself embedded
in yet a larger whole, a communal form of life. These are part of “the
framework on which the workings of our language is based.”70 If com-
munication is to be possible at all, people must agree in the language
they use. In order even to disagree we need some common ground,
against the background of which our disagreement can be set up.71 This,
Wittgenstein hastens to point out, is not so much an “agreement in opin-
ions but in form of life.”72
Communal agreement, however, does not constitute the whole of
the framework conditioning our language. Our concepts rest on some
‘very general facts of nature’ in that, if these were different from
what they happen to be, different concept-formations would become
intelligible:
“If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-games
lose some of their importance, while others become important.”73
64 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
70 Wittgenstein 1994, I, 240.
71 See Wittgenstein 1994, I, 240-242, Wittgenstein 1997, 156.
72 Wittgenstein 1994, I, 241.
73 Wittgenstein 1997, 63; cf. Wittgenstein 1994, II, p. 230.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_01  01-02-2006  11:09  Pagina 64
These ‘facts’ fall roughly into two groups. First, the applicability of our
language is dependent upon certain general regularities concerning the
world around us. For example, objects do not suddenly vanish or come
into existence, change colour or size, etc. If they would, our language-
games would be thrown into disarray.74 Our biological nature, secondly,
plays a comparable role. This, too, is part of the framework within which
we construct and engage in our language-games. For example, our per-
ceptual capacities place constraints upon the concepts we may usefully
employ. If we could not distinguish between different colours, our colour-
grammar obviously could not get of the ground. Further, our shared pat-
terns of reaction influence our teaching practices. Ostensive definition,
for example, could not play the role it does if human beings looked at
the pointing finger (as cats tend to do) instead of in the direction in
which it points. Similarly, our psychological concepts presuppose shared
‘primitive reactions’. If there were:
“no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became excep-
tion and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal fre-
quency — this would make our normal language-games lose their point.”75
Once again, there are a number of misunderstandings which need to be
avoided. We briefly discuss three interrelated topics. The first has to do
with Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the necessity of agreement in language
(agreement). The second concerns the relation between language and the
so-called ‘general facts’ which Wittgenstein refers to (facts of nature).
The last centres around the notion of a form of life (forms of life).
a) Agreement — Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the importance of peo-
ple agreeing in the language we use has been the cause of certain mis-
givings. That people, if communication is to be possible, need to agree
about definitions seems natural enough. However, according to Wittgen-
stein, we need to agree not only in definitions but also in judgements.76
This, as Wittgenstein readily admits, seems to abolish logic. Or it would
make the correctness of, say, a particular measurement dependent, not
on the facts, but on communal consensus.
Wittgenstein denies that such a conclusion necessarily follows. What
counts as a correct application of rules (an accurate measurement) is deter-
mined by the rules themselves, which are our standards of correctness.
Now, these rules neither specify the results of particular measurements nor
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that there is general agreement in applying them. It is no part of the def-
inition of ‘a correct measurement’ that it is ‘that on which people agree’;
by no means is ‘logic’ abolished. On the other hand, if people did not
generally agree on the results of measurements these rules would lose
their point. A technique which produced no constant results could not
qualify as measuring. That is to say that “what we call ‘measuring’ is
partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.”77
Communal agreement may not be part of our grammar, but it is part of
the framework within which our grammar is applied.
b) Facts of nature — Language is autonomous; grammar is arbitrary.
Our concepts cannot be justified by reference to reality, nor does ‘the
way things are’ force us to adopt any specific set of concepts. Neverthe-
less, as we have seen, the framework surrounding language — certain
very general facts concerning both the world around us as well as our
biological nature — do, as it were, have a say. On several occasions
Wittgenstein draws our attention to this point, stating that his interest
“certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very gen-
eral facts of nature”78 and that what he is supplying are “really remarks
on the natural history of human beings.”79 Does this not create a certain
amount of tension; a tension between a view of language as being, on
the one hand, autonomous and yet, on the other hand, conditioned by the
facts of nature? Furthermore, if philosophy must take an active interest
in these general facts of nature, supplying remarks on the natural history
of humankind, then, surely, philosophical investigations cease to be
purely conceptual. Rather, they would be, at least partly, empirical in
nature, thus bringing philosophy closer to the natural sciences than
Wittgenstein seems to allow.
Now, it is true that Wittgenstein does not deny that concept-formation
is causally conditioned. There are, indeed, constraints upon grammar,
just as there are constraints upon games.80 But we should note that these
constraints are not so much constraints upon logic but, rather, constraints
within which we construct our grammar. Our concepts have a use within
language-games which are played within a presupposed framework. If
this framework were to change — if, for example, things continually
changed colour and size — our concepts could be thrown into disarray.
But note, first, that the presupposed regularity of the world is not a
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component element of our concepts. It is no part of the explanation of
‘red’ that it ‘looks red under such-and-such conditions’. These back-
ground constancies are “part of the framework within which our lan-
guage-games are played, not part of the games themselves.”81 Secondly,
although a radical change of framework could throw our concepts into
confusion, it would not make them false. There is no such thing as a true
or a false concept; for it is by the grace of the concepts we employ that
we can distinguish between truth and falsity in the first place. However,
it could make our concepts less practical or even useless. Thirdly, even
though the framework places constraints upon our grammar, it does not
force our hand. Our present grammatical structures are not inevitable or
unavoidable, let alone correct. Vastly different conceptual structures can
be and have been erected on the same foundations.82
In Wittgenstein’s view, then, a recognition of the framework within
which our grammar is constructed does nothing to impugn the auton-
omy or arbitrariness of grammar. Nor does this ‘paying attention to 
the facts’ run counter to a determination of philosophical investigations 
as conceptual in nature. The point of Wittgenstein’s observations con-
cerning the framework within which our language operates is to expose
various fallacies, such as, for example, the belief that our grammar is,
in some deep or metaphysical sense, correct. His purpose is not to inves-
tigate empirical hypotheses about concept-formation. That is not a philo-
sophical issue:
“philosophy investigates grammatical, conceptual structures, not the back-
ground preconditions that as a matter of fact make them possible, although the
distinction between these is of utmost importance. Philosophy is concerned
with the grammatical articulations of our concepts, and that is not a matter of
hypotheses in natural science, but of the description of conventions.”83
Although it is philosophically important to appreciate the framework
within which our language-games function, such an appreciation should
be distinguished from philosophical investigation proper which, as the
examination of conceptual structures, moves within our language-games.
Finally, Wittgenstein’s remarks on the natural history of human beings
are not so much biological but anthropological or even cultural. For him,
the natural history of man is the history of a convention-forming, concept-
exercising, language-using animal — a cultural animal.
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“Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our
natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.”84
c) Forms of life — Wittgenstein’s notion of a form of life has suffered
much abuse. Philosophers both friendly and unfriendly to Wittgenstein’s
work have used the notion in a variety of ways which cannot be justified
by reference to Wittgenstein’s own remarks on the matter. By no means
a thorough investigation of the subject, the following remarks serve
merely to call attention to some possible misunderstandings.
Wittgenstein’s comments on forms of life have often been assimi-
lated to his remarks about the framework in which our language is
employed. A form of life has been taken to be primarily a biological
concept, alluding to our common natural reactions. These are the ‘facts
of human natural history’ and, as such, should be accepted as given.85
There is, consequently, only one human form of life, which charac-
terises our species and reflects our nature. We might be able to imagine
other forms of life, for example, those of animals. But the concepts, if
any, arising out of these must be unintelligible to us. In Wittgenstein’s
own words, “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him”.86
Now, one might glean some support for this interpretation from
Wittgenstein’s remark that a form of life is “something animal”.87 One
might also refer to the example of a tribe with a very different kind of
education from that which human beings receive; their life would run
on differently, their concepts would be alien to us.88 Nevertheless, Baker
and Hacker argue convincingly that such an interpretation is “a carica-
ture of Wittgenstein’s arguments”.89
First, what is ‘natural’ for Wittgenstein is not always biological.
Looking in the direction pointed at, crying out in pain, etc., may be
biologically natural, but ordering, questioning, recounting, chatting,
etc., clearly are not. And, for Wittgenstein, these are as much part of
our natural history as eating and drinking. His understanding of the
natural history of man is, as noted above, largely cultural. Likewise,
the notion of a form of life is predominantly a cultural one. Secondly,
far from asserting that other conceptual structures would be unintelli-
gible to us, Wittgenstein argues that a little imagination can render
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them natural.90 In fact, a different education might give rise to very 
different concepts — the point being that it is not so much nature but
nurture which is decisive.
Although there are more reasons to reject the interpretation referred to
above,91 we shall leave it at this. There is not one, unique, human form of
life; rather, different epochs, different cultures, have different forms of life:
“Different educations, interests and concerns, different human relations
and relations to nature and the world constitute distinct forms of life. For
such different cultures form different conceptual structures, adopt distinc-
tive forms and norms of representation.”92
This is a point of some importance, for it reminds us that different
(human) interests, practical needs, historical practices, etc. — i.e. dif-
ferent forms of life — may lead to distinct conceptual schemes.93 This 
is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s remarks about framework-conditions.
Here, too, different conditions might lead to concepts different from 
the ones we (now) employ. Nevertheless, forms of life are not part of
the framework. Rather, they are conditioned by it, grafted onto it just
as grammar is. This may perhaps be illustrated as follows. Two tribes
of humans, geographically near, yet historically and culturally distant,
may develop quite different conceptual schemes. However, the frame-
work-conditions surrounding the language of tribe A are no different
from those surrounding the language of tribe B. The difference between
the tribes, Wittgenstein might say, is a difference in forms of life. Never-
theless, these different forms of life are grafted onto the same frame-
work. Now, where lions are concerned, matters are not the same. That we
could not understand a lion, even if it should talk, does not mean, as
Glock points out, that “we could not understand a lion who utters English
sentences like ‘I’m not interested in you, I’ve just had an antelope’.”94
Rather, it means that if lions had a feline language, consisting perhaps 
of growls, roars, etc., we could not understand it. Here, the difference
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between us and a lion is much greater than that between tribe A and B
above. For not only do lions have different interests, concerns, needs, etc.
from us but, what is more, lions are biologically different from us, enjoy-
ing, for instance, very different perceptual capacities. Not only would we
not share the same form of life, but the frameworks onto which our
respective forms of life are grafted would differ as well.
One final note may be in order. In our discussion we have suggested,
somewhat casually, that a different education, different concerns and
interests may culminate in divergent forms of life, that cultural differ-
ences may constitute distinct forms of life, or even that one might dif-
ferentiate between animal and a human forms of life. It might be argued
that this only goes to show the need for a more precise definition of 
the concept than Wittgenstein provides, one which will allow us to for-
mulate criteria of individuation for the diversity of forms of life. That
demand, however, is misconceived. As Baker and Hacker point out, 
in advance of a particular question and a specific context it would be
quite pointless to draw hard and fast distinctions between what counts
as the same and what as a different form of life. Such distinctions
depend upon the purpose and context of different kinds of investiga-
tion.95 ‘Forms of life’ do not denote static phenomena of fixed scope.
Rather, the notion serves to remind us “of the general need for context
in our activity of meaning.”96 A reminder which the philosopher would
be wise to pay heed to.
2.2 Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough
The previous sections sought to provide a sketch of Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy. Rough as the sketch may be, it should suffice to impress
upon us the extent of the differences between Wittgenstein’s earlier and
later thought. Now, it seems no more than reasonable to assume that the
transformation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method should imply a
transformation of his philosophical dealings with religion. However,
lacking any discussion of religion, the Investigations cannot validate this
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assumption. Fortunately, there are other sources to which we may turn.
The first of these is the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough.
The Remarks on Frazer consists, actually, of two parts. In 1930,
Wittgenstein and Drury spent a couple of weeks reading Frazer’s The
Golden Bough. Although the work consists of some thirteen volumes,
they never got “beyond a little way into the first volume, so frequent were
Wittgenstein’s interruptions to explain his disagreements with Frazer’s
approach.”97 Wittgenstein felt that Frazer’s account of primitive magical
ritual as an early form of science robbed the rituals of their depth, reduc-
ing them to something infinitely more shallow. His criticism of Frazer’s
approach, as well as some notes on what the correct philosophical method
should be, can be found in the first part of the Remarks on Frazer, which
was composed in the summer of 1931.
In 1936, Wittgenstein was given a copy of the abridged edition of The
Golden Bough, which seems to have inspired him to return to the subject
of primitive ritual.98 This resulted in the second part of the Remarks on
Frazer, which was composed no earlier than 1936 and possibly as late as
1948 or thereafter.99 These were only rough notes, and have a smaller
scope, dealing exclusively with Frazer’s account of the fire-festivals of
Europe, particularly the Beltane festival of Scotland. Also, they are far
less critical of Frazer; here, there are none of the vicious attacks to be
found in the first set of remarks.
In what follows, we deal mainly with the earlier set of remarks. First,
we examine Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer’s anthropological account.
Frazer seeks to explain primitive beliefs and rituals as an early and mis-
guided form of science. Wittgenstein rejects both Frazer’s method and
its results. Instead of trying to explain primitive ritual, we should strive
to present it in a perspicuous way. Not only does this allow us other
possibilities of understanding, it also shows primitive behaviour to be
less alien to us than we might, at first, have thought.
Before we begin, however, a warning. The Remarks on Frazer consti-
tutes Wittgenstein’s first more or less extended discussion of religious
beliefs and practices which belongs to the later rather than the earlier
period. As such, it deserves serious attention.100 However, in commenting
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tators. This, he suggests, may have much to do with a desire to “Christianize” Wittgenstein.
(See Clack 1999, p. 6.)
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on these remarks one should bear in mind that they are incomplete 
and were not intended for publication. Had Wittgenstein spent more
time on them, he might well have altered or stricken certain remarks,
or expressed them differently. In short, they cannot be taken to represent
Wittgenstein’s considered opinion. As Hacker puts it: “If one wants to
learn from them, they should not be squeezed too hard.”101
2.2.1 Ritual and explanation
“We must begin with the mistake”;102 let us take a quick glance at
Frazer’s account of primitive magic and ritual, to see what Wittgenstein
is arguing against.103 In his monumental work, The Golden Bough, Frazer
presents us with a wealth of material concerning primitive magic and 
ritual.104 His aim, however, is not merely presentation but, moreover,
explanation. Why is it that people the world over have performed such
rites? What is the rationale behind magic? Frazer’s answer is well
known: primitive magic and ritual practices arise as a primitive form of
science. Primitive man, finding himself in a hostile world which he can
neither understand nor control, turns his hand to ‘science’ and elaborates
a theory to explain the workings of nature: magic is the result. Primitive
ritual should be seen as a practical application of this theory of magic.
Ritual actions are instrumental in nature, attempts at achieving concrete
(empirical) goals. Of course, these goals will never be achieved by these
means for, sadly, both theory and application are mistaken. Primitive man
has only a limited grasp of the facts of nature; ignorant of elementary
causal connections, his theorising cannot help but be erroneous.
We have here, in short, three claims central to Frazer’s anthropological
account. First, magic is an attempt at explaining the workings of nature; 
it comprises of the savage’s opinions on what makes the world go round.
Secondly, rituals function as instrumental activities, set to achieve specific
goals. Thirdly, magic and ritual are in the nature of vulgar errors. According
to Clack, these claims mark Frazer’s account as a version of intellectualism:
72 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
101 Hacker 2001, p. 75.
102 Wittgenstein 1979, p. 1.
103 Our account of Frazer is more in the nature of a caricature than an exposition of 
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thorough examination and partial defence of Frazer’s work in relation to Wittgenstein’s
remarks, see Clack 1999.
104 It has been contended, though, that Frazer was not always as true to the evidence
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(See Clack 1999, pp. 14-15; Hacker 2001, pp. 86-88.) 
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“A dominant strand of anthropological thinking about religion, intellectu-
alism contends that magic and religion arise and function as explanations
of the world and of natural phenomena. What is essential about religion is
its theoretical foundation; ritual actions are therefore secondary, and are
practical applications of theory. The function of ritual is instrumental,
focused on the achieving of concrete, empirical ends. All of these factors
are present within The Golden Bough […].”105
And all these factors are targets for Wittgenstein’s critique. Frazer’s fun-
damental mistake, Wittgenstein suggests, is that in his attempt to under-
stand primitive ritual behaviour, he strives to explain it. Where Frazer sees
terrible and awe-inspiring ritual practices, he thinks to explain their char-
acter in terms of primitive science; where he sees depth in certain prac-
tices, he thinks to explain their impressiveness by an historical hypothesis.
This, according to Wittgenstein, is misguided:
“Even the idea of trying to explain the practice — say of killing the priest-
king — seems to me wrong-headed.”106
And again:
“I think one reason why the attempt to find an explanation is wrong is 
that we have only to put together in the right way what we know, without
adding anything, and the satisfaction we are trying to get from the explana-
tion comes of itself.”107
It is important to note that, despite these remarks, Wittgenstein is not
claiming that any attempt at historico-anthropological explanation is
misconceived.108 Rather he is stressing the possibility of, and need for,
a different kind of understanding:
“An historical explanation, an explanation as an hypothesis of the devel-
opment, is only one kind of summary of the data — of their synopsis. We
can equally well see the data in their relations to one another and make a
summary of them in a general picture without putting it in the form of an
hypothesis regarding temporal development.”109
Wittgenstein remarks that one is tempted to say about the material Frazer
has collected that ‘all this points to some secret law’.110 And, he admits,
one could present this ‘secret law’ in an hypothesis of development, 
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as Frazer does. But one could also do it “just by arranging the factual
material so that we can easily pass from one part to another and have a
clear view of it — showing it in a ‘perspicuous’ way.”111 Such a perspic-
uous representation — ‘übersichtlichen Darstellung’ — Wittgenstein
insists, is fundamental importance:
“For us the conception of a perspicuous presentation is fundamental. It
indicates the form in which we write of things, the way in which we see
things. (A kind of ‘Weltanschauung’ that seems to be typical of our time.
Spengler.) […] This perspicuous presentation makes possible that under-
standing which consists just in the fact that we ‘see the connections’.
Hence the importance of finding intermediate links.”112
As Hacker points out, Wittgenstein is not suggesting that Frazer’s data 
is irrelevant to any hermeneutic purpose. Rather, he is advocating a dif-
ferent principle of ordering from Frazer’s developmental one. One that
allows us to ‘see the connections’: showing patterns of affinities and dif-
ferences of ceremonious expression, revealing analogies and disanalo-
gies in the ritualized response to what primitive man everywhere finds
impressive, awesome, or sacred. Such an arrangement of the material
“will display the specific ceremonial, ritual physiognomy of a given
savage practice against the backcloth of whole families of analogous
rituals.”113
Once this is done, the primitive practices may become less alien to 
us. Frazer presents his material as strange and terrible, as far removed
from our modern-day activities. In Wittgenstein’s view, what he fails to
realise is that in describing the beliefs of primitive man he has at hand
words which are perfectly intelligible to us, such as ‘ghost’, ‘shade’,
‘soul’, etc. These words are still very much alive in our own, civilised
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111 Wittgenstein 1979, pp. 8-9.
112 Wittgenstein 1979, p. 9. Here, we encounter for the first time that notion of an
Übersicht which plays such a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s later thought. In due course,
this remark became paragraph 122 of the Philosophical Investigations, “transformed from
a comment on anthropological hermeneutics into one on philosophical method.” (Hacker
2001, p. 75.) Which has led Clack to suggest that “Wittgenstein’s reading of Frazer led to
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vocabulary. Compared with this, Wittgenstein adds, “the fact that we do
not believe our soul eats and drinks is a minor detail.”114
“And when I read Frazer I keep wanting to say: All these processes, these
changes of meaning, — we have them here still in our word-language. If
what they call the ‘Corn-wolf’ is what is hidden in the last sheaf; but also
the last sheaf itself and also the man who binds it, we recognize in this a
movement of language with which we are perfectly familiar.”115
Their familiarity, Wittgenstein suggests, shows “our kinship to those
savages”.116 A kinship which is not merely expressed in our language,
but also in our action. After all, people (still) hold religious beliefs and
engage in religious activities — activities not that different from those
described by Frazer. Says Wittgenstein:
“The religious actions or the religious life of the priest-king are not dif-
ferent in kind from any genuinely religious action today, say a confession
of sins.”117
And do we not kiss the pictures of the ones we love and smash those of
the one’s who have spurned us? Again, such actions are not that far
removed from those of Frazer’s savage who sticks his knife in an image
of his enemy.
Both in language and action, civilised man is more primitive — or
primitive man more civilised — than Frazer cares to recognise. Wittgen-
stein’s perspicuous presentation has forged a link between primitive and
civilised culture, allowing us, in yet a further sense, to ‘see the connec-
tions’. Ironically, it is only because there are such connections that we
might even entertain such explanations as Frazer offers:
“And Frazer’s explanations would be no explanations at all if finally they
did not appeal to an inclination in ourselves.”118
In the Investigations we find the following remark:
“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because
of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something 
— because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his
enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck
him. — And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most
striking and most powerful.”119
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In an earlier version of this remark, written in the same period as the
Remarks on Frazer, Wittgenstein adds Frazer’s name.120 What is it that
Frazer fails to recognise? Precisely that which forms the foundation of
his enquiry. At the root of primitive ritual behaviour lies not a primitive
form of science born out of ignorance and fear but simple and familiar
things which, once seen, are most striking and most powerful. Those
things which man, primitive and civilised alike, really knows and finds
interesting:
“That a man’s shadow, which looks like a man, or that his mirror image,
or that rain, thunderstorms, the phases of the moon, the change of seasons,
the likenesses and differences of animals to one another and to human
beings, the phenomena of death, of birth and of sexual life, in short every-
thing a man perceives year in, year out around him, connected together in
any variety of ways — that all this should play a part in his thinking (his
philosophy) and his practices, is obvious, or in other words this is what we
really know and find interesting.”121
These phenomena are not impressive due to their inexplicable nature. 
On Wittgenstein’s view, it is not because primitive man cannot explain
fire or fire’s resemblance to the sun that he finds it impressive for no 
scientific explanation as such would make it less so. Again, none of
these phenomena is particularly mysterious in itself, though any one of
them can become so to us. It is, Wittgenstein says, “precisely the char-
acteristic feature of the awakening human spirit that a phenomenon 
has meaning for it.”122 When asked why this is so, Wittgenstein’s only
answer is, simply, “Human life is like that.”123
“In other words, one might begin a book on anthropology in this way:
When we watch the life and behaviour of men all over the earth we see that
apart from what we might call animal activities, taking food &c., &c., men
also carry out actions that bear a peculiar character and might be called 
ritualistic.
But then it is nonsense if we go on to say that the characteristic feature
of these actions is that they spring from wrong ideas about the physics of
things. (This is what Frazer does when he says magic is really false physics,
or as the case may be, false medicine, technology, &c.)”124
Here, we already have some indication of Wittgenstein’s rejection not
only of the form of Frazer’s account, but also of its content. Not only is
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Frazer wrong in trying to explain primitive beliefs and rituals, what is
more, his explanations lead to gross misrepresentation. They make the
beliefs appear as mistakes, which, to Wittgenstein’s mind, is most unsat-
isfactory. “Was Augustine mistaken, then”, he asks, “when he called on
God on every page of the Confessions?”125 Wittgenstein replies:
“Well — one might say — if he was not mistaken, then the Buddhist holy-
man, or some other, whose religion expresses quite different notions, surely
was. But none of them was making a mistake except where he was putting
forward a theory.”126
According to Wittgenstein, it is ludicrous to present ritual activities as
mere mistakes:
“If the adoption of a child is carried out by the mother pulling the child
from beneath her clothes, then it is crazy to think that there is an error in
this and that she believes she has borne the child.”127
If anyone can be said to be in error it is Frazer himself. Actually, Wittgen-
stein remarks sarcastically, Frazer is much more savage than his savages:
“for these savages will not be so far from any understanding of spiritual
matters as an Englishman of the twentieth century. His explanations of the
primitive observances are much cruder than the sense of the observances
themselves.”128
It is only because Frazer presents magic as a form of science that the 
rituals may appear to be mistakes. To repeat, the error lies not in the
observances themselves, but in Frazer’s mode of representation. He sees
the rituals as flowing from certain primitive scientific views on the world. 
In the last analysis, the rituals are, as it were, a matter of opinion. This is
rejected by Wittgenstein: the characteristic feature of primitive man is
precisely that he does not act from opinions he holds about things.129
Commenting on Frazer’s example of the king who must be killed in his
prime because, according to the notions of the savages, his soul would
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not be kept fresh otherwise, Wittgenstein remarks that “where that prac-
tice and these views go together, the practice does not spring from the
view, but both of them are there.”130 Magical beliefs do not arise as
attempts at explaining the world. Rather, as we have seen, they find their
roots in that which, though simple and familiar, is most significant to
man:
“When Frazer begins by telling the story of the King of the Wood at Nemi,
he does this in a tone which shows that something strange and terrible is
happening here. And that is the answer to the question ‘why is this happen-
ing?’: Because it is terrible. In other words, what strikes us in this course
of events as terrible, impressive, horrible, tragic, &c., anything but trivial
and insignificant, that is what gave birth to them.”131
Here, we are not confronted with an opinion but, rather, with a symbol:
“Put the account of the King of the Wood at Nemi together with the phrase
‘the majesty of death’, and you see that they are one.
The life of the priest-king shows what is meant by that phrase.
If someone is gripped by the majesty of death, then through such a life
he can give expression to it. — Of course this is not an explanation: it puts
one symbol in place of another.”132
Once this is realised, the possibility of a different understanding of
primitive ritual opens up. For Frazer, as we will recall, the rituals are
instrumental in nature, set to achieve certain empirical goals. Of course,
seeing as the underlying reasoning is faulty, their performance is futile.
This, Wittgenstein concludes, not only presents primitive peoples as 
in error but also as quite stupid. But, we are admonished, “it never does
become plausible that people do all this out of sheer stupidity.”133 After
all, primitive man possessed considerable skills:
“The same savage who, apparently in order to kill his enemy, sticks his
knife through a picture of him, really does build his hut of wood and cuts
his arrow with skill and not in effigy.”134
If Frazer were correct, “we should expect to see the primitive building in
effigy.”135 He would construct a miniature hut and proceed to wait for a
life-size one to magically appear. But, of course, no such thing happens.
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In fact, the rituals do not seem to be used in such a way at all. Wittgen-
stein brings out this point as follows:
“I read, amongst many similar examples, of a rain-king in Africa to whom
the people appeal for rain when the rainy season comes. But surely this
means that they do not actually think he can make it rain, otherwise they
would do it in the dry periods in which the land is “a parched and arid
desert”. For if we do assume that it was stupidity that once led the people
to institute this office of Rain King, still they obviously knew from experi-
ence that the rains begin in March, and it would have been the Rain King’s
duty to perform in other periods of the year. Or again: towards morning,
when the sun is about to rise, people celebrate rites of the coming of day,
but not at night, for then they simply burn lamps.”136
If the rites were not used in this way then how are we to understand
them? Wittgenstein suggest that they may be seen as “the practice of a
highly cultivated gesture-language.”137 The rites should be understood
as a form of language or, perhaps better, a symbolism, by means of
which what is significant in human life, what is found to be impressive
or marvellous, is expressed. They do not aim at anything; they are not
instrumental but, rather, expressive in nature:
“Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of a loved one. This is obviously not
based on a belief that it will have a definite effect on the object which the
picture represents. It aims at some satisfaction and it achieves it. Or rather,
it does not aim at anything; we act in this way and then feel satisfied.”138
Besides emphasising the non-instrumental nature of ritual action, the above
remark reminds us of our connection to the primitive rites described by
Frazer. The ‘gesture-language’ that is ritual is with us still, when we kiss
the picture of a loved one, when we place flowers on a grave, when we
take off our hat on entering a church. Such actions are not based on any
opinion, nor do they aim to achieve some empirical goal. Rather, they are
symbols expressing our values concerning what is deep and important in
our lives: 
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“A religious symbol does not rest on any opinion.
And error belongs only with opinion.”139
The Remarks on Frazer invite us to question the central claims of
Frazer’s account. Instead of trying to explain primitive beliefs and ritu-
als, Wittgenstein presents us with an Übersicht, intended to break the
hold of Frazer’s anthropological story. Primitive belief and ritual is 
not some early attempt at science and technology, but an expression of
what goes deep in people’s lives.140 Moreover, it is not as primitive as
we might care to believe; the gesture-language of ritual has survived
man’s coming of age.
2.2.2 Possibilities of religious meaning
In his Lectures on Aesthetics Wittgenstein emphasised that he was trying
to effect a change in style of thought. He saw himself as persuading his
students to exchange one style of thought for another:
“I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed
to another. […] How much we are doing is changing the style of thinking
and how much I’m doing is changing the style of thinking and how much
I’m doing is persuading people to change their style of thinking.”141
Wittgenstein, Baker and Hacker suggest, was stressing the importance of
what might be termed ‘analogical thinking’.142 He was urging his students
to forego causal or genetic explanations in favour of a comprehensive
survey of similarities and dissimilarities or, in other words, an Übersicht.
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to attribute an expressivist theory to Wittgenstein on the basis of the Remarks on Frazer.
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141 Wittgenstein 1999, p. 28.
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the Remarks on Frazer is that,
here, the notion of an Übersicht is first introduced. In the Investiga-
tions ‘clarification by means of surveyability’ serves to displace the
philosopher’s theoretical explanations of the workings of our language.
In the Remarks on Frazer we are urged to adopt the same method in
relation to religious beliefs and practices. What we are dealing with is
‘a highly developed gesture-language’; the clarity we are after will not
be achieved by means of an hypothetical explanation but by a survey
of the workings of this language. The crucial role such a survey plays
in Wittgenstein’s understanding of religious practices is attested to by
Baker and Hacker:
“Surveyability, in understanding ritual and religious symbolism, plays a
crucial role, in Wittgenstein’s view, in producing an understanding of what,
at first sight, seems bizarre. Just because ritual is symbolic, an Übersicht of
that ‘highly developed gesture-language’ can resolve perplexity in a way in
which a developmental hypothesis cannot.”143
As we have seen, Wittgenstein does not repudiate the possibility of devel-
opmental hypotheses as such. Causal and genetic explanations have their
place, but what is truly perplexing cannot be resolved thus. Such explana-
tions do not bring out either the significance or the depth of religious
activities; they simply pass it by.
The rituals “can be ‘explained’ (made clear) and cannot be explained.”144
That is to say, in giving a descriptive presentation of the rituals, we may
come to an understanding that was not ours before. If one is so inclined,
one might say that the rituals have thus been explained. But such expla-
nations, if one insists on calling them that, are of a different kind from
those offered by Frazer. The latter’s rationalistic explanations seek to
characterise ritual behaviour as the false or confused result of ignorance.
Wittgenstein, by contrast, hopes to bring out the meaning and impres-
siveness of the rituals by, as it were, putting “one symbol in place of
another.”145 In this context, the appeal to ‘a tendency in ourselves’ is 
a condition of our finding the symbolism of a given ritual intelligible,
and of our being able to grasp the beliefs that are partly constitutive of a
rite as reasons for the ritual actions.146 Of course, there is no guarantee
that this will always be possible. As Fergus Kerr puts it: “if we cannot
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imagine what it is to observe rites, enjoy singing hymns and the like, the
nature of religion is bound to remain opaque.”147
The Remarks on Frazer constitutes a break with Wittgenstein’s ear-
lier thought on matters religious. By the time he wrote the Remarks,
Wittgenstein had abandoned most, if not all, of the central doctrines of
the Tractatus. It should hardly surprise us to see this reflected in his
dealings with religious expressions, as, surely, it is. The main concerns
of the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics have either disappeared 
or been transformed. Gone is the insistence on the nonsensicality, and
hence ineffability, of expressions of value, gone also the tight connec-
tion between ethics, religion and aesthetics. Instead, we find a number of
themes which are central to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Most important
of these is the emphasis on the need for a perspicuous presentation. In
giving an Übersicht, Wittgenstein allows us to recognise possibilities of
meaning where formerly there were none. The Tractatus’ stringent crite-
ria of meaning have been slackened. Religious expressions are no longer
presented as going beyond the boundaries of language. Rather, they con-
stitute a language in their own right; a symbolism which does not seek
to describe states of affairs but is expressive in nature.
It might be thought that the differences between the Remarks on
Frazer and Wittgenstein’s earlier remarks on expressions of value can,
at least partially, be explained by the fact that, in the Remarks on Frazer,
Wittgenstein is dealing not with current beliefs and practices but with
those from a distant past. But that would be a mistake. As we have seen,
Wittgenstein explicitly draws the connections between primitive beliefs
and rituals and the ways of the civilised. In both our language and our
actions we betray a kinship to primitive man. We (still) use and under-
stand such words as ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘ghost’, etc. They are part of a whole
mythology deposited in our language, and fulfil a crucial role in the
thought and imagination of our culture.148 Again, we kiss the pictures of
loved ones, only to smash them when the love has died, we take of our
hats in church, knock on wood, and so on, and so forth. Furthermore,
Wittgenstein sees no real difference between the religious actions in the
days of yore and those of today, say, a confession of sins or a baptism.149
This opens up the possibility of understanding contemporary (Christian)
religious practices along the lines of the primitive rituals. Perhaps they,
too, are not based on opinions but are expressive in nature? And again,
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perhaps here, too, what we need in order to understand is not an expla-
nation but a comprehensive survey of similarities and dissimilarities? It
certainly appears that Wittgenstein believed this to be the case. For these
ideas return in his Lectures on Religious Belief, which were delivered
some six years later. They are the topic of the next section.
2.3 Lectures on religious belief
Wittgenstein’s lectures of the year 1938-39 are unique among his corpus.
Rather than dealing with mathematics or philosophy in general, they are
concerned with aesthetics and religious belief. A number of central themes
which we already encountered in the Remarks on Frazer return in these
lectures. First, there is the rejection of a ‘scientific method’. Instead of
offering a theory or explanation, we must make certain comparisons,
group together certain cases.150 In other words, what is needed is an Über-
sicht, a descriptive account which draws our attention to differences and
similarities and allows us to see the connections. Secondly, Wittgenstein
emphasises the importance of looking at the application rather than at
the form of words. In his Lectures on Aesthetics Wittgenstein stresses
that, to get clear about aesthetic expressions, we need to focus not so
much on the words themselves but
“on the occasions on which they are said — on the enormously compli-
cated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the
expression itself has almost a negligible place.”151
Wittgenstein emphasises the need to provide a context for our activities
of meaning. We need “to describe the whole environment”152 in which
the words occur as only one element:
“In order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of
living. We think we have to talk about aesthetic judgements like ‘This is
beautiful’, but we find that if we have to talk about aesthetic judgements
we don’t find these words at all, but a word used something like a gesture,
accompanying a complicated activity.”153
In the early 1930s, Wittgenstein had already propounded similar thoughts
concerning religion:
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“I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrinal propositions,
in which there is thus no talking. Obviously the essence of religion cannot
have anything to do with the fact that there is talking, or rather: when 
people talk, then this itself is part of a religious act and not a theory. Thus
it also does not matter at all if the words used are true or false or non-
sense.”154
The Lectures on Religious Belief may be seen as Wittgenstein’s attempt
to understand religious expressions as ‘part of a religious act’. The fol-
lowing examines the results of this attempt.
In commenting on the Remarks on Frazer, we argued, one must exer-
cise some caution. These remarks are incomplete, and were never intended
for publication. They cannot be taken to represent Wittgenstein’s consid-
ered opinion. Where the Lectures on Religious Belief is concerned, a sim-
ilar warning applies. These, too, are incomplete and were never meant to
be published. What is more, there are not even written by Wittgenstein.
That is to say, what we know about the lectures Wittgenstein delivered
in the year 1938-39, including the Lectures on Religious Belief, has come
to us through the notes taken by his students. Wittgenstein actually tried
to prevent this from happening. During one of his lectures he told his
students to stop making notes:
“If you write these spontaneous remarks down, some day someone may
publish them as my considered opinions. I don’t want that done. For I am
talking now freely as my ideas come, but all this will need a lot more
thought and better expression.”155
Evidently, his instructions were ignored; the lecture notes have indeed
been published. We have been given fair warning: the notes should not
be thought of as Wittgenstein’s considered opinion. Still, there is little
doubt that they more or less accurately portray his thinking on the mat-
ters addressed.156 As such, they provide an invaluable source of infor-
mation and should not be ignored.
2.3.1 Judgement Day
In 1930, the BBC broadcast a number of talks on the topic of ‘science
and religion’ which were later published bearing the title Science and
Religion: A Symposium. One of the participants was a certain Father
O’Hara who offered an apologetic aimed at showing that the Christian
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faith is as soundly based in reason as are science and history. The truths
of Christianity, according to O’Hara, are reached by the very same intel-
ligence that is operative in science and with the same certainty. For
example, Christianity appeals to the historical records contained in the
New Testament and asserts that these are trustworthy, even when judged
by the severest scientific criticism.157
Wittgenstein must have either heard or read Father O’Hara’s contribu-
tion, for in his Lectures on Religious Belief he launches a brutal attack.158
Father O’Hara, Wittgenstein remarks, is “one of those people who make
it a question of science.”159 He is trying to make the whole business
appear to be reasonable, which, to Wittgenstein’s mind, is ludicrous.160
Not only is religious belief not reasonable, it doesn’t even pretend to be.
After all, “Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: not only that
it is not reasonable, but that it is folly.”161
O’Hara assumes that the believer bases his belief on certain historic
facts, as narrated in the New Testament. According to Wittgenstein, how-
ever, closer examination will reveal that the events told of in the Bible
are not treated as are ordinary historic facts:
“Here we have a belief in historic facts different from a belief in ordinary
historic facts. Even, they are not treated as historical, empirical, propositions.
Those people who had faith didn’t apply the doubt which would ordi-
narily apply to any historical propositions. Especially propositions of a time
long past, etc.”162
In the following remark, written a year before he delivered his lectures,
Wittgenstein expresses the same sentiment somewhat more elaborately:
“Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather it offers us a (historical)
narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the
belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and
thin, which you can do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative,
don’t take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives!
Make a quite different place in your life for it.”163
The ‘history’ of the Gospels is to be seized on by the believer. It is to
make a difference to his life which no ordinary history could. Even if it
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were certain that Biblical history is factually accurate, even if there were
as much evidence as for Napoleon, this would not be enough. For such
indubitability would not suffice to make one change one’s whole life.164
Here, then, we have people who treat this historical evidence, such 
as it is, in an entirely different way. A way which may well strike us as
being unreasonable. After all, they base enormous things on evidence
which taken in one way would seem exceedingly flimsy.165 And yet,
although it is obvious to Wittgenstein that they are not reasonable, he
refuses to call them unreasonable. If anyone may be called unreasonable
it is Father O’Hara:
“I would definitely call O’Hara unreasonable. I would say, if this is reli-
gious belief, then it’s all superstition.
But I wouldn’t ridicule it, not by saying it is based on insufficient evi-
dence. I would say: here is a man who is cheating himself. You can say:
this man is ridiculous because he believes, and bases it on weak reasons.”166
Where religious beliefs are concerned, evidence is treated in an entirely
different way, reasons look entirely different from normal reasons.167
Religious believers, Wittgenstein insists, do not base their beliefs on
weak reasons. Rather, religious beliefs are not reasoned at all:
“I want to say: they don’t treat this as a matter of reasonability. […] You
could also say that where we are reasonable, they are not reasonable —
meaning they don’t use reason here.”168
These points may be further developed by taking a closer look at
Wittgenstein’s prime example of a religious belief, the belief in a Last
Judgement. Here we have such an expression as ‘I believe that so and so
will happen’ which, according to Wittgenstein, is used quite differently
from the way in which we might use it in science.169 From a scientific
point of view, it appears to be a forecast, referring to some future event
of great consequence. Once again, we might assume that the believer has
sufficient reason to believe that such a thing will happen, that he is privy
to some kind of evidence. Wittgenstein, however, is adamant that this is
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not so. Quite the contrary; if there were evidence, this would in fact
destroy the whole business:
“Suppose, for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; make
forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of Judge-
ment Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such a thing, and even if 
it were more convincing than I have described, belief in this happening
wouldn’t be at all a religious belief.”170
True, the believer will probably want to say that he has his reasons,
maybe even that he has proof. And there will be cases where we can
only conclude he reasons wrongly. That is to say, he reasons in a way
similar to us, producing evidence, weighing the facts, etc., and makes
something corresponding to our blunders. No doubt, for Wittgenstein,
Father O’Hara serves as an example of such a case. Here, Wittgenstein
would say, the believer bases his belief on weak reasons; the evidence is
simply insufficient. On the other hand, there are cases where the believer
seems to be engaged in an altogether different game. Evidence is treated
in an entirely different way, reasons look entirely different from normal
reasons We are inclined to say that the believer does not reason at all, or
in a very different way. Here, it is more difficult to decide whether or
not a blunder has been committed. For example, someone has a dream of
the Last Judgement and says that, now, he knows what it will be like.
Surely, this would not be merely poor evidence, it would be more than
ridiculous:
“If you compare it with anything in Science which we call evidence, you
can’t credit that anyone would soberly argue: ‘Well, I had this dream…
therefore…Last Judgement’. You might say: ‘For a blunder, that’s too
big.’”171
As soon as we realise that what is presented is ‘too big to be a blunder’
— not just a bit but altogether absurd — we might be inclined to start
looking for an entirely different interpretation. If so, what we need to
look at is not the expression of the belief as such. As we have seen, in his
Lectures on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein argues that, in order to get clear
about aesthetic words, we should not so much focus on such judgements
as ‘This is beautiful’ but on the complicated situations in which these
expressions may have but a negligible place. The same holds true for
religious beliefs:
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“There are, for instance, these entirely different ways of thinking first of all
— which needn’t be expressed by one person saying one thing, another
person another thing.
What we call believing in a Judgement Day or not believing in a Judge-
ment Day — The expression of belief may play an absolutely minor
role.”172
We should not focus on the form of the words but on the use to which
they are put. We have to look and see at what is done with them, what
follows from them, under what circumstances they are employed, what
difference they make in a person’s life, and so on.173 Once this is done,
a totally different picture may emerge. The belief in a Last Judgement is
not a reasoned belief; there is no appeal to ordinary grounds for belief.
What the believer has is not proof that there will be such a thing as the
Last Judgement but, rather, an unshakeable belief which will show in the
way it regulates for all in his life:
“This is a very much stronger fact — foregoing pleasures, always appealing
to this picture. This in one sense must be called the firmest of all beliefs,
because the man risks things on account of it which he would not do on
things which are by far better established for him.”174
The firmness, or unshakeability, of the belief lies not in the amount of
evidence which may be garnered in support of it but in the role it plays
in the life of the believer as a guidance for his life; whenever he does
anything, this is before his mind:175
“Here believing obviously plays much more this role: suppose we said 
that a certain picture might play the role of constantly admonishing me, or
I always think of it. Here, an enormous difference would be between those
people for whom the picture is constantly in the foreground, and the others
who just didn’t use it at all.”176
There would be an enormous difference, indeed. Wittgenstein offers the
following example by means of clarification:
“Suppose someone were a believer and said: ‘I believe in a Last Judgement,’
and I said: ‘Well, I’m not so sure. Possibly.’ You would say that there is a
enormous gulf between us. If he said ‘There is a German aeroplane overhead,’
and I said ‘Possibly I’m not so sure,’ you’d say we were fairly near.”177
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In the case of the aeroplane, the dispute is about a matter of fact. Both
disputants would agree as to what would count as a German aeroplane
and what not, and how one should decide the matter. By contrast, in 
the case of believing in a Last Judgement, what is in question is not a
matter of fact but a whole way of thinking. The disputants would not be
disagreeing as much as talking at cross-purposes:
“Those who said: ‘Well, possibly it may happen and possibly not’ would
be on an entirely different plane.
This is partly why one would be reluctant to say: ‘These people rigor-
ously hold the opinion (or view) that there is a Last Judgement’. ‘Opinion’
sounds queer.
It is for this reason that different words are used: ‘dogma’, ‘faith’.”178
Wittgenstein’s analysis, then, gives us cause to reconsider the nature of
the disagreement between the believer and the unbeliever. We are, per-
haps naturally, inclined to think that they contradict each other, the one
claiming the opposite of the other. But, in Wittgenstein’s view, this is
nonsense:
“If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgement Day, in the sense
in which religious people have belief in it, I wouldn’t say: ‘No. I don’t
believe there will be such a thing.’ It would seem to me utterly crazy to say
this.
And then I give an explanation: ‘I don’t believe in…’, but then the
religious person never believes what I describe.
I can’t say. I can’t contradict that person.”179
If the believer were doing no more than expressing an opinion or offer-
ing an (im)probable hypothesis, we “would say they reason wrongly,
meaning they contradict us.”180 But, if Wittgenstein is right, the believer
may be engaged in an altogether different game. Rather than venting his
opinions, he is expressing his faith. We are not dealing with a ‘rigor-
ously held view’ but with an ‘unshakeable belief’. Here, there can be no
question of the believer and the unbeliever contradicting each other.
Does this mean that it was all just show? That the believer and the
unbeliever have nothing much to disagree about? Obviously not. The
point is not that there is no disagreement between them, but that the
nature of the disagreement is not that of merely a factual dispute. Rather,
it pertains to a distinct way of life. The believer thinks and acts differ-
ently, saying different things to himself, entertaining different pictures.
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Someone might, for example, think of his behaviour and what happens
to him in terms of retribution. Whenever he is ashamed of himself he
thinks ‘This will be punished’, when he is ill he takes it as a punishment,
and so on.181 Such a person thinks entirely different from someone who
has made no place for the notion of retribution in relation to his life. Yet,
Wittgenstein remarks, “so far, you can’t say that they believe different
things.”182 As far as matters of fact are concerned, there need be no 
difference of opinion. Rather, the unbeliever does not, as it were, con-
nect the dots in the same way, perhaps not even aware that there are any
dots to be connected. Notions of punishment or retribution play no, or an
altogether different, role in his life; he entertains no such, or different,
pictures:
“It is this way: if someone said: “Wittgenstein, you don’t take illness 
as punishment, so what do you believe?” — I’d say: “I don’t have any
thoughts of punishment.”183
The differences between the believer and the unbeliever are real enough.
But they need not show up in anything which is said. One is almost
inclined to say that here, nothing can be said, yet everything can be
shown. The difference religious beliefs make shows itself in the life of
the faithful who no longer rest their weight on the earth but suspend
themselves from heaven. And then everything will be different, the world
has become a wholly different one.184
2.3.2 An expressivist account of religious language?
Many have felt that Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Religious Belief are reduc-
tionist in nature, reducing religious belief to the mere expression of a
certain attitude to life. Although it cannot be denied that certain passages
tend to support such a conclusion, I hope to show that there is good
reason to reject it.
First, we should remind ourselves that Wittgenstein was not unaware
that his later philosophy might give a reductionist impression. In the Inves-
tigations he anticipates such a reaction. Discussing the nature of sensa-
tions, in particular the feeling of pain, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor com-
plains that Wittgenstein reduces feeling pain to displaying pain-behaviour.
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His analysis makes it appear that the sensation itself, the pain we have, is
‘a nothing’. Wittgenstein replies: 
“Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion
was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about
which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which
tries to force itself on us here.”185
Wittgenstein is not denying that there is a difference between pain-
behaviour with and without pain. He is, rather, insisting that the gram-
mar of ‘pain’ is not the grammar of objects.
Turning to Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘God’, one might say it is anal-
ogous to the Investigations’ treatment of ‘pain’. Is not God made out to
be a nothing? Here, too, Wittgenstein might well reply that He is not a
something, but not a nothing either. Once again, Wittgenstein is rejecting
the grammar which tries to force itself on us: “Grammar tells us what
kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar).”186 The grammar of
‘God’, Wittgenstein suggest, is not the grammar of objects: “If the ques-
tion arises as to the existence of a god or God, it plays an entirely dif-
ferent role to that of the existence of any person or object I ever heard
of.”187 Do these remarks show that Wittgenstein is committed to an
expressivist account of religious language?
In short, the expressivist argument runs something like this.188 True,
talk of God does not refer to some kind of entity or person; it cannot 
be construed as factual. Our ‘ordinary’ beliefs get their sense precisely
by virtue of their picturing possible or actual facts. In other words, the
belief ‘that p’ has a descriptive or cognitive element; consequently, it
may be true or false. Religious beliefs, by contrast, lack this cognitive or
descriptive function; they are neither true nor false. But that does not
mean they are nonsensical. Their significance is to be found in the way
they express certain desires, fears, intentions, attitudes to life as a whole,
and so on.189 This kind of argument has a respectable history, not only in
philososphy of religion, but in moral philosophy as well. A. J. Ayer, for
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example, agrees that statements of value fail the test of cognitive signif-
icance.190 Although Ayer admits that they are, thus, factually empty, he
refuses to condemn them as nonsensical. Their significance lies in their
emotive or expressive force. Similarly, R. B. Braithwaite rules out the
possibility of religious expressions having a factual or cognitive mean-
ing.191 Nevertheless, rather than dispatching them as nonsensical, he
locates their significance in their expressing a commitment to a way of
life. Ayer’s ‘emotive theory of values’ and Braithwaite’s ‘empiricist’s
view of religious belief’ provide classic examples of expressivist accounts
of moral and religious beliefs, respectively.
Expressivist accounts of religious belief trade on a uniform under-
standing of description and reference, providing a single, straightforward
criterion of what is to count as meaningful. Religious beliefs, having no
descriptive content, fail the test. If they are to be something other than
nonsense, their content must be non-descriptive. We have observed how
the Tractatus may, to a certain extent, be said to advocate such a theory
of meaning. As such, it played no small part in opening up the possi-
bility of a non-descriptive or non-cognitive understanding of religious
belief. However, we have also observed how Wittgenstein’s later work
repudiates many of the central assumptions underlying the Tractarian
account. As Clack points out,
“[Wittgenstein’s] relation to the kind of linguistic theories which give birth
to the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction is thus quite paradoxical: he is
both father-creator and enemy. Consequently, one can use the later work of
Wittgenstein in order to criticize those trends in philosophy from which the
idea of non-cognitivism springs.”192
From Wittgenstein’s later point of view, there can be no single criterion
of what is to count as referential or descriptive and, hence, as meaningful.
What is called a description may denote “a great variety of things”.193
Whether or not a given sentence is descriptive really all depends upon the
circumstances in which it is used. In short, Wittgenstein’s later philoso-
phy undermines the philosophical foundations on which the expressivist
account of religious belief rests. For Wittgenstein, the hard dichotomy
between the descriptive and the non-descriptive, between the cognitive
and the non-cognitive, etc., are redundant.194
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Wittgenstein’s later philosophy leaves little room for an expressivist
understanding of religious belief. Furthermore, his writings on religious
belief provide textual evidence to support a non-expressivist reading. Far
from endorsing the non-descriptive nature of religious beliefs, Wittgen-
stein has no qualms in calling them descriptive:
“Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has hap-
pened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something
that actually takes place in human life. For ‘consciousness of sin’ is a real
event and so are despair and salvation through faith. Those who speak 
of such things (Bunyan for instance) are simply describing what has hap-
pened to them, whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it.”195
Finally, the Lectures on Religious Belief give evidence to the fact 
that Wittgenstein was both aware of and averse to the possibility of an
expressivist understanding of his remarks. One of his students explicitly
raises the issue. Discussing the example of someone, convinced he may
never see his friend again, telling him, ‘We might see one another after
death’, Lewy asks whether this is not simply the expression of a certain
attitude. Wittgenstein emphatically rejects Lewy’s suggestion:
“I would say ‘No, it isn’t the same as saying ‘I’m very fond of you’’ 
— and it may not be the same as saying anything else. It says what it says.
Why should you be able to substitute anything else?” […] ‘He could just
as well have said so and so’ — this [remark] is foreshadowed by the word
‘attitude’. He couldn’t just as well have said something else.”196
Of certain pictures, Wittgenstein argues, we say that they might as well
be replaced by another. But this is not always the case: “The whole
weight may be in the picture.”197
2.3.3 A passionate commitment
The Lectures on Religious Belief provide “a paradigm case of [Wittgen-
stein’s] late method of philosophising.”198 Wittgenstein’s approach
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throughout the Lectures is practical and descriptive. Renouncing some
general definition of ‘religion’, he sets out instead from a number of
examples of expressions of religious belief. By means of a careful scrutiny
of such expressions — drawing connections and pointing out similarities
and dissimilarities — Wittgenstein seeks to understand their possible use
or meaning. In so doing, a number of interlocked themes emerge. Conso-
nant with the Remarks on Frazer, Wittgenstein refuses to treat of reli-
gious beliefs as hypotheses or opinions. The scientific model distorts the
peculiar logic of religious beliefs, masking their unshakeable or absolute
character. Laying bare the grammar of the beliefs reveals the regulatory
role they play in the lives of the faithful. They are like ‘pictures’ which
are constantly in the foreground, regulating the believer’s thought and
action. This may also shed some light on the nature of the disagreement
between the believer and the unbeliever. Rather than contradicting each
other, they may be seen to be displaying different styles of thinking. As
Wittgenstein later put it:
“It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passion-
ate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s belief, it’s
really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing
hold of this interpretation.”199
In the Tractatus, expressions of religious belief are condemned to the
domain of the ineffable. Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
They can only picture facts, say what is or is not the case. Expressions
of value, be it ethical, religious or aesthetic, are pseudo-propositions. As
attempts to express what by its very nature is inexpressible, they can but
fail. Although something can be shown, nothing can be said. It should be
clear that by the time Wittgenstein gave his lectures on religious belief,
he no longer adhered to these conclusions. Certainly, the Lectures main-
tain a distinction between expressions of religious belief and statements
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have seen, however, the real core of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, if such a thing 
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highlighting of similarities and dissimilarities; these features mark the Lectures on Reli-
gious Belief as a prime example of Wittgenstein’s late method of philosophising. The
fact that the notion of a language-game is not explicitly referred to is of little or no 
consequence.
199 Wittgenstein 1984, p. 64; the remark dates from 1947.
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of fact, and the former’s significance is still in question. Wittgenstein’s
criticism of Father O’Hara shows that although Wittgenstein’s no longer
enjoins the faithful to silence, he still urges them to choose their words
with care. But there is no reference to the ineffable or mystical; no dis-
tinction between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’; no talk of pseudo-propositions;
and so on. Rather than discarding religious language as nonsensical,
Wittgenstein seeks to explore its grammar, hoping to clarify what mean-
ing it may have.
Not everyone has welcomed these clarifications. Many have felt that
Wittgenstein presents a reductionist account of religious belief. It can-
not be denied that certain of Wittgenstein’s remarks tend to support
such an interpretation. On the other hand, we have seen that there is
good reason to reject it. Perhaps we should say that Wittgenstein’s
remarks on religious belief are too fragmentary to draw a definitive
conclusion. As we shall see in the following chapters, much depends
upon how one develops Wittgenstein’s insights, upon the manner in
which draws together the various observations and strands of argument
Wittgenstein has left us.
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CONCLUSION: 
WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The previous two chapters focused on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, in
particular his remarks upon religious belief. Although our aim was, 
and is, not biographical, we found that recourse to a certain amount 
of biographical material proved an indispensable aid to interpreting 
the mystical sections of the Tractatus. Though certainly not irrelevant,
such biographical references are less germane to an interpretation of
Wittgenstein’s later dealings with matters religious. I do not wish to deny
that there is still a personal dimension to remarks on religious belief from
the later period. Certain passages in Culture and Value “appear very
much to be confessions of faith, or, at the very least, gestures in the
direction of religious belief”1 rather than examples of detached philo-
sophical analysis. But such passages are few and far between. On the
whole, Wittgenstein takes up a more distant position, drawing a far
stronger distinction between his philosophical and his personal views
on religious belief than evinced by his earlier work. The remarks are
less personal, less in the nature of a prayer, and more of a contemplative
bent; at times even displaying a hint of criticism.2 Where the Wittgen-
stein of the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics was, one might say,
speaking for himself, the Wittgenstein of the Remarks on Frazer and the
Lectures on Religious Belief is content to let the religious beliefs and
practices speak for themselves.
Part of the reason may be that Wittgenstein’s new philosophy allowed
him little opportunity to speak in the first person. Janik and Toulmin
seem to suggest as much. They argue that the Tractatus, by effectively
thrusting the whole of ethics and religion outside the boundaries of the
sayable, underpinned Wittgenstein’s original Kierkegaardian attitudes.
But, from 1930 on, things had changed drastically:
1 Clack 1999(a), p. 52.
2 Anja Weiberg, among others, has drawn attention to the fact that, from 1937 onward,
there is something of an edge to Wittgenstein’s discussions of religious beliefs: “Ist der
Verfasser des Tractatus noch durchaus dem Christentum zuzuordnen, fällt diese Zuord-
nung später, ab circa 1937, nicht mehr so leicht. Wittgenstein beschränkt sich […] nicht
mehr nur auf Anrufungen Gottes und die Feststellung seiner eigenen Unvollkommenheit
und Unanständigkeit, sondern reflektiert, durchaus kritisch, verschiedene Aspekte der
Christlichen Religion.” (Weiberg 1997, p. 62.)
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“we find [Wittgenstein] still adhering to the same ethical standpoint, yet 
in a new philosophical context; and it is not clear that his new account of
language continued to provide any longer the kind of support for his ethi-
cal point of view that the Tractatus position had given. […] At the very
least, he is no longer in a position to underpin his own individualistic view
of ethics by appeal to a sharp dichotomy between the expressible and the
transcendental.”3
It would seem difficult to pin down an ethical standpoint which remained
the same throughout Wittgenstein’s life. Not seldom a radical shift of
philosophical perspective carries a change of ethical or religious under-
standing in its wake; more often than not, these things go hand in hand.
Whatever of that, Janik and Toulmin are certainly right to emphasise 
the change in philosophical perspective: Wittgenstein’s new account
of language.
The author of the Tractatus presents an austere view of human lan-
guage, even a repressive one, for it denies the intelligibility of much 
of what we say, including that of our expressions of religious belief.
Although religious truth may show itself, as the mystical, any attempt
to express what is good and godly will unavoidably transgress the
bounds of sense, misuse language and produce nonsense. Of course, 
the doctrine that religious truths are ineffable has an important place in
the history of religious thought. And perhaps we should say that the
greatest achievement of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, so far as the
philosophy of religion is concerned, is to have incorporated that doctrine
into a comprehensive theory of language.4
In the early 1930s, however, the Tractarian theory of language began
to crumble. Wittgenstein’s philosophy was radically transformed, and 
it was this transformation which both necessitated and facilitated a cor-
responding transformation of his view of religion. To be sure, Wittgen-
stein maintains that the language used to express religious beliefs is quite
unlike the language used to state matters of fact. But this no longer entails
that it is, therefore, a misuse of language. To insist that religious expres-
sions must be nonsensical is to think that the distinction between sense
and nonsense is somehow given prior to our actual linguistic activities.
But what makes sense is not prior to our use of language but shown in it:
“Practice gives words their sense.”5 Thus, there is nothing ineffable
about religious belief; a proper understanding of religious utterances
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3 Janik & Toulmin 1973, pp. 233, 234.
4 See Hyman 2001, p. 4.
5 Wittgenstein 1984, p. 85.
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requires an apprehension of their role within the distinctive form of life
or culture to which they belong.6
‘I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view.’7 We began our investigation by quoting
the first half of that remark. But it is more likely the latter half which
may have led commentators to insist that a closer scrutiny of Wittgen-
stein’s writings on religious belief conceal a consistent and coherent 
philosophy of religion, or even that Wittgenstein’s writings are fun-
damentally religious as they stand. By contrast, we have advocated a
somewhat more moderate appreciation of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on
religion. There can be no doubt that questions concerning ethics, aesthet-
ics and religious belief played an important role for Wittgenstein. It
would be going too far, however, to claim that such questions lie at the
very centre of his philosophy. Furthermore, the ‘answers’ Wittgenstein
presents are not always as clear or as compelling as one might like them
to be. One should not lose sight of the fact that Wittgenstein dealt with
religion and religious belief in a piecemeal, one might almost say, hap-
hazard way. If the student of philosophy of religion expects to find 
a detailed organised account of religious belief, or something of the
nature of a systematic approach to the problems traditionally associated
with the philosophy of religion, he will most certainly be disappointed.
Wittgenstein did not bequeath a comprehensive philosophy of religion
— the material at our disposal is simply too mosaic, too incomplete.
Rather, we are treated to what Iris Murdoch has aptly called a series of
‘exasperating hints’.8
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6 See Hacker 2001, p. 34.
7 See Rhees 1981, p. 94.
8 Quoted in Clack 1999(a), p. 75.
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PART II
From Wittgenstein to Wittgensteinianism
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II
The first part of this book focused on Wittgenstein’s writings on religious
belief. At their best, Wittgenstein’s remarks reveal a distinct and penetrating
understanding of the matter. They are forceful and compelling, promising us
new possibilities of philosophically understanding religious belief and invit-
ing us to pursue these further. Just as often, however, one is left with ques-
tions to which Wittgenstein pays little attention, let alone provides answers.
Wittgenstein does not bequeath a comprehensive philosophy of religion. His
writings on the subject are fragmentary and incomplete. This means that
anyone seeking to elaborate a Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion faces
the task of expounding and expanding Wittgenstein’s insights. There must
always be a certain amount of interpretation and further development.
The following chapter examines the works of a number of authors who
took this task to heart. Writing even before Wittgenstein’s own remarks
on religious belief were made public,1 they sought to interpret and apply
a number of central themes of the Philosophical Investigations so as 
to illuminate the character of religion.2 As a result, what has been called
‘(neo-)Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion’ became a recognisable phe-
nomenon even before many had had the opportunity actually to see what
Wittgenstein himself had to say on the matter.3 It has been argued that this
early Wittgensteinian appropriation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy for
the philosophy of religion “has had unfortunate consequences not only
for how we have come to understand Wittgenstein’s relevance to religion
but also for how we have come to understand his work in general.”4 The
Wittgensteinians, Joseph M. Incandela contends, distorted Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy, focusing too narrowly on language-games and forms 
of life as possessing an ultimacy of intelligibility and justification. As
1 None of Wittgenstein’s later writings on religious belief were published until 1966.
2 See Clack 2001, p. 12; cf. Clack 1999(a), p. 78 and Clack 2003, pp. 203ff.
3 Literature on the subject vacillates between the two terms: ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’
and ‘Wittgensteinian’ philosophy of religion. Presumably, the prefix ‘neo’ is added to
underscore the fact that we are dealing, not so much with Wittgenstein’s position but,
rather, with that of his followers which, though based on Wittgenstein’s work, signifi-
cantly goes beyond it. It is, indeed, important to keep this in mind. Still, in what follows,
for no reason other than economy, we shall simply speak of Wittgensteinian philosophy
of religion.
4 Incandela 1985, p. 457.
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a result, religious modes of discourse, as distinctive language-games or 
as (a) distinctive form(s) of life, were awarded a quasi-ontological and
epistemological autonomy. While this may seem a useful strategy for
safeguarding religious belief against positivistic censure, such a strat-
egy, Incandela argues, was far from Wittgenstein’s mind. Unfortu-
nately, such was the impact of the Wittgensteinian reading that many
have mistakenly thought these conclusions to be implied by Wittgen-
stein’s own work.
Clack has expressed similar misgivings. The story of Wittgenstein’s
presence in contemporary philosophy, he argues, is a peculiar and in
many ways a tragic one. Even though the later Wittgenstein’s own writ-
ings on religion did not appear until 1966, due to the work of the early
Wittgensteinians, their perceived character had already been established:
“Wittgenstein’s view of religion appeared to be known even before many had
heard what he himself had written, and (here’s the tragedy) that view was
habitually understood in terms of ‘fideism’: religion was a ‘language-game’,
a ‘form of life’ neither requiring justification nor susceptible to criticism or
explanation. Absence of such notions in Wittgenstein’s own considerations of
religion seemed to make little difference to these characterisations. The die
had been cast.”5
Our discussion aims to show that Incandela’s and Clack’s suspicions 
are not unfounded. Although the early Wittgensteinians remain firmly
rooted in Wittgenstein, the use they make of his philosophical heritage
does indeed raise a number of problems. The early Wittgensteinians put
great effort into elaborating the significance of Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy for the philosophical study of religion, fleshing out his fragmentary
remarks to pave the way for a systematic, more comprehensive account
of religious belief. But there is both strength and weakness here. In giv-
ing inordinate weight to Wittgenstein’s notions of a language-game and
a form of life they lay themselves open to the charge of fideism.
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5 Clack 2001, p. 12.
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3. THE WITTGENSTEINIAN SCHOOL OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
In the first part of this chapter we turn to examine some of the earlier
writings of Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, and Norman Malcolm. Our main
interest lies in how these authors introduced a number of themes from
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy into the philosophy of religion, prepar-
ing the way for a more comprehensive Wittgensteinian account of reli-
gious belief. Thus, we shall not scrutinise their conclusions too closely.
Far more critical attention is given, in the second part of this chapter, to
D. Z. Phillips’s The Concept of Prayer. This, Phillips’s first published
book, constitutes the first sustained and systematic attempt at applying a
Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophical study of religion. As such,
it has played a crucial role in giving shape to what has been referred to
as ‘the Wittgensteinian School of philosophy of religion’.1
3.1 The roots of the School
3.1.1 Rush Rhees
The roots of the Wittgensteinian School may be traced back to the 1950s,
when Rush Rhees wrote a series of pieces on religion which “were evi-
dently inspired by, and in many ways were a continuation of, Wittgen-
stein’s later thoughts on the character of belief.”2 Those acquainted with
Wittgenstein’s work will certainly find much that is familiar in Rhees’s
writings. It is not too difficult to bring out the similarities. In fact, it is
more difficult to spot the differences. One should not forget that although
most of the topics addressed by Rhees undeniably have their roots in
Wittgenstein’s remarks, in every single case Rhees takes the discussion
1 While Rhees, Winch, Malcolm, and Phillips may certainly be regarded as eminent
members, the list of those who have, at one time or other, been considered as members of
the Wittgensteinian School of philosophy of religion is long and variegated. Among oth-
ers, and in no particular order, G. E. Hughes, Peter Geach, Stanley Cavell, J. M. Cameron, 
O. K. Bouwsma, Paul Holmer, Don Cupitt, W. D. Hudson, R. H. Bell, and Robert Coburn,
have all, in one way or other, been associated with Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. 
2 Clack 1999(a), p. 78. These pieces, along with related work by Rhees, have been
edited and published by D. Z. Phillips.
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further than Wittgenstein did. Where Wittgenstein’s remarks are piece-
meal and often, to some extent, personal, in Rhees we find the makings
of a more comprehensive account of religious language. But we must
not move too quickly here. Although there is development, it is not the
development of a system. In fact, Rhees’s papers are often just as tenta-
tive and personal as Wittgenstein’s. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that
Rhees elaborates on certain themes which have continued, up until this
day, to play a significant role in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion.
We indicate three of these below.
The first theme concerns the nature of philosophical enquiry. Rhees
follows Wittgenstein in claiming that philosophical problems are concep-
tual problems. As Wittgenstein has it, they “are solved, not by giving
new information, but by arranging what we have always known.”3 Rhees
agrees:
“The perplexity of mathematics and the perplexity of religion are what 
I am calling difficulties with concepts. And the point of that is chiefly that
in neither case is it a difficulty that comes because we do not yet know
enough; it is nothing for which we can wait on the result of some further
observation. It does not come from ignorance, it comes from a confusion of
concepts.”4
Now, as we have seen, on the one hand, Wittgenstein’s (later) philosoph-
ical method is designed specifically to dissolve philosophical problems.
Hence, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein addresses a philosophical
audience. For example, no one in the medical profession should benefit
from his discussion of the concept of pain. Nor does it seem plausible
that Wittgenstein hopes to reform our everyday practices into which 
the concept first enters. Rather, these practices constitute Wittgenstein’s
methodological starting point. We need to return to our everyday prac-
tices to solve the problems which occur when we are doing philosophy.5
On the other hand, there is a further aspect to Wittgenstein’s work where
philosophical clarification is not so much occasioned by specific philo-
sophical problems but, simply, by an urge to understand. One is striving
for clarity, for the sake of clarity. Obviously, these two aspects overlap.6
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3 Wittgenstein 1994, I, 109.
4 Rhees 1997, p. 195.
5 See, for example, Wittgenstein 1994, I, 11, 116-117, 194.
6 Alan Bailey has argued that the latter one gains the upper hand in Wittgenstein’s
dealings with religious belief. In his view, this explains why Wittgenstein’s enterprise 
is rather unsuccessful: “the chief reason for Wittgenstein’s relative lack of success in 
the case of religious language may well lie in the fact that his philosophical methodology 
is directed primarily towards the dissolution of philosophical problems rather than the 
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But one might say that Rhees emphasises the latter aspect more strongly.
He is trying ‘to make sense of the whole thing’; and it is not just the
philosopher who stands to gain from doing so:
“There are philosophical puzzles in religion, in a way somewhat analogous
to that in which there are philosophical puzzles in science, I suppose. One
gets into tangles and wonders whether there is any way of making sense of
the whole thing. I suppose the philosopher’s business then would be to try
to help the believer to understand what it is that he is doing and saying; not
to interpret it, but to help him to avoid confusions — confusions with other
ways of speaking which are foreign to religion, for instance.”7
The claim that there are philosophical problems in religion, as there are
in science, is somewhat ambiguous. Surely, problems occurring in reli-
gion, or in science, are not so much philosophical as religious or scien-
tific problems. Formally, the distinction may be stated as follows: in the
latter case, what constitutes a problem is determined by means of criteria
provided by a given linguistic context whereas, in the former case, prob-
lems arise due to a lack or confusion of such criteria. Evidently, it is not
always easy clearly to draw such a distinction. But it cannot be lost alto-
gether if Wittgenstein’s approach is to remain viable. For if philosophi-
cal confusion does not so much occur when we are doing philosophy but
is inherent in our everyday linguistic activities, we no longer have any
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disinterested clarification of meaning for its own sake.” (Bailey 2001, p. 134.) Note that
Bailey is not just criticising the results of Wittgenstein’s enquiry into religious language.
Rather, he is questioning the viability of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method in this area
of enquiry. The problem, Bailey argues, is simply that the specific form of intellectual
confusion that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic techniques are intended to eliminate is not wide-
spread in our thought about matters of religion. The most we can do is to investigate with-
out prejudice the way statements about God are used by religious believers. But Wittgen-
stein’s methodology, we are told, is unfit to fulfil this task of disinterested clarification.
Now, whether or not one agrees with Bailey that Wittgenstein’s conclusions are disap-
pointing is one thing. But it will not do to rule out the applicability of his method of
philosophising. For one thing, Bailey distinguishes too sharply between ‘dissolution’ and
‘description’, making it appear as if one must choose: either one gets busy dissolving
philosophical problems or one engages in the disinterested clarification of meaning for its
own sake. This obscures the internal relation that binds these two activities. For Wittgen-
stein, the dissolution of a philosophical problem is effected through the disinterested clar-
ification of meaning. Furthermore, Bailey’s suggestion that, where religious discourse 
is concerned, there are “no characteristically philosophical perplexities to be dissolved”
(Bailey 2001, p. 135) is bewildering. The central questions informing Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy have to do with the nature of linguistic representation, with the relation between
language and reality, with the intentionality of thought and language, with metaphysics,
and so on. To suggest that, where religious language is concerned, such questions do not
arise seems systematically capricious and historically inaccurate. If they have not caused
philosophical perplexity, they have certainly been the focus of much disagreement.
7 Rhees 1997, p. 30.
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rough ground to be led back to.8 Furthermore, we would no longer be
addressing just a philosophical audience: we are helping the believers to
understand what they are doing. If anyone, they stand to gain most from
the dissolution of the problems at hand. But the claim that the philoso-
pher is in a better position to understand religious expressions than the
believers themselves hardly seems amenable to Wittgenstein’s position.
Or better: it raises some rather irksome questions concerning the relation
between philosophical and religious understanding, questions to which
we will return in the course of this chapter.
Turning from methodology to application, Rhees’s conclusions do not
stray too far from Wittgenstein’s. The absolute nature of belief in God is
affirmed; religion is tied to a particular form of life; religious language
is argued to be confessional rather than speculative; etc. Rhees continu-
ally stresses the distinctive character of ‘religious language’. In keeping
with Wittgenstein, he discusses this in terms of differences in grammar:
“There is a way in which language is used in religion — what we may call
the grammar of religious language — which is different from other uses 
of language. This appears especially in connection with certain expressions
which are the same here and in language that is not religious, but which
have a different grammar here.”9
The addendum, clearly, is that once we lose sight of the distinctiveness
of religious expressions we fall into all manner of confusions. Rhees
offers quite a few examples, some of which are remarkably similar to
Wittgenstein’s. Compare, for instance, Rhees’s discussion of the propo-
sition ‘God exists’ to Wittgenstein’s: 
“‘God exists’ is not a statement of fact. You might say also that it is not in
the indicative mood. It is a confession — or expression — of faith. This is
recognised in some way when people say that God’s existence is ‘neces-
sary existence’, as opposed to the ‘contingency’ of what exists as a matter
of fact and when they say that to doubt God’s existence is a sin as opposed
to a mistake about the facts.”10
Rhees is evidently treading familiar ground. However, it is important to
note that his examples are more elaborated than Wittgenstein’s, and his
conclusions more resolute. Rhees’s emphasis on the distinctiveness of
religious language is particularly strong. He goes so far as to say that, in
108 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
8 See Wittgenstein 1994, I, 107. Of course, one might solve this problem by arguing
that not all our linguistic activities are confused; just religious ones. But this is a conclu-
sion neither Rhees nor Wittgenstein is inclined to entertain.
9 Rhees 1997, pp. 192-193.
10 Rhees 1997, p. 49; cf. Wittgenstein 1999, pp. 59-60.
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religion, notions of truth and reality may acquire a whole new sense.11
These themes are not lacking in Wittgenstein’s work, but are more promi-
nent in Rhees’s. It is not too difficult to understand why critics of the
Wittgensteinian School have felt uneasy. Too strong an emphasis on the
autonomy of religious expressions, one might feel, results in too strong
an isolation and immunisation of religious belief. Thus, the charge of
fideism may gain a foothold. However, in fairness to Rhees, the auton-
omy claimed for religious language is not absolute. Rhees continually
draws attention to the tight connections which must exist between reli-
gious language and activities and other linguistic practices. In fact, in 
his famous article Wittgenstein’s Builders, he criticises Wittgenstein for
taking the analogy between language and games too far; it becomes
almost impossible to see how the various language-games can still be
said to make up a language:
“For the ‘cases’ of games are all games themselves; and of course they do
not make up a game. Different languages would not make up a language
either. This shows that I am pushing the analogy in a way that it was not
meant to go.”12
The meaning of religious language depends also upon the way in which
it is connected to other uses of language. Still, there are grounds for
suspicion, if not in Rhees than certainly in Winch’s earlier work, where,
as we shall see, the isolation of social practices takes a particularly
virulent form.
Finally, the similarity between Rhees’s and Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on religion is also evident from Rhees’s choice of material. One might
say that Rhees was particularly interested in a strand of Christianity he
found in the writings of, for example, Kierkegaard and Simone Weil, as
well as in the work of Russian novelists, such as Tolstoy. The mystical
tradition, including figures such as St. John of the Cross and Meister
Eckhart appealed more strongly to him than, say, the natural theology of
Aquinas. This ties in with Rhees’s distrust of — or, at the least, puzzle-
ment concerning — any kind of rational or natural theology. Rhees
rejects the attempt to establish the rationality of belief in God, or prove
God’s existence. Religious beliefs are not to be understood as dressed up
statements of fact, the truth of which may be verified independently.13
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11 See Rhees 1997, p. 285.
12 Rhees 1970, p. 76.
13 See, for example, Rhees 1997, pp. 8-12, 16-22, 36-37, 44, 98, 103-104, 129, 285,
293-294.
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This should not surprise anyone at all familiar with Wittgenstein’s work.
From his earliest to his latest writings, he shows little patience for a
rationalist approach to theology. And his interest in the mystical, how-
ever idiosyncratic, already surfaces in the Tractatus. Furthermore, we
have remarked upon the influence Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief had upon
Wittgenstein, and highlighted his interest in Kierkegaard. But, once again,
Rhees goes one step beyond Wittgenstein in awarding these sources a
central role in the philosophical study of religious belief. On the whole,
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has followed his lead.
To summarise: Rhees sets off from familiar themes and elaborates
and expands upon these. The way in which he does so resonates still 
in contemporary Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. Rhees’s work
remains close to Wittgenstein’s, not just in content, but also in spirit.
Like Wittgenstein’s, Rhees’s remarks are fragmentary; although they
contain the seeds of a more comprehensive account of religious phenom-
ena, they eschew the systematic framework required to provide such. As
Clack points out, such a framework was in no small part developed by
Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science, first published in 1958.14
Although the book does not actively engage in philosophy of religion,
it had an enormous impact on authors who sought to apply Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy to the study of religion. It did so in at least three
ways.
3.1.2 Peter Winch
The Idea of a Social Science sets out “to undermine the idea that the
methods of the natural sciences can profitably be applied to the under-
standing of human and social affairs.”15 Winch takes John Stuart Mill’s
conception of a social science as exemplary of an approach that flou-
rishes still at the present time.16 According to this approach, the aim of
any scientific investigation is to establish causal sequences, that is: 
“to show that the temporal succession of A and B is an instance of a
generalization to the effect that events like A are always to be found 
in our experience to be followed by events like B.”17 Of course, such
broad statistical generalizations are ultimately not enough. They must
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14 See Clack 1999(a), p. 79.
15 Clack 1999(a), p. 79.
16 See Winch 1990, p. 75. The Idea of a Social Science was originally published in
1958; all references are to the second edition.
17 Winch 1990, p. 67.
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be connected deductively with the laws of nature from which they result.
In short, a scientific investigation aims to explain certain phenomena in
terms of the regular laws which govern them. Where the social sciences
are concerned, matters are really no different: “there can be no funda-
mental logical difference between the principles according to which we
explain natural changes and those according to which we explain social
changes.”18 It follows that
“The methodological issues concerning the moral sciences should be seen
as empirical: an attitude involving a wait-and-see attitude to the question
of what can be achieved by the social sciences and, incidentally, ruling the
philosopher out of the picture.”19
Winch emphatically rejects this conclusion. The notion of a human
society, he argues, involves a scheme of concepts which is logically
incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in science. The issues
facing us are not so much empirical as conceptual. And this means that
they are the domain of the philosopher rather than that of the scientist.
Not to put too fine a point on it, “giving an account of the nature of
social phenomena in general, itself belongs to philosophy.”20
We shall not aim to reproduce Winch’s argument in full. But the main
thrust runs as follows. The scientist’s task is one of observing regularities
and expressing these in the form of generalizations which are connected
deductively to the laws governing the phenomena under investigation. Of
course, in order to do so, the scientist needs concepts and criteria accord-
ing to which he determines what shall count as relevant, what shall
count as an instance of ‘the same thing’ occurring. These concepts and
criteria must be understood in relation to the rules governing the scien-
tific investigation. But in this respect there is a crucial difference between
the natural and social sciences respectively:
“for whereas in the case of the natural scientist we have to deal with only
one set of rules, namely those governing the scientist’s investigation itself,
here what the sociologist is studying, as well as his study of it, is a human
activity and is therefore carried on according to rules.”21
The concept of gravity does not belong essentially to the behaviour of 
a falling apple but, rather, to the physicist’s explanation of the apple’s
behaviour. The concepts at work in human activities, by contrast, belong
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essentially to these activities; they are internally related to them.22 Accord-
ing to Winch, 
“it is these rules, rather than those which govern the sociologist’s investi-
gation, which specify what is to count as ‘doing the same kind of thing’ in
relation to that kind of activity.”23
The conclusion Winch wants us to draw is that we cannot understand
social activities without taking into account the ideas which inform these
activities. Thus:
“a monk has certain characteristic social relations with his fellow monks
and with people outside the monastery; but it would be impossible to give
more than a superficial account of those relations without taking into
account the religious ideas around which the monk’s life revolves.”24
Now, if sociology is really philosophy in disguise, we should want to
enquire as to the nature of philosophy. First and foremost, Winch rigor-
ously distinguishes philosophy from science. Science aims to explain the
nature of certain particular natural phenomena; philosophy, by contrast,
is concerned with the nature of reality as such and in general.25 This may
seem to amount to a traditional understanding of philosophy as meta-
physical ontology. But Winch immediately moves away from such a
conclusion. For the question ‘What is real?’ is “not an empirical ques-
tion at all, but a conceptual one. It has to do with the force of the con-
cept of reality.”26 Such questions cannot be solved by empirical enquiry;
rather, they involve the elucidation of the concept of reality — or better,
the concepts of reality. That is to say, Winch rejects a monolithic account
of human institutions and practices in favour of “an infinitely extendable
number of distinctive modes of social life, each of which can be evalu-
ated only on its own terms.”27 According to Winch, it is of the very
nature of a human society “to consist in different and competing ways of
life, each offering a different account of the intelligibility of things.”28 It
follows, Winch argues, that one cannot apply criteria of logic to modes
of social life as such, for they are only intelligible in the context of var-
ious ways of living or modes of social life. There is, in other words, no
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single account of truth, meaning, rationality, or, indeed, reality, to which
all human institutions implicitly do or must conform. Rather, various
social relations express various ideas of truth, reality, etc.29 Philosophy’s
task is not to explain these ideas, nor to reduce them to a spurious unity
but, rather, to elucidate the role they play in their natural contexts of
application.
Obviously, Winch’s approach should have some significant conse-
quences for the study of religion. That is, if, indeed, religion constitutes
one distinct ‘category of behaviour’, one specific ‘mode of social life’.
Winch leaves little room for doubt: “science is one such mode and
religion is another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to
itself.”30 In fact, for a work which does not explicitly engage in the phi-
losophy of religion, the number of examples drawn from the religious
field is remarkable.31 The lesson to be learnt is unmistakable: religious
life is conducted according to considerations of its own. It provides its
own criteria of intelligibility, criteria which need not conform to those
constitutive of other modes of social life. Here, too, our task is not to
explain but to elucidate. Religion should be understood in terms of the
ideas expressed by the believers themselves:
“Consider the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican (Luke, 18, 9). Was
the Pharisee who said ‘God, I thank Thee that I am not as other men are’
doing the same kind of thing as the Publican who prayed ‘God be merciful
unto me a sinner’? To answer this one would have to start by considering
what is involved in the idea of prayer; and that is a religious question. In
other words, the appropriate criteria for deciding whether the actions of
these two men were of the same kind or not belong to religion itself.”32
Two important points come to the fore here. First, the claim that the cri-
teria involved in answering the question raised above belong to religion
underscores the distinctive nature of the religious way of life and implies
the possibility of drawing a clear distinction between what does and does
not belong to this category of behaviour. Secondly, if the question is a
religious question, it follows that the philosopher “must himself have
some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement
he is studying and understand the considerations which govern the lives
of its participants.”33 These two points, however, raise at least as many
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questions. For, first, it is not at all obvious that one can always clearly
separate the wheat from the chaff. What is and what is not religious
often may be difficult to decide. It may be a matter of dispute not only
from an outsider’s but, more importantly, from an insider’s point of view
— as between adherents of two distinct religious traditions. One gets the
impression that, having been delivered from a monolithic understanding
of human society, one is thrown back to a monolithic understanding of
religion. Secondly, one may wonder why the question, as Winch seems
to imply, belongs exclusively to religion. Surely the ‘same’ question may
be asked, and answered, from within various disciplines, say psychol-
ogy. In fact, it would seem to follow from Winch’s own analysis that,
unless we specify the context in which the question arises, we have no
way of knowing what it entails. In other words, although the question
may be a religious one, it is difficult to see why it must be. Furthermore,
the claim that the philosopher must have some religious feeling raises
questions concerning the relation between philosophical and religious
understanding. To say that one needs some acquaintance with the reli-
gious movements one is studying seems no more than common sense.
However, the demand for some ‘religious feeling’ on the part of the
philosopher is ambiguous. What is the nature and extent of this reli-
gious feeling? Does this mean that we must become believers in order
to understand? The Idea of a Social Science steers clear from answering
these questions.
It should be clear, as Clack points out, that “Winch’s program for
social understanding is an application of Wittgenstein’s later philosoph-
ical method”.34 In keeping with Wittgenstein, Winch rejects the scien-
tific endeavour to explain, favouring a descriptive approach. Philosophy
does not formulate sets of criteria of intelligibility; rather, it describes
those criteria which are at work in our social practices, or, as epistemol-
ogy, describes the conditions which must be satisfied if there are to be
any such criteria at all.35 Philosophy is, thus, uncommitted enquiry; it is
not its business to award prizes to science, religion, or anything else, it
does not advocate any Weltanschauung.
Where Winch significantly goes beyond Wittgenstein, however, is,
first, in his relocation of the social studies as a branch of philosophy.
In Winch’s hands, the injunction that philosophy does not explain
anything “entails that sociology should become like philosophy (rather
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than biology), laying bare the ideas expressed in social institutions, rather
than explaining them.”36 Secondly, in Winch, the terms ‘mode of social
life’ and ‘category of behaviour’ seem to play a role similar to that of
language-games and forms of life in Wittgenstein. But we would do well
to remember that although other Wittgensteinians have followed Winch
in claiming that religion is a autonomous mode of social life, or that reli-
gious belief constitutes a logically distinct category of behaviour, Wittgen-
stein himself never put forward so bold a thesis. As we have seen, his
notions of a language-game and a form of life play a far more dynamic
role than their Winchian counterparts. As Winch would later admit,37
it is difficult to avoid the impression that The Idea of a Social Science
presents social practices, traditions and institutions as more or less iso-
lated and self-contained, each going its own, fairly autonomous, way —
a necessary ingredient, one might say, for a fideist philosophy.
To summarise: The Idea of a Social Science provided Wittgensteinian
philosophy of religion both means and mandate. Winch both justified the
study of religion in its own terms, rather than in terms of some underly-
ing dynamic, and delivered the systematic framework required for doing
so. The way in which Phillips criticises well known attempts to ‘explain
away’ religion in his, aptly titled, Religion Without Explanation bears
witness to the importance of Winch’s work. Such critics of religion as
Feuerbach, Durkheim and Freud are argued to have failed to incorporate
believers’ concepts within their explanations.38 But this is to get ahead
of our story. For Religion Without Explanation was published in 1976,
well after Wittgenstein’s own writings on matters religious had been
made available. To trace the history of the Wittgensteinian School of
philosophy of religion, we should go back some ten years, to 1965, and
Phillips’s first book, The Concept of Prayer. Before we do so, however,
let us conclude our examination of the roots of the School by turning to
Malcolm’s discussion of Anselm’s ontological argument(s).
3.1.3 Norman Malcolm
In his paper ‘Anselm’s Ontological Arguments’, published in 1960, Mal-
colm undertakes a defence of Anselm’s ontological argument for the
existence of God. Or at least of one of Anselm’s arguments, for, remark-
ably, Malcolm discovers two distinct arguments in Anselm’s writings.
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Although he admits that there is no evidence that Anselm thought of
himself as offering two different proofs, Malcolm is convinced
“that in Anselm’s Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two differ-
ent pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and
that a good deal of light may be shed on the philosophical problem of ‘the
ontological argument’ if we do distinguish them.”39
The first argument Malcolm recognises in Anselm’s writings is the one
with which we are familiar. In essence, it seeks to deduce the existence
of God from our conception of Him as something a greater than which
cannot be conceived. That something a greater than which cannot be
conceived, i.e. God, cannot exist only in the understanding, for then a
greater thing could be conceived, namely, one that exists both in the
understanding and in reality. It follows that God exists. Malcolm rejects
this argument on the grounds that it rests on the false assumption that
‘existence’ or ‘being’ is a ‘perfection’ or ‘real predicate’. Here, Malcolm
admits, he is simply restating some of the observations Kant made in his
attack on the ontological argument.40
According to Malcolm, the idea that existence constitutes a perfection
does not play a role in Anselm’s second argument, however:
“[Anselm’s] first ontological proof uses the principle that a thing is greater
if it exists than if it does not exist. His second proof employs the different
principle that a thing is greater if it necessarily exists that if it does not nec-
essarily exist.”41
The subtle but crucial difference lies in the presence of ‘necessarily’ 
in the second, and its absence from the first proof. This is important
because, in Malcolm’s view, the concept of ‘necessary existence’ is rad-
ically different from that of ‘existence’, which he interprets as contin-
gent existence.42 Kant was right to insist that contingent existence is not
a property, and thus not a perfection. But this criticism does not affect
Anselm’s second proof. Here, Anselm is maintaining “not that existence
is a perfection, but that the logical impossibility of non-existence is a
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perfection” or, in other words, that “necessary existence is a perfection.”43
Consequently, the second argument holds. Malcolm summarises it as
follows:
“If God, a being greater than which cannot be conceived, does not exist
then He cannot come into existence. For if He did He would either have
been caused to come into existence or have happened to come into exis-
tence, and in either case He would be a limited being, which by our concep-
tion of Him He is not. Since He cannot come into existence, if He does not
exist His existence is impossible. If He does exist He cannot have come
into existence (for the reasons given), nor can He cease to exist, for nothing
could cause Him to cease to exist nor could it just happen that He ceased to
exist. So if God exists His existence is necessary. Thus God’s existence is
either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of
such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assum-
ing that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.”44
I shall not be concerned with the question whether Malcolm interprets
Anselm correctly, nor shall I seek either to establish or refute this ver-
sion of the ontological argument.45 Rather, I wish to draw attention to
some of the distinctly Wittgensteinian elements Malcolm brings into his
discussion. The first thing to note is the emphasis Malcolm places upon
paying attention to the actual use of religious language. Once we do so,
we come to see that it makes no sense to treat of God’s existence as 
contingent existence. Anything which exists contingently, one might
say, is dependent for its coming into existence, and for its continued
existence, on other things and events. Thus, for instance, a house is built
by a carpenter; its coming into existence is dependent on a certain cre-
ative activity. And, evidently, its continued existence is dependent upon
many things: that a tree does not crush it, that it is not consumed by fire,
and so on.46 God’s existence, by contrast, cannot be said to be depend-
ent on anything: 
“If we reflect on the common meaning of the word ‘God’ (no matter how
vague and confused it is), we realize that it is incompatible with this mean-
ing that God’s existence should depend on anything. Whether we believe in
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Him or not we must admit that [God] cannot be thought of as being
brought into existence or as depending for His continued existence on any-
thing.”47
Again, of anything that exists contingently it makes sense to ask how
long it has existed, whether it will still exist tomorrow, and so on. Where
God is concerned, Malcolm argues, such questions make no sense:
“It seems absurd to make God the subject of such questions. According to
our ordinary conception of Him, He is an eternal being. […] To ascribe
eternity to something is to exclude as senseless all sentences that imply that
it has duration.”48
Of course, even if we allow that believers conceive of God as ‘independ-
ent’, ‘limitless’, ‘eternal’, and so on, this does not show that such talk
makes sense. Existence, one might argue, cannot be a necessary property
of anything. That is to say, every proposition of the form ‘x exists’ must
be contingent. Thus, if Malcolm is right about the way in which believ-
ers conceive of God, he has merely shown that the concept is senseless.49
Malcolm, however, rejects this argument. There are, he argues “as many
kinds of existential propositions as there are kinds of subjects of dis-
course.”50 We need to look at the use of words rather than manufacture
a priori theses about it. When we do so, we will come across the reli-
gious use of words:
“Here is expressed the idea of the necessary existence and eternity of God,
an idea that is essential to the Jewish and Christian religions. In those 
complex systems of thought, those ‘language-games’, God has the status of
a necessary being. Who can doubt that? Here we must say with Wittgen-
stein, ‘This language-game is played!’ I believe we may rightly take the
existence of those religious systems of thought in which God figures as a
necessary being to be a disproof of the dogma, affirmed by Hume and
others, that no existential proposition can be necessary.”51
Malcolm seems to imply that the fact that the concept of God has an
established use in religious discourse constitutes evidence for the mean-
ingfulness and consistency of that concept.52 Surely, it is not difficult to
see why that conclusion should arouse suspicion. Suspicions which may
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well be confirmed when, at the end of his essay, Malcolm turns to 
consider the question of the relation of Anselm’s argument to religious
belief. It would be unreasonable, Malcolm tells us, to require that the
recognition of Anselm’s argument as valid must produce a conversion.
We can imagine an atheist going through the argument, becoming con-
vinced of its validity, yet remaining an atheist. The only effect it could
have “would be that he stopped saying in his heart ‘There is no God’,
because he would now realize that this is something he cannot meaning-
fully say or think.”53 At this level, the argument is understood as a piece
of logic. But, or so it seems, this is but a shallow or a partial understand-
ing of Anselm’s argument. For Malcolm goes on to say that at a deeper
level
“the argument can be thoroughly understood only by one who has a view of
that human ‘form of life’ that gives rise to the idea of an infinitely great
being, who views it from the inside not just from the outside and who has,
therefore, at least some inclination to partake in that religious form of life.”54
If Malcolm’s conclusions concerning the religious language-game were
a cause for concern, how much more so are these conclusions concern-
ing the religious form of life? Not only does Malcolm’s revision of the
ontological argument deprive the unbeliever of the possibility of deny-
ing God’s existence, what is more, he cannot even be said truly to under-
stand the argument that accomplishes that feat. Even if Malcolm may
not have intended his remarks to be taken in this way, it should not sur-
prise us that critics have found them to imply some form of fideism.
When we encounter the concept of God as a problem in philosophy,
Malcolm argues, we do not consider the human phenomena that lie
behind it. Thus, it is not surprising that many philosophers believe that
the idea of a necessary being is an arbitrary and absurd construction. For
even if we allow that the concept is free of self-contradiction, one would
still want to know “how it can have meaning for anyone.”55 Why is it
that human beings have formed such a concept? Says Malcolm:
“This is a legitimate and important question. I am sure that there cannot 
be a deep understanding of that concept without an understanding of the
phenomena of human life that give rise to it.”56
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While Malcolm gives some indication of the direction in which we
should look by referring to certain remarks of Kierkegaard’s, he feels
that he has been unable to provide an adequate account of the human
phenomena that lie behind the concept of God. In the following sections,
we shall see that The Concept of Prayer took it upon itself to fill that
gap. Whether, in so doing, it also succeeded in bridging the gap between
religious understanding and philosophical understanding remains to be
seen.
To summarise: Malcolm’s essay seeks to unravel the philosophical
problem of the ontological argument. Like Wittgenstein, Malcolm urges
us to pay attention to the actual use of our language. Where he goes
beyond Wittgenstein is in awarding religious belief the status of a distinct
and logically autonomous language-game or form of life. As Malcolm
later put it: “Religion is a form of life; it is language embedded in action
— what Wittgenstein calls a ‘language-game’. Science is another. Nei-
ther stands in need of justification, the one no more than the other.”57 It
should be clear that these conclusions do not stray too far from Winch’s
conclusions in The Idea of a Social Science. It should be equally clear
that they go far beyond anything Wittgenstein said or what can plausibly
be regarded as what he meant but did not say.58
3.2 D. Z. Phillips: The Concept of Prayer
Early Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion reaches its climax in 
D. Z. Phillips’s The Concept of Prayer. Published in 1965, this was,
perhaps, the first extended essay in the philosophy of religion influ-
enced by Wittgenstein’s philosophy.59 In an early review, Antony Flew
opined that the book was likely to be dismissed “by many as an essay 
in a fashionable religious obscurantism, by Wittgenstein out of Kierke-
gaard.”60 In the remainder of his review, Flew leaves little doubt that he,
at any rate, was prepared to do so. Contrary to Flew’s expectations,
however, the book provoked a good deal of discussion. Interestingly,
this discussion focused not so much on Phillips’s actual analyses of 
different examples of prayer but, rather, on the epistemological issues
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raised by the essay — as far as Phillips is concerned, regrettably so.61
Nevertheless, our discussion follows suit. At this stage of our investi-
gation, our main interest lies in the way in which Phillips makes bear
Wittgenstein’s philosophy upon the philosophical study of religion. Of
course, ‘methodology’ and ‘description’ are interrelated. As Phillips puts
it, The Concept of Prayer aims at “affecting philosophical antagonism
against religion in so far as it attempts to clarify the kind of activity
prayer is.”62 Still, we shall focus primarily upon the former aspect. The
first section argues that this partiality is justified. The Concept of Prayer
played a decisive role in shaping people’s perception of the character of
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. What is more, closer examina-
tion suggests that its view of a ‘Wittgensteinian’ method or approach is
less the result of a careful reading of Wittgenstein than of the influence
of its direct predecessors: Rhees, Winch and Malcolm. This alone pro-
vides sufficient warrant to examine its methodological suppositions.
In inheriting much of its predecessors’ point of view, The Concept of
Prayer also inherits many of their problems. Discussing Rhees’s, Winch’s
and Malcolm’s work, we raised a number of questions which may loosely
be grouped under three headings: the nature, the task, and the results 
of philosophical enquiry. In doing so, we encountered a number of prob-
lems; problems which have fuelled the charge of fideism. The second
and third sections of this chapter examine how The Concept of Prayer
engages with these issues. As we shall see, although it presents a more
thorough examination, it tends further to complicate rather than to dis-
solve our difficulties.
3.2.1 The Concept of Prayer, Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians
Why the emphasis upon the epistemological and methodological? Phillips
later argues that we may put this down to the deep-rooted assumption
that we can first determine whether God exists or not, and turn to look
at worship only if that issue is settled in the affirmative.63 One of the
main points The Concept of Prayer seeks to establish is that this assump-
tion betrays a misunderstanding both of the nature of religious discourse
as well as of the nature of philosophical investigation. Appealing to
Wittgenstein, Phillips argues that philosophical problems are conceptual
in nature. They often arise when we try to give an account of concepts
THE WITTGENSTEINIAN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 121
61 See Phillips 1981, p. vii.
62 Phillips 1981, p. 29.
63 See Phillips 1981, p. vii.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_02  01-02-2006  11:11  Pagina 121
with which we are perfectly familiar. By means of illustration, Phillips
cites the famous passage from Augustine’s Confessions: “What then is
time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to 
an inquirer, I do not know.”64 The way to solve such a problem is not 
by means of an empirical investigation. What we need is a descriptive
account of the concepts or activities that puzzle us. Of course, ‘descrip-
tive’ should not be taken in a naïve sense. Seeking to give a philosoph-
ically relevant account of, for instance, the activity of praying, one 
cannot simply proceed to recite the creeds, or to repeat the words used
in the prayer. What is needed is a conceptual account; an account which
pays attention to the grammar of a given discourse, and the actions into
which it is woven. Such an account leaves, as Wittgenstein said, every-
thing as it is.65 That is to say, it does not provide any foundations but
clarifies what was already there awaiting clarification. As Phillips has
it, it is not up to the philosopher to determine whether or not belief in
the existence of God is rational. On the contrary, philosophy’s task is
the much more modest one of trying to understand what belief in God
amounts to. Having once descriptively clarified that belief, its work 
is done.
Clearly, this perspective places The Concept of Prayer in quite a crit-
ical relationship to many of its contemporaries. The disagreement runs
wide and deep, concerning not only the subject of enquiry, but also the
nature of that enquiry as such. And, perhaps, that should not surprise us.
For no matter what weight one wishes to give to Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy, his is a critical voice. Not just in relation to the kind of philosophy
he explicitly opposed, but even in relation to those philosophies which
were believed to be more accommodating to his thought. This is still
true within the contemporary scene, and it was certainly true in 1965,
when Wittgenstein’s (later) writings were only just being appropriated.
So, although it is perhaps deplorable that the discussion The Concept of
Prayer provoked focused almost exclusively on the methodological doc-
trines and epistemological theses it presented, it is also quite understand-
able. In taking up a distinctly Wittgensteinian standpoint, Phillips takes
up a distinctly critical standpoint. The direction his later work has taken
only goes to confirm this. Positive themes continue to play an important
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role, but the larger part of Phillips’s work is, in fact, negative. Construc-
tive analyses of what religious believers are actually doing are over-
shadowed by a forceful critique of certain philosophical methods and 
the accounts of religious activities they engender. Furthermore, attention
is given increasingly to the exegesis of Wittgenstein’s remarks and the
promotion of a Wittgensteinian approach.
To discuss these matters now would take us too far astray. We return
to them at a later stage. Luckily, we need not invoke any of Phillips’s
later works to make our point. For The Concept of Prayer already effec-
tively illustrates it. Leslie M. S. Griffiths is surely right that, in the book,
there is a predominance of talk about what religion is not.66 If confirma-
tion is needed, we may turn to Phillips himself:
“My arguments have a destructive and a constructive aspect: I want to
stop ways of talking about prayer which lead to confusion, but also I
want to try to say what people are doing when they pray. Although these
two aspects are interdependent, I must admit that the former tends to pre-
dominate […].”67
Even when presenting his view of what believers are doing when they
pray, Phillips’s argument often proceeds by way of exclusion: neither
this nor that, but like so. Moreover, one does well to remember that the
whole of the first chapter of the book is taken up by an investigation into
the nature and implications of a specific philosophical approach which is
critically contrasted with other, ‘traditional’, approaches.
The Concept of Prayer draws heavily upon Wittgenstein’s later phi-
losophy in explicating this approach. Right from the start, where Phillips
quotes paragraphs 123 and 124 of the Investigations, he makes it clear
that he endorses a conception of the relation of philosophy to religion
which derives, at least for a large part, from Wittgenstein’s remarks. At
times, he comes close to implying that he is merely bringing Wittgen-
stein’s words to our attention.68 For the most part, however, Phillips
should be read as saying that his position is implied by Wittgenstein’s
remarks. This, indeed, would be the more prudent claim as most of the
methodological doctrines and epistemological theses presented in The
Concept of Prayer are nowhere to be found in Wittgenstein’s work.69
Wittgenstein never actually said that philosophy does not provide a foun-
dation for prayer, that, instead, it merely gives an account of it, leaving
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everything as it is. He never called religion a distinct form of life which
may only be understood by looking at the things religious believers do
and say. Did he imply these things? Given the fact that Wittgenstein’s
writings on religious belief had not yet been published and that his 
Philosophical Investigations was only just being appropriated, one might
expect a thorough analysis to support this claim. If so, one will be disap-
pointed. The Concept of Prayer never engages in this task. Phillips
quotes Wittgenstein on six occasions only. The first four quotes, all in
the first chapter, derive from the Philosophical Investigations; the latter
two from the Tractatus.70 Phillips’s discussion of these passages falls
short of a careful exegetical examination. Given the importance bestowed
upon Wittgenstein’s thought this is rather surprising. One wonders why
Phillips does not provide such an examination.
Our answer must remain speculative, but it seems a reasonable assump-
tion that Phillips does not do so because, first, this is not his main aim
and, secondly, because it had already been provided. Rhees’s, Malcolm’s
and Winch’s work shows how Wittgenstein’s remarks should be taken
and how his descriptive method should be made to bear on religious
belief. The systematic preliminaries had already been dealt with. What
was lacking was a comprehensive descriptive account of a specific reli-
gious activity. This is what The Concept of Prayer sets out to deliver. 
In doing so, the debt it owes to its predecessors is unmistakable. For
although the initial appeal is to Wittgenstein, the real support is provided
by Rhees, Winch and Malcolm.
As for Rush Rhees — although The Concept of Prayer was written
under his supervision his work is not explicitly mentioned. But his voice
may be clearly recognised throughout the book. Rhees emphasised the
importance of recognising the distinctive grammar of religious discourse;
he rejected an understanding of religious beliefs as explanatory or hypo-
thetical; he refused to make philosophy the arbiter of truth in matters
religious, stressing the personal element and arguing that to say Chris-
tianity is true, is to adopt it; he placed great weight upon the works of
Kierkegaard and Simone Weil — all these themes reappear in The Con-
cept of Prayer. As for Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch, their work
plays a crucial supporting role in the first chapter of The Concept of
Prayer. Extended use is made of Malcolm’s analysis of the concept of
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an eternal God, and Phillips leans heavily on Winch in arguing for 
the distinctiveness of the religious way of life and the autonomy of the
criteria of logic which arise in that way of life and from which religious
language and the activities into which it is woven derive their intelligi-
bility. Wittgenstein is heard on neither topic. Which is hardly surprising,
for his discussion of the concept of God was not yet available and his
(then) published works provide little, if any, textual support for Winch’s
socio-philosophical thesis of the autonomy of categories of behaviour. It
is no accident that Phillips turns to Winch, quoting in full the famous, or
notorious, passage from The Idea of a Social Science where it is claimed
that science and religion are distinct modes of social life.71
It would seem, then, that The Concept of Prayer’s understanding of
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy owes more to Rhees, Winch and
Malcolm than to a careful examination of Wittgenstein’s own remarks.
This suggestion also helps to explain another remarkable aspect of the
book. Rightly or wrongly, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion is, by
now, indissolubly connected to talk of religious beliefs as distinctive
language-games, of religion as a specific form of life. It may, therefore,
come as something of a surprise that, in The Concept of Prayer, the notion
of a language-game is not employed at all, and the notion of a form of
life just once or twice.72 This is all the more puzzling when one recalls
that Wittgenstein adds ‘praying’ to a list of examples meant to exemplify
the multiplicity of language-games.73 As we saw, Winch, too, refrained
from extensive use of the terms, opting for talk of ‘ways of living’,
‘modes of social life’, ‘categories of behaviour’ and ‘contexts of appli-
cation’. The fact that Phillips follows Winch in emphasising the distinc-
tive framework, context, or way of life that constitutes religion,74 lends
support to our suggestion that, in The Concept of Prayer, Winch takes
precedence over Wittgenstein.
Perhaps we should say that it were the Wittgensteinians rather than
Wittgenstein who provided The Concept of Prayer its primary source of
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inspiration. Rhees, Winch and Malcolm play a crucial role in preparing
the way for some of the main themes and key arguments of The Concept
of Prayer. What sets Phillips’s book apart is the way in which it takes 
up these voices and expands upon them. Rhees’s remarks, we saw, are
tentative and fragmentary; they lack an overall systematic framework.
Winch provides such a framework but does no more than hint at its
implications for the study of religion. Malcolm’s discussion remains
negative and abstract; it falls short of providing an extended descriptive
account of religious belief(s) or practice(s), and of the human phenom-
ena that lie behind it. Phillips, one might say, draws them together into
a more comprehensive account, an account which engages critically with
contemporary philosophical accounts, thus giving a distinctive voice to
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion.
To summarise, I see no reason to doubt Phillips’s word when he tells
us that what he started out with when writing The Concept of Prayer
was a cluster of puzzling problems concerning prayer, rather than with
something called a philosophical position which he then applied to 
the problems at hand.75 Nevertheless, in addressing these problems, the
book also aims to elaborate and endorse a conception of the relation of
philosophy to religion argued to be implied by Wittgenstein’s remarks;
a specific philosophical approach which is presented as radical and
innovative.76 It is, indeed, the first sustained and systematic attempt at
applying a Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophical study of reli-
gion. As such, its contribution to the development of Wittgensteinian
philosophy of religion cannot be overestimated. And it is as such that
we discuss it here.
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8558-05_Bloemendaal_02  01-02-2006  11:11  Pagina 126
3.2.2 The Concept of Prayer and philosophical clarification
In designating the nature and task of philosophical enquiry, Phillips, like
Rhees, emphasises philosophy’s hermeneutical task. On the one hand,
Phillips may be understood as arguing that the question of God’s exis-
tence constitutes a philosophical problem. By clarifying the grammar of
the concept of God, he believes the problem may be shown to rest on
confusion. Having been led back to the rough ground, our philosophi-
cal problem is dissolved. This would tie in neatly with Wittgenstein’s
therapeutic method. On the other hand, various passages suggest that
philosophical clarification need not set off from specific philosophical
problems. Rather, it seeks to attain a clear understanding of religious
phenomena — the language, beliefs and the actions into which they 
are woven — trying to make sense of the whole thing.77 Philosophical
clarification brings not just the dissolution of philosophical puzzles but
a new understanding of the subject under investigation. Here, Phillips
feels, Wittgenstein may be misleading. For, although his remark that
philosophy must leave everything as it is rightly emphasises the relation
of philosophy to the discourse it wishes to investigate, it does not do jus-
tice to the new understanding which such an enquiry brings.78 The same
goes for Wittgenstein’s comparison of the philosopher’s treatment of a
problem to a doctor’s treatment of an illness:
“If one is treated for an illness one hopes to be restored to health; one
hopes to return to the state one was in before the illness occurred. But when
one is rescued from the grips of a philosophical puzzle, one does not return
to the state one was in before the puzzle occurred. On the contrary, one
possesses an understanding which one did not possess previously.”79
The Concept of Prayer thus vacillates between a problem-oriented and a
more hermeneutical designation, placing strong emphasis on the notion
of a philosophical understanding which is, so to speak, philosophy’s net
gain. In the following section we enquire into the nature of this new
understanding; for now, let us probe a bit more deeply into The Concept
of Prayer’s conception of philosophical clarification.
In 1965, the influence of logical positivism was still very much
noticeable in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of religion. Perhaps the slogan,
‘the meaning of an expression is its use’ — in many ways traceable to
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Wittgenstein’s work — had broadened positivism’s narrow criteria of
meaning. But Phillips is right to say that religion benefited little from
these concessions.80 Expressions of religious belief were deemed at best
false, at worst vacuous or nonsensical. In the hands of believers, our
every-day concepts, to use two famous phrases, ‘are stretched to break-
ing point’ and are thus ‘killed by inches, the death of a thousand qualifi-
cations’.81 The Concept of Prayer seeks to overcome these objections by
attacking what it takes to be their fundamental assumption. Namely,
“that there is a primary context of ordinary use which can self-evidently
be taken as paradigmatic for evaluating use in other contexts.”82 This,
Phillips argues, is by no means self-evident; on the contrary, to assume
such is to be guilty of arbitrary linguistic legislation.83 The Concept of
Prayer urges us to abandon ‘ordinary language’ as a norm of meaning-
fulness and rationality and to start looking at the use words actually have
in the various contexts in which they are employed. Conceptual analysis
— that is, philosophical clarification — pays attention to the depth
grammar of a given discourse, thus bringing out the criteria of meaning
internal to that discourse and revealing what it means to engage in said
discourse.84 The point of a philosophical investigation of religion is not
to be found in propaganda either for or against religion. The philosopher
wishes merely to understand the grammar of religious discourse. There
is no meaning in the claim that philosophy can justify this discourse; it
can do no more than provide a further understanding of what religious
believers are doing and saying.85
There is some doubt, however, as to whether The Concept of Prayer
truly succeeds in breaking loose from the positivistic assumptions it so
vehemently attacks. According to Incandela it does not.86 He argues that
we are offered, what David Pears called, a species of ‘linguistic natural-
ism’, which says that
“‘there is nothing but the facts’ (but, pace the scientific form of positivism,
the linguistic facts of the use of grammar of a particular mode of discourse
— of which religion is one). Pears concludes, ‘This kind of answer to
philosophical questions is positivistic’; but it is a ‘subtle positivism’ which
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does not discriminate against those modes of discourse which until Wittgen-
stein had to sit at the back of the bus.”87
The logical positivists were concerned to ground meaning and rationality
in ‘the given’, that is, observable, empirical reality. Religious beliefs, they
maintained, have a hard time living up to this demand. For instance, when
the theist says that God is a mystery which transcends human understand-
ing, A. J. Ayer enquired, is he not really saying that it is unintelligible?88
Phillips’s reply would seem to confirm Incandela’s suggestion that The
Concept of Prayer has not really left positivism far behind:
“My reply and my argument can be expressed in the following remarks by
Marcel: ‘Not only does the word “transcendent” not mean “transcending
experience”, but on the contrary there must exist a possibility of having an
experience of the transcendent as such, and unless that possibility exists the
word can have no meaning.’”89
Far from dismissing the positivists’ criteria of meaning, Incandela con-
cludes, Phillips and his predecessors merely came up with a hybrid form
of it they could live with:
“they still wanted religious acts and statements to be grounded somehow in
experience and so discoverable through empirical analysis. The form of life
model simply allowed them to interpret these acts and statements within a
particular context. […] Hence, while religious beliefs could not possess
any meaning for the former group since no sense experience could confirm
or disconfirm them; the same sort of beliefs acquired legitimation for the
latter group precisely because it is an observable fact that people do hold
them — that is, that certain people do talk and act in ‘religious’ ways.”90
Once again, textual evidence would seem to support this claim. Witness
how Phillips continues the passage quoted above:
“Talking to God is not an impossible feat. People do so when they pray.
There are contexts within which concepts such as prayer are used and have
their meaning. If religious people speak of God as being beyond human
understanding or as a mystery, these are religious ideas which can be under-
stood as such.”91
The emphasis here is not so much on the individual language user but 
on autonomous and distinctly religious modes of discourse from which
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individual religious acts, beliefs, and expressions derive their meaning.
Paradoxically, this position does turn out to be more amenable to the
positivistic climate in which it arose than to Wittgenstein’s view.
This, as noted previously, supports our suggestion that Phillips draws
more on his predecessors than on Wittgenstein. For the rationale of these
claims is revealed not by direct reference to Wittgenstein, but to Mal-
colm and Winch. Drawing upon their work, Phillips argues that criteria
of truth and falsity are internally related to, and vary systematically with,
a variety of contexts. Religion, as Winch indicated, is one of these con-
texts. Which means that criteria of truth and falsity in religion are to be
found within religious traditions.92 To ask whether or not a religious
belief, say, that God exists, is true, is to ask a question “about the possi-
bility of giving an account of the distinction between truth and falsity,
sense and nonsense, in religion.”93 That is to say, we must take account
of the criteria of meaningfulness where talk of God’s existence is con-
cerned. If we fail to do so, our account is in danger of becoming a mere
ignoratio elenchi.94
In the course of his investigation, Phillips, to put it crudely, accuses
quite a few of his peers of ignorance. Such authors as Ayer, Flew, Hep-
burn, and Mitchell are argued to have failed to take due account of the
criteria of meaning and truth at work in religious contexts. They con-
strue God’s existence as akin to the existence of physical objects, taking
it for granted that the concept of God belongs within the conceptual
framework of the reality of the physical world.95 But, Phillips maintains, 
in so doing they impose an alien grammar upon religious language.96
Making extended use of Malcolm’s work, Phillips argues that the con-
cept of God logically precludes the possibility of His non-existence.
That is to say, God’s existence is not contingent; it is not that as a mat-
ter of fact God will always exist, but that it makes no sense to say that
God might not exist.97 It follows that the rejoinder that we should first
decide whether or not there is a God to pray to before we start analysing
the concept of prayer, is misguided. On the contrary, it is only by clari-
fying religious language, by giving a conceptual account of the activity
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of prayer, that we may come to see what it means to talk of God as exist-
ing. The believer, Phillips argues, learns a (religious) language. The
suggestion is “that to know how to use this language is to know God.
This common knowledge of God is religion.”98
To many, this was (and is) a startling conclusion. Referring to the pas-
sage quoted above, Flew could only conclude that Phillips surely did not
intend to say what he actually says.99 Likewise, Griffiths’s review of The
Concept of Prayer surmises that Phillips is missing the point. After all,
no philosopher would wish to deny that the significance or importance
of prayer is to be found within the activity of praying. But that is not to
say anything about meaning as a property of knowledge-claims:
“Indeed, answering a question about meaning as a linguistic property, or
a question about the assertorial status of religious remarks, by appealing to
or recommending that the questioner engage in some sort of activity or
performance […] constitutes a commission of what I call ‘the performa-
tive fallacy’.”100
In short, questions as to the meaning of prayer, questions as to the status
of the purported knowledge-claims which inform or derive from the
activity of praying, cannot be answered by looking at “what men are
doing when they talk to God.”101 To say that talking to God is not an
impossible feat for, after all, people do so when they pray,102 is surely to
dodge the whole issue. Boldly put, it only makes sense to pray when
there is a God to receive the prayer in the first place:
“The crux here is that, although this logically prior question of existence
does not of course have actually to be decided before we can begin to analyse
the concept of prayer, nevertheless, the philosopher who fails to insist that
the practice of prayer does presuppose an affirmative answer is simply not in
touch with prayer as conceived by the Saints and the Fathers.”103
Indeed, it is not hard to see how the suggestion that ‘to know how to
use religious language is to know god’ led many critics to accuse The
Concept of Prayer of some form of reductionism. Clack, for example,
considers this yet more evidence of the book’s implicit positivistic tenor.
Instead of declaring victory over the phantoms of positivism, Phillips
should really admit defeat: 
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“Accepting that after Hume and Ayer there can be no way of justifying the
metaphysical claims made by religion, Phillips and other writers of his ilk
chose, from some kind of nostalgic yearning, to preserve the language of
religion while rejecting the objects to which that language had formerly
been believed to refer.”104
Of course, on Phillips’s view, we have simply returned to the ‘deep-
rooted assumption’ that has led attention away from his actual analyses of
prayer. These analyses are not guilty of being reductionist. On the con-
trary, Phillips maintains that they do justice to the various features which
‘the life of prayer’ exhibits.105 In the following section we will examine
whether Phillips can substantiate this claim. For now, one may perhaps
reply that Flew and Griffiths are not merely assuming that questions as to
God’s existence have logical priority, they are arguing to this effect. Fur-
thermore, Flew seems willing to engage Phillips on his ‘home ground’.
For in claiming that Phillips is ‘out of touch’ with paradigmatic examples
of prayer, i.e. prayer as conceived by the Saints and Fathers, Flew is 
saying that Phillips’s account falls short of its self-proclaimed standard:
it fails to accommodate the various features the life of prayer exhibits.
Finally, we would hazard to say, the reason the assumption is so deep-
rooted is because it gives voice to a sentiment which is profoundly right.
It would be ludicrous to suggest that a (Christian) life of prayer need not
presuppose the existence of God. What to make of the person who is
committed to such a life but does not believe that God exists? The sug-
gestion is not even palatable without filling in more of the details of the
story. Of course, Phillips does not mean to deny that, on the whole, those
for whom prayer constitutes an important part of their life would, if
asked, affirm the existence of God. Where he parts ways with his critics
is in giving an account of what presupposing or affirming God’s exis-
tence amounts to. This dispute, Phillips insists, can only be settled by
reference to the language of faith. Here, Malcolm’s argument can help us
no further. For although it is important in warning us of a number of false
moves in the philosophical treatment of the existence of God, something
more positive than this must be accomplished:
“One must proceed to say what belief in an eternal God means; that is,
what the point of such a belief is. Here, the deductive logic of the previous
arguments does not suffice. One must take account of what religion means
for religious believers if one wishes to pursue this new enquiry. Otherwise
religion will seem pointless and arbitrary to someone outside religion. It is
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no accident that Malcolm’s appeal to the actual use of the concept of God
plays such a crucial role in his argument. In this essay, it is with the point
of religious worship that I shall be concerned.”106
What is needed is a philosophical clarification of the concepts at work in
the religious way of life which, by paying attention to the depth grammar
underlying and regulating the use of these concepts, reveals their meaning.
But there is an ambiguity in the above passage which needs to be brought
out.107 If one does not, one might be somewhat puzzled by the implication
that Malcolm has not yet been engaged in fulfilling said task. Surely a
clarification of such conceptual brainteasers as ‘God exists’ and ‘God is
eternal’ is, in part, what his essay sought to provide. Phillips’s point may
be understood, however, once we recognise how tight a connection is
being drawn between ‘having meaning’ and ‘having a point’, and, con-
versely, between something having no meaning and something being
pointless and arbitrary. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Phillips
here uses the word ‘meaning’ as synonymous with ‘significance’.108 The
meaning of belief in an eternal God is equated with whatever the point of
this belief may be. But this tends to run together various senses of the
word ‘meaning’. Clearly, there is a sense in which we may say that to 
see the meaning is to see the point. But when ‘meaning’ is used in its
‘logical’, ‘grammatical’ or ‘linguistic’ sense, the equation collapses. In
this latter sense, something which is pointless need not be meaningless,
and vice versa. One may perfectly well be able to understand the mean-
ing of a certain belief without seeing any point in believing it (because,
for example, the belief simply is untrue), or while continuing to find the
belief an arbitrary one. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether something
which is meaningless, in the latter sense, can be called pointless. Rather,
what has no meaning is neither significant nor futile, neither necessary
nor arbitrary. The Concept of Prayer is not always as clear in distin-
guishing these two senses of ‘meaning’ as one might wish. As regards
the implication that Malcolm has not yet revealed the meaning of belief
in an eternal God; here, ‘meaning’ should primarily be understood in the
former sense, that of ‘significance’.
Perhaps it is understandable that questions as to the point of religious
belief crop up given the strong emphasis on the distinctiveness of reli-
gious grammar and the religious mode of life characteristic of early
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Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. Where it comes to allowing the
‘distinct modes of social life’ to overlap and intermingle, The Concept 
of Prayer evinces the same kind of reserve as Winch’s The Idea of a
Social Science. Religious beliefs and activities tend to enter into social
isolation. This may guarantee their autonomy, but is hardly conducive 
to their significance. That is to say, one invites the question as to why
people would want to engage in religious activities in the first place. The
more one isolates religious concerns from our worldly cares, the more
one starts wondering why these concerns should play a role in anyone’s
life. The Concept of Prayer hopes to avoid this problem by inviting us 
to consider the human phenomena which lie behind religious belief.109
After all, religious concepts 
“are not technical concepts; they are not cut off from the common experi-
ences of human life: joy and sorrow, hope and despair. Because this is so,
an attempt can be made to clarify their meaning.”110
Before we turn to consider whether Phillips makes good on these words,
we should note that this passage contains the same ambiguity of the sense
of ‘meaning’ we just now discussed. As it stands, the remark seems to
entail the rather curious consequence that the meaning, if any, of techni-
cal concepts cannot be clarified. It is difficult to see why this should be
so, or indeed what Phillips is after. What, precisely, should the adjective
‘technical’ denote? A clear answer is not forthcoming. Phillips uses the
term rather loosely, leaving it ill-defined. It is introduced in the discus-
sion with Ayer we already referred to, concerning the believer’s claim
that the nature of God is beyond human understanding.111 Should we not
conclude that to say that something transcends human understanding is to
say that it is unintelligible? This conclusion, Phillips replies, follows only
when we take the religious ideas to be would-be epistemological theories.
But they are not. They are religious rather than technical concepts and
can be understood as such.112 This, then, gives us some indication of what
Phillips means by technical concepts: epistemological and theoretical
concepts constitute prime examples. If so, then we may safely say that we
employ many concepts which may be denoted ‘technical’. And it may
well be true that such concepts are not intimately related to experiences
of joy and sorrow. But surely it does not follow that, therefore, they have
no meaning or that their meaning cannot be clarified.
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It remains obscure why Phillips should wish to deny this. Unless, that
is, one assumes that, once again, the word ‘meaning’ should be under-
stood primarily in the sense of ‘having a point’ or ‘being significant’.
Thus, one might inject some intelligibility into the argument. But, if this
is indeed Phillips’s position, it remains an awkward one, at best. For not
only is the equation of ‘meaningful’ with ‘having a point’, as we have
argued, a dubious one, but little sense can be made of the claim that
technical concepts are pointless or arbitrary. It is either patently false 
— in their appropriate contexts theoretical and epistemological concepts
are clearly neither pointless nor arbitrary — or begs the question as to
why being cut off from common experiences of joy, sorrow, etc. should
be set up as a standard of conceptual significance. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, how can we be so sure that certain religious ideas should not 
be deemed — in the sense specified — technical in nature? Unless one
already labours under the presumption that theoretical or epistemolo-
gical and religious interests must be, can be, and are, strictly separated,
the possibility cannot be excluded a priori. At any rate, one’s conclu-
sion should be the result rather than the condition of the possibility of
clarification.
All this aside, Phillips’s suggestion that we may come to see the mean-
ing, in both the senses discussed, of religious beliefs and activities by
examining the human phenomena out of which they arise seems to allow
some leeway for explaining religious belief in non-religious terms. And,
on occasion, Phillips may appear to come close to doing so. Faced with
personal tragedy, the death of a child, believers may recognise their help-
lessness and seek something to sustain them, the love of God. When the
child unexpectedly recovers, they thank God for this turn of events.113
In this sense, religious activities may be said to arise from common
human phenomena of hope and despair. Phillips warns us, however, not
to misunderstand the nature of this relationship. For instance, the relation
between praising God and what happens is not one of inference.114 To
return to our example, the distressed parents are not asking God to save
their child, nor are they thanking Him for having brought it about that the
child survives. Rather, their prayers, if they are truly religious, are best
understood as 
“an expression of, and request for, devotion to God through the way things
go. […] When deep religious believers pray for something, they are not 
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so much asking God to bring this about, but in a way telling Him of the
strength of their desires. They realize that things may not go as they wish,
but they are asking to be able to go on living whatever happens.”115
If, in fact, it were otherwise, that is, if the parents were really out to get
God to put things aright, and thanking Him for complying, the prayer,
Phillips concludes, would not be religious but, rather, superstitious. They
would be praying to, what Phillips, borrowing from Simone Weil, calls
a naturalistic god. Which means they were not talking to God at all. No
doubt, Phillips argues, many people may worship a naturalistic god. But
that is irrelevant. After all, to err is human. Phillips, so he states, is not
interested in such mistaken religious beliefs, but in what he takes to be
genuine faith.116
In a sense, then, and without wanting to be coarse, the life of the child
drops out of the equation. Phillips realises as much when he poses the
question as to why — if what the prayer really amounts to is ‘Thy will
be done’ — the specific requests are mentioned at all. His answer is as
follows:
“since a man is concerned with hope and meaning in his life, it is the
desires which he actually does have which he wants to bring to God. After
all, it is these desires and not any others which threaten to overwhelm him,
and through which he must seek God.”117
It would be very uncharitable to suggest that Phillips portrays the parents’
desire for their child to be saved as an obstacle their faith must overcome.
Still, can his analysis do justice to the strength of the desires? Is the role
they are awarded in the prayer in accordance with their ‘human phenom-
enal’ content? Phillips places great weight upon Simone Weil’s under-
standing of the spirit of God as the spirit of self-denial. Crudely put, to
find the love of God, is to lose oneself. This, for Simone Weil, is the
prime use of suffering:
“If I thought that God sent me suffering by an act of his will and for my
good, I should think that I was something, and I should miss the chief use
of suffering which is to teach me that I am nothing.”118
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There is little doubt that The Concept of Prayer presents these words 
as genuinely and deeply religious. One might agree. And one should cer-
tainly see how Phillips’s analysis of petitionary prayer fits in well with
Weil’s remarks. But it is less easy to see how invoking the spirit of self-
denial has brought us closer to common human experiences of hope and
despair, joy and sorrow. After all, does not the renunciation of the self
involve the renunciation or, at least, transformation of these experiences?
What Phillips’s analysis demonstrates is how feelings of despair, joy,
etc., may occasion prayers of petition or thanksgiving.119 But if this is
what is meant by saying that prayer is not cut off from common human
experiences the relation is rather meagre.
The emphasis upon renunciation may be said to focus more on ‘the
divine’, than on ‘the human’. And it is because of this that it raises a
further question. This question has been posed eloquently by Clack.
Referring to Weil’s love of ‘being a nothingness’, Clack argues that
“It does not go without saying that such sentiments are not pathological.
From the necessity of denying our self-centredness, need we really go this
far? Does not this self-abasing, nothingness-seeking religion act as a con-
firmation of Nietzsche’s suspicion that Christianity served only to destroy
everything noble, everything vigorous and affirmative in human life, so
that the Christian really was the ‘sick animal man’?”120
Well, need we really go this far? Perhaps that is for the reader to decide.
Phillips would seem to indicate so when he stresses the personal dimen-
sion in religious belief. Although philosophical enquiry may help us
understand the nature of truth in religion, it cannot decide on anyone’s
behalf who the true God is or which is the true prayer. And this is due
precisely to the nature of truth in this context — to affirm the truth of a
religious belief, is to adopt it:
“To say, ‘This is the true God’, is to believe in Him and worship Him. […]
Belief in the true God is not like belief in a true theory. To believe in the
former case is synonymous with worship, and […] it is too much to expect
such an effect from any philosophical argument.”121
Seeing the truth of a prayer is indistinguishable from being prepared to
pray it. Thus, in so far as the philosopher chooses one kind of prayer,
he is making a religious judgement. In doing so, he is essentially on
the same footing as anyone else.122 But does not this contention, that
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philosophy cannot decide what constitutes true religion, sit rather uneasily
with the claim that philosophical enquiry can and should distinguish
between what is truly or genuinely religious and what is not?123 Further-
more, when one starts distinguishing between genuine religious belief
and superstition, it is, in Clack’s words, “impossible entirely to shake off
the pejorative overtone of the term, entailing that what is meant by a
superstition is simply a religious practice of which one disapproves.”124
Evidently, Phillips’s analysis captures an important strand of Christian-
ity. It fits in well with Simone Weil’s understanding of belief in a super-
natural God, and perhaps it can accommodate many of Kierkegaard’s
views. But whether it can do justice to the various ways in which Chris-
tianity has historically understood itself remains doubtful. Of course, it
need not. In fact, The Concept of Prayer denies any claim to complete-
ness. There are, Phillips admits, many prayers which do not fit readily
into his exposition: “all I can do is to note them and leave it at that.”125
Given Phillips’s persistent use of the distinction between what is gen-
uinely religious and what is superstitious, however, one might feel the
prospects for these prayers to be rather bleak.
We began this section by enquiring further into the notion of philo-
sophical clarification. We are left with the question as to whether such
clarifications can justify and sustain a criterion of what constitutes
genuine religious belief. To answer this question, however, we need
to pay attention to the new understanding this clarification engenders.
The following section turns to this task. It asks three interrelated
questions: what is the nature of this understanding; how does one
know that one’s understanding is correct; how does one acquire such
understanding? In raising these questions, a host of problems comes
to the fore.
3.2.3 The Concept of Prayer and philosophical understanding
First, what is the nature of this new understanding? It is clear that the
understanding gained is a philosophical understanding. That is to say, 
it is internally related to the activity of philosophical clarification and
need not coincide with the understanding a believer may have of his reli-
gious belief. While praying, a believer may know what he is doing, but
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when one asks him to give a non-religious, i.e. philosophical, account 
of prayer he may well fail to provide an adequate one.126 There is no 
reason to suppose that a devout believer must be a competent philoso-
pher, nor does he need to be. After all, for example, we are perfectly
capable of telling the time even if we lack the philosophical resources to
give an adequate account of the concept of time. But when Phillips tells
us that a philosophical understanding of religion may amount to seeing
the difference between what is deep and what is shallow in religion, or
even between what is truly religious and what is not religious at all,127
matters become rather more urgent. For, surely, this is the kind of under-
standing the believer, if not actually needs to possess, certainly would
benefit from possessing. Phillips seems to deny this. He argues that
someone who makes all the wrong philosophical moves need not lack
religious insight.128 But, if making all the wrong philosophical moves
amounts to taking things to be deep which are really shallow, and believ-
ing things to be truly religious which, in fact, are not religious at all,
then it is difficult to see how this can be maintained. Surely, here, we
can only conclude that religious and philosophical insight overlap or go
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hand in hand so that the “deepening of philosophical understanding 
may at the same time be the deepening of religious understanding”.129
Now, I do not wish to deny that there is clearly something right about
saying, as Phillips later puts it, that someone may be both a spiritual
giant and an intellectual invalid.130 The Concept of Prayer brings out the
point well by reference to Tolstoy’s story ‘The Three Hermits’.131 A
bishop is told of three hermits who live together on an island and who
are reputed to be holy men. Upon visiting them, the bishop is amused to
find that the only prayer they ever pray is ‘Three are ye, three are we,
have mercy upon us!’. He proceeds to teach them the Lord’s Prayer in
the hope of deepening their knowledge of God. With great difficulty, the
hermits finally manage to master the prayer, by repeating it after the
bishop time and time again. Satisfied, the bishop departs. But that night,
when his ship is far from land, the three are seen running on the water,
crying out to the bishop. They have already forgotten the prayer, and beg
to be taught again. Realisation dawns upon the bishop. Leaning over
ship’s side, he says, ‘Your own prayer will reach the Lord, men of God.
It is not for me to teach you. Pray for us sinners’.
The story is compelling. But is its point really that religious under-
standing is not intellectual understanding?132 Should we not say, rather,
that the story can only have the appeal is has because we normally do
associate deep religious belief with some level of intellectual understand-
ing? One should emphasise that the three hermits present an extraordi-
nary case. Their running upon the water provides the point, for both
bishop and reader, where their holiness suddenly breaks through. Nor-
mally, we do not come to learn about any individual’s piety by their 
ability to walk upon water. The depth of their faith is shown in the way
they live their lives. And, here, the ability to explain and teach, to make
their faith intelligible, is by no means irrelevant. To use a famous phrase,
faith may well be a faith seeking understanding.133 Phillips may be right
that to gain knowledge of God is not to accumulate facts about an exter-
nal object. But categorically to state that knowledge of God is not a
matter of learning, and that deepening one’s knowledge of the divine is
140 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
129 Phillips 1970, p. 268. This passage, taken from an article published only two years
after The Concept of Prayer already indicates that Phillips’s later writings are more con-
sidered in this respect.
130 See Phillips 1970, p. 264.
131 See Phillips 1981, pp. 60-61.
132 See Phillips 1981, p. 61.
133 The reply that the understanding sought is not intellectual but religious is surely
facile.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_02  01-02-2006  11:11  Pagina 140
not a matter of increasing intelligibility, is to go too far.134 Religious
belief need not be scholarly; nor need it be mute. Tolstoy’s story teaches
us not to overestimate the former; it can only do so if we have also
learnt not to underestimate it. In short, religious and intellectual under-
standing cannot be so strictly separated.135
Let us turn to our next question. How should one ascertain that one’s
philosophical understanding is correct? Here, further problems await us.
For, given Phillips’s account thus far, it is clear that it will not do to 
simply ask the believers: one cannot accept what they say as (philosoph-
ically or intellectually) true.136 Phillips’s answer is that in distinguishing
the good from the bad accounts, the ultimate appeal is to actual usage
itself. The account must be judged on the grounds of whether it accom-
modates the various features which the activity under investigation
exhibits.137 This may seem straightforward but, on closer examination, it
is far from thus. After all, even if the appeal to actual usage would con-
sist of mere empirical observation, one would still need to know what
constitute the relevant features of the activity under investigation. And
that presupposes at least some prior understanding of the activity. The
question as to what is correct would then repeat itself at this level. More
importantly, however, Phillips’s notion of the appeal to usage cannot 
be so understood. For it is determined philosophically as the clarifica-
tion of the (depth) grammar of the practice under investigation. There
is thus always a certain amount of circularity involved. Indeed, an exclu-
sively empirical understanding of the appeal to usage is explicitly rejected.
Phillips is adamant that one cannot philosophise ‘by Gallup poll’.138
There is no (need for) empirical research to gather statistical data on
believers’ views of their belief. Perhaps this also explains why Phillips
draws his primary examples not, as it were, from everyday religious life
but, rather, from philosophical and literary sources. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky,
Simone Weil and Kierkegaard provide the reminders par excellence of
‘genuine’ religious belief. Of course, these reminders are intended as
reminders of actual religious practice. That is to say, they are carried
back to the way an average, contemporary, believer experiences and
practices his faith. But, given Phillips’s distinction between philosophical
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and religious understanding, it is difficult to see how this believer can
partake in this dialogue; he remains a silent witness throughout The Con-
cept of Prayer.
Clearly then, the appeal to actual usage is far from unproblematic.
Indeed, if it were not, one should expect Phillips to be able to reach some
level of agreement with his opponents. However, as we saw, this is hardly
the case. Flew’s objection that Phillips’s account is out of touch with par-
adigmatic examples of prayer, i.e. prayer as conceived by the Saints and
Fathers, should itself be taken as an appeal to practice. Flew is saying
that his analysis, rather than Phillips’s, does justice to the various fea-
tures which the life of prayer exhibits. How to judge between the two?
Phillips implies that, at a certain stage, there is no longer any possibility
of doing so:
“What can one say to philosophers who insist on talking in this way? One
can ask them to look again at the way people worship, and at what the
Saints have written about their Faith. Also, one can point out the implica-
tions which their way of talking has for religion, and try to show how the
implications of one’s own views are truer to religious belief. […] On the
other hand, one must not be afraid to admit that one’s arguments about
religion may reach a stage where all one can say to one’s opponent is,
‘Well, if you can’t see it, that’s that!’”139
Of course, Phillips would do well to remember that his opponent may
reach the same conclusion. Thus, the whole notion of which account is
correct would seem to be left hanging in the air. But this belies the
tenor of The Concept of Prayer. For Phillips leaves little room for doubt
that his opponents’ accounts are radically mistaken and that this can 
be philosophically demonstrated. It is perhaps interesting to note that
the passage quoted above precedes the one where Phillips argues that
philosophers who make all the wrong moves need not necessarily lack
religious insight. This may, indeed, be charitable. But one may, per-
haps, forgive the philosophers addressed for finding it facetious rather
than generous.
At any rate, this brings us to our final question: how does one
acquire a philosophical understanding of religious belief? One may
reply, simply, ‘by taking note of the depth grammar of religious belief’.
But, by now, it should be clear that this reply will not do. The philoso-
pher must already have “an idea of what genuine prayer is before [he]
can give a philosophical account of it”.140 The philosopher must, in
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other words, have some ‘feeling for the game’.141 Winch, we saw, formu-
lated a similar requirement. The problem was that although it seems no
more than common sense to say that some acquaintance with the reli-
gious movements one is studying is required, the demand for ‘religious
feeling’ on the part of the philosopher is ambiguous. Phillips’s account
hardly ameliorates matters. We should not object to Phillips’s insistence
that in order to carry out an analysis of religious concepts, some acquain-
tance with such concepts is essential. And we may understand why 
he thus limits his field of enquiry to that of ‘Hebrew and Christian
prayers’.142 The question, however, is what ‘some acquaintance’ amounts
to. When we take into account the close connection Phillips draws
between understanding and believing, the question becomes urgent.
The Concept of Prayer repeatedly emphasises that the relation between
understanding and believing is internal.143 That is to say, the understand-
ing involved in religious beliefs and activities cannot be separated from
holding these beliefs, and engaging in these activities.144 Now, unless
one is conflating understanding with believing in this context, it seems
clear that there is a kind of understanding the non-believing philosopher
has to do without. Take, for instance, the notion of divine wrath. Phillips
argues that,
“where the anger referred to is God’s anger, we do not understand anger in
this context by virtue of the same kind of shared knowledge of what anger
means145 […] but by understanding a common religious experience,146
namely, that of being the object of divine wrath. […] I mean that to be able
to come to see meaning in religious concepts in the sense of being able to
use them, is to come to see what divine anger means, is to come to view
one’s life in relation to the will of God, and to recognize the horror of
estrangement from it.”147
The positivistic drift of this remark can hardly be overlooked. The mean-
ing of the notion of divine wrath is grounded in a certain experience
and so discoverable through analysis. After all, there are contexts in
which the notion is applied, accompanied by the relevant behaviour. 
The real difference is that whereas the positivists’ appeal is to ‘ordinary
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language’, Phillips invokes ‘religious language’.148 Whether or not one
feels this approach, as such, to be expedient, it does create a problem.
For whereas we are all ‘ordinary language users’, not all of us are ‘reli-
gious language users’. That is to say, if philosophy’s task is to clarify the
meaning of religious concepts, such as divine anger, and if to come to
see what divine anger means is to understand a common religious expe-
rience and to come to view one’s life in relation to God’s will, then the
unfortunate conclusion would seem to be that only a philosopher who is
also a believer may accomplish this task. We may come to sympathise
with Griffiths’s accusing Phillips of ‘the performative fallacy’.
Phillips might reply that although, indeed, there is a kind of under-
standing which only the believer can be said to have, the philosopher
does not need to have this understanding to understand that. Somewhat
less convolutedly, the philosopher may understand that he does not
understand. But, first, this seems an untimely demise for philosophical
clarification. Surely it makes no sense to say that we can clarify what
this understanding, which we do not understand, amounts to? Secondly,
it certainly provides a convenient point of entry for a fideist philosophy.
After all, if the understanding involved in prayer cannot be separated
from the praying itself,149 prayer becomes impenetrable to the outsider:
if you do not pray, you do not understand.
The demand that the philosopher must have an idea of what consti-
tutes genuine religious belief constitutes a genuine problem. To say that
this idea is no arbitrary choice, as it must be justified by showing how it
takes account of the complex behaviour of religious believers in various
situations,150 fails to break the deadlock. For the comparison between
one’s account of religious activities and these activities presupposes a
philosophical understanding which presupposes a prior feeling for the
game, and so on. Of course, the circle need not be vicious. Coming to
understand, one might say, just is dialectical; an interplay between the
observer and that which is observed. This, I take it, is precisely the point
Phillips makes by insisting that his account can be justified by appeal to
actual usage. However, as we have seen, the appeal to usage is far from
unproblematic.
We may summarise this section’s argument as follows. Following its
predecessors’ lead, The Concept of Prayer moves away from Wittgenstein
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to the extent that it stresses philosophy’s ‘transformative’ task. It is not
philosophy’s task to reform the practices it seeks to clarify; religious
language does not need tidying up.151 In this respect, Wittgenstein was
right to insist that everything is left as it is. Yet, philosophical clarifica-
tion does transform one’s understanding of the object under investiga-
tion. One gains a new, philosophical, understanding. The Concept of
Prayer falters, however, in giving an account of this new understanding.
Maintaining too strict a dichotomy between philosophical and religious
understanding, it all but eliminates the possibility of a dialogue between
the two, obscuring the former and de-intellectualising the latter. By
weakening the boundaries, one might go quite some way towards solv-
ing these problems. But The Concept of Prayer tolerates painfully little
overlap between religious and non-religious modes of life. This is
almost inevitable given the strong emphasis on the distinctiveness of
religious grammar and the religious mode of life characteristic of early
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. Showing too little sensibility to
Wittgenstein’s insight that words only have meaning in ‘the stream of
thought and life’, The Concept of Prayer is unable to overcome its self-
inflicted positivistic limitations. Thus allowing the charge of fideism to
gain some credibility, if not plausibility.
3.2.4 An unscholarly charge?
The term ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ originates in a paper under that title
by Kai Nielsen, published in Philosophy in 1967. ‘Fideism’ is commonly
used to refer to a position adopted by some religious believers when they
contend that belief rests on faith rather than on reason, and that an intel-
lectual justification of religion is therefore unnecessary, or indeed impos-
sible. The Wittgensteinian twist to fideism, one might say, is that the
unassailability of religious belief does not rest on an appeal to faith.
Rather, it is presented as the logical conclusion from a philosophical
argument. According to Nielsen, the Wittgensteinian argument proceeds
from Wittgenstein’s assertion that what is given are our forms of lan-
guage which constitute our forms of life.152 Forms of life taken as a
whole are not amenable to criticism; each mode of discourse is in order
as it is, for each has its own criteria and each sets its own norms of
intelligibility, rationality, reality, etc. Thus, there is no Archimedean
point in terms of which a philosopher (or anyone else for that matter)
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can relevantly criticise a form of life as a whole. On the assumption that
religion constitutes one such logically autonomous form of life, or cat-
egory of behaviour, it follows that the prospects of philosophical criti-
cism are very slim indeed. Qua form of life, religion is a fait accompli
which neither stands in need of justification nor should fear censure
from non-religious forms of life.153
Phillips is not on Nielsen’s original list of Wittgensteinian Fideists.
However, in his An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion Nielsen
returns to the topic of Wittgensteinian Fideism, providing a more com-
prehensive and sustained critique. Here, Phillips’s work is explicitly
referred to as presenting “a detailed paradigmatic statement of Wittgen-
steinian Fideism.”154 Justified or not, many have shared Nielsen’s opin-
ion. Phillips is surely right that he has become the author said to be pri-
marily associated with this position.155 Discussions of his work in terms
of Wittgensteinian Fideism are certainly not hard to come by, and con-
tinue to be offered up to the present day.156 Regrettably so, Phillips feels.
Phillips tells us he knows of no philosopher who has held the views
attributed to Wittgensteinian Fideists. At any rate, he insists that he him-
self has never done so. In his Belief, Change and Forms of Life, Phillips
undertakes, as he puts it, “the boring, but necessary, task of providing
straightforward textual evidence which shows that I have never held 
the views attributed to me.”157 The persistence of the Fideist critique, in
spite of Phillips’s rebuttals, has prompted Phillips to suggest that the
term ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ is an ‘unscholarly creation’, since it can
be, has been, and still is, used as an excuse for sidestepping the real
issues raised by his work, and that of others following Wittgenstein’s
lead in the philosophy of religion.158
I agree with Jacob Joshua Ross that the criticism of Phillips’s position
as fideist was never more than a half-truth.159 Phillips is right to insist
that, from his earliest work onwards, far from endorsing the fideist the-
ses Nielsen and others attributed to him, he has always argued against
them. The Concept of Prayer places too strong an emphasis upon the
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distinctiveness and autonomy of religious forms of discourse. As a result,
some of its analyses imply a fideist conclusion; but this conclusion is
never explicitly advanced. Furthermore, in Phillips’s later work, the main
problems that hamper The Concept of Prayer are addressed.160 Rather
than stressing the distinctiveness and logical autonomy of our forms 
of discourse, Phillips increasingly emphasises the way in which they are
related to one another. It would be a mistake, Phillips now argues, to
treat of religion as a form of life, it can only be understood in a form 
of life.161 Again, the positivistic connection between meaning and expe-
rience is abandoned and the relation between philosophical and religious
understanding is dealt with far more subtly. Finally, far from seeking to
immunise religious belief from external criticism, Phillips argues that
philosophical clarification may reveal confusions in religious beliefs and
practices.
Does this mean that Phillips is right to suggest that the charge of
fideism is an unscholarly one, used primarily as an excuse for sidestep-
ping the real issues raised by his work? That conclusion goes too far.
The charge of fideism is, indeed, a half-truth. This means that it is par-
tially false. However, Phillips would do well to remember that this also
means it is partially true. Phillips’s claim that the fideist interpretation 
of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion in no manner reflects what
Wittgensteinians have actually said, but is rather the result of philosoph-
ical prejudice, aided by a certain jargon which has generated a life of 
its own,162 cannot be sustained. Nielsen’s work did indeed have a huge
impact on discussions of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion but, as
Clack points out, Wittgensteinians cannot just wash their hands of the
fideistic import of such comments as Winch’s remark that science and
religion are ‘distinct modes of social life’, each with ‘criteria of intelli-
gibility peculiar to itself’ or Malcolm’s parallel claim that religion and
science are forms of life, neither of which stands in need of justification.
If ‘fideism’ and ‘Wittgensteinianism’ have become almost synonymous
terms in the philosophy of religion, then the responsibility does not lie
with hostile commentators alone.163 Indeed, Phillips himself has some
responsibility in this matter. For although it cannot be denied that he has
never explicitly sought to establish the fideist conclusions attributed to
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161 See Phillips 1986, p. 79.
162 See Phillips 1986, p. 4.
163 See Clack 2003, p. 208. 
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him, neither can it be denied that several passages in his earlier writings
encourage a fideist reading. It is, perhaps, regrettable that Phillips has
never explicitly corrected these earlier views. Had he done so, certain 
of his critics might have been more easily persuaded finally to lay the
charge of fideism to rest.
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CONCLUSION: 
FROM WITTGENSTEIN TO WITTGENSTEINIANISM
The early Wittgensteinians did us an invaluable service in putting 
Wittgenstein’s thought centre stage in the philosophy of religion. Their
work stimulated the scholarly interest in Wittgenstein’s remarks on reli-
gious belief and provided the fertile soil from which Wittgensteinian phi-
losophy of religion could grow. The ‘Wittgensteinian voice’ has become
a significant ingredient of contemporary philosophy of religion, certainly
within the Anglophone field, and increasingly so in the Continental one.
The influence each of the works we discussed continues to exert bears
testament to their import.
But there is both strength and weakness here. The early Wittgenstein-
ian reading of Wittgenstein is dubious. As Ronald S. Laura once put it,
“The problem with most Wittgensteinians is that they are not Wittgen-
steinian, or at least, not Wittgensteinian enough.”1 The Wittgensteinians
placed inordinate weight on Wittgenstein’s notions of a language-game
and form of life, focusing too narrowly on language-games and forms 
of life as possessing an ultimacy of sense and justification. As a result,
these notions — or their early Wittgensteinian counterparts — begin 
to play a static as opposed to a dynamic role. Rather than heuristic,
methodological, devices, language-games and forms of life threaten to
become the socio-linguistic building blocks of a static and compartmen-
talised social reality.2 Science is one such logically self-contained uni-
verse of discourse, religion another, neither stands in need of justifica-
tion. While this may seem a useful strategy for safeguarding religious
belief against positivistic censure, there is a high price to pay. Drawing
attention away from the individual language user and placing it in
autonomous modes of discourse all but eliminates any possibility of dia-
logue. Religious belief tends to become an isolated activity, impenetra-
ble from the outside. Thus, critics have accused the Wittgensteinians of
retreating into some kind of ‘Christian ghetto’.3 Our discussion has
shown that these misgivings are not wholly unfounded. Against the early
1 Quoted in von Stosch 2001, p. 230, n. 98.
2 See Incandela 1985, pp. 460-462, von Stosch 2001, p. 233.
3 See McGrath 1997, p. 121.
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Wittgensteinian background one cannot prevent the charge of fideism to
obtain a foothold.
On the other hand, we should not forget that, by now, some forty years
have gone by, years in which the authors we have discussed have further
developed and amended their position. This is certainly true with respect
to Phillips’s work.4 Nevertheless, discussions of his work in terms of
‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ continue to be offered, discussions which, more
often than not, tend to focus exclusively on Phillips’s earlier writings. It
would indeed by a challenge to unearth an article on Phillips which does
not pursue the familiar and tired line that he is defensively protecting
religion from outside attack.5 In this respect, one may sympathise with
Phillips’s exasperation with the fideist label. Perhaps it is time to lay the
charge of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ to rest and focus, not so much on
‘Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion’ as on Phillips’s philosophy of
religion.
Before we do so, one final question remains: did the early Wittgen-
steinian reading have an adverse effect on the way in which Wittgenstein’s
work was received, as Incandela and Clack suggest? It certainly provoked
a good deal of discussion and may well have shaped some people’s per-
ception of Wittgenstein’s writings such that “readers find in Wittgenstein
what they expect to find there rather than what is actually there.”6 On the
other hand, we should, perhaps, not overestimate the extent to which it did
so. In this respect it is interesting to note that Nielsen — in whose work
the ‘Wittgensteinian Fideist’ critique originates — makes it clear, right
from the start, that his target is not so much Wittgenstein as the Wittgen-
steinians:
“Let me remark at the outset that I am not sure to what extent Wittgenstein
himself would have accepted a Wittgensteinian Fideism. But Wittgenstein’s
work has been taken in that way and it is thought in many quarters that such
an approach will give us a deep grasp of religion and will expose the shal-
lowness of scepticism. […] But do not forget, what indeed I hope would 
be true, that Wittgenstein might well wish to say of Wittgensteinians what
Freud said of Freudians.”7
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PART III
Phillips’s Philosophy of Religion
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III
The following chapters turn to examine Phillips’s philosphy of religion
in the light of his whole body of work. We begin by developing the con-
trast between Phillips’s earlier and his later work, hinted at in the pre-
vious chapter. Chapter four examines Phillips’s mature understanding 
of philosophical enquiry as a form of contemplation. A contemplative
philosophy seeks, in a certain way, to give an account of reality, of the
reality of concepts in our lives, without meddling in them in any way.
Where religious concepts are concerned, matters are no different. Here,
too, the philosopher’s concern is with doing justice to these concepts, to
the role they play in our shared language-games and form(s) of life. Of
course, this presumes that there is some reality to religious concepts, that
they cannot be explained away as false or illusory. Hence the importance
of Phillips’s attack on reductionist theories of religion. Phillips develops
two lines of argument. On the one hand, he aims to show that the reduc-
tionist theories of religon can be shown to be confused on their own
terms of reference. Secondly, they can be rejected on the basis of an
appeal to the use which language has in many religious beliefs. Chapter
five focuses on Phillips’s first line of argument, chapters six, seven and
eight address the second line of argument through and examination of
Phillips’s accounts of the belief in miracles, in immortality, and in the
reality of God. Finally, the ninth chapter draws our discussion to an end
by asking whether Phillips’s account of religious belief can be said to be
revisionist in nature. 
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4. PHILOSOPHY, DESCRIPTION, AND CONTEMPLATION
In the previous chapter we discussed Phillips’s first book, The Concept
of Prayer, as exemplifying the way in which, in the late fifties and early
sixties, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was utilised for the philosophi-
cal study of religion, as well as effectively illustrating Phillips’s earlier
position. The first chapter of The Concept of Prayer presents the method-
ology which is adopted in the remainder of the book. This is, perhaps,
a natural and prudent configuration for any philosophical essay: one
first develops one’s general philosophical position from which a more
or less clearly delineated methodology may be assembled which can
then be applied to the problems at hand. Appearances are deceptive, as
it turns out. For this, Phillips tells us, was not the case with The Con-
cept of Prayer:
“It might be worth saying at the outset that the first chapter of my book, The
Concept of Prayer, was written last. Some philosophers have spoken as if I
had in my possession first something called a general philosophical posi-
tion, and then applied this to the life of prayer. […] This is quite incorrect.”1
What The Concept of Prayer started with was a cluster of puzzling
questions concerning prayer. It sought to answer these problems by tak-
ing as examples prayers which Christians have heard often enough, and
asking what it means to pray those prayers. It was only after attempt-
ing to do this, Phillips tells us, that he turned to consider why some
philosophers have concluded that these activities are radically con-
fused or meaningless.2
The passage quoted above is taken from Phillips’s article ‘Religious
Belief and Philosophical Enquiry’, which first appeared in the quarterly
Theology in 1968. It was reprinted in 1970 in the almost identically titled
collection Faith and Philosophical Enquiry. This collection contains
some thirteen essays which, barring one, were all written after The Con-
cept of Prayer. Many of them address specific issues regarding the con-
clusions drawn in The Concept of Prayer. Phillips engages commentators
and critics, elaborating his position. In tackling some of the problems
raised by The Concept of Prayer, the essays round off Phillips’s position.
1 Phillips 1970, p. 62.
2 See Phillips 1970, p. 62.
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Furthermore, whereas The Concept of Prayer may be said to focus on a
single problem, this collection deals with a far broader range of topics.
Thus, it introduces a number of new themes and further develops certain
arguments, quite a few of which continue to characterise Phillips’s posi-
tion up to the present day. Finally, in these essays Phillips draws more
extensively upon Wittgenstein’s work to illustrate and explicate his posi-
tion, in particular on Wittgenstein’s then recently published Lectures on
Religious Belief.3
In short, even though The Concept of Prayer was not written from the
point of view of an antecedently established, general, philosophical posi-
tion, many of the articles collected in Faith and Philosophical Enquiry
proceed to defend, or at least clarify, such a position in more or less gen-
eral terms. In the years that followed, and through numerous publications,
this process of development and clarification has continued. It culminates
in Phillips’s mature position which views philosophical enquiry as a form
of contemplation.
The notion of contemplation identifies three crucial aspects of Phillips’s
conception of philosophical enquiry. First, a contemplative philosophy
arises out of a sense of wonder. Secondly, Phillips emphasises the inde-
pendent nature of philosophical enquiry. Thirdly, he insists that philo-
sophical enquiry remains disinterested. The first part of the chapter intro-
duces these three themes, the second part engages in a more thorough
examination. The third and final part of this chapter summarises our find-
ings and argues that the distinction between Phillips’s earlier and later
works may be understood in terms of a gradual shift in attention — a shift
from a ‘descriptive’ to a ‘contemplative’ understanding of philosophical
enquiry.
4.1 The notion of contemplation
What is the philosopher trying to do? What subject matter is character-
istically his? The question of philosophical authorship, Phillips argues,
cannot be decided by a survey of what philosophers actually do. For
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3 See, for example, Phillips 1970, pp. 49, 51, 55, 72, 79-80, 84-92, 111ff., 157, 244.
Most of these references are to the Lectures on Religious Belief although they include some
to the Tractatus, Notebooks, and Lecture on Ethics. It is worth noting that Phillips refers
almost exclusively to remarks of Wittgenstein’s which deal specifically with religious or
moral belief. In Faith and Philosophical Enquiry Phillips does not (yet) systematically
explore Wittgenstein’s remarks on philosophical logic, epistemology or methodology.
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whatever one concludes for oneself there will be philosophers who, as 
a matter of fact, engage in something different. Nor will it do simply 
to say that they are not doing philosophy. This will inevitably lead to 
the accusation that one is operating with an a priori conception of the
subject:
“When one looks at the variety of activities that go under the name of phi-
losophy, any attempt to reduce these activities to an essence, or a defini-
tion, in any descriptive sense, is obviously futile.”4
This may lead one to conclude that the matter simply cannot be resolved.
‘Philosophy’, one might suggest, comes close to being what Wittgenstein
called a family resemblance concept. There just are these various ways
of engaging in philosophy; some may overlap, others need not share 
any single feature. In the latter case, lacking any philosophical common
ground, the dispute between adherents of adversary approaches will be
irresolvable. It has been argued that this is the case in the dispute between
Wittgensteinian and other, more traditional, approaches to the philosophy
of religion. Richard Messer, for example, contrasts Phillips’s work to that
of Swinburne. In his view, their dispute is not a matter of disagreement
but, rather, of radical disparity. Both contestants are not so much unwill-
ing to settle the issue as unable to do so. Underlying their respective
philosophies are ‘disparate fundamental trusts’,5 which prevent any kind
of resolution to their dispute:
If they shared a common criterion, or sufficiently similar criterion […] then
there would be disagreement, which theoretically could be overcome. How-
ever, since they differ and use disparate criteria to reach their conclusions,
this element of the debate […] cannot be brought to resolution.”6
This conclusion, it seems to me, is too hasty. For although one can
hardly ignore the variety of competing approaches within any field of
philosophy, it will not do to deny any unity to the subject, not in the
least where the nature of philosophical enquiry is concerned. Undeni-
ably, the question as to the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical
problem which can only be resolved by philosophical discussion. This,
in fact, is precisely what Messer does by introducing a radical notion
of relativity, entering at a pre-conceptual level, which undermines any
possibility of settling the dispute between Phillips and Swinburne.7
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6 Messer 1993, p. 127.
7 See Messer 1993, pp. 147-148.
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The point is not whether one agrees with Messer’s notion of disparate
fundamental trusts. The point is to see that his conclusions are them-
selves an attempt at clarifying the nature of discourse as such and, by
implication, of philosophical discourse. These conclusions are not the
result of an empirical investigation or descriptive survey. Rather, they
are reached by philosophical discussion and need to be supported by
philosophical argument. Phillips certainly would agree that he cannot
stop Swinburne from calling his procedures ‘philosophy’, and vice versa.
What he can do, however, is show the difference between these proce-
dures. This “can only be achieved by philosophical discussion, the philo-
sophical discussion which cannot be bypassed.”8
Clearly then, Phillips does not rest content with an irresolvable plu-
rality of philosophical approaches. On the contrary, he maintains that
“there is a common method, that of philosophical discussion, for which
there is no short-cut.”9 As we shall see, Phillips has very strong views
on what the philosopher can rightfully claim to be his task. In presenting
these views, however, Phillips maintains that he is “not imposing a con-
ception of philosophy on anyone but rather arguing, philosophically, for
an alternative.”10
The philosophical alternative Phillips proposes is that of a contem-
plative philosophy. The reference to philosophical enquiry as a form of
contemplation appears rather late in Phillips’s work. It is first discussed
in a paper published in 1995.11 In this paper Phillips is replying to cer-
tain points raised by William Wainwright. According to Phillips, Wain-
wright is not satisfied by Phillips’s insistence that, when confronted by
varieties of belief and unbelief, philosophy’s task is one of conceptual
clarification rather than adjudication. After all, clarification shows that
adherents of rival perspectives each regard their own perspective as true.
In this sense, “holding a moral or religious perspective does commit one
to regarding it as superior to its rivals.”12 As Phillips reads him, Wain-
wright sees no reason why philosophy should not be an aid in establish-
ing which of the rival perspectives is, in fact, the correct one.
Although Phillips is convinced that the notion of philosophy as the
arbiter of truth in moral or religious matters is, as such, mistaken, on this
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10 Phillips 1999, p. 155; cf. Phillips 1999, p. 2.
11 ‘Epistemic Practices’ in Topoi, December 1995; republished as ‘Epistemic Practices:
the Retreat from Reality’ in Phillips 2000, pp. 24-44.
12 Wainwright 1995, p. 91; quoted in Phillips 2000, p. 42.
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occasion, that is not the point he pursues. Rather, he asks Wainwright
why it should not be possible for him and others
“to acknowledge that there is a different emphasis to be found in philoso-
phy, whatever they think of it — one which contemplates possibilities of
human life rather than seeks answers?”13
In Wainwright, Phillips says, there is an emphasis on a desire for answers.
According to Phillips, his reticence in providing any such answers leads
Wainwright to suspect that he must be committed to holding that there
are no common methods for settling such disputes and, hence, no issue
of truth or falsity, correctness or incorrectness involved. This is a move
similar to Messer’s which we discussed above. We already witnessed
Phillips’s reply that there certainly is a common method, that of philo-
sophical discussion. He now adds that the aim of that discussion
“is not truth or correctness in Wainwright’s sense, but a contemplation of
possibilities which leads to an understanding that life can be like that.”14
The philosophical imperative is to understand rather than to adjudicate
or to appropriate. And, surely, we can appreciate more than we appro-
priate. Given the fact that the philosopher appreciates differing moral
and religious perspectives, Phillips asks, how could it be otherwise? The
contemplation of perspectives which we do not appropriate personally
“can itself deepen our understanding of human life, an understanding
which is not a search for solutions.”15 In fact, a desire for finding solu-
tions may block contemplation and understanding. Phillips refers to Rhees
who, he believes, brings out excellently how this may happen. For Rhees,
philosophy arises from a sense of wonder at the possibility of meaning
and understanding. To do philosophy, Rhees feels, one must be able not
only to see questions where those not given to philosophy see none, but
also to look on these questions in a particular way. Not wanting to dismiss
them nor get rid of them through any sort of answer. Such contemplation,
Rhees concludes, may be difficult to achieve in our cultural climate:
“This goes with contemplation of the ways in which people think and
inquire — e.g. in trying to solve problems in physics, or in connection with
moral problems. And this is difficult. Perhaps especially so in a culture
which has become as technological as ours — as much preoccupied with
getting things done, with how to do things, with results.”16
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15 Phillips 2000, p. 43.
16 Quoted in Phillips 2000, p. 44.
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The article we have examined provides the first explicit discussion of
Phillips’s understanding of the notion of philosophical contemplation.
Three interrelated points are brought to the fore. First, a contemplative
philosophy arises from a sense of wonder at the variety of phenomena
that make up human life. Secondly, the independent nature of philosoph-
ical enquiry is emphasised. A contemplative philosophy is not an attempt
at arriving at any specific answer but an effort to understand the variety
of answers that may be given. This means, thirdly, that philosophical
enquiry is disinterested enquiry: it seeks to understand, not to advocate,
nor to appropriate.
In his work after 1995, Phillips further develops his understanding of
philosophical enquiry as a form of contemplation. He argues most pro-
lifically for a contemplative philosophy in his Philosophy’s Cool Place.
Through a discussion of Socrates, Plato, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein,
the first half of that book seeks to elucidate what such a contemplative
philosophy amounts to. Thus, Phillips’s aim here is constructive. In the
second half of the book Phillips engages in discussions with Rorty, Cavell,
Baier, and Nussbaum. Here, his aim is far more critical. The authors dis-
cussed all serve as examples of how easily one may be tempted to go
beyond such a contemplative philosophy — examples of “how difficult
it is not to go ‘beyond Wittgenstein’.”17
Though in quotes, the readiness with which Phillips equates a con-
templative philosophy with Wittgenstein’s philosophy should not be
overlooked. Although his 1995 article discussed above does speak of
philosophical enquiry as a form of contemplation, Phillips tells us he
owes this way of putting the matter to his colleague R. W. Beardsmore.18
Wittgenstein’s name is not yet mentioned. In 1999, however, it is mainly
by reference to Wittgenstein’s work that Phillips seeks to elucidate 
his understanding of a contemplative philosophy. According to Phillips,
Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, and certain critical extensions of
it by Rush Rhees, provide excellent examples of a contemplative con-
ception of philosophy.19 The three main topics of Phillips’s previous 
discussion all return and are related to Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
writings.
Phillips urges us to recognise the independence of the philosophical
problems Wittgenstein addresses. The point of struggling with these
questions “is not external to philosophy, as though the philosophical
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reflection were the means to attaining it.”20 For Wittgenstein, philosophy
is not for anything. As noted above, Rhees had his doubts as to whether
such a conception of philosophy will find easy acceptance in our culture,
obsessed, as he believed it to be, with ‘getting things done’. Wittgenstein
often expressed similar misgivings. He felt that the surrounding domi-
nant culture was uncongenial to the spirit in which he wrote his philoso-
phy. He often spoke of the ‘sickness of the age’, the ‘poverty and dark-
ness of the times’.21 In 1930 he wrote the following:
“It is all one to me whether or not the typical Western scientist understands
or appreciates my work, since he will not in any case understand the spirit
in which I write. Our civilization is characterised by the word ‘progress’.
Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features.
Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more compli-
cated structure. And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not
as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable
in themselves.”22
For Wittgenstein, the search for clarity is not informed by an end which
is identifiable independently of philosophy. This is closely connected to
what has been termed Wittgenstein’s ‘quietism’, the demand that philo-
sophical enquiry, as paragraph 24 of the Philosophical Investigations has
it, ‘must leave everything as it is’. According to Phillips, many have felt
that here Wittgenstein is carrying matters too far. His hyperbole should
be excused as a harmless stylistic flourish. But that reaction, Phillips
argues, does great disservice to Wittgenstein’s work:
“It obscures, or even ignores, what a philosophical problem was for him.
When we are puzzled philosophically, Wittgenstein argued, what we stand
in need of is not additional information, but a clearer view of what lies
before us.”23
In striving for clarity, the philosopher leaves everything as it is. To
achieve clarity is not to arrive at a certain judgement but, rather, to under-
stand what arriving at any such judgement amounts to. “The philoso-
pher,” Wittgenstein wrote, “is not a citizen of any community of ideas.
That is what makes him into a philosopher.”24 In short, philosophical
enquiry is disinterested enquiry.
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Wittgenstein, Phillips continues, strove after this contemplative ideal
in every area of philosophical enquiry he engaged in. And not in the
least where the philosophy of religion is concerned. His analysis of reli-
gious perspectives remains independent and disinterested. Wittgenstein
gives the same kind of attention to religious discourse as to any other
discourse. He aims to do justice both to religious perspectives and anti-
religious perspectives, both to belief and atheism. As a philosopher, he
neither advocates nor appropriates any of the perspectives under investi-
gation. His concern is with their conceptual character, not their truth.25
Wittgenstein’s question is not whether or not God exists, but what it
means to believe in God or to deny His existence.26
Phillips further illustrates the contemplative nature of Wittgenstein’s
investigation into matters religious by drawing a contrast between Wittgen-
stein and Kierkegaard. There are, as many have remarked, remarkable
similarities between Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s work.27 Both are
concerned, one might say, with making grammatical distinctions to dis-
solve confusion. Kierkegaard believed many of his contemporaries were
caught up in a monstrous illusion. They were confused about the true
nature of Christianity. Wittgenstein endeavoured to dissolve confusions
he thought were widespread on matters of mental concepts, discourse
about language and so on. Both employ an indirect method to accom-
plish this task. In this respect, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author-
ship is mirrored in the various ‘voices’ entertained in the Philosophical
Investigations. Finally, both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard recognise
the limits of philosophy. By means of philosophy we may become clear
about the nature of Christianity. The monstrous illusion may be dis-
pelled. But no amount of philosophising, Kierkegaard holds, will teach
us how to become a Christian. As we have seen, Wittgenstein might be
said to agree. Conceptual clarity is not personal appropriation: “Wis-
dom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard called a
passion.”28
These similarities may lead one to conclude that Wittgenstein and
Kierkegaard were engaged in a parallel project. According to Phillips,
however, this would be a mistake: “there is an important asymmetry
between Kierkegaard’s qualitative dialectic and Wittgenstein’s philosophical
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method.”29 Kierkegaard, Phillips argues, is primarily a religious thinker,
concerned with specific confusions concerning Christianity. His entire
work, Kierkegaard wrote, is related to the problem of ‘becoming a Chris-
tian’.30 This means that the clarity he seeks is a means to a further end.
His main concern is to remove those obstacles on the path of becoming
a Christian. Kierkegaard, Phillips continues, has something close to 
an underlabourer conception of philosophy: “Philosophy clears away
conceptual confusions to facilitate clear building and clear living.”31
Wittgenstein’s interest, by contrast, lies not “in constructing a building,
so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible
buildings.”32 Given the way Kierkegaard views his task, there is no place
in his work to doubt the categories of the aesthetic, the ethical, and the
religious.33 In Kierkegaard’s work, the distinction is between the uncon-
fused Kierkegaard and the confused people of Denmark who thought
they were Christians when they were not. With Wittgenstein, Phillips
argues, things are different:
“The ‘voices’ he entertains in the Investigations are not the voices of others
who are confused. Rather, these are tendencies of thought to which he him-
self is deeply attracted and with which he struggles.”34
The asymmetry is also displayed when we turn to consider the limits 
of philosophy. For Kierkegaard, philosophy can do no more than clear
up the confusions between the categories of the aesthetic, the ethical and
the religious. It will not make one embark on becoming a Christian.
Thus, Kierkegaard “because of his religious interest, gives pride of place
to what philosophy cannot do.”35 Although Wittgenstein would agree
that one cannot philosophise one’s way into Christianity, it would be
mistaken, Phillips argues, to represent his main interest in his later 
philosophy as that of clearing up confusions. This fails to recognise 
the independence of the philosophical problems Wittgenstein addresses 
and bypasses his concern with what philosophy can do. According to
Phillips, Wittgenstein is not primarily interested in the meaning of these
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30 See Phillips 1999, p. 14.
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32 Wittgenstein 1984, p. 7.
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34 Phillips 1999, p. 47.
35 Phillips 1999, p. 30.
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specifically religious forms of discourse. In contrast to Kierkegaard,
Wittgenstein’s movement of thought is “not from a concern about reli-
gion to the need for conceptual clarification but from a concern about
the possibility of discourse to what can be said about religion.”36 This 
is why Wittgenstein’s philosophy remains contemplative, even when
dealing with matters religious.
To summarise: in Phillips’s view, independence and disinterest reveal
the contemplative nature of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical
enquiry. Wittgenstein seeks to achieve a clear understanding of the var-
ious modes of discourse in which people may be engaged and the forms
of understanding they involve. He aims to do justice to these modes of
discourse and forms of understanding, showing them for what they are
without meddling in them in any way. This remains true, even where
religious belief is concerned. Wittgenstein does not set out to determine
whether or not we should believe in God. Rather, the questions he raises
concern the various possibilities of belief and unbelief, of certainty and
knowledge. These questions, Phillips concludes, cannot be treated in a
formal or abstract way:
“What they amount to can be shown only in terms of how people actually
do think about things, the things they do not question, the things that go deep
with them. Wittgenstein wonders at the fact that people do think in this way.
He wants to show this as a direct result of the questions in philosophical
logic he raises. To ask what it means to say something, for Wittgenstein, is
the question that leads him, in the end, to a contemplation of the world pic-
tures which are constitutive of how people think, act, and live.”37
Note that Phillips speaks of Wittgenstein as ‘wondering’ at the fact that
people act and think in the way they do. We have already referred to
Rush Rhees’s belief that wonder is characteristic of philosophy:
“Perhaps it is that thinking about the notions of reality and understanding
leads one constantly to the threshold of questioning the possibility of under-
standing at all, and to wonder at the possibility of understanding.”38
Although Phillips warns us not to conflate various senses of wonder, he
nevertheless agrees with Rhees that a philosophical concern with the pos-
sibility of sense is linked, in Wittgenstein’s contemplative conception of
the subject, with wonder at the forms ‘sense’ and ‘saying something’ take
for different people:
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“Wittgenstein wondered at the fact that the great problems of philosophy
existed at all, a wonder that is internally related to the kind of attention he
thought these problems demanded of him.”39
4.2 A contemplative philosophy
Wittgenstein once expressed his ideal as “a certain coolness. A temple
providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them.”40 In
the first part of this chapter we saw how Phillips explains this remark in
terms of the independence and disinterest he takes to be characteristic of
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical enquiry. Perhaps one should
note that it is not immediately clear whether Wittgenstein was referring
specifically to his philosophy.41 There can be no doubt, however, that
the quotation, which serves as a motto for Philosophy’s Cool Place,
articulates Phillips’s philosophical ideal. A contemplative philosophy
asks that we “give a certain kind of attention to our surroundings with-
out meddling with them.”42
We noted that Wittgenstein had little hope of his contemporaries wel-
coming such an understanding of philosophical enquiry. Sadly, Phillips
feels, little has changed since Wittgenstein’s time. In the present cli-
mate of Anglo-American philosophy this conception of philosophical
enquiry still proves difficult to accept. Our “technological culture with
its primary interest in arriving at answers and solutions”,43 allows little
room for a conception of philosophy’s task as one of contemplation and
understanding:
“Many philosophers want ‘to go beyond it’. Not content with the kind of
attention Wittgenstein says philosophy asks of us, some philosophers want
attention to lead to substantive results: results concerning what we do
know, how we ought to live, what we should believe, and the spirit in
which we should talk to one another.”44
Rather than contemplate reality, philosophy should set out to answer
substantive questions about it and bring about changes in it where nec-
essary or, at the very least, facilitate this process. This tendency to want
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to go beyond a contemplative philosophy may be witnessed in any field
of philosophical enquiry. But, Phillips feels, it is particularly strong in
the area in which he has concentrated his writing: the philosophical
study of religion.45 Here, it is argued, the high degree of disengagement
demanded by a contemplative conception of philosophy cannot be main-
tained. The philosopher needs to show whether it is rational to believe in
God, whether or not God exists. Proponents of this view “are not con-
tent with contemplating where we already are.”46 They may not agree on
where we ought to go, but they are one in their conviction that philo-
sophical enquiry should lead us somewhere.
Phillips, it will be clear, rejects such demands. In his autobiographical
afterword to Philosophy’s Cool Place he tells us that, in his thirty-eight
years of teaching philosophy, he has sought to follow Wittgenstein’s
lead, trying to do what he feels to be “one of the most difficult things 
to do in philosophy — to go nowhere.”47 This perhaps rather curious
remark serves to articulate the disengagement at the heart of Phillips’s
philosophical programme.
In the following we engage critically with Phillips’s proposal for 
a philosophy ‘on a road to nowhere’. The three main characteristics 
of a contemplative philosophy — its independent and disinterested
nature, and the form of wonder that lies at its root — are discussed 
in turn.
4.2.1 The independent nature of philosophical enquiry
What, precisely, constitutes the independence of philosophical enquiry?
One way to answer this question satisfactorily would be to specify a
subject matter exclusive to philosophy. In 1999, Phillips tells us that a
contemplative philosophy, “is concerned, in a certain way, with giving
an account of reality.”48 To those acquainted with his earlier writings
this remark may come as something of a surprise. Has not Phillips
argued, time and again, that the desire to present the nature of reality in
a single, comprehensive, account is rooted in a deep-seated philosophi-
cal confusion? Phillips admits that there are serious problems connected
to the attempt of giving an account of all things. Nevertheless, he main-
tains that a contemplative philosophy seeks to overcome these problems
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without abstaining from asking the fundamental questions in philosophy
about the nature of reality.
To say that philosophy gives an account of reality is to invite the
question ‘The reality of what?’. After all, are not the other arts and sci-
ences concerned with the same thing? Phillips illustrates the problem by
referring to Socrates’ discussion with Gorgias.49 Socrates asks Gorgias
what it is that he teaches. Although the question seems straightforwardly
factual, Phillips believes it goes to the heart of philosophy. For what
Socrates is really asking is whether there is anything to teach, whether
there is a logos in things to be understood. Gorgias claims that his sub-
ject has to do with speech; but then he is asked, ‘Speech about what?’.
Whatever substantive reply Gorgias may give, Socrates points out that
the subject is that of an already existing art or science. If each of these
has its own distinctive subject matter, what distinctive subject matter
remains for Gorgias’ so-called art of rhetoric? Gorgias might wish to
reply that rhetoric is not concerned merely with speech but also with
speaking well. But this reply, Phillips argues, will not help him. For
Socrates could simply employ the same tactic and ask ‘Speaking well
about what?’. After all, whether one is speaking well will be determined
by the logos appropriate to the art relevant to the example of speech.
In short, what Socrates shows is that rhetoric cannot be an art. He
inverts the claims of the Sophists: the arts and their logoi cannot be
reduced to rhetoric; rather, rhetoric is logically parasitic on the very
‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ whose reality the Sophists denied:
“Persuasion involves a reference to ‘truth’, because persuasion, even when
deceptive, involves a reference to ‘what is the case’. The persuader relies
on concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ in those he is trying to persuade.”50
Of course, Phillips’s main interest lies not with the refutation of the
Sophists’ claims. The question is whether we can, by the same Socratic
questions, have a contemplative conception of philosophy. What if we
were to ask Socrates to specify philosophy’s subject matter? He, too,
might reply that he is concerned with discourse. But, once again, the
question is, ‘Discourse about what?’. Should Socrates say he is con-
cerned with knowledge and understanding, we may retort, ‘Knowledge
and understanding of what?’. Any substantive answer leads back to the
arts and sciences. Once we allow these their proper subject matters 
it seems we can only conclude that philosophy, having no distinctive
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subject matter to call its own, is not truly an art or science. What then
remains of the independent nature of philosophical enquiry?
The tempting reply here would be to argue that the difference between
philosophy and the other sciences is one of generality. Whereas the lat-
ter are concerned with the reality of this and that, i.e. the reality of a par-
ticular state of affairs, philosophy seeks to give an account of reality as
a whole. Such an account “is not meant to explain the existence of one
state of affairs as opposed to another but to show how it is possible for
anything to be real.”51
This answer, Phillips argues, faces two serious problems. First, it will
be clear that an enquiry into the nature of all things can no longer be 
an empirical enquiry. Any empirical investigation will always be into a
specific state of affairs, no matter how general. The answers put forward
in this context will be hypothetical, that is, will allow the possibility of 
a counter thesis. But an account of reality as a whole is supposed to 
rule out the possibility of a counter thesis. In other words, whatever cri-
teria we propose to determine what is real, we invite the question as to
the reality of those criteria. This is what Phillips calls the problem of
‘measuring the measure’:
“If one provides any measure of ‘the real’, one can always, in turn, pose a
question about the reality of the measure. No measure offered can avoid
this difficulty.”52
Closely connected to this problem is that of what Wittgenstein referred
to as ‘subliming the logic of our language’.53 Discussing the relation
between a name and the thing named, Wittgenstein asks what the words
‘this’ and ‘that’, used, for example, in an ostensive definition, may be
said to be names of. Surely, Wittgenstein suggests, if we want to avoid
confusion it would be best not to call these words names at all.
“Yet, strange to say, the word ‘this’ has been called the only genuine name;
so that anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approxi-
mate sense.”54
This idea, Wittgenstein argues, springs from a tendency to sublime the
logic of our language, the tendency to take language out of its actual
contexts of application. Thus, Wittgenstein’s reply takes the form of a
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reminder. He reminds us that we call very different things ‘names’; the
word ‘name’ is used to characterise many different kinds of use of 
a word, related to one another in many different ways. Returning to 
the problem at hand, Phillips argues that the word ‘real’, likewise, has
a variety of applications which are related to one another in various
ways. Why should we settle for any one of these applications rather
than another?
“If we face a plurality of measures, why should we favor any one above
others as the account of the reality of ‘all things’ […] why not settle for rec-
ognizing that there are many measures of ‘the real’, that what we mean by
‘the real’ is not one thing but varies with the contexts in which questions
about ‘the real’ may arise?”55
Faced with the problems of ‘measuring’ and ‘subliming’ the measure,
the prospects for philosophical enquiry as an enquiry into the nature 
of reality may seem pretty dire. Philosophy, it appears, is left with a
purely negative task, the task of exposing its own pretensions: there is
no reality to discover, enquire into, or give an account of. This conclu-
sion may result in various conceptions of philosophy. Phillips discusses
three possibilities, none of which, he argues, constitute a contemplative
philosophy.
The first two possibilities involve a form of scepticism. One “may
abandon the whole enterprise of giving an account of reality and embrace
a scepticism about any notion of reality” or “one may admit that it makes
sense to seek an account of reality but be entirely skeptical as to whether
one can, in fact, arrive at an adequate account.”56 Phillips rejects both
possibilities. The first option is illustrated by a discussion of the Sophists.
They argued that there is no such thing as reality, or, for that matter,
knowledge or truth. There is only opinion, which may be strong or weak,
but not valid or invalid. The best philosophy can do is to teach us how to
express our opinions most forcefully so that we may persuade others of
our point of view: philosophy becomes rhetoric. We already considered
Phillips’s discussion of Socrates’ dialogue with Gorgias. Phillips argues
that Gorgias robs philosophy of any distinctive subject matter, and fails
to realise that rhetoric is logically parasitic on the reality of the notions
of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ it denies.
The second option is likewise rejected. It fails to realise the force of
the problem of subliming the measure. For although it is sceptical about
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the possibility of arriving at an adequate account of reality, it still main-
tains that the notion of such an account is intelligible. According to
Phillips, however, the point is not “that no successful account can be
given of reality but that the very idea of such an account is confused.”57
This insight leads the way to the third possibility Phillips discusses. As
a result of the problems encountered so far
“one may assume that philosophy cannot give an account of Reality as a
whole, because that conception is confused. No one measure of ‘the real’
can be provided. What we need to recognize is that in human activities
there are many conceptions of ‘the real’ and ‘the unreal’. Philosophy must
settle for pointing this out, clarifying the differences between them, and
locating the confusion of attempting to transcend them in a more compre-
hensive account of Reality.”58
For Phillips, this understanding of philosophical enquiry does not amount
to a contemplative one. To those acquainted with Phillips’s work, his
rejection of this conception of philosophical enquiry — for ease of ref-
erence let us call it a ‘descriptive’ one — seems astonishing. After all, 
it is a conception of philosophy which many may feel to be implied 
by Wittgenstein’s later writings. More importantly, we have certainly
become familiar with it from Phillips’s own work. The Concept of Prayer
seems to fit the bill rather well. On the methodological level, The Con-
cept of Prayer emphasises the importance of resisting the craving for
generality, a desire to give an all-embracing unitary account of reality.
All too often, one use of the word ‘real’ is elevated as a paradigm for
any use of the word; as we have seen, a mistake Phillips now identifies
as that of ‘subliming the measure’. Looking back, in 1968, on The Con-
cept of Prayer, Phillips tells us that what he tried to do was to urge
“that the distinction between the real and the unreal does not come to the
same thing in every context. To think otherwise is to fall into a deep con-
fusion about the relation between language and reality.”59
Drawing, once again, on Winch, Phillips reiterates his argument: what is
real or not is not given prior to any use of language but is shown in the
various uses language has. The philosopher’s task is that of “looking to
see whether there are any such differences, and if there are, showing
their character.”60 In so doing, the grammar of a given form of discourse
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is revealed. This, Phillips argues, is precisely what he sought to do in
The Concept of Prayer:
“What I wish to urge is that one can only give a satisfactory account of
religious beliefs if one pays attention to the roles they play in people’s
lives. By comparing these roles with others one can bring out the grammar
of religious belief. This is what I sought to do by comparing confessing,
thanking, and asking in prayer, with confessing, thanking, and asking in
other contexts.”61
There is little indication here of any philosophical task over and above
that of clarifying the grammar of the mode of discourse under investi-
gation, in this case, religious belief(s). Nor is there any hint of a further
philosophical understanding of ‘reality as a whole’ which is the result of
such clarification. On the contrary:
After [philosophy] has sought to clarify the grammar of such beliefs its
work is over. As a result of such clarification, someone may see dimly that
religious beliefs are not what he had taken them to be. […] The results are
unpredictable. In any case, they are not the business of philosophy.”62
This point of view is by no means confined to The Concept of Prayer and
the articles published shortly thereafter. In Religion Without Explanation,
published in 1976, we find a similar approach. Faced with religious 
language-games, philosophy’s “task is a descriptive one; he gives an
account of the use of language involved.”63 Philosophy aims at clarifying
the grammar of a given discourse, primarily by means of contrasting it to
other modes of discourse and revealing the differences. The emphasis is
not so much on understanding ‘reality as a whole’ as on understanding
the distinctive nature of the mode of discourse clarified. Referring to reli-
gious belief, Religion Without Explanation tells us that
“More than anything for the philosopher, however, the investigation is a clar-
ification of the nature of activity which has almost always been an impor-
tant feature of human life. To achieve such clarification it will be important
to be aware of differences between human activities, so that we shall not be
too ready to assume that what it makes sense to say of one it must make
sense to say of another.”64
Although philosophical description is constructive in that it allows us 
a clear understanding of the grammar of religious beliefs, this clarity 
is still mainly understood negatively. Although one hopes to convey
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something of the meaning and force of religious language, one may
achieve no more than to stop people from talking nonsense,65 and “put
an end to much idle speculation carried on in the name of philosophy
of religion.”66 In an article first published in 1989 Phillips sums this 
up nicely:
“The aim of Wittgenstein’s work […] is to find our way from conceptual
puzzlement to conceptual clarity. This aim, if achieved, would clarify the
grammar of belief and unbelief, and also the grammar of the disagreement
between them. It is in this sense that philosophy’s task is a humble one, and
it is in this sense, too, that philosophy leaves everything where it is.”67
In his earlier work, one might say, Phillips has no intention of ensuring
the independence of philosophical enquiry by claiming, on the model
of the empirical sciences, a specific subject matter. In a sense, he con-
cludes that, indeed, philosophy is not really a science at all. That is to
say, he follows Wittgenstein in effecting a strict separation between 
the empirical sciences on the one hand and philosophy on the other.
Philosophy is not a cognitive enterprise. It does not compete with any
of the empirical sciences. It aims not so much at truth, but at concep-
tual clarity. The philosopher does not explain, for instance, what ‘under-
standing a sentence’ is in terms of a physiological or psychological
process. Rather, his aim is to elucidate the import of the concept of
understanding in the diversity of human activities in which it is embed-
ded and employed.
In short: philosophical problems are not empirical problems. They
arise out of a misunderstanding of our forms of language. The philoso-
pher’s task is to rid us of these confusions by means of conceptual
reminders. This is achieved, mainly, through perspicuous representations
of those parts of language that give rise to our confusions. It will be
clear that this brief summary strays little from accounts to be found in
much of the secondary literature on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.68
More importantly, such a conception of philosophy is certainly strongly
in evidence in Phillips’s own work. In Philosophy’s Cool Place, how-
ever, it is rejected because it “leaves out the fundamental questions in
philosophy about the nature of reality.”69 A contemplative philosophy,
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as we saw, is concerned with giving an account of reality. Thus Phillips’s
main question is the following:
“How can philosophy give an account of reality which shows that it is nec-
essary to go beyond simply noting differences between various modes of
discourse, without invoking a common measure of ‘the real’ or assuming
that all modes of discourse have a common subject, namely, Reality?”70
Our discussion so far indicates that it will not be easy to arrive at an
answer to this question. Before we turn to consider Phillips’s efforts,
however, we should examine two further reasons why Phillips rejects a
descriptive conception of philosophical enquiry. First, such a conception
of philosophical enquiry fails to recognise the independent, or distinctive,
nature of philosophical problems and, secondly, it is unable to account
for the unity of language. We discuss these in turn.
If we think of the main impetus of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as
a desire to pass from confused to unconfused thought and equate the
essence of his method with that of providing perspicuous grammatical
representations, we attribute an underlabourer conception of philosophy
to him. The philosopher is called upon to clear away our confusions so
that we may continue with our affairs:
“Philosophy clears away conceptual confusions to facilitate clear building
and clear living. Conceptual underlaborers clear up conceptual confusions
on one site after another. If we ask underlaborers where there own site is,
the question betrays our misunderstanding. It does not make sense to attrib-
ute a site to them; their work is occasioned by confusions that occur on
other sites.”71
On this view, philosophy has no distinctive site of its own. We always
have to speak of the philosophy of something or other — philosophy 
of morals, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of religion, and so on.
Philosophy is thought of in instrumental terms: as exercises in problem
solving or as the therapy that makes one’s puzzles go away.72
Now, it is true, Phillips admits, that Wittgenstein sometimes spoke of
philosophy as if the question is whether the philosophical clarification
has done the trick; whether it would relieve the mental cramps of those
who are bothered by philosophy. This leaves one to wonder, as Rhees
puts it, “whether tranquillizers would not have worked as well.”73 Such
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talk, Phillips argues, even when it is Wittgenstein’s, does not do justice
to his philosophical practice. He refers to Rhees who points out that
Wittgenstein was never guided by any thought of the likely effect of 
his philosophical conclusions on the average student or anything of that
sort.74 Furthermore, Phillips argues, if philosophy is the way to rid us of
confusions in our lives it becomes unintelligible why Wittgenstein so
strongly discouraged the pursuit of the subject. That is to say, according
to Phillips, this view implies too naïve an identification of ‘philosophical
confusion’ with ‘confused living’.75 It is extremely important to distin-
guish between, say, “philosophical puzzlement about science and doing
science.”76 To suggest that the former would lead to difficulties with the
latter, that philosophical problems about science might hold up scientific
progress, would be, Phillips argues, to underestimate “the independence
of philosophy, the way its problems and how they are discussed come
from the character of the subject.”77 The philosopher “reflects in a sub-
ject which has a history, and its own distinctive questions.”78 Such ques-
tions as whether moral or religious viewpoints can have any objectivity,
how words acquire meaning and how language is related to reality, and
so on. Wittgenstein, too, was concerned with these questions. His phi-
losophy is informed not just by the aim of ridding us of confusion by
means of distinguishing between different uses of language, but “also 
by an aim that making these distinctions subserves — to show what is
involved in speaking a language at all.”79
Although we may agree with the gist of Phillips’s arguments, they 
do raise some concerns. If one were so inclined one could argue that
Wittgenstein was never guided by the effects of his philosophy on the
average student for no other reason than that he lacked empathy with
them. Foolishness aside, this fact can hardly be said to demonstrate that
Wittgenstein did not feel that the real discovery of his later philosophy
“is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when 
I want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer
tormented by questions which bring itself in question.”80 One should not
forget that although Wittgenstein certainly wrestled with problems that,
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traditionally, belong to the subject of philosophy, he was very critical 
of the solutions on offer. Many of these, he felt, are the product of con-
fusion. More often than not, the emphasis in the Investigations is not so
much on providing new, alternative solutions but on dissolving the prob-
lems. This is why Wittgenstein’s method is essentially indirect. Philo-
sophical theses, being unintelligible rather than false, cannot be directly
refuted. Phillips agrees that one can get someone to see this only indi-
rectly, by getting that person to appreciate the route that led to his con-
fusion.81 This certainly implies a move from confusion to clarity. Indeed,
it would be quite a challenge to discuss the Investigations without refer-
ring to the notion of philosophy as a therapy that delivers us from con-
fusion. In addition, we should note that, for Wittgenstein, the dissolution
of philosophical problems, is effected through conceptual clarification.
As we pointed out in reply to Bailey, one must take care not to obscure
the internal relation between ‘distinguishing language-games’ and the
dissolution of philosophical problems.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Wittgenstein cared much for 
any attempt strictly to separate confusions we may fall prey to whilst
philosophising, from those we might encounter in other walks of life. He
did indeed discourage the pursuit of philosophy to some of his students.
The biographical material available to us suggests that his reasons for
doing so were various and complicated. They had to do not only with his
understanding of the nature of philosophy but also with his dislike and
moral distrust of the academic milieu, as well as with his feelings for the
students involved and his hopes for their lives. Although I do not want
to go into this matter to any great extent, suffice it to say that one is
struck by the way in which Wittgenstein related his profession to his
life. This does not imply any straightforward distinction between philo-
sophical and non-philosophical confusions. On the contrary, Wittgenstein
said that working on philosophy is like working on oneself.82
Phillips is right, of course, to insist that the philosopher reflects in 
a subject which has a history, and its own distinctive questions. And,
obviously, there is a difference between philosophical puzzlement about
science and doing science. But if one conceives of philosophical enquiry
as, at least in part, conceptual clarification, it would be silly to deny that
this activity has its place and import within science as well. If so, it is
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not patently clear why philosophical reflection should have no impact 
on scientific enquiry. In fact, one might reasonably argue that one can
hardly account for the history of either subject without invoking the
other. It is not just a case of philosophy interacting with science.83 Var-
ious periods in history show that the two disciplines were more strongly
interwoven than that.84 Of course, this is not meant to underplay the
importance of seeing the differences between philosophical and non-
philosophical contexts, such as science. The point is, on the one hand, 
a historical one: these differences have not always been as clear as
Phillips seems to imply. This, one should mention, is certainly true of
Phillips’s main subject of enquiry, that of religious belief, or, at least,
Christianity. The history of Christian faith and theology and that of
philosophical reflection have, more often than not, run on parallel tracks.
On the other hand, the point is a more systematic one. Although it is
important to draw attention to the differences between philosophical 
and non-philosophical contexts it is equally important to emphasise the
fact that philosophical reflection is situated within the broader context of
human life. From these connections philosophy draws its sustenance as
well as its import. To deny these connections would not be to ensure
philosophy’s independence. Rather, it would be to ensure its isolation
and, inevitably, as we shall see further on, its irrelevance.
Despite these worries, however, Phillips’s main point still holds. It
would indeed be a mistake to represent Wittgenstein’s chief concern 
in his later philosophy as no more than that of clarifying distinctions
between language-games. Wittgenstein is not so much interested in the
forms of meaning realised in any specific type of discourse. The disin-
terested clarification of possibilities of meaning is carried out, not for 
its own sake, but for the sake of the (dis)solution of the philosophical
problems with which Wittgenstein engages. In fact, as we have seen, the
whole notion of a language-game is devised with this aim in mind.
This brings us to Phillips’s second reason for rejecting a descriptive
understanding of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. If one does no
more than clarify the distinctions between language-games one fails to
address the issue of how these various language-games hang together.
Unless there is a kind of unity to our language, “our dialogues would sim-
ply be an absurd collection of arbitrary activities.”85 Here, the analogy
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between language and games begins to break down; a point which, as we
have already noted, Rhees makes in his article Wittgenstein’s Builders.
It is assumed, Rhees argues, that the same language is spoken in each of
the various language-games. The problem is how we should understand
this. Surely, it makes no sense to say that all the language-games taken
together make up one additional language-game, just as different lan-
guages would not make up one additional language either.
One might reply that each separate language-game is complete. This
is what Wittgenstein seems to suggest when he introduces the language
of the builders in part one of the Investigations, paragraph 2. Of course,
the point of the example is to disabuse us of the idea that any form of
language awaits analysis for its completion. This is a point Rhees accepts.
He still criticises Wittgenstein, however, for claiming that the language
of the builders could be the whole language of the tribe. Not so much
because its vocabulary is limited but, rather, because the words have no
application outside of the activity of building:
“The trouble is not to imagine a people with a language of such limited
vocabulary. The trouble is to imagine that they spoke the language only 
to give these special orders on this job and otherwise never spoke at all. 
I do not think it would be speaking a language.”86
For one thing, this ‘language’ would contain no standards of correct-
ness. What counts as correct would be no more than what we normally
do. For there to be standards of normativity, Rhees argues, it is essential
that the vocabulary of the builders be used on other occasions, outside
of the activity of building. The meaning of a certain expression in a lan-
guage-game depends, in part, on how this expression is used in other
language-games:
“You might ask why this should make such a difference — the fact 
that they are used elsewhere. And one reason is that then the expressions 
are not just part of one particular routine. Their uses elsewhere have to do
with the point or bearing of them in what we are saying now. It is the way
in which we have come to know them in other connexions that decides
whether it makes sense to put them together here, for instance: whether one
can be substituted for another, whether they are incompatible and so forth.
The meaning that they have within this game is not to be seen simply in
what we do with them or how we react to them in this game.”87
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Rhees is arguing that a certain generality belongs to language. This is
not the generality of a formal system, not that of a calculus, but “the
generality involved in a way of living, in which what is said on one
occasion has an interlocking intelligibility with what is said on other
occasions. Without this, there would be nothing that we would call a lan-
guage.”88 Clearly, Wittgenstein himself also realised this. That is why he
said that we learn what an expression means in a family of language-
games, that words only have meaning in the stream of thought and life
and that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.89 This shows
that Wittgenstein goes beyond merely noting the differences to enquire
into the kind of unity language has. If all we do is show the differences
between language-games, this concern will not be addressed. For the 
differences can only be the differences they are because their reality
depends on the place they occupy in the broader context of human life
and discourse.90
Having now discussed Phillips’s first two reasons for rejecting a
descriptive conception of philosophical enquiry we may draw the follow-
ing conclusions. The descriptive conception constitutes a naïve reading
of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It too readily assumes that Wittgen-
stein’s main discovery is that language really consists of a multitude of
independent units or language-games. The only task facing the philoso-
pher is that of describing the various grammars that exclusively consti-
tute meaning in the diversity of language-games. Thus we may come to
learn what people mean when they say this or that, and we may assist
them in getting rid of their possible confusions by pointing out their
transgression of the rules of the particular game they happen to be
playing. What this misses, as Phillips rightly points out, is that when
Wittgenstein said that language is a family of games, his concern was
not primarily with distinguishing one language-game from another, but
rather with the question of the kind of unity language has. Human 
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discourse is not a collection of isolated, arbitrary games. There is a gen-
erality to language, be it not the generality of a formal system or calcu-
lus. To provide descriptive accounts of various language-games is not
the end, but rather the beginning of Wittgenstein’s enquiry. That is to
say, as we have seen, the notion of a language-game plays a method-
ological rather than an ontological role in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
It is a tool which is employed in the course of addressing problems in
philosophical logic, problems, as, once again, Phillips rightfully reminds
us, that traditionally and distinctively belong to the subject of philoso-
phy. We have also argued, however, that for Wittgenstein the emphasis
lies not so much on resolving as on dissolving these problems. The
clarity that should result from his enquiry is not secured by transcend-
ing the various modes of discourse, drawing them together in one com-
prehensive philosophical account of reality. Rather, it consists not in 
the least in the realisation that this aspiration cannot be coherently
expressed. If these conclusions are correct, Phillips’s demand that a con-
templative philosophy should provide an account of the nature of reality
becomes rather disconcerting. One is inclined to say that no room has
been left for such an account. How does Phillips propose to overcome
these difficulties? For an answer, we must return briefly to the discus-
sion between Gorgias and Socrates.
Phillips left us with the question whether we can, by the same Socratic
questions that plagued Gorgias, have a contemplative conception of phi-
losophy. Can Socrates specify philosophy’s subject matter? Once we
allow the already existing arts and sciences their proper subject matters
it seems there is none left for philosophy. According to Phillips, how-
ever, we need not embrace this conclusion. When asked what kind of
discourse a contemplative philosophy is concerned with, Phillips tells 
us we could reply, ‘Discourse about discourse’. A contemplative philos-
ophy is concerned “with the possibility of discourse, the possibility of
‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’.”91 The main question is what it means to say
something.92 In answering this question, a contemplative philosophy
provides an account of reality.
What are we to make of these remarks? Phillips’s initial reply, that
the subject matter of philosophy is discourse about discourse, comes
across as a play on words rather than a substantial solution to the prob-
lem. One might reasonably feel that, apart from the matter of phrasing,
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this answer is no different from the previous one which suggested that
philosophy is concerned with discourse. The problem with this answer 
is that the subject matter has already been spoken for by, for example,
sociologists and psychologists, linguists and grammarians. Of course,
Phillips should reply that a philosophical enquiry is a conceptual enquiry.
The question is whether we can give an intelligible account of “the pos-
sibility of discourse as such.”93 But this proposal faces serious difficul-
ties as well. The suggestion that our object of enquiry is not so much
‘discourse about this or that’ but ‘discourse as such’ raises suspicions of
essentialism. Given Phillips’s analysis of the problems of measuring and
subliming the measure, surely he should accept that we are not so much
confronted by discourse as such but, rather, by a variety of forms of dis-
course which need not necessarily share any single common characteris-
tic. How should philosophy transcend these various forms of discourse
to arrive at a more fundamental and comprehensive account of reality?
One might conclude that, perhaps, Phillips is proposing some form of
transcendental enquiry. But that is not an option, for Phillips explicitly
denies this. His aim, he tells us, is not
“to set up any kind of transcendental project, any kind of demonstration of
the conditions of discourse, conditions that seek to get behind, in some
way, the possibilities exemplified in discourse itself.”94
A contemplative philosophy, Phillips argues, does not set out to reveal
the conditions of our discourse. Rather, it considers, or contemplates, the
various possible forms that our discourse actually takes. Thus, Phillips is
talking about possibilities (plural) of discourse rather than the possibility
(singular) of discourse as such. These possibilities do not evince some
kind of transcendental necessity. We do not talk to one another in the
way we do because we must — this is simply what we do:
“What will count as ‘sayable’ will depend on how people actually talk to
one another. Or, better, that people talk to one another in the ways in which
they do, that they make the connections they do, will show what is and
what is not ‘sayable’.”95
Indeed, this way of putting matters does not imply some form of tran-
scendental enquiry. Then again, neither does it take us any further
towards ‘an account of reality’. For what should the contemplation of
possibilities of discourse, ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ amount to other than
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the clarification of the various conceptions of ‘discourse’, ‘knowledge’
and ‘truth’ that arise in human activities? The philosopher could show
the differences and the similarities between these various conceptions,
but how should he transcend them to arrive at a more comprehensive
account of reality? By contrast, the phrase ‘the possibility of discourse
as such’ does imply the prospect of transcending the various possibilities
of discourse but only at the cost of introducing some kind of transcen-
dental condition, or set of conditions, which the various possibilities must
have in common — once again, a clear-cut case of what Phillips calls
‘subliming the measure’.
Let us turn to consider Phillips’s final suggestion, the suggestion that
a contemplative philosophy enquires into what it means to say some-
thing. It is difficult to see how this should avoid the problems we have
encountered. What it means to say something varies from one context 
to the next, depending, not in the last place, on what is said. If we are
conceptually confused about something that is said, philosophical clari-
fication may be of help. Such clarification, however, would not amount
to an account of reality but simply to a clear understanding of the mean-
ing of the expression that confused us. To argue that the question does
not relate to the meaning of some particular expression but to the mean-
ing of saying something at all, is to assume that saying something must,
in some essential sense, always amount to the same thing, if anything
can be said to have been said at all. Surely, this constitutes yet another
case of subliming the measure. Faced with such a claim, philosophy
should point out the various meanings saying various somethings may
have and locate the confusion in trying to transcend them in a more
comprehensive account of reality.
Perhaps Phillips would reply that we are over-interpreting his notion
of ‘an account of the nature of reality’. To say that philosophy is con-
cerned with discourse is to point out that a philosophical enquiry is
conceptual rather than empirical, aimed at clarification rather than
explanation. To say that it is concerned with discourse as such is no
more than to preserve the independence of philosophical enquiry. The
philosopher is not so much interested in the meaning of any specific
form of discourse but rather in what is involved in speaking a language
at all. Such phrases as ‘the possibility of discourse’ and ‘what it means
to say something’ serve only to underscore this and to emphasise the
importance of accounting for the kind of unity language has. Finally, to
provide an account of the nature of reality is to disclose what charac-
terises our thinking and acting, to show the various world pictures
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which are constitutive of how people think, act, and live, for what they
are. Thus we learn, for example, that it makes no sense to say that ‘real-
ity’ gives foundation to our ways of thinking and acting. On the con-
trary, philosophical contemplation of the possibilities of human discourse
reveals that there are various distinctions between ‘the real’ and ‘the
unreal’, that we learn to make these distinctions in the contexts of our
ways of acting and thinking, and that, hence, it makes no sense to try
philosophically to transcend these distinctions by invoking a common
measure of ‘the real’.96 Does not this teach us something about the way
things are, that is, about the nature of reality?
Obviously, I can only speculate as to whether Phillips would agree
with this way of putting matters. At any rate, it still leaves questions
unanswered. If the notion of ‘reality’ gets its meaning in the contexts 
of our ways of acting and thinking, then whence do we derive the notion
of ‘reality’ Phillips employs when he says that philosophy provides 
an account of the nature of reality? Phillips cannot pick any one of 
the various notions of ‘reality’ as a paradigm for all — that would be to
sublime the measure. Nor can he argue that philosophy transcends the
various distinctions we make between the real and the unreal by expli-
cating the essential feature they all share and which makes them into 
distinctions of the real and the unreal in the first place. For he accepts
that “there are various distinctions between ‘the real’ and ‘the unreal’ 
in discourse and that they do not all have something in common”.97 It 
is difficult to see how we should conclude anything other than that 
the philosophical account of the nature of reality “trades on an abstract
notion of reality, to which, of necessity, no content can be given.”98
In paragraph 116 of the Investigations Wittgenstein tells us that
when philosophers use such words as ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’,
‘I’, ‘proposition’, ‘name’ and try to grasp the essence of the thing we
should always ask whether the word is ever actually used in this way
in our language where it is at home. He could easily have added the
word ‘reality’ to his list. The aim is to bring the words back from their
philosophical or metaphysical use to their natural applications. Phillips
agrees: philosophy aims to return us from our confusions to clarity about
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the natural contexts in which our concepts have their meaning.99 He
adds that this task is one which can never reach a conclusion: old prob-
lems keep coming back in new forms and cultural developments may
occasion new problems.100 There is, one might say, no single account of
reality, no definitive Übersicht, which, once and for all, shall cure us of 
all our troubles.
One must take care, however, not to make it appear as if philosophi-
cal enquiry leaves us empty-handed: we simply return to the way we
actually used words all along. This, as Phillips already points out in The
Concept of Prayer, ignores the new understanding we gain from work-
ing through our problems. True; but would it not be highly misleading
to represent this understanding as the achievement of an account of real-
ity? Wittgenstein unfailingly rejects the conclusion that philosophical
enquiry results in positive theses, theories or explanations. This is con-
nected to the essentially indirect nature of philosophical clarification. As
we noted above, according to Phillips, philosophical theses cannot be
directly refuted. Such a refutation would suggest that the theses are intel-
ligible but false. But the trouble with such theses is not their falsity but
their unintelligibility; an attempt is made to say something that does 
not make sense. One can get someone to see this “only indirectly, by
getting that person to appreciate the route that led to the confusion, so
that the person no longer wants to say what he or she did.”101 In this
respect, one might say that philosophical understanding shows itself, not
in what we say, but in what we abstain from saying. In other words, the
emphasis lies not so much on the resolution of philosophical problems
as on their dissolution. This does not mean that we abandon the funda-
mental questions in philosophy concerning ‘the nature of reality’. Quite
the contrary. But the way in which we engage with these questions is not
by answering them directly, by replacing the confused theses — confused
accounts of reality — with alternative, better, ones. Rather, we need to
work through the problems to achieve clarity about the concepts at work
in our lives. As Wittgenstein puts it: “the philosophical problems should
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completely disappear.”102 This is why we could say that, in philosophy,
we are ‘on a road to nowhere’.
Phillips’s insistence on providing an account of reality makes it appear
as if there is a shortcut after all. Such an account, presumably, can show
us directly why it is confused to seek a philosophical account of Reality
(capital ‘R’). Apart from the problems we already referred to concerning
the indeterminacy of the notion of ‘reality’, we should note that this
makes it unintelligible why we should say that, in philosophy, we are
struggling to go nowhere. Not only would we not be going nowhere,
moreover, why should there be any struggle? Of course, it may well be
difficult to arrive at a correct account of the nature of reality. But it is
clear that Phillips is not referring to intellectual or technical difficulties.
Rather, in working on philosophical problems a resistance of the will has
to be overcome; we have to give up certain ways of thinking.103 One of
these ways of thinking, one might feel, is the idea that the aim of philo-
sophical enquiry is “to ‘get somewhere’, to make contact with reality”.104
Let us draw this section to a close by summarising our conclusions. In
his earlier work, one might say, Phillips comes close to entertaining a
descriptive conception of philosophical enquiry. In his later work he
rejects this in favour of a contemplative conception. On the one hand, this
is because the descriptive conception does not preserve the independent
nature of philosophical enquiry and fails to account for the kind of unity
the various language-games it may distinguish have. On the other hand,
Phillips argues that a descriptive understanding of philosophical enquiry
fails to provide an account of the nature of reality.
As to the latter, it is highly implausible that Phillips is suggesting to
develop an account of the nature of reality in any strong sense of the
term. He would then face the task of showing how ‘the way of thinking
and acting’ that is philosophy can provide an understanding of ‘reality’
that somehow transcends the various distinctions between ‘the real’ and
‘the unreal’ on offer in our forms of discourse. This would certainly con-
stitute a break from his position in his earlier work. Phillips has argued
time and again that it is a deep-rooted confusion to believe that philoso-
phy can provide any such comprehensive account. Of course, a person
may change his mind, even if he is a philosopher. But Phillips gives no
indication that this is the case. Quite the opposite; even in Philosophy’s
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Cool Place itself, one need not look hard to find remarks which preclude
the possibility of giving a philosophical account of the nature of reality.
Indeed, Phillips carefully presents his case against any such an attempt
in terms of the problems of measuring and subliming the measure. Yet
we find no clear answer to the question as to how he proposes to over-
come these problems.
We have considered a weaker, or more modest, interpretation of
Phillips’s understanding of an account of reality. One might say that
the clarity about the concepts at work in our lives which results from
philosophical contemplation adds up to such an account. We argued
that this suggestion still faces the problem of the indeterminacy of the
concept of ‘reality’ Phillips employs. Furthermore, it is difficult to rec-
oncile with an understanding of philosophical enquiry as the indirect
dissolution of philosophical problems, an understanding which gives
poignancy to the phrase that, in philosophy, we are going nowhere.
Our argument has shown that, if we abandon the problematic notion
of a philosophical account of reality, we can still preserve the independ-
ent nature of philosophical enquiry. The clarification of the possibilities
of meaning realised in specific forms of discourse is informed by and
aimed at the (dis)solution of questions and problems that distinctively
belong to the history of the subject of philosophy. Furthermore, there is
no reason to invoke an account of reality to counter the claim that our
forms of discourse are just arbitrary activities. Perhaps we cannot say,
directly, that our forms of discourse hang together thus and so. Rather,
this is something that can only be, indirectly, shown. At one stage,
Phillips compares the unity of our language to that of a conversation or
dialogue.105 As any dialogue, our language is open-ended. One cannot
predict in which direction it will go. How, and if, our forms of discourse
hang together will depend on how, and if, people actually talk to one
another. To put it differently: people do not understand one another
because there is a unity to our language. Rather, how, and if, people
understand one another shows the kind of unity our language has.
Despite the problems we have encountered, Phillips’s discussion of 
a contemplative philosophy carries the promise of a correction of his
earlier views. Many of the difficulties we ran into in our discussion of
The Concept of Prayer resulted from too strong an isolation of religious
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forms of discourse. By paying more attention to the unity of language,
these problems may well be resolved. Of course, this also raises new
issues. For one thing, it casts doubt on too strong an emphasis upon the
independent nature of philosophical enquiry. Philosophy cannot extract
itself from the stream of thought and life; philosophical discourse is just
more discourse. What is said in philosophical contexts has a bearing on
what is said in non-philosophical contexts, and vice versa. If so, can we
maintain that philosophical enquiry remains thoroughly disinterested?
The following section turns to consider that question.
4.2.2 The disinterested nature of philosophical enquiry
The Concept of Prayer awards philosophy a negative role, in the sense
that, ideally, philosophy remains thoroughly disengaged from the socio-
linguistic practices it seeks to clarify. Philosophy aims merely to under-
stand. And to understand, say, a religious point of view, is neither to appro-
priate nor to advocate it. Taking its cue from Wittgenstein’s remark that
his ideal is ‘a certain coolness’, Philosophy’s Cool Place would seem 
to reaffirm this conclusion. A contemplative philosophy gives attention
to our surroundings without meddling with them. Philosophers, Phillips
opines, are reluctant to do so. Rather than leaving ‘ragged what is
ragged’,106 they are tempted to make matters tidier than they are.107 Phillips
is adamant that philosophical enquiry can and must leave everything as
it is.108 Although it may reveal what various moral or religious perspec-
tives amount to, it neither advocates nor appropriates any one of them.109
Phillips’s conclusion that philosophical contemplation remains disin-
terested follows, in the first place, from the independent nature of philo-
sophical enquiry. The philosopher engages with questions which belong
distinctively to the nature of his subject. He is not so much interested in
any specific moral or religious perspectives for their own sake. They are
treated as examples of the various possibilities of moral and religious
sense that are shown in human practice and discourse.
It does not follow, however, that such an enquiry cannot lead to sub-
stantive results. We may accept that philosophical enquiry is not informed
by the aim of showing which of the various perspectives discussed should
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be appropriated, if any. But why should we deny the possibility of an
answer to this question as a result of one’s enquiry? Thus, Phillips needs
to justify the stronger claim that, not only is it not philosophy’s primary
aim to advocate any specific moral or religious perspective but, more-
over, philosophy cannot fulfil this aim, even if it so desired. Indeed,
Phillips tells us that he is not trying to desist from tasks which philoso-
phy can fulfil but which, for some reason or another, he is not interested
in. Rather, he argues that the very conception of these tasks is confused.
Philosophy cannot establish whether there is a God, prove why we should
heed moral considerations, or determine the nature of the good life. This,
Phillips maintains, is itself a philosophical conclusion.110
The manner in which he reaches this conclusion should, by now, be
familiar. Just as we learn to distinguish between what is real and unreal
within a variety of contexts so, too, we learn to distinguish between what
is, say, good or bad within the variety of moral practices in which we
may engage. These practices disclose various distinctions between ‘the
good’ and ‘the bad’, which do not all have something in common. It is
confused, Phillips maintains, to treat differing perspectives as external
objects of comparison and to think that one could have a demonstration,
independently of any perspective, to decide which is the right one.111 We
may be misled into thinking so, because from the point of view of one
moral perspective we may call another mistaken or false. But “these
terms are value judgments, and if they are spelled out, it is in terms 
of values.”112 Thus, we cannot justify our values by reference to human
flourishing, to human good and harm, “because these notions, so far
from being independent of our values, are informed by them.”113 We
might argue that we can solve that problem by introducing a ‘non-moral’
criterion. For example, Phillips discusses Annette Baier’s suggestion that
we should reconsider Hume’s attempt to give morality a basis in human
capacities for cooperation. The problem, as Phillips points out, is that
“For anyone with serious moral values, it will not be the conditions of
cooperation with others that determine whether cooperation is possible […]
we might well remind ourselves that it may be anything but benign to sug-
gest that diverse moral views must be subordinated to a cooperative ideal.
Everything depends on the moral character of the cooperation.”114
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Philosophy, by means of perspicuous representations, may help remove
our confusions concerning various moral or religious perspectives or
open us up to possibilities of understanding we had not yet recognised.
Although, as a result, we may come to appreciate the rich variety of moral
and religious perspectives in human discourse, philosophy cannot itself
determine whether any, and, if so, which of these perspectives should be
embraced. What a man makes of such perspectives is a matter of what
man he is; a matter, one might say, of a person’s character.115 Phillips
agrees with Winch that “philosophy can no more show a man what he
should attach importance to than geometry can show a man where he
should stand.”116
It has been argued, however, that Phillips does not practice what he
preaches. Incandela, for one, feels that Phillips’s understanding of the dis-
interested nature of philosophical enquiry exacts a form of moral detach-
ment which ignores the personal involvement Wittgenstein demanded of
the philosopher. Incandela shows how such detachment may tend towards
the comical:
“[P]hilosophers like Malcolm and Phillips appeared to take Wittgenstein’s
statement that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’ to sanction or at least
allow a detached withdrawal by the philosopher from the form of life he is
describing. Here one can imagine such a philosopher clocking out at 5.00
after a hard day of describing a certain amount of religious grammar.”117
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Phillips faced the problem of the indeterminacy of the concept of ‘reality’ he employs.
Likewise, he now has to explain his understanding of the concept of a moral or religious
conviction. It is quite uncomfortable to conclude that the various possibilities of moral and
religious sense cannot be reduced to a single, formal, principle and then proceed to explain
what moral or religious convictions are. This implies that, after all, some meaning can be
given to the notion of an unadulterated form of such perspectives.
117 Incandela 1985, p. 465.
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But, Incandela continues, the matter may quickly become somewhat less
silly. He asks us to consider Phillips’s discussion of child sacrifice. Says
Phillips:
“If I hear that one of my neighbours has killed another neighbour’s child,
given that he is sane, my condemnation is immediate. […] But if I hear
that some remote tribe practices child sacrifice, what then? I do not know
what sacrifice means for the tribe in question. What would it mean to say
I condemned it when ‘it’ refers to something I know nothing about. If I
did condemn it, I would be condemning murder. But murder is not child
sacrifice.”118
Incandela feels certain that, for Wittgenstein, “such moral detachment
and reluctance to criticize would have been bitter pills to swallow and
ones I am confident his work does not prescribe.”119 Although Incandela
does not say so explicitly, he leaves little room for doubt that he feels no
philosophy should prescribe them. Nevertheless, examples of the kind
Incandela refers to are not hard to come by in Phillips’s work. Consider,
for instance, Phillips’s discussion of the Assyrian practice of inflicting
pain upon imprisoned warriors. Here we are perhaps inclined, without
hesitation, to speak of ‘torture’, “even though ‘torture’ is in the mind of
neither the victor or the vanquished.”120 Philosophical contemplation
may open us to other possibilities. The pain inflicted may be a way of
honouring the captured warriors.121 Once we come to recognise this, our
reactions to the practice may correspondingly change. Phillips argues
that such misunderstandings give point to Winch’s remark: “If we do
not understand, we are in no position to know what we are getting indig-
nant about, or, as the case may be, what forgiving.”122
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121 See Phillips 2001, p. 322; cf. Phillips 1976, p. 77. The question, or so it seems, is
not whether it may be a way of honouring captured warriors, but whether it is. If we accept
that the situation could be other than we took it to be we should, at the most, suspend our
judgement. Sometimes Phillips gives the impression as if philosophical contemplation
need do no more than reveal possibilities, rather than actualities, of meaning. We return to
this issue in the following chapters.
122 Winch 1987, p. 193; quoted in Phillips 2001, pp. 322-323. Phillips warns us that,
even here, we must beware of generalisations. For example, lack of comprehension of
how a footballer can be killed for scoring an own goal need not prevent us from reacting
morally: “Indeed, it is part of the sense [our] reaction has: moral or religious incompre-
hension.” (Phillips 2001, p. 323.) I agree, and I wonder why Phillips does not make the
same point with respect to the Assyrian practice of inflicting pain on captured warriors.
Phillips seems to imply that, if it turns out that the Assyrians think of their behaviour in
terms of honouring the captives, we misunderstand the practice if we think of it as a form
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This latter remark indicates that Incandela’s depiction of Phillips’s
position as one of moral detachment may be misleading. Clearly the
emphasis here is not on some kind of moral detachment demanded by
philosophical enquiry but, rather, on the difference to one’s moral reac-
tions various forms of understanding — including philosophical under-
standing — may bring about. Let us return for a moment to the example
Incandela refers to. Here, too, closer examination reveals that Phillips is
not arguing for moral reticence with regards to child sacrifice. Rather he
is trying to show how one’s moral opinions are bound up in the way of
life one leads and the kind of understanding one possesses.123 The exam-
ple of child sacrifice was introduced to illustrate the way in which our
moral responses may alter with regards to cultures different from our
own. A point, one feels, which is difficult to deny.
That Phillips is not arguing, as Incandela suggests, that philosophical
contemplation must lead to moral detachment becomes undeniably clear
when we consider his discussion of Rhees’s remarks on, once again,
child sacrifice. Witness Rhees’s words:
“I would not say I was shocked by the practice of child sacrifice in a really
living religion, say in some part of Africa. If I learnt that a group of people
were practising child sacrifice in some house in London at the present day,
this would be entirely — repeat: entirely different. I would think the African
practice was terrible — or I might say something of the sort. But I should
have a deep respect for it. And I should certainly not say that people from
other lands ought to break it up.”124
Phillips proceeds to criticise Rhees for making it appear as if his analy-
sis must lead to a feeling of respect. Understanding may bring clarity,
but clarity does not, of itself, convey a specific moral attitude: “The moral
or religious response which comes in the wake of clarity cannot be pre-
dicted from that clarity itself. This is itself an insight which comes from
philosophical contemplation.”125
Incandela might retort that Phillips has fallen into his own trap. In the
concluding chapter to Religion Without Explanation Phillips argues that
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of torture. But this does not follow. Whether or not we think of certain activities as a form
of torture need not depend on how the participants in these activities think of it. Even if
we take note of the Assyrian point of view, we may still reject it, saying, perhaps, that 
torture is no way to honour a person. In this case, to call the Assyrian practice ‘torture’,
is not to explain or describe it but morally to condemn it. That is one form our under-
standing might take which cannot be ruled out, philosophically, as misunderstanding.
123 See Phillips 1970, pp. 237, 253 n. 6.
124 See Rhees 1998, pp. 101-102; quoted in Phillips 1999, p. 57.
125 Phillips 2001, p. 324.
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the philosopher who gives himself to the disinterested contemplation of
religious belief must have “respect for the belief he is investigating.”126
Does this not show that, despite his criticism of Rhees, Phillips reaches
the same conclusion: philosophical enquiry must lead to a feeling of
respect. If I understand him correctly, that is not the point Phillips is
making. The respect he refers to is not the result of philosophical con-
templation, but its prerequisite. Far from demanding moral detachment,
Phillips is emphasising the moral imperative which informs philosophi-
cal contemplation.127 Philosophical enquiry is not personal in that it does
not seek to advocate any specific moral or religious point of view. The
philosopher’s concern is that the moral and religious perspectives under
investigation are not misrepresented, but even in the absence of such
misrepresentations, one may still want to oppose them. If there is advo-
cacy involved at all, “it is advocacy concerning the conduct of our
enquiries.”128 Of course, there is no obligation to be puzzled philosoph-
ically. But when people are,
“it is a caricature to describe them as uninterested, uninvolved spectators
who transcend the busyness of life. This is because disinterestedness is not
a lack of interest, but an interest of a special kind which has a moral imper-
ative of its own. Philosophical contemplation, in trying to do justice to what
it surveys, is not itself an attempt to arrive at a specific moral or religious
viewpoint, but an effort to understand the kinds of phenomena we are con-
fronted by in morality and religion.”129
The ‘morality of philosophical enquiry’ constitutes an important theme
in Phillips’s work. In the opening chapter to his Recovering Religious
Concepts Phillips tells us that one way of looking at his work “is as 
a series of charges against the immodest methods employed by some
philosophers in the philosophy of religion.”130 In Philosophy’s Cool
Place he opines that to cling to the idea that philosophy has the task of
telling us what the moral character of our lives should be is “a corrup-
tion of philosophical contemplation” which itself displays “a lack of
character”.131 Phillips does not deny that use may be made of philosoph-
ical distinctions and expertise in the elucidation and advocacy of specific
moral or religious perspectives. But, he adds, it is another matter “to
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127 One might wonder, however, whether the same could not be said of Rhees’s
remarks.
128 Phillips 1999, p. 58.
129 Phillips 2001, p. 324.
130 Phillips 2000, p. 1.
131 Phillips 1999, pp. 155 and 121 respectively.
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claim that such perspectives are underwritten by philosophy.”132 In
matters moral and religious, everyone has to speak for him or herself.
As we saw, as early as The Concept of Prayer, Phillips argues that if
the philosopher fails to resist the temptation of dressing up his moral or
religious decision as philosophy, he introduces an impurity into his 
philosophy.133
Whether or not one agrees with Phillips, it is clear that his replies
refute Incandela’s objections. There is, indeed, a kind of neutrality con-
nected to Phillips’s understanding of philosophical enquiry. A contem-
plative philosophy, one might say, seeks a position outside existential
dialectic in ‘disinterest’.134 It does so in order to do justice to the vari-
ous possibilities of moral and religious sense in human discourse. This
demands that we give attention to perspectives that are not ours, how-
ever reluctant we may be to do so.135 But it would be a mistake to depict
this as a form of moral detachment. Quite the opposite: philosophical
contemplation is strongly committed to a moral imperative of its own.
So far, we have seen that a contemplative philosophy seeks to attain a
clear understanding of the various possibilities of moral and religious
sense that are realised in human discourse. This task is difficult, not just
on the technical level, but also because of the moral demands it makes
on the philosophical author.136 The moral or religious response which
may come in the wake of clarity, if attained, cannot be predicted from
that clarity itself.137 Philosophical contemplation does not endorse or
appropriate any specific moral or religious point of view. In this sense,
it leaves everything as it is.
This latter claim, however, would seem to be by far the stronger one.
That is to say, even if no single perspective is appropriated or advocated,
does that mean that everything is left as it is? When we discussed
Phillips’s example of the Assyrian practice of inflicting pain on impris-
oned warriors we found that philosophical contemplation may reveal
possibilities of meaning that had not yet occurred to us and that, as a
result, our reactions to this practice may correspondingly change. Surely,
then, it cannot be correct to say that everything is left as it is. Let us
consider some further examples.
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134 See Phillips 1999, pp. 37, 116.
135 See Phillips 1999, p. 145.
136 See Phillips 2001, p. 319.
137 See Phillips 2001, p. 324.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_03  01-02-2006  11:16  Pagina 192
First, what about the enquirer? Still on the practice of child sacrifice
in a living religion, Phillips argues that philosophical understanding may
amount to seeing the difference between this practice and the massacre
at My Lai. We may come to see that, whereas in the first case, the sac-
rifice means something deep to the people who take part in it, in the lat-
ter there is nothing of the sort.138 Still, this understanding “has nothing
to do with the judgments people may or may not wish to make […]
although there will be a difference between judgments made with and
without understanding.”139 Phillips neglects to tell us, however, what this
difference may amount to. Perhaps he would reply that it may amount 
to many different things. There is no way of predicting beforehand. But
from an ethical point of view, is not a judgement made with understand-
ing better than one made without? After all, Phillips agreed with Winch
that, unless we understand, we are in no position to know what we are
getting indignant or forgiving about. Or, as Phillips puts it, there “is a
difference between reflective and unreflective criticism, the former often
being one of the marks of moral responsibility.”140 Even if we accept
that philosophical reflection and understanding are not equivalent to
moral reflection and understanding, the former clearly informs and, pos-
sibly, transforms the latter.
Turning to matters of faith, we might feel that the ‘distance’ demanded
in the philosophical search for clarity is necessarily at odds with the
demands of piety. Indeed, many Christians have viewed such enquiry
with distrust and dislike. But, according to Phillips, there is no necessary
tension between clarity and piety. Quite the opposite; the “deepening of
philosophical understanding may at the same time be the deepening of
religious understanding.”141 In his paper ‘Advice to Philosophers who
are Christians’,142 Phillips tells us that the Christian conviction he has
indicated, as a Christian who gives himself to disinterested enquiry,
might find a place in Simone Weil’s words when she said that “if she
pursued truth without fear, she would find herself, in the end, falling
into the arms of Christ.”143 If philosophical understanding simply leaves
everything as it is, the reactions both of those who distrust philosophical
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139 Phillips 1999, p. 58.
140 Phillips 1993, p. 209.
141 Phillips 1970, p. 268.
142 Republished in Wittgenstein and Religion (1993), pp. 220-236.
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enquiry and those, as Simone Weil, who see in it a possible path to a
deeper faith, would become unintelligible.
One final example: discussing the Christian virtue of charity, Phillips
argues that “clarity does not make one yield to charity but neither is
it a necessary hindrance to spirituality, because clarity is a condition
of seeing the possibility of charity. In certain circumstances, clarity
may have a spiritual significance, not least for worship.”144 In Philos-
ophy’s Cool Place Phillips does not provide a further analysis of what
these circumstances are, whether the relation between clarity and wor-
ship is external or internal, and so on. But whatever conclusions he
should draw, it cannot be said that philosophy has left everything as 
it is.
It seems philosophical enquiry may have an impact upon the enquirer’s
moral and religious beliefs. Wittgenstein was right to say that working
on philosophy is working on oneself. In ‘Authorship and Authenticity’,145
Phillips warns us, however, that Wittgenstein was referring to philo-
sophical difficulties rather than personal difficulties: “Wittgenstein’s
problems have their roots, not in his personal life, but in tendencies of
thought to which anyone can be susceptible, since they arise from the
language we share.”146 But the whole question is whether we can effect
such a straightforward distinction.147 Indeed, a few pages further on
Phillips tells us that, although the source of Wittgenstein’s problems is
not personal, “the struggle with these problems is personal. In fact, the
struggle for clarity has analogies with a moral struggle.”148 In Philoso-
phy’s Cool Place — the second chapter of which is in many ways a
sequel to ‘Authorship and Authenticity’ — Phillips returns to this discus-
sion. Once again, he reminds us that when Wittgenstein said that work-
ing in philosophy is like working on oneself, Wittgenstein was referring
to difficulties in doing philosophy.149 Yet, at the same time, one finds
Phillips agreeing with Peter Winch that, in the Investigations, there is 
“a spiritual dimension seldom met in the works of ‘professional philoso-
phers.’”150 This is not simply because of the passion with which Wittgen-
stein pursued the subjects he discussed, but also because of the ways he
brings out how “a lack of clarity about them can have grave implications
194 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
144 Phillips 1999, p. 60.
145 Republished in Wittgenstein and Religion (1993), pp. 200-219.
146 Phillips 1993, p. 212.
147 See Conant 2002, p. 88.
148 Phillips 1993, p. 215.
149 See Phillips 1999, p. 46.
150 Winch 1993, p. 129; quoted in Phillips 1999, p. 62.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_03  01-02-2006  11:16  Pagina 194
for [people’s] relation to life.”151 After all, Phillips concludes, “Wittgen-
stein said that working on philosophy is like working on oneself.”152
There seems to be some unresolved tension here.
The same tension, I suggest, may be found when we turn from the
enquirer to the object of philosophical enquiry. In certain areas, Phillips
argues, philosophical enquiry seems to have little effect on the object of
enquiry. Not so where moral and religious beliefs are concerned. We
cannot say that, whatever answers are given in philosophy, the role which
these beliefs play in people’s lives goes on regardless. Here, philoso-
phy makes a substantial difference to what is being investigated.153 The
results may be destructive: in exposing certain of our beliefs as confu-
sions, philosophical clarity will force us to give up such beliefs. On the
other hand, they may be constructive: we may come to recognise certain
moral or religious possibilities, where formerly we saw none. Phillips
makes it clear that this does not apply exclusively to those engaged in
philosophy professionally. To deny that philosophical enquiry may have
an effect on those outside professional philosophy would be to ignore 
the way in which philosophical discussion impinges upon our everyday
moral and religious practices. Indeed, Phillips himself argues that philos-
ophy’s influence may be indirect, effecting people’s beliefs, whether or
not they have ever read any philosophy themselves.154
If this is true, how can we maintain that everything is left as it is?
Phillips may want to say that, although philosophical clarification may
affect a person’s attitude to, say, religious belief, it has not in any way
interfered with the actual use of religious language. We haven’t changed
what we are looking at, just the way we are looking at it. But this runs
counter Phillips’s claim that philosophy makes a substantial difference
to what is being investigated, namely, moral and religious beliefs, rather
than a person’s attitude to, or understanding of, them. Moreover, it is
doubtful whether we can draw such a strict boundary between what we
are looking at and the way we look at it. Finally, if one’s perspective is
transformed, one may well want to engage in some reform as a result. If
philosophical clarification has exposed certain confusions, one might
feel the need to reform the language which gave rise to these confusions
in the first place. Of course, the reformer need not be a philosopher. But,
first, if we “cannot divorce philosophical enquiry from the life of the
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enquirer”,155 it may well turn out to be. Secondly, even if it is not, phi-
losophy has still been an agent of change, be it indirectly.
Philosophy would seem to make a difference. The examples we
have considered tend to undermine rather than support the idea that we
could effect a radical severance between philosophical understanding
and practical (moral or religious) understanding. In his latest work,
Phillips comes close to drawing this conclusion, yet, in the end, shies
away from it. The penultimate chapter of Religion and the Hermeneutics
of Contemplation reviews Winch’s conclusions concerning the problems
connected to understanding a culture different, and far removed, from
our own. In his earlier writings, Phillips argues, Winch deals with these
problems in a very general way. Discussing the differences between
European and Zande modes of thinking, Winch argues that, although we
cannot deny any conflict here, it would go too far to say they logically
contradict each other:
“It could be that people who interest themselves in cricket find it impossi-
ble to take baseball seriously, and vice versa: there would be conflict here
too, but no contradiction. It would make little sense to ask in the abstract,
which game it was ‘right’ to support […].”156
There is no reference to any speaker, no question of whose understanding
we are talking about. The emphasis lies on the analogy between speaking
and playing games, on learning and applying new rules. Understanding
cultures different from our own seems “like mastering strange games we
had not heard of, or getting to know the rules people are following.”157
In his later work, Phillips suggests, Winch comes to realise that these
analogies are quite inadequate. The notions of rules and mastering skills
have their most natural applications in the context of games or, perhaps,
mathematical procedures. But it is unnatural to speak in this way about
language, which is more akin to a dialogue or a conversation. What,
Phillips asks, would it mean to speak of mastering the rules of a conver-
sation? Discourse, and the activities with which it is interwoven, are
rooted in the lives people are leading and the wider social and cultural
contexts in which those lives are placed. Language-games are played 
by people with lives to lead. It will not do to argue, in general terms, 
that the games, the different forms of life, do not contradict each other.
Language-games and forms of life do not contradict each other, people
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do. Such contradictions must be dealt with when and where they arise.158
These conclusions have an important bearing on what it is to understand
cultures other than our own:
“Growth of understanding in discourse is not like mastering the complex-
ities of a game. […] Rather, it will be a matter of extending our under-
standing of human lives which are, in important respects, different from
our own.”159
For example, a sensitive anthropologist who gives a good account of the
use of the poison oracle among the Azande may, in that sense, bring us
to understand what is going on. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
I have the kind of understanding the Azande themselves possess. For 
it makes no more sense to say that the practices of the Azande “could
play a role in our lives than it does to apply a map of Central London to 
the Sahara desert.”160 But what about Evans-Pritchard’s claim that, dur-
ing his field work among the Azande, he organised his practical affairs
much as the Azande did, and found it as satisfactory a way of running
his affairs as any other? According to Winch, this was possible because
these practices play a living role in the lives of the people amongst whom
Evans-Pritchard was living. Thus, his actions could be met with the kinds
of response and resonance which gives them their sense. Phillips dis-
agrees. He tells us that when Rhees heard of the way Evans-Pritchard
had organised his affairs among the Azande he remarked: ‘But he still
had the return air-ticket in his pocket’. Phillips elaborates:
“For Evans-Pritchard, consulting an oracle is more like a technique he
chose to adopt. But it is not a choice for the Azande, any more than their
lives are choices for them. If practices were adopted in the way Evans-
Pritchard adopted consulting oracles, then life itself would be a collection
of skills. Such a view would leave out the whole aspect of cultural roots
and their connection with what constitutes the identity of a people.”161
Although Phillips certainly has a point, his analysis raises some ques-
tions. First, Phillips takes it for granted that Evans-Pritchard embarked
on his project as an experiment. He simply wanted to see what it was
like to live, for a while, as the Azande do, keeping in mind, always, that
he could give it up any time he liked and return back home on the first
flight out. That may well be true. But the question is whether there are
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no other possibilities. Might not someone, for whatever reason, give up
his old life to live among the Azande, with never a thought of returning
home? Perhaps Phillips would reply that, even so, he still chooses to 
do so. For this reason, though his understanding of the Azande will be
different from that of Evans-Pritchard, it will still not be equivalent to
the understanding the Azande themselves possess. Our emigrant can
always recall the life he lived before joining the Azande, and ponder 
the changes his decision has wrought. This is something the Azande 
can never do. Agreed. But on this reading the claim that we cannot have
the same understanding as the Azande do becomes a tautology. To have
this understanding would amount to no less than being a member of 
the Azande.162 One might well develop this argument to such an extent
that it becomes doubtful whether we can ever be said to have the same
understanding as anyone else: to have the same understanding as Jack 
or John, one would have to be Jack or John — understanding becomes,
in essence, a private affair. My point is not to deny that there will be dif-
ferences between the understanding the Azande possess and the under-
standing we possess, or, for that matter, between my understanding and
my neighbour’s. But, to use one of Phillips’s phrases, these differences
can only be the differences they are because their reality depends on the
place they occupy in the broader context of human life and discourse.
Any understanding we might reach of the Azande is attained in relation
to their understanding, not only of themselves, but also of us. Under-
standing, far from being private, is dialectical. In this respect we would
do well to remind ourselves that, as a result of Evans-Pritchard’s stay
among the Azande, their understanding may also be transformed and
extended. Rather than stressing the differences between various forms of
understanding we should note the way in which they stand in a dialogic
relation to one another. To say that this dialogue shows that we can
never attain complete understanding, that there is always something we
lack, is highly misleading.
Phillips gets it right, I believe, when he concludes that the notion 
of understanding is indeterminate. The difficulties we have encountered
do not pertain exclusively to so-called ‘alien’ cultures. The idea that our
own culture is perfectly transparent to us will not bear closer scrutiny.
Indeed, some parts of ‘our’ culture may be more alien than cultural
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manifestations which are geographically or historically remote. The line
between what is and what is not ‘alien’ is quite indeterminate.163 This
only reinforces the point that the problems we have encountered “spring
in a large part from certain peculiarities of our notion of understanding,
rather than from peculiarities about the relation between one culture and
another.”164 We cannot deal with these difficulties in any abstract or 
formal way; given the indeterminacy in the notion of understanding, we
should always ask whose understanding we are talking of.
The reader may think that we have gotten sidetracked into a rather
lengthy discussion of the difficulties concerning the understanding of
other cultures. The conclusions we have reached, however, are pertinent
to our current topic. For if understanding is indeterminate, how is this
related to the imperative of understanding involved in a contemplative
philosophy? Is there not good reason, Phillips asks,
“to question my contemplative conception of philosophy? Does it not
conjure up a picture of the philosopher hovering over the limitations and
indeterminacy of our comprehension, or lack of comprehension, under-
standing all he surveys? If our actual situation makes such transcendence
impossible, why make it the aim of philosophy?”165
The complexities we face, Phillips concludes, make us wonder whether
there is a distinctive philosophical imperative of the understanding at
all. Returning us straight back to the topic of this section, Phillips enter-
tains the possibility that, perhaps, “there is no clear distinction, after
all, between speaking for oneself about moral or religious questions,
and making philosophical observations about such questions.”166 Phillips
maintains, however, that this would be a mistake:
“We look at the philosophical and non-philosophical contexts […] think-
ing that a qualitative difference […] must emerge, and being puzzled if
it does not happen. We forget the two contexts themselves. It would be
foolish to deny interaction between them, but equally foolish to deny their
differences. The philosopher reflects in a subject which has a history, and
its own distinctive questions.”167
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For example, the philosopher may puzzle over whether moral or religious
viewpoints can have any objectivity. This question can be answered in
various ways. For instance, it may be thought that unless different views
can be resolved in terms of reasons wider than themselves to which they
all appeal, they are reduced to personal preferences and thus lose their
imperative. To avoid this unsatisfactory conclusion, it may be thought
necessary to say that different viewpoints are perspectives on the same
reality.168 As we have seen, Phillips rejects such an analysis. It is con-
fused to treat differing perspectives as external objects of comparison
and to think that one could have a demonstration, independently of any
perspective, to decide which provides the better alternative in a given
situation. For the agent, moral or religious considerations are constitu-
tive of what he takes the situation to be.169 This does not take us back
to the conclusion that, thus, all viewpoints are equal and that we must
be tolerant of them all. Recognising possibilities of religious sense,
for example, does not force us to abandon anti- or non-religious val-
ues. On the contrary, philosophical clarity would show the opposition in
a truer light:
“the opposition may be seen to be all the stronger. For example, it can now
be seen as a genuine clash which does not depend on showing the opposi-
tion to be confused.”170
For whose sake does the philosopher engage with these questions?
Phillips replies: for his own sake and for that of anyone else who is puz-
zled, philosophically, like him.171 That is to say, Phillips maintains that
“these, and many other philosophical questions, need not occur [to] or
bother the moral or religious agent who strives to be clear about other
viewpoints.”172 But, first, what kind of clarity about other viewpoints is
the moral agent striving after if not the kind of clarity we have just dis-
cussed? Given Phillips’s answers, it seems likely that the agent striving
to be clear would, at the very least, not object to learning about them.
After all, would not he, too, want to see ‘the opposition in a ‘truer light’’?
Secondly, it is simply wrong to say that such questions as whether moral
or religious viewpoints can have any objectivity, whether they do not
simply express the agent’s personal preferences, belong exclusively to
philosophy. These questions have been posed, in various guises, by
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various people in the course of their ‘non-philosophical’ lives. Of course,
philosophy has taken up these question in a specific way. They have
been systematically explored in the course of the history of the subject.
But the point is that if such an enquiry would not be informed by, and
rooted in, concerns that play a role in our everyday moral and religious
lives, it becomes difficult to see what significance, or sense, philosophi-
cal enquiry has. There are, indeed, differences between philosophical and
non-philosophical contexts. But, as we have already argued, these differ-
ences may not always be as clear as Phillips tends to imply, particularly
so where moral and religious beliefs are concerned. If this is true, why
should we expect to be able to draw any clear distinctions between speak-
ing for oneself on moral or religious matters and making philosophical
observations about them?173
Perhaps Phillips would agree that philosophical enquiry has an influ-
ence on our everyday lives. After all, he does not wish to deny interac-
tion between philosophical and non-philosophical contexts. He might
maintain however that philosophy leaves everything as it is in the sense
that it neither advocates nor appropriates any specific moral or reli-
gious point of view. Philosophy aims at clarity of understanding. But the
“moral or religious response which comes in the wake of clarity cannot
be predicted from that clarity itself.”174 On the one hand, we should ask
what kind of contrast Phillips is implying. Are there any other forms of
understanding people may attain that will allow us to predict, without
error, a specific moral or religious response? Of course, certain forms of
understanding will show a person’s moral or religious commitments. But
does this not hold for philosophy as well? After all, as we have seen, in
Phillips’s understanding, a contemplative philosophy is committed to a
moral imperative of its own.175 On the other hand, if philosophical clar-
ity shows the opposition between rival moral or religious perspectives 
in a truer light, it would be naïve to insist that we cannot predict, in any
way, what kind of result such clarity will have on certain people. One
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final example should clarify both these points. Philosophical clarifica-
tion, Phillips admits, may strengthen one’s beliefs or weaken them. He
maintains, however, that the “results are unpredictable. In any case, they
are not the business of philosophy.”176 One may find this a harsh deci-
sion. Phillips might agree. Take the example of the university teacher
who realises that his lessons may have a hurtful effect on certain ‘weak
students’. What is he to do? Should he spare them the truth? Phillips
answers: “harsh though it sounds, I think he must be intellectually hon-
est and admit that in this context truth is more important than people.”177
Perhaps so. But is this not a moral issue, and may not the teacher’s deci-
sion be challenged? At any rate, I do not see how this challenge could
be met by means of disinterested philosophical enquiry.
Let us draw this section to a close. We discussed Phillips’s understand-
ing of the disinterested nature of philosophical enquiry, focusing on the
relation between philosophy and morality or religious belief. We consid-
ered a radical interpretation: philosophical enquiry has no impact on our
everyday, personal, moral or religious commitments and understanding
thereof. It leaves everything as it is. Our argument has shown that posi-
tion to be untenable. We then considered a more moderate interpreta-
tion: it is not denied that philosophical enquiry has a bearing on what is
said in morality or religion. Nevertheless, philosophy leaves everything
as it is in that it does not endorse any specific moral or religious point of
view. We may still distinguish between speaking as a philosopher and
speaking for oneself. Without wanting to deny the differences between
philosophical and non-philosophical contexts, we have argued that no
straightforward distinctions can be drawn. As we have seen, the fact that,
in Phillips’s view, philosophical contemplation is committed to a moral
imperative of its own, only serves to reinforce this conclusion.
In the previous section we saw that, whereas, in his earlier work, the
emphasis lay mainly on highlighting the distinctiveness of various lan-
guage-games and their logical autonomy, in his later work Phillips more
readily draws our attention to the way in which these language-games
hang together: “language-games have their sense in the same language,
otherwise they would say nothing.”178 Our forms of discourse “cut across
and impinge on each other in countless ways in the hubbub of voices in
our own and other cultures.”179 The differences between various forms
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of discourse have their reality in human conversations where one thing
bears on another and vice versa. This, Phillips concludes, is the kind of
unity that discourse has.180 As indicated, I believe that Phillips’s growing
attention to the ways in which our language-games hang together consti-
tutes an important amendment to his earlier views. At the same time it
prevents him from envisioning too secluded a position for philosophical
contemplation. If philosophy is to say anything, it cannot completely
extract itself from the ‘hubbub of voices’ that makes up our language.
But did not Wittgenstein say that the philosopher is not a citizen of any
community of ideas; that his ideal was a certain coolness, to create a
temple for the passions without meddling with them? He did. But he
also said that working on philosophy is like working on oneself, and he
doubted whether one can be a good philosopher if one cannot even man-
age to be a good man. Our discussion has shown that Phillips’s proposal
to explain these latter remarks in terms of difficulties concerning the
practice of philosophy is unsatisfactory. One might feel this conclusion
to be supported by Phillips’s claim that Wittgenstein’s conception of his
philosophical vocation is a quasi-religious one.181 Phillips explains his
remark in terms of the form of wonder that lies at the root of Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy. This is the final topic we must discuss.
4.2.3 Philosophical wonder
The notion of philosophical wonder plays an important role in Phillips’s
understanding of a contemplative philosophy. In his discussion he draws
heavily upon Rhees. We already witnessed Rhees’s suggestion that, in
thinking about the notions of reality and understanding we may be led 
to wonder at the possibility of understanding at all. For Rhees, wonder 
is characteristic of philosophy anyway. He proceeds to sum up various
possible forms of wonder: wonder at death, wonder at the beauty of
human action, or that of a natural scene and, in the same way, wonder at
what is terrible and what is evil, etc.182 Phillips warns us not to misun-
derstand Rhees’s remarks. He is not claiming that ‘wonder’ comes to the
same thing in all the examples he mentions. Nor is he saying that those
who wonder in these ways need be engaged in philosophical wonder-
ment. For Phillips, the point is,
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“that these other examples of wonder may throw light on the presence of
wonder in philosophy and that a failure to see any point in these examples
is likely to be linked, in some ways, with a failure to see any point in a con-
templative conception of philosophy. For example, if one can see primitive
ritual only in instrumental terms, it may be less surprising if one can see
philosophical inquiry only in instrumental terms as well — as exercises in
problem solving or as the therapy that makes one’s puzzles go away.”183
Phillips makes his point so tentatively that one can hardly take issue
with it. He is not arguing that a specific form of wonderment is the sine
qua non of philosophical enquiry. He merely aims to show how various
examples of wonder may throw light on the kind of wonder that informs
a contemplative philosophy. What kind of wonder are we talking about
and how does it relate to Phillips’s understanding of a contemplative
philosophy?
Phillips expresses the notion of philosophical wonderment in various
ways. It is, very briefly, “wonder that life can be like that”.184 Somewhat
more elaborately, philosophical wonderment is “wonder at the different
ways in which people think, the kind of problems they have, and what
counts as solutions to these problems.”185 For Phillips, the main import
of these remarks is to shed light on the possibility of an understanding 
of philosophy which is neither substantive nor that of an underlabourer.
Philosophical contemplation does not set out to arrive at definite answers
or solutions. Rather, it aims to do justice to the variety of answers and
questions that arise in human discourse:
“If you think from a certain angle, something must be left out. But there is
a different kind of reflection characteristic of philosophy: reflection on and
wonder at the fact that people do think and act from such angles with the
forms of understanding they involve.”186
Evidently, Phillips’s introduction of the notion of philosophical wonder-
ment serves to shed light on the two topics we discussed in our previous
sections: the independent and disinterested nature of philosophical
enquiry. It is from a sense of wonder that philosophy sets out on a road
to nowhere:
“I have emphasized a wonder that, I believe, is as old as philosophy
itself — wonder at the possibility of discourse, at the fact that people
have spoken and still speak to one another in various ways. […] It is in
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contemplating these possibilities in wrestling with philosophical prob-
lems that we are engaged in the struggle to go nowhere.”187
Of course, one need not share Phillips’s wonder at ‘the fact that people
have spoken and still speak to one another in various ways’. At any
rate, Phillips feels sure that Wittgenstein did. This leads him to describe
Wittgenstein’s conception of his vocation as quasi-religious. As is well
known, Wittgenstein once said that he could not help seeing every
problem from a religious point of view.188 Various commentators have
tried to make sense of this remark. In Phillips’s view, Wittgenstein’s
remark should not be taken to express some form of religious belief.
Inevitably, such a conclusion would raise the question which religion
Wittgenstein’s adhered to. Phillips replies that among dictionary defini-
tions of ‘religious’ we have: ‘strict’, ‘rigid’, ‘scrupulous’, and ‘consci-
entious’. He argues that
“it is dangerous to say more of Wittgenstein’s remark: he applied himself
to philosophy religiously, that is all. It would be absurd to ask in which 
historical religion this application took place!”189
This suggests that we should paraphrase Wittgenstein’s remark to read 
‘I cannot help seeing every problem from a ‘strict’, ‘rigid’, etc., point of
view’. One may wonder whether that covers Wittgenstein’s intended
meaning. Given the importance he attached to matters religious in his
life, it seems unlikely that he meant no more than that he worked very
conscientiously on his philosophy.
In Philosophy’s Cool Place Phillips moves away from this position,
opting instead for an appreciation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of his
philosophical vocation as ‘quasi-religious’. He does so because “Wittgen-
stein wondered at the fact that the great problems of philosophy existed at
all, a wonder that is internally related to the kind of attention he thought
these problems demanded of him.”190 This immediately raises the ques-
tion whether not everyone engaged with philosophical contemplation
should understand his vocation as quasi-religious. After all, Phillips has
just argued that that kind of wonder is internally related to a contempla-
tive understanding of philosophy. Luckily, this conclusion need not fol-
low, because it is not at all clear why, if Wittgenstein wondered about
these things — or if anyone else wonders about these things — we
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should invoke the term ‘quasi-religious’. Surely, to wonder at the great
problems of philosophy has little to do with religion, or religious won-
der.191 Phillips agrees. He argues that in calling Wittgenstein’s concep-
tion of his vocation quasi-religious
“we do not imply that it goes over into the religious domain. We cannot
equate wonder at the great problems of philosophy with religious wonder,
because, in each case, the meaning of ‘wonder’ in internally related to the
context in which it occurs.”192
Nevertheless, he maintains that there are good reasons for calling
Wittgenstein’s vocation quasi-religious. Often, Phillips argues, “when
Wittgenstein discusses religion, he speaks as an outsider, yet his dis-
cussion is infused with a spiritual sensibility.”193 The same sensibility,
Phillips continues, is shown in his concern for his friends. He discussed
personal problems with them in a “language of spiritual concern”,194 a
language, as Winch puts it, “poised on the edge of the religious.”195
This, Phillips agrees with Winch, “shows ‘the spiritual importance,’ at
least in certain circumstances, ‘of philosophical clarity concerning the
issue raised.’”196
Note that there is no longer any mention of ‘wondering at the great
problems of philosophy’. The whole notion of ‘philosophical wonder’
seems to have disappeared. Instead Phillips refers to the spiritual sensi-
bility which is shown in Wittgenstein’s work and in his correspondence
with his friends. But what kind of ‘spiritual sensibility’ or ‘spiritual con-
cern’ are we talking about? Just as the notion of wonder is internally
related to the contexts in which it occurs, so, too, with the notion of
spirituality. To say that we are dealing with a quasi-religious context, is
really to fail to answer this question. Phillips’s discussion does not suc-
ceed in clarifying the notion of a ‘quasi-religious’ vocation. Nor does it
demonstrate any internal relation between philosophical wonder and reli-
gious wonder, quasi or not. What the discussion does once again show,
we may note in conclusion, is that philosophical clarity does not always
leave everything as it is. In certain circumstances, Phillips tells us, it
may have a spiritual significance.
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4.3 From description to contemplation
To introduce a contrast between Phillips’s ‘earlier’ and his ‘later’ posi-
tion may seem a problematic strategy. One might argue that there are no
clear breaks in Phillips’s oeuvre which justify such an approach. Phillips
himself seldom, if ever, explicitly addresses this issue: “I let others
speak of periods in my work and of the projects I engage in. I simply go
where my puzzles take me.”197
In the previous sections we have, nevertheless, sought to justify 
the drawing of such a contrast. We focused on Phillips’s latest works in
which he develops his conception of philosophical contemplation. If our
conclusions are correct, our discussion shows that although there is no
sharp line separating the old from the new, it is warranted to speak of 
a more or less gradual shift of attention. This may be expressed as a shift
from a descriptive to a contemplative understanding of philosophical
enquiry. We may summarise this shift as follows.
Phillips’s earlier work presents philosophy’s task as neutral and clar-
ificatory: it provides descriptive accounts of various points of view
without advocating any one of them. There is a characteristically strong
emphasis upon the logical distinctiveness and autonomy of religious
language and activities. Quite some weight is placed upon arguing that
religious beliefs constitute distinct modes of discourse or language-
games, that religious activities constitute distinctive categories of behav-
iour or forms of life. Furthermore, although the terminology is, increas-
ingly so, derived from Wittgenstein, it is doubtful that the use to which
it is put can be justified by reference to Wittgenstein’s writings. We
suggested that for quite a few of his main methodological and episte-
mological doctrines Phillips relies more heavily upon the early Wittgen-
steinians — Rush Rhees, Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch — than on
Wittgenstein.
The later work is characterised, first and foremost, by Wittgenstein’s
ever increasing presence. Phillips more often and more thoroughly turns
to examine and rely upon Wittgenstein’s writings first hand. Drawing
upon his work, Phillips moves away from a purely descriptive towards a
contemplative conception of philosophy. Clarifying distinctions between
language-games remains important but the emphasis now lies on the fun-
damental questions which these distinctions are said to subserve. The
philosopher’s concern is not just with various specific forms of discourse
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but with ‘the possibility of discourse as such’. If all we do is show the
differences between language-games, this concern will not be addressed.
For the differences can only be the differences they are because their
reality depends on the place they occupy in the broader context of human
life. Human activities cannot be treated as a collection of arbitrary acts;
they stand in a dialogic relation to one another.
It is worth emphasising that the contrast we have drawn is by no
means absolute. Rather it tries to capture a gradual shift of attention
within a more or less stable philosophical frame of reference. Phillips’s
earlier work may be said to work towards his later understanding of
philosophy as contemplative. But it is only in Phillips’s later writings
that this conception of philosophy finds its mature expression. Given
the gradual nature of the shift from description to contemplation, it
would be quite artificial to decide upon a year which is to separate 
the old from the new. If forced to choose, however, one might opt for 
the year 1976. This year saw the publication of Religion Without Expla-
nation, a book which, by our standards, should be considered part of 
the earlier corpus of works. Phillips’s latest offering, Religion and the
Hermeneutics of Contemplation, grew out of the idea of revising Reli-
gion without Explanation with a view to a second edition. However,
Phillips tells us, revision soon became rewriting.198 Religion and the
Hermeneutics of Contemplation extends its earlier counterpart in a num-
ber of ways, one of which is the addition of a chapter on Peter Winch.199
As we have seen, by reference to Winch’s work, Phillips seeks to reveal
the limits of the analogy between specific uses of language and games,
and warns against the artificiality of strict divisions between various
categories of behaviour and the inadequacy of the compartmentalised
view of social life such division engenders.200 Winch’s earlier work,
Phillips allows, may have suffered from such shortcomings. Winch him-
self later realised as much. Faced with the problem of the notion of
understanding, specifically the way in which we either fail or come to
understand a different or alien point of view, Winch came to the con-
clusion that
“his position up to 1976 needed to be revised […] After 1976, Winch sees,
increasingly, the need to give more complex answers to this question than
his earlier analyses would have allowed.”201
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It is noteworthy, to say the least, that many of the examples provided of
Winch’s ‘earlier analyses’ tend to coincide with Phillips’s own earlier
analyses.202 Perhaps it is no coincidence that Phillips addresses these
issues in a revision of his 1976 publication Religion Without Explanation.
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5. RELIGION AND REDUCTIONISM
The previous chapter discussed, in general terms, Phillips’s later con-
ception of philosophical enquiry as a form of contemplation. A contem-
plative philosophy seeks to achieve a clear understanding of the various
modes of discourse in which people may be engaged and the forms 
of understanding they involve. It aims to do justice to these modes of
discourse and forms of understanding, showing them for what they are,
without meddling in them in any way. Where the study of religious
forms of discourse is concerned, matters are no different. The contem-
plation of religious possibilities of meaning “is simply an application 
to religion of the more general contemplative character of philosophy
itself.”1 Philosophical contemplation enquires into the role concepts play
in human life, including religious concepts. Now, as we saw, according
to Phillips, a contemplative philosophy finds acceptance difficult in 
the present climate of Anglo-American philosophy. If anything, Phillips
suggests, this is even more so where the philosophy of religion is con-
cerned. Why should this be so?
In the first chapter of Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation
Phillips tells us that, ever since Paul Ricoeur’s book, Freud and Philoso-
phy: An Essay on Interpretation, it has been commonly understood that if
we want to understand religious concepts we have to choose between two
distinct modes of interpreting religion in religious studies: the hermeneu-
tics of recollection or the hermeneutics of suspicion.2 The former, Phillips
argues, is sympathetic to religion. Its advocates assume that believers are
in touch with something real, a message we need to heed. Our task is to
recollect, in the sense of retrieve, this message for our age. The new faith
which emerges from this dialectical exercise will be one which has been
purged by the fires of criticism. By contrast, the hermeneutics of suspi-
cion, denies that there is a divine reality in religion. The very conception
of it is said to be the product of illusion. Thus, there is nothing real to
recollect or retrieve; rather, enlightenment consists in rescuing us from
religious mystification. Here, according to Phillips, the imperative of the
intellect is an imperative to be radically suspicious.
1 Phillips 2001, p. 4.
2 See Phillips 2001, pp. 1ff.
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According to Phillips, both the hermeneutics of recollection and the
hermeneutics of suspicion owe an enormous debt to David Hume. It is,
Phillips feels, not extravagant to claim that Hume’s Dialogues Concern-
ing Natural Religion constitutes the most devastating critique of religion
in the history of philosophy.3 This work,
“has shaped, if not determined, the terms of reference within which most
philosophy of religion is carried on. In any discussion of religion and
modernity, there is no way of avoiding Hume.”4
The fundamental claim of the Dialogues is that it is impossible to infer
anything substantive about God from the world: everyday facts cannot
lead to transcendental conclusions. That being so, it is easy to see how
the Hume’s work contributes to the hermeneutics of suspicion. Although
there may be dispute as to Hume’s final conclusions concerning reli-
gious belief, it will be clear that, if any inference from world to God is
logically problematic, any faith which is dependent on such an inference
is, at least, equally problematic.
One may feel that although Hume’s contribution to the hermeneutics
of suspicion is clear enough, his influence on the hermeneutics of recol-
lection is less obvious. According to Phillips, however, that would be a
mistake. The hermeneutics of recollection maintains that there is ‘some-
thing real’ in religion. It does not deny, however, that in retrieving this
‘something’ various forms of criticism need to be worked through, not in
the least those offered in the Dialogues. In other words, many philoso-
phers of religion sympathetic to religion attempt to answer Hume in his
own terms. According to Phillips, the work of Richard Swinburne can be
seen in this light. It is no coincidence that he has been described as a
twentieth-century Cleanthes.5
Must we choose between the hermeneutics of suspicion on the one hand
or the hermeneutics of recollection on the other? According to Phillips,
we need not. A contemplative philosophy offers us an alternative: ‘the
hermeneutics of contemplation’. The hermeneutics of contemplation is
also related to Hume’s critique of religion. The nature of this relation,
however, can only be appreciated, Phillips argues, if one is prepared to
go ‘beyond Hume’.6 The main question, philosophically, is whether we
must accept Hume’s terms of reference, whether, in doing so, we are
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illuminating or obscuring possibilities of meaning. Phillips speaks very
highly of Hume and admits that, in his opinion, Hume’s arguments are
irrefutable. But what if there are other possibilities of religious belief,
possibilities different in kind from those Hume criticises? Phillips main-
tains that there seems to be good reason to suspect this to be the case, if
only on purely historical grounds:
“It is generally agreed that deism is an attenuated and distorted form of
Christianity. It is this deism which is the object of Hume’s attack in the
Dialogues. One would expect philosophers, therefore, to be interested in
those other possibilities of religious sense not captured by deism.”7
According to Phillips, however, this does not seem to be the case. Nei-
ther the hermeneutics of suspicion nor the hermeneutics of recollec-
tion is willing to go beyond Hume’s terms of reference and enquire into
other possibilities of religious belief untouched by his analyses. That the
hermeneutics of contemplation should be at odds with the hermeneutics
of suspicion seems obvious enough. From the latter’s perspective, there
is little to be said after Hume’s conclusions. Religion has been dealt 
a fatal blow, and that is that. But the hermeneutics of contemplation does
not part ways only with religion’s detractors but with its defenders 
as well. Attempts to go beyond Hume will be resisted also within the
hermeneutics of recollection, certainly by those who seek to answer
Hume in his own terms. These terms, Phillips argues, define how they
see their apologetic task. Any effort to go beyond them would be seen
as an erosion of the intellectual defence which has to be made.8 The
hermeneutics of contemplation, however, does not come from a request
to do any favours for religion. To repeat, the contemplation of religious
possibilities of meaning is simply an application to religion of the more
general contemplative character of philosophy itself, discussed in the
previous chapter. When religious possibilities are elucidated, the aim is
not apologetics or advocacy:
“Rather, that elucidation is part of the more general philosophical con-
templation of possibilities of sense, of the kind of philosophical attention
which seeks to do justice to the world. Whether a person can personally
appropriate the perspective which has been elucidated is always a further
question.”9
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Whereas the hermeneutics of recollection “has the retrieval of faith as
its aim; a faith purged by criticism and, hence, one that can be advo-
cated”,10 the hermeneutics of contemplation aims merely to understand,
not to advocate or appropriate. In this sense, it remains independent and
disinterested.
This chapter examines Phillips’s efforts to go ‘beyond Hume’. First,
we focus on Phillips’s discussion of Hume’s Dialogues. Next, Phillips’s
critique of the various explanations of religion the ‘inheritors of Hume’s
legacy’ put forward is examined. The third and final part of this chapter
sets the stage for the ‘other possibilities of religious meaning’ Phillips
advances, to be explored in subsequent chapters.
5.1 Hume’s legacy: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Three years after his death, in 1779, David Hume’s Dialogues Concern-
ing Natural Religion were published. In this work, Hume undertakes a
thorough criticism of religious belief, specifically of the attempt to infer
the existence of God from the world in which we live. Already during his
lifetime Hume had criticised religious belief in such essays as Of Mira-
cles and Of a Particular Providence and a Future State which gained
him the dubious honour of being called ‘the great infidel’. The Dia-
logues, however, can be seen as the most extended and carefully pre-
sented articulation of Hume’s point of view and as such has inspired a
great deal of discussion. Many consider it the most decisive modern cri-
tique of some of the major arguments concerning the nature and exis-
tence of God. J. C. A. Gaskin submits that we may think of Hume as
the founder of the philosophy of religion:
“when ‘philosophy of religion’ is understood in its usual modern sense 
— as analysis of the truth and meaning of religious beliefs — it is difficult
to think of anyone other than David Hume as its founder.”11
Phillips agrees that Hume has left us a philosophical legacy which cannot
be overestimated. In Religion Without Explanation and again in Religion
and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation he discusses Hume’s conclu-
sions.12 Phillips’s assessment is ambivalent. In her review of Religion
Without Explanation, Helen Oppenheimer remarks that, for Phillips,
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Hume “is both the hero and the villain.”13 On the one hand, Hume’s 
critique of the argument from design is not to be gainsaid. The Dia-
logues renders any inference from world to God logically problematic.
On the other hand, Hume’s legacy is misleading. Hume believed such
arguments to be a necessary constituent of religious belief. Therefore, 
if these arguments run aground, so, too, does religious belief. According
to Phillips, this is a misunderstanding. There are other possibilities of
religious belief which are independent of the metaphysical assumptions
Hume criticises. If one uncritically accepts Hume’s legacy, one will not
be able to appreciate these other possibilities.
Hume’s criticisms in the Dialogues are directed mainly at the argu-
ment from design; at the attempt to infer the nature or existence of God
from the world in which we have our lives. In these arguments Phillips
discerns three levels of increasing severity.14 At the first level, Phillips
argues, Hume imposes restrictions upon what could be concluded from
the design argument if it were valid. At the second level, he argues that
there is nothing to be gained from postulating a ‘Divine Artificer’ to
explain the order found in the world. At the third level, Hume criticises
the argument from design as applied, not so much to various individual
parts of the world, but to the universe as a whole.
The first level of criticism is Philo’s claim that we cannot infer more
about God than the evidence allows. Philo and Cleanthes agree that, as
our ideas reach no farther than our experience, and we have no expe-
rience of divine attributes and operations, we must infer them from the
evidence available to us.15 The problem, Philo argues, is that the evi-
dence is fundamentally ambiguous. When we look at nature as we know
it, we do not find the neat order that the argument from design requires.
Instead we find a world of mixed effects, including good and bad fea-
tures. As Cleanthes sees it, nature ‘ravishes into admiration all men’;
Philo, by contrast, finds it ‘contemptible or odious to the spectator’.16 No
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doubt, Phillips observes, “there is some reason, in some circumstances,
to react in either way.”17 But the point is that, if the evidence is mixed,
we can only infer that the character of the Author of Nature is equally
mixed. Because of the ambiguity of the evidence we cannot infer any of
the infinite attributes of God on the basis of it. Philo states his case as
follows:
“But let us still assert that, as this [God’s] goodness is not antecedently estab-
lished but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for
such an inference while there are so many ills in the universe, and while
these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding
can be allowed to judge on such a subject. […] the bad appearances […] may
be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never
prove these attributes.”18
On the evidence available, Phillips quips, it would seem that God has his
good days and his bad days.19 At any rate,
“on such evidence, we can never find grounds for believing in an all-
powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God. We cannot arrive at such a belief
on an experiential or experimental basis.”20
But, one might argue, neither can we conclusively invalidate such a
belief. After all, has not Phillips just admitted that, given the circum-
stances, we may react to nature in the way Cleanthes does? Perhaps
Cleanthes cannot demonstrate decisively the truth of his belief. But can
Philo prove him wrong? In his famous parable of the long-neglected
garden, does not John Wisdom show that either attempt is hopeless; that
the evidence is simply inconclusive? We might insist that we can say no
more than that “there are many reactions to the flowers and weeds of
the garden in which we live, among them, religious reactions.”21
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Hume’s second level of criticism demonstrates the inadequacy of 
this reply. At this level, Hume develops three layers of argument. First,
he points out that the analogy between works of nature and human arte-
facts is very weak. Secondly, Hume argues that there is no need to refer
to a designing intelligence to explain the facts of nature. Even where 
certain patterns are observed these can be explained in perfectly natural
ways. One might argue, however, that any such natural explanation will
itself, in turn, require an explanation. Hume replies, thirdly, that there is
nothing to be gained from going on asking questions ad infinitum. Why
go so far as to postulate the operations of an intelligent agent? Why not
stop at the material world?
As long as we think of nature as a garden, Phillips argues, it makes
sense to infer a gardener. But why should we think of nature as a garden,
as an artefact, in the first place? The legitimacy of the inference from
world to God depends on the appropriateness of the comparison. Hume
points out that the similarities between human artefacts and works of
nature are few, and where they exist the differences of scale on the two
sides of the analogy further devalue the argument. Clearly, Phillips con-
cludes, this line of argument is more damaging to the argument from
design than the one Hume presents at the first level of criticism:
“It is more severe to be told, not simply to be careful about one’s inferences
concerning design, but that the whole notion of design, in this context, is
logically inappropriate.”22
What does Phillips mean when he states that the notion of design is 
‘logically inappropriate’? At times, he gives the impression that, if only
we would observe nature carefully, we should come to see that the infer-
ence to a designer is simply false: “Thousands of causes are at work
innature, but they are not the result of human-like design or planning.”23
But, surely, this begs the question. For it is Cleanthes’ contention that
these causes are the result of intelligent design. Furthermore, this makes
it appear as if, after all, we could settle the matter experientially. If so,
Cleanthes’ suggestion would not be ‘logically inappropriate’ but, rather,
empirically incorrect.
Alternatively, Phillips’s remark could be read as follows. Hume’s
erosion of the analogy between human artefacts and works of nature
opens the way “to the recognition that nature admits of natural expla-
nations, and that the inference to a designer has no basis in nature
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itself.”24 Hume, Phillips argues, is urging us to ‘treat nature naturally’.
Such patterns as there are in nature require no supernatural explanation;
we may suggest various alternatives:
“It is vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or veg-
etables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain know how
an animal could subsist unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not find
that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its
matter, corrupting, tries some new form?”25
According to Gaskin, Hume’s suggestion is of astonishing intellectual
daring and foresight. For it is only a small step from the idea that a living
organism would not remain in existence as a living organism unless its
parts were working in such a way as to preserve it, to the idea of natural
selection.26 Both the theory of natural selection and Hume’s anticipation
of it have serious consequences for the design argument:
“In the first place they provide an explanation for the structural order in liv-
ing organisms. […] In the second place the teleological argument is fatally
weakened. If the appearance of purpose, the apparent adjustment of means
to ends in animate nature, is only the satisfying of conditions which have to
be satisfied if the organism is to survive, then the analogy in the teleologi-
cal argument between human purposive contrivances and the seemingly
purposive parts of nature altogether disappears.”27
Whether or not Hume’s remark in the Dialogues provides sufficient
ground to claim that he anticipated the theory of natural selection may
be a matter of debate. Gaskin admits that Hume claims no more than
that his alternative explanation of the order and purpose in nature is log-
ically conceivable. Hume’s contention is that the design argument is 
no better grounded in experience than the non-teleological possibility 
he suggests. Gaskin insists, however, that “This equality is in itself suf-
ficient to upset the exclusive claims of design as a way of accounting
for the order, in particular the purposive structure, of living things.”28
Now, obviously, for us, the idea of natural selection is no longer merely
a logical possibility but a very well-evidenced theory. Consequently, 
its potential for damaging the design argument has greatly increased.
But Phillips’s remark that the notion of design is logically inappropriate
seems to imply a stronger claim. According to Phillips, one gathers, it
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makes no sense to speak of design in nature; such talk is unintelligible.
Although this is Phillips’s eventual conclusion, it is not Hume’s. Phillips
is not unaware of this fact. As we shall see in a moment, this constitutes
the main difference between his earlier and his later discussion of Hume.
Before we do so, however, there is one final argument to be considered.
For one might insist that, although natural explanations of order and pur-
pose in the world are not logically inconceivable, they still stand in need
of further explanations until we arrive at some ultimate cause.
Phillips rejects this move. He argues that it is not true that particular
natural causal explanations are intellectually inadequate, forcing us to 
go on asking further questions. Whether further questions are asked
depends on the circumstances:
“Sometimes, the insistence on asking further questions is not a sign of
commendable intellectual persistence, but of stubbornness and stupidity; a
failure to recognise when enough is enough. We all know that it does not
take too many questions ‘Why’ from a child before the child is told not to
be silly!”29
But, once again, is not Phillips begging the question? The advocate of
the argument from design is made out to look like a child playing a silly
game. But as it stands, Phillips’s ridicule of his opponent’s case is not
decisive. Agreed; whether or not further questions are in order depends
upon the circumstances and, as Phillips adds in his earlier discussion of
Hume, “the interests represented in the question. There is no necessity
that every answer to the question Why? must give rise to a further ques-
tion.”30 But the circumstances in which the proponents of the argument
from design present their case, as well as their interests in doing so, are
not those of a child continually asking ‘Why?’. It is not enough to point
out that there is no necessity to ask further questions. Phillips needs to
show why, in these circumstances, to ask further questions would be to
do no more than to demonstrate one’s stubbornness or stupidity. This,
Phillips does not do.31
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Hume’s own argument, I believe, is of a different nature. If we postulate
the operations of an intelligent agent as an ultimate cause, Philo argues,
the question is how we shall satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of
that being. How can we satisfy ourselves by going on in infinitum?32
Cleanthes objects to the question:
“Even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection,
Philo, that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new
question which may incessantly be started?”33
Philo immediately concurs. There is, he admits, nothing wrong with
explaining a particular effect by a more general cause, even if these gen-
eral causes themselves should remain, in the end, totally inexplicable.
However, Philo adds, what is not satisfactory is “to explain a particu-
lar effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be accounted for
than the effect itself.”34 In his analysis, Gaskin points out that the qual-
ification in the word ‘particular’ needs emphasis. An explanation is good
and proper, and need not itself be explained, provided the explanation is
more general than, or known apart from, that which it purports to explain.
Hume’s contention is that where the postulation of an agent cause is
concerned, this is not the case. That explanation is no more general than
the order in nature itself. It is intrinsically no better understood, nor does
it stand any less in need of a further explanation:35
“To say that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme
Being fall into order of themselves and by their own nature is really to talk
without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know why
it is not as good sense to say that the parts of the material world fall into
order of themselves and by their own nature? Can the one opinion be intel-
ligible, while the other is not so?”36
Philo’s claim is not so much that Cleanthes has carried on asking ques-
tions beyond the point where it becomes silly, but that the explanation
advanced is not really an explanation at all. Thus understood, Philo’s
point seems more damaging to the argument from design than Phillips
makes it appear. Given that Phillips is concerned to present Hume’s case
as strongly as possible, one wonders why he should not mention it. Could
it be that Phillips’s concern to show that the proponent of the design
argument continues to ask questions beyond the point where it makes
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sense to do so anticipates his eventual conclusion that the whole argu-
ment is logically confused? For Hume, it would appear, there is some
meaning to the question ‘Who, or what, is the cause of order in the
world?’. Phillips, however, doubts whether this is so. Let us consider
his arguments to this effect.
One might insist that although parts of the world can be explained nat-
urally, the existence of the world as such cannot. It demands some other
form of explanation. Now, the word ‘world’ might mean the planet earth,
or some part of it. But it is clear that both Hume and Phillips take it to
mean ‘the universe’, i.e. ‘all there is’. Thus, at this point, we are no longer
concerned solely with the argument from design but, more specifically,
with the cosmological argument. Whereas the former takes specific states
of affairs as its starting-point, the latter begins from the fact that anything
exists, in the manner it does exist. Why should there be something rather
than nothing? Why should there be this rather than something else?
Hume’s examination of the cosmological argument is what Phillips
means by the third level of criticism in the Dialogues. At this point,
Phillips’s analysis in Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation
turns away from the one presented in Religion Without Explanation. In
his earlier discussion, Phillips believed Hume’s arguments to be com-
pletely successful. He now argues that Hume does not press his argu-
ments far enough.
When we see a house, Phillips argues, it is perfectly natural to ask by
whom it was made, how it came to be. A house implies an architect;
does not the universe in like manner imply a designer? After all, like
effects have like causes. In this way the argument would have as com-
pare talk of the universe as a whole with talk of houses, of human arte-
facts. But the legitimacy of the inference depends on the appropriateness
of the comparison. As we have seen, Hume points out that the analogy
is, at best, very weak. Furthermore, he argues that for a cause-effect rela-
tion to hold between objects we must have experience of the cause and
effect being frequently conjoined, that is, as Hume puts it, being ‘two
species of objects’:
“When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined
together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of the one wherever I see the
existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how
this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are
single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult
to explain.”37
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Normally, we infer one thing from the other on the basis of past expe-
rience. We can say ‘If P, then Q’ only because we have learnt from past
experience that given P then Q. So we can ask who built this house,
even if we have not seen this particular house built, because we have
experience of houses being built. But how can we say these things of
the universe? To ascertain this reasoning it were requisite that we had
experience of the origin of worlds. Obviously, as Philo points out, this
is not the case:
“Have worlds ever been formed under your eye, and have you had leisure
to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appear-
ance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your expe-
rience and deliver your theory.”38
According to Phillips, this shows us that Hume thinks it is idle to seek a
substantive answer to the question ‘Who made the universe?’. We have
no idea of the context in which that question could be answered. This
objection cannot be avoided, Phillips adds, by saying that, although the
universe is unique, it bears the mark of its Maker. True, when we see a
maker’s mark on a product, we usually do not check the authenticity of
the mark. But the important point is that this could be done, if necessary.
The absence of an independent check in the case of the claim that God
made the world leads us back to all the difficulties Hume has raised.
Now, in his earlier discussion, Phillips admits, he made a further claim.
He argued that Hume did not merely remain agnostic on these questions:
Hume “is not simply saying that we can never know whether anyone
made the universe. He is questioning the intelligibility of such talk.”39
Phillips now argues that this view is mistaken:
“It is mistaken precisely because Hume did not press his objections to the
analogy between the universe and a house in the logical directions which
bring out how severe the criticism can be.”40
Perhaps, Phillips argues, we should say that Hume realised that asking
for the cause of ‘everything’ is odd. Such questions as: ‘How did X come
to be?’, are usually asked of particular things. In such a case an answer
may be provided by referring to the existence of something other than X.
But when one asks: ‘How did everything come to be?’, what else is
there to refer to? The logically necessary distinction between explicans
and explicandum can no longer be made. Phillips feels, however, that
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there are deeper issues concerning the notion of explaining ‘the origin of
the world’ which “Hume either did not pursue sufficiently, or did not
recognise at all.”41
Suppose, Phillips argues, that in asking why anything exists, we mean
‘anything as opposed to nothing’. The problem then becomes how we
should understand what ‘nothing’, used in this absolute sense, is sup-
posed to mean. Normally, as when we say there is nothing in the drawer,
we establish that there is nothing by establishing what is the case. But
when we try to speak of ‘nothing’ in the absence of any such context it
is not clear that our words mean anything at all.42 Were we to say that
everything may cease to exist, we would seem to be assuming that ‘the
world’ can be regarded as a thing or class of things. But there are great
difficulties in this. If we treat ‘the world’ as an object, how are we to
identify this object?
“Any object, or group of objects, is individuated against a background of
other objects. But against what background do we individuate the world?
If ‘everything’ is thought to be a thing, we cannot answer the question, ‘This
thing as distinct from what?’.”43
Alternatively, if we treat ‘the world’ as a class of things, by which crite-
ria should we determine whether something belongs to this particular
class or not? Clearly, ‘Everything’ is not a class of things. The notion of
a class, Phillips argues, entails the notion of a limit, and a distinction
between things inside and outside the limit. But if our class is the class
‘containing everything’, it becomes anyone’s guess as to how we should
draw such limits.44
Certainly, Phillips raises a number of valid points. But is it true to say
that Hume failed to realise these? In his analysis of Hume’s Dialogues,
A. G. Vink does not seem to think so. He argues that Hume is not just
saying that we can never know what (or who) caused the universe but
that the question cannot even be meaningfully posed.45 Gaskin agrees;
he writes that, for Hume, the cosmic question, ‘Why anything?’, simply
becomes unanswerable,
“not because of our lack of information, but, in Hume’s terms, because in
general we lack any possibility of understanding how we should settle ques-
tions about ‘the origin of worlds’. Thus the question ‘why anything?’, far
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from necessitating the answer ‘god’, is not even comprehensible and what is
more (Hume might have added), if the universe had been empty, would the
question ‘why nothing?’ have been supposed to necessitate the same answer
which the question ‘why anything?’ is supposed to necessitate in the uni-
verse of things?”46
Although Phillips agrees that this greater challenge is latent in Hume’s
remarks, he insists that Hume himself failed to appreciate this.47 Hume
saw correctly that the design argument allows room for all manner of
theories concerning the origins of the world. It could be the product of
an infant deity, a committee of deities, and so on. As Philo points out, it
is difficult to see why “so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in
any respect, preferable to none at all.”48 But, Phillips argues, if this mat-
ter is pressed, as it should be, we can see that this is really just another
way of saying that there is no room here for real theories or hypotheses
at all. In the absence of any intelligible context for discrimination, these
notions “have taken off into metaphysical orbit.”49 Regrettably, this is
not Hume’s conclusion. He believed that we must remain agnostic on
this matter:
“Hume, in some ways, continues to speak of the universe or the world as
though it were a thing, the only problem being that, unlike other things,
such as houses, we do not have the kind of experience of it which allows
us to frame any definite hypotheses concerning it.”50
In short, Phillips insists that Hume did think it makes sense to speak of
‘the world’, and to speculate on what its origins might be. Were this not
the case, Phillips argues, “we would not be in a position to appreciate
what Hume meant by ‘true religion’.”51 Phillips’s argument, then, would
seem to hinge on our understanding of Hume’s notion of ‘true religion’.
What did Hume mean by this?
In the final part of the Dialogues, Philo may surprise the reader when
he says of himself that no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed
on his mind. It seems clear that, for Hume, the objections to the argu-
ment from design do not add up to a total, knockdown, disproof. Hume,
through Philo, finds a vestigial design argument convincing:
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“A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless,
the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems
as at all times to reject it.”52
Something of the design argument survives: the possibility of interpret-
ing the cause of order in the universe as an intelligent agent. Hume sees
no logical impossibility in the claim that the order found in nature could
be explained as the work of an ordering agent.53 But we should not for-
get that Hume maintains that this agent cannot be known to have any
attributes other than those just sufficient to produce the given result: 
the power of an agent together with some remote analogy to human
intelligence. In part XII of the Dialogues, the limitations of this possi-
bility are emphasised:
“If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain,
resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least unde-
fined, proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe prob-
ably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this proposition
be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it
affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any
action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried
no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with
any appearance of probability, to other qualities of the mind: If this really
be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man
do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often
as it occurs […]”54
These are the limits within which Hume is willing to give assent to a
belief in a god (or gods). But this assent is without value for any theistic
religion. It carries no duties, invites no action, allows no inferences and
involves no devotion. Gaskin suggests it is perhaps best described as a
highly attenuated deism which is not positively advocated. Its sole credo
is a diffidently held belief in an intelligent origin of natural order and its
sole observance is the morality which would anyway have been fol-
lowed for other reasons ‘were there no god in the universe’.55
This then is Hume’s ‘true religion’. Does it involve Hume in thinking
of the world as some kind of object, the origin of which may be specu-
lated upon? It is far from obvious that this is the case. According to
Phillips, Hume’s ‘true religion’ is a ‘minimal belief’ in which, had he
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appreciated the full extent of the logical problems connected to explain-
ing the cause of the universe, Hume would not have indulged:
“Hume should have heeded his own advice, with respect to other meta-
physical theses, when he came to discuss the notion of the origin of the
world: consign it to the flames. Instead, we find him conceding that the
cause or causes of order in the universe bear some remote, inconceivable
analogy to human intelligence.”56
Now, although, in the second sentence, Phillips paraphrases Philo more
or less correctly, the first sentence indicates that he assumes the concep-
tion of ‘true religion’ to arise in the context of the notion of the origin of
the world. A few pages further on, this suspicion is confirmed when
Phillips states, straightforwardly, that
“Hume’s conception [of ‘true religion’] involves a minimal belief in a
remote, inconceivable analogy between the cause or causes of the uni-
verse, and human intelligence.”57
If this were an accurate rendering of Philo’s words then, perhaps, there
would be some justification to the claim that Hume continued to think of
the universe as some kind of object, the origin of which may be specu-
lated upon. But it is not. As Vink points out, it is important to emphasise
that the remote analogy Philo will allow is that between human intelli-
gence and the cause or causes of order in the universe. His concession to
Cleanthes comes after the latter’s attempt to put the design argument to
use as a cosmological argument:
“The argument from analogy Philo is eventually willing to accept has no
bearing on the question of the cause of the universe — for Philo, that
question is no longer relevant — but relates to the question of the order in
the universe. In answering this question the analogy advanced by Clean-
thes […], however weak and limited, has a restricted use.”58
According to Vink, commentators have been rather too careless in par-
aphrasing Philo’s remark, making it appear as if his main concern is
with a first cause which may explain the transition from ‘nothingness’
to ‘being’, rather than with possible causes or explanations of the order
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we find in the world.59 Unfortunately, it would seem, Phillips’s discus-
sion is no exception. At the very least, it obscures the distinction to
which Vink draws our attention.
One should say ‘obscures’ rather than ‘disregards’ because, at other
times, Phillips does seem aware of the distinction. He asks why, in the
end, Hume awards some measure of worth to the design argument. The
reason, Phillips suggests, is that Hume thought “that ‘the order’ exhib-
ited in our modes of reasoning itself requires explanation in terms of
some principle in the universe, although we cannot claim knowledge 
of it.”60 To account for this principle of order in the universe, Hume
believed that one must choose between ‘the mental’ and ‘the physical’.
Hume thought it self-evident, Phillips continues, that we should opt for
the former. This is why he did not call himself an atheist: “not simply
because he believed atheists were too dogmatic about ‘the original prin-
ciple of order’, but because he believed, wrongly, that atheists must be
committed to materialism.”61
Here, then, Phillips addresses Philo’s concession to Cleanthes in its
proper context, i.e. as related to the question of cause(s) of order in the
universe rather than to the cause(s) of the universe as such. His judge-
ment, however, is no less harsh. Hume’s mistake, Phillips argues, is not
just that he thought that, in order to be an atheist, one must embrace
materialism. The main problem lies in the choice he forces upon us, the
choice between ‘the mental’ and ‘the physical’. This kind of metaphysi-
cal dualism, Phillips claims, has been demolished by Wittgenstein. There
is nothing to choose between; both categories are equally confused. Thus
Phillips rapidly concludes that
“the notion of ‘the original principle of order in the universe’ is confused,
as are the two candidates to be that principle: the categories of ‘the mental’
and ‘the physical’. But it is in the context of the first of these categories
that the equally confused notion of ‘true religion’ emerges, the supposition
that the cause or causes of order in the universe bear some remote, incon-
ceivable analogy to human intelligence.”62
What are we to make of this? It is difficult to see how Phillips’s read-
ing may be supported by the Dialogues alone. Nowhere does Hume say,
whether he be Philo, Cleanthes or Demea, that we must reject atheism
because we must reject materialism. As we saw, according to Gaskin,
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what remains of the design argument is the possibility, not the neces-
sity, of interpreting the cause of order in the universe as the actions of
an intelligent agent. Vink goes even further. He feels that Gaskin is far
too hasty in his assumption that Hume’s conception of ‘true religion’
involves a belief in an intelligent being or agency. As the argument pro-
ceeds, Vink argues, Philo more and more expresses his preference for 
an internal, natural principle of order rather than an external, ideal one.
The analogy between this principle of order and human intelligence
should be understood merely in a structural sense. That is to say, Philo’s
belief in the intelligence of the ultimate cause is nothing more than a
belief in its intelligibility.63 Whatever of this, it should be clear that either
reading casts doubt on Phillips’s conclusions. Perhaps we should enquire
whether Phillips’s analysis can be sustained by further argument, or on
the basis of Hume’s other writings. That task, however, is beyond the
scope of our present investigation. But, apparently, it is also beyond the
scope of Phillips’s investigation. For he presents his conclusions rather
hastily and sketchily, without any reference to the source material which
should support them.64 In the absence of a more detailed examination,
we must suspend our judgement.
However, our reservations may be strengthened by the following, more
general, considerations. It cannot be denied that Wittgenstein argued
against what might be termed ‘mentalism’ in logic. For example, he
criticised the suggestion that a word is ‘physical’, and its meaning is its
‘mental’ correlate and rejected the idea that ‘understanding’ may be
explicated in terms of mental processes. But it is important to remember
that Wittgenstein was attacking specific, well-defined targets. Phillips’s
far more general assertion that the categories of ‘the mental’ and ‘the
physical’ are, as such, confused — i.e. have no intelligible application —
is far from clear, let alone self-evidently correct. Consequently, Phillips’s
verdict that the idea of ‘the original principle of order in the universe’ can
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63 See Vink 1985, pp. 146-147, 176-179, 200-203. It should be clear that Vink objects
also to Gaskin’s characterisation of Hume’s ‘true religion’ as a ‘highly attenuated deism’.
However, Vink may be somewhat overzealous in his efforts to establish that Hume’s
position is thoroughly atheistic, or, Vink’s preferred term, ‘non-theistic’. On the whole,
Philo’s manner of speaking in the twelfth part of the Dialogues does seem to favour
Gaskin’s reading and, moreover, as Gaskin points out, again and again in private and
published work Hume gives explicit or implicit assent to the proposition that there is a
god. Though the disagreement, as Vink puts it, is not ‘merely verbal’, one should, per-
haps, not overstate the differences. After all, Gaskin readily acknowledges that Hume’s
‘true religion’ is as damaging to Christianity as any atheism could be.
64 To my knowledge, to date, Phillips has not engaged in a more thorough discussions
of this matter.
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but be confused is difficult to assess. Must it be confused to speak of the
laws of nature or, say, the theory of evolution, as pointing towards prin-
ciples of order in nature? Again, do not the various cosmologies offered
by natural science — for instance, big-bang and steady-state theories —
establish a theoretical framework which allows us, to a certain degree, to
say something about the universe as a whole? Although this may entail
some presupposition of structural unity, it need not necessarily commit
one to treating the universe as some kind of big object, with all the logi-
cal problems this entails. Without wanting to delve too deeply into these
matters, it would seem that, unless one deems such efforts unintelligible
in advance, one allows the religious apologist a window of opportunity to
present his case. It is clear that Phillips sees no such opportunities; the
blinds have long since been drawn. It is equally clear, however, that this
was not Hume’s position.
We have considered Phillips’s analysis of Hume’s three levels of cri-
tique in the Dialogues. In his earlier discussion, Phillips believed Hume’s
arguments to be completely successful. Hume demonstrates
“that even where people have thought there were grounds in the world we
know for inferring divine activity as an explanation of them, such thoughts
have been the result of philosophical confusion.65 The world we know does
not stand in need of any transcendental hypothesis to serve as its ultimate
explanation. The whole notion of a God and another world which we can
infer from the world we know is discredited.”66
Phillips’s later discussion shies away from this conclusion. Hume, Phillips
now believes, did not press his arguments far enough:
“Hume, in his attenuated deism, is still in the grip of conceptions of ‘the
world’ which, elsewhere, he himself criticises. This means that Hume
failed to press home the logical implications of some of his best criticisms.
Had he done so, his attack on certain ways of philosophising about religion
would have been even more devastating.”67
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67 Phillips 2001, p. xii. Note the suggestion that Hume was attacking certain ‘ways of
philosophising about religion’. At the very least, one should conclude that Hume’s attack
certainly reflected badly on (what Hume took to be) religious belief. He is saying that the
correct way of philosophising about religion leads to some rather irksome conclusions for
believers. Of course, from Phillips’s point of view, Hume’s criticisms do not really affect
the possibilities of religious belief Phillips wishes to bring to the fore. Hume’s criticisms
are most damaging to what Phillips takes to be distortions of religious belief. Seeing as
Phillips believes these distortions to be, at least partly, the handiwork of philosophers,
Hume is useful to him in attacking certain ways of ‘philosophising about religion’. (See,
for example, Phillips 2000, pp. 9ff., pp. 63ff.)
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At his strongest, Hume argues that the inference from world to God is
logically problematic. But, according to Phillips, these logical difficulties
are far more severe than Hume realised, “although this greater challenge
is latent in his remarks.”68 The qualification is important, for it allows
Phillips to persist in his claim that Hume’s critique is entirely success-
ful.69 When properly developed, Hume’s arguments demonstrate that the
argument from design is fatally flawed. The problem is just that Hume
himself failed to appreciate this.
Phillips’s line of reasoning depends, to a large extent, on his analysis
of Hume’s conception of ‘true religion’. We have argued, however, that
this analysis is questionable: it tends to obscure the distinction between
the question of the origin of the world and the question of the cause(s)
of order in the world. There are good reasons to suppose that Hume
rejected the former of these questions. Ironically, on this issue, Phillips’s
earlier discussion seems nearer the truth. Hume did think that the pos-
tulation of ‘God’ as the ‘cause of the universe’ is unintelligible. Admit-
tedly, however, Hume accepts the latter question. Although Phillips’s
later discussion anticipates throughout the conclusion that the argu-
ment from design, in all of its guises, is the product of conceptual con-
fusion, this conclusion simply does not appear in the Dialogues. Nor do
I believe it is helpful to claim that it is ‘latent in Hume’s remarks’ or
‘implied by his strongest arguments’. Whether one likes it or not, in the
context of the question of the cause(s) of order in the world, Hume con-
cedes that the design argument has a — very limited — applicability.
But it is not at all clear that this concession involves Hume in thinking
of the world as some kind of object the origin of which may be specu-
lated upon. Neither is it obvious that the notion of a principle of order 
in the universe must be confused as it trades on a metaphysical dualism
between ‘the mental’ and ‘the physical’. Phillips’s arguments to this
effect are presented in too brief and dogmatic a fashion to be immedi-
ately convincing.
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68 Phillips 2001, p. 87.
69 See, for example, Phillips 2001, p. 80. For another example, see Phillips’s paper
The Friends of Cleanthes: a Case of Conceptual Poverty. (Phillips 2000, pp. 63-81.) In a
footnote Phillips writes: “It has been well argued that Hume’s philosophy does allow 
a form of attenuated deism. My conclusion in the present essay has to do with what I take
to be the implications of Hume’s strongest arguments.” (Phillips 2000, p. 262, fn. 61, 
italics added.) In the main body of the text these implications are spelled out: Hume
demonstrates that “an argument from design is impossible in principle.” His conclusion
“is not that it is highly unlikely that the world is the product of a divine plan. Hume’s
conclusion is that such talk is unintelligible.” (Phillips 2000, p. 65.)
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If our conclusions are correct, should Phillips be overly concerned
about them? Not really. After all, first, Hume’s concession to Cleanthes
does not annul his earlier criticisms of the argument from design. If a
traditional theistic conclusion is drawn from it, then Hume’s objections
are, indeed, devastating. In allowing Cleanthes a window of opportunity,
Hume is really allowing preciously little. At best, Cleanthes may claim
that there is probably a remote analogy between the cause(s) of order in
the universe and human intelligence. At any rate, in Hume’s view, this
line of reasoning will never lead to rational belief in anything the reli-
gious man might want to call god.70 To insist, moreover, that it must be
the product of confusion may be no more than to add insult to injury.
5.2 The inheritors of Hume’s legacy
By now, the reader may well be expected to have become rather curious
as to these ‘other possibilities of religious meaning’ to which, Phillips
has it, Hume is blind. What are these other possibilities of meaning?
This question has both a formal and a substantive component. The for-
mer concerns the logical status of Phillips’s other possibilities of mean-
ing. Is it just that Phillips presents us with beliefs which are non-contra-
dictory and which could conceivably be held by (groups of) individuals,
or is he advancing descriptions of actual religious beliefs and practices?
The latter concerns the content of these other possibilities of meaning:
what are they about? We will discuss these questions shortly. First, how-
ever, we turn to the ‘inheritors of Hume’s legacy’. For Phillips’s discus-
sion of Hume is a prelude to his critique of the various forms of reduc-
tionist explanation which followed in Hume’s wake.
Now, it might be thought that Hume’s conception of ‘true religion’
allows some logical space for actual historical religions, in particular
Christianity. But, as we have seen, this is hardly the case. Although
‘true religion’ is rationally unobjectionable and has no pernicious con-
sequences, it has always been confined to very few persons; “we must”,
Philo insists, “treat of religion as it has commonly been found in the
world”.71 And, whatever ‘true religion’ ought to have been in history
and society, it most certainly is not religion as it has been commonly
found. That religion is characterised by Hume as ‘vulgar religion’, 
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‘popular religion’, ‘superstition’, and so on. There is never any doubt
that ‘vulgar religion’ contains virtually all the religion there actually is,
including practically the whole history of Christianity.72 The Christian
apologist will find no solace in Hume’s ‘true religion’.
For Hume, ‘vulgar religion’, i.e. religion as we encounter it the world,
and ‘superstition’ are as good as interchangeable. Not only has religion
caused untold harm to mankind, it is also irrational and illusory. If the
arguments in the Dialogues are sound, as Hume took them to be, the
question becomes why people continue to cultivate these illusions. In
suggesting that religion is caused by fear and fostered by ignorance,
Hume was perhaps the first philosopher to propose that religion can be
explained as a wholly natural phenomenon. According to Phillips, Hume
“reduces religion to a natural phenomenon; a phenomenon which helps
one understand why religion along with philosophical defences of it, leads
one to postulate transcendental illusions. Once Hume’s philosophical cri-
tique is accepted, the inevitable legacy he bequeaths is simply the task of
giving increasingly detailed accounts of how these illusions come to be
formed and believed.”73
The ‘inheritors of Hume’s legacy’ took this task seriously. The 19th and
early 20th centuries saw a profusion of natural explanations of religion,
devised from within various disciplines, including, but not limited to,
(philosophical) anthropology, psychology and sociology. Despite their
great diversity of approach and notwithstanding the rival conclusions
they draw, Phillips believes these accounts to have at least two features
in common. First, their architects all stand in the legacy of Hume. Sec-
ondly, the accounts aim to provide a naturalistic, reductionist explana-
tion of religion.
Of course, Phillips does not mean to say that such authors as Emile
Durkheim or Sigmund Freud would refer to David Hume as their great-
est mentor. Rather, his point is that the authors under investigation were
all convinced that it had already been established that religion is a fic-
tion; that God does not exist. What the eighteenth-century enlighten-
ment demonstrates — not in the least in the person of David Hume —
is that the inference from world to God is logically flawed. Everyday
facts cannot lead to transcendental conclusions. Once this is accepted,
and if one agrees with Hume that religious beliefs are dependent upon
such an inference, then one can only conclude that these beliefs are
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equally flawed. In this way the terms of reference for the discussion 
of religion are set. Religion cannot be what it purports to be; religious
beliefs are patently false, or, even worse, unintelligible. They have to be
explained in some natural way. The ‘inheritors of Hume’s legacy’ sought
to provide such natural explanations. By understanding the genesis of
religion, they argued, the confusions involved in it can be recognised.
Religious belief can then be restated in terms of the realities which pro-
duced it, and all talk of religious factors can thus be eliminated.
In Religion Without Explanation and again in Religion and the
Hermeneutics of Contemplation, Phillips discusses a number of such
explanations of religion. His earlier discussion examines the accounts
provided by Tylor and Frazer, Marrett, Freud and Durkheim. His later
one adds discussions of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, Lévy-Bruhl and
Peter Berger. The inclusion of Berger in his list of targets should already
indicate that Phillips’s reason for discussing various reductionist accounts
of religion is not primarily historical. Phillips’s main interest is not to
categorise the numerous forms reductionism has taken in the history of
the study of religion. His central target is not any individual reductionist
account of religion but, rather, a mode of reflecting on religion which,
though it may have found its first comprehensive expressions in the
19th century, still exerts a powerful grip on the contemporary study of
religion, not in the last place where the philosophy of religion is con-
cerned. The point of his considerations, Phillips tells us,
“is philosophical, namely, to enquire whether, if one understands religious
beliefs in this way, one is illuminating or obscuring possibilities of mean-
ing.”74
Not surprisingly, Phillips concludes that the reductionist explanations
obscure possibilities of meaning. Evidently, this conclusion may be sup-
ported by expounding those beliefs which are distorted by reductionist
analysis. In this way, perspicuous representations of counter-examples
are part of the response to the reductionist’s claim.75 But Phillips aims to
do more than that. His discussion, he claims,
“also contains something which one does not find very often in discus-
sions of naturalistic, reductionist theories of religion, namely, a demon-
stration of conceptual confusions in the theories based on their own terms
of reference.”76
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According to Phillips, the attempts to explain away religious belief as a
cluster of mistakes or confusions are themselves riddled with conceptual
confusions. This may be shown, Phillips has it, “in terms recognised as
their necessary conditions by these modes of explanation.”77 Phillips aims
to provide such a critique for each instance he examines. For example,
in his discussion of Freud and Durkheim, he argues that their treatment
of religion is confused even in psychoanalytic and sociological terms.
Thus, “the theories are shown to be, not simply descriptively inaccu-
rate, but also conceptually inadequate.”78 In turning to consider religious
belief, Freud and Durkheim break their own procedural rules.
In the course of these discussions Phillips advances various criticisms,
many of which, I suspect, would be accepted even by those unsympa-
thetic to his work. For example, I take it few would disagree with
Phillips’s claim that Freud’s suggestion that religion has its origins in a
common complicity in a murder can hardly be taken seriously as a his-
torical thesis. Again, Phillips is by no means the first to point out that
that Freud’s individualistic psychology prevents him from giving serious
enough attention to the heterogeneity of social and cultural movements.
On the other hand, Phillips also presents arguments which are, perhaps,
somewhat less clear-cut. For example, as Phillips has it, Durkheim argues
that human activities and interests are a function of social solidarity.
This, Phillips claims, reveals “a fundamental logical confusion at the
very core of Durkheim’s system”, for “it is not our social bonds which
explain our interests, but our interests which characterise our bonds.”79
No doubt, there are those who will be inclined, rightly or wrongly, to
take issue with Phillips on this matter.
It cannot be our aim to assess each of Phillips’s criticisms on its 
own merit. That would require an in-depth analysis of the writings of the
various authors under investigation which, even if I could provide it,
would take us far beyond the scope of our present enquiry. Furthermore,
even though it is of importance to Phillips’s programme to demonstrate
the logical flaws, if such there be, in various reductionist accounts of
religious belief, we already noted that these individual accounts are not
his prime target. Phillips wants to demonstrate, not just that Freud and
Durkheim did not get it right, but that the whole endeavour to ‘explain
away’ religion is misguided.
234 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
77 Phillips 2000, p. 68.
78 Phillips 2001, p. 24.
79 Phillips 2001, p. 16.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_03  01-02-2006  11:16  Pagina 234
How may this conclusion decisively be established? Let us assume,
for the sake of argument, that each and every one of Phillips’s criticisms
of the reductionist accounts of religion he considers is right on target,
would this establish that conclusion? I think not. After all, Phillips’s
opponents could argue that although, say, Freud’s account is flawed, it
may be amended and restated in such a way so as to eliminate these
flaws. Furthermore, it may be argued that whereas perhaps no single
reductionist theory can account for every religious belief and practice,
every aspect of religious belief and practice can be explained by some
reductionist theory. One might even add that whereas, at the present
time, the social sciences are not yet equipped to provide a ‘unified theory
of religion’ there is no reason to suppose that such a theory will not, one
day, be developed. In this way, the general reductionist thesis may be re-
established. A demonstration of the flaws in various individual reduc-
tionist accounts does not clinch the matter. Something more is needed.
Some flaw which is not accidentally related to a specific reductionist
explanation of religion but necessarily adheres to any such account. What
could this be?
In his essay Reductionist study of religion and the spiritual dimension
of meaning, H. J. Adriaanse distinguishes two distinct approaches in the
study of religion. The first, more moderate approach, rejects wholesale
reductionism, arguing that it is possible to do justice to the autonomy of
religious belief:
“Religion need not be approached in a reductionist manner and explained
in terms of non-religious factors, such as social or psychological mecha-
nisms. Just as there is a proper domain of the arts or of politics, so too there
is a proper domain of religion. As for the study of religion, its task is to
describe and elucidate, as best it can, what goes on within this domain.”80
Adriaanse contrasts this approach to a more radical one which denies
religion its autonomy. From this point of view, religion is something that
stands in need of explanation and, what is more, to shroud this explana-
tion in religious terms is really to shroud it in mystery:
“one who does not believe and, therefore, can in no way share the believer’s
reference to a transcendent reality, such a person has no other option in the
study of religion than to reduce religion to non-religious factors. He can but
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opt for a reductionist approach. Or else matters will never be clarified and
religion remains, as ever, an inscrutable mystery.”81
It will be clear that the first, moderate approach is closer to Phillips’s
position than the latter, radical one.82 As Phillips puts it in his, aptly titled,
Religion Without Explanation, religion ‘must remain without explana-
tion’. In anticipation of his critics, Phillips immediately adds that he has
a certain kind of explanation in mind, the kind which seeks “to charac-
terize religious belief as the false or confused result of ignorance, emo-
tional stress, social pressure or metaphysical impulse, or explanations
which seek foundations for faith in philosophical arguments or proofs.”83
Of course, there is no objection to saying that in arguing against such
explanations one has oneself ‘explained’ something about religion. Nor
should we object to calling certain forms of elucidation ‘explanations’.
But these “forms of explanation, if one insists on calling them that, are
not those which characterized the rationalistic traditions which have had
such a widespread influence on the philosophy of religion.”84 In other
words, “reductionist analyses are explanations of religion, but all expla-
nations are not reductionist.”85
It would be rather surprising should these remarks put the reduction-
ist at ease. Is it not somewhat disingenuous to say that, indeed, religion
allows of explanations but only in this sense that we can explain that
religious belief cannot be explained? It still seems as if Phillips denies
that there can be any non-religious explanations of religion. According
to Wayne Proudfoot this is plain silly. Proudfoot draws a distinction
between ‘descriptive’ and ‘explanatory’ reductionism.86 The former con-
sists in the failure to identify an emotion, practice, or experience under
the description by which the subject identifies it. The latter consists in
no more than offering an explanation of an emotion, practice, or experi-
ence in terms that are not those of the subject and that might not meet
his approval. While Proudfoot admits that descriptive reductionism is
unacceptable, he maintains that there is nothing wrong with explanatory
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86 See Proudfoot 1985.
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reductionism. In Religion Without Explanation, Proudfoot argues, Phillips
fails to recognise this distinction; he rules out all forms of reductionism,
including wholly legitimate forms of explanatory reductionism.
As may be expected, in Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contem-
plation, Phillips rejects Proudfoot’s criticism. Phillips denies that he has
ever claimed that religious belief can only be understood in terms of 
religious concepts. An intellectual interest in activities which are not,
primarily, intellectual will, inevitably, bring to bear on those activities
concepts which are not used, and may even not be understood, by the
participants in those activities. In this sense, Phillips argues, the enquiry
is wider than the activity being investigated, as it includes concepts
which belong to the interests of the intellectual enquiry in question. This
is true, not just of psychology, sociology, etc., but also of philosophical
discussions of religion. Furthermore, Phillips insists that his critiques of
Freud, Durkheim, etc., need not deny that religion often takes the com-
pensatory forms these thinkers criticise.87 This means that, far from
rejecting reductionist explanations out of hand, Phillips admits that “In
certain cases, reductionist, naturalistic explanations will prove to have an
application.”88
Clearly then, Phillips agrees with Proudfoot that it would be silly 
to deny that there can be non-religious explanations of religion. But,
Phillips argues, it would be equally silly to think that in saying this, one
is endorsing explanatory reductionism. According to Phillips, explana-
tory reductionism makes a far more ambitious claim than Proudfoot
implies. It is not just that the terms in which the reductionist explana-
tion is presented need not be familiar or acceptable to the subject but
that they certainly will not be acceptable to anyone who wishes to
remain a believer. This is because explanatory reductionism advances
the general thesis that religious beliefs are, necessarily, the product of
confusion:
“My claim is that explanatory reductionism makes the general claim that,
after analyses of various kinds, religious belief will be seen to be necessar-
ily illusory. [Religious] beliefs are said to be the products of illusion, con-
ceptual confusions which sociological or psychoanalytic analyses may bring
out. The authors of reductionist analyses stand in the legacy of Hume, a
master of conceptual suspicion. It [is] in this philosophical context that I
[discuss] the reductionist analyses.”89
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At the core of explanatory reductionism, Phillips asserts, lies the gen-
eral claim that religion as such is necessarily the product of confusion.
If this is indeed correct, then Phillips’s confident dismissal of a radical
reductionist approach in the study of religion would seem to be wholly
justified. After all, if the attempt to provide a reductionist account of reli-
gion is to be a scientific, any claim to a necessary conclusion becomes
highly suspect. Modern science is empirical science. As such, it reveals
no necessities.90
One might well expect Adriaanse to agree with these conclusions. But
this is not the case. Rather than an outright rejection of radical reduction-
ism we find Adriaanse telling us that he finds the radical, reductionist
approach highly appealing. Not only is it candid and resolute, it is also,
in principle, quite sensible. After all, how else should the non-believer
approach religion but with the hope of reducing it to its natural causes?
Moreover, this approach has proven to be quite productive. There can be
no denying that there is much to religion which can be, and has been,
done away with. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Adriaanse, too, is
inclined to reject an all-inclusive reductionism:
“The reductionist may reveal some, many, a great deal of religious beliefs
to be false or unintelligible, or even worse: vicious, foolish, reprehensible,
and in so doing he does us a great service. But can he show all religious
beliefs to be false? Is religion as such false? At what point has one seen
enough of religion to be able to draw that conclusion with a clear con-
science?”91
Perhaps that day may never come. But just as Adriaanse renounces an
overly confident reductionism, so too does he renounce too confident 
a rejection of reductionism. Adriaanse’s choice is a hesitant and tenta-
tive one. By contrast, as we saw, Phillips’s choice is far more confi-
dent: explanatory reductionism can and must be rejected. How are we to
explain this? Should not Adriaanse agree with Phillips that the reduc-
tionist’s claim to necessity should be rejected? The problem is that Adri-
aanse might well reply — and, I suspect, advocates of radical reduction-
ism certainly will reply — that Phillips has picked too easy a target.
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religieuze uitspraken als onwaar ontzenuwen? Is religie als zodanig onwaar? Wanneer
heeft een godsdienstwetenschapper genoeg van religie gezien om dàt met een gerust hart
te kunnen zeggen?”
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Surely the reductionist can drop any reference to a necessary conclusion.
Rather than stating that religion is necessarily false or illusory, he claims
no more than that religion, as such, may possibly be, or very likely is,
false or illusory.92 Must such an ‘amended’ reductionist approach be
ruled out in advance? Of course, the reductionist’s claim may prove to
be factually inaccurate. Waiting on the language of faith we may find
that there are possibilities of religious meaning of which, as it turns out,
it makes no sense to say they are false or unintelligible. But must this be
the case? That assumption would seem to suffer from the same kind of
confusion Phillips believes to be inherent in explanatory reductionism.
Phillips is right to reject the reductionist’s claim to necessity. And he
may be right that the reductionist accounts he discusses entail such a
claim. But there is no reason to suppose that the reductionist cannot
amend his position in such a way as to circumvent these objections. Such
an amended reductionism would claim no more than that it is conceivable
that religion, as such, is false or illusory. This claim may well be offen-
sive to the believer. But must it be offensive to the philosopher? For an
answer, let us turn, briefly, to Phillips’s discussion of Freud.
Phillips discusses Freud as one of the ‘inheritors of Hume’s legacy’.
Now, as we saw, Phillips agrees that if religious belief is what Hume
takes it to be, his critique is irrefutable. Of course, he denies that Hume
treats ‘of religion as commonly found in the world’. At the very least,
his terms of reference obscure and distort other possibilities of religious
meaning. But unless Phillips wishes to claim that Hume’s terms of ref-
erence are never applicable — that is to say, that the ‘other possibilities
of meaning’ really constitute the only possibilities of religious meaning
— then Hume’s analysis must be at least partially correct. That is to say,
sometimes religion is precisely what Hume took it to be and, therefore,
susceptible to his censure.
It seems only reasonable to suppose that something similar holds in
reference to reductionist explanations of religion. According to Phillips,
their authors accept Hume’s terms of reference and, as did Hume’s, their
analyses distort or obscure other possibilities of religious meaning. But,
once again, unless Phillips wishes to claim that Hume’s terms of refer-
ence are never applicable we should conclude that the reductionist expla-
nations can only be, at least sometimes, on the mark. Indeed, as we saw,
Phillips admits that in certain cases, reductionist, naturalistic explanations
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have an application. What has to be abandoned, at a minimum, is the
claim that religion in general is necessarily illusory. In his discussion of
Freud, Phillips examines the possibility of such a correction.
Phillips finds a host of problems in Freud’s analysis of religion.93 One
problem concerns the way in which Freud judges religious behaviour to
be neurotic. Phillips refers to two examples of Freud’s. The first con-
cerns a ‘primitive’ religious practice among the Maori. A Maori chief
would not blow a fire with his mouth, for his sacred breath would com-
municate his sanctity to the fire, which would pass it on to the pot on 
the fire, which would pass it on to the meat in the pot, so that the eater,
infected by the chief’s breath conveyed through these intermediaries,
would surely die. The second example concerns a patient of Freud’s who
demanded that a certain household article her husband had purchased be
removed from the house because it made the room she lived in ‘impos-
sible’. The reason for this was that she unconsciously associated the arti-
cle with a friend of hers who was at the moment ‘impossible’ or taboo.
Consequently, the article was as taboo as the friend herself with whom
she must not come into contact.
Now, according to Phillips, Freud, illegitimately, equates the two cases.
He wants to argue that the ‘impossibility’ of coming into contact with
the sacred is no different, and no less neurotic, than the ‘impossibility’
involved in one woman finding another quite impossible. Freud fails to
pay attention to the idea of the sacred which is connected with the Maori
practice:
“Freud wants to get behind the description of the Maori practice to what
he takes to be the psychoanalytic explanation behind it. Notice that he is
ruling out the concept of the sacred as a possible account of the Maori
practice.”94
In order for talk about the unconscious to make sense, Phillips argues,
the unconscious reasons or motives ascribed must be intelligible to the
person so analysed. In the case of the Maori tribesmen, this is not the
case. Freud is saying that their reasons cannot be true because they are
inherently senseless. Rather, they should be analysed in the way we
analyse neurotic behaviour in our own society. This, Phillips argues,
makes no sense, for
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“these assumptions ignore the very conditions of intelligibility which make
psychoanalysis possible. The form of neurosis and of unconscious desires
depends on the kind of society within which the neurosis occurs.”95
Although Phillips raises an important point, his remarks also betray a
number of rather questionable assumptions of their own. First, in what
sense should we understand Phillips’s claim that the concept of the
sacred provides a possible account of the Maori practice? He cannot
mean to say that the concept explains the practice, for this runs counter
Phillips’s claim that it is confused to think of religious beliefs as expla-
nations:
“A belief that a religion is God-given is not an explanation of that religion,
since it is itself a religious belief. What is happening here is that the use of
a religious perspective is being confused with talk about the perspective, as
though one were grounding it in some simple way.”96
Freud’s talk is talk about the Maori practice. Obviously, then, the con-
cept of the sacred has no explanatory value to him because it belongs to
the practice he is trying to explain. For Freud completely to ignore the
concept of the sacred would amount to what Proudfoot calls ‘descriptive
reductionism’. Freud would then fail to identify the practice under the
description by which the subject identifies it. Although it makes sense 
to demand that, in identifying the Maori practice, we must take due
account of the descriptions and reasons brought to the fore by the partic-
ipants, this does not entail that Freud must accept them as satisfactory.
We cannot, a priori, exclude the possibility that Freud’s explanation can
‘get behind’ them to reveal their underlying sources. Of course, the argu-
ment cuts both ways. Phillips could reply that, likewise, Freud cannot, a
priori, rule out the possibility that the reasons professed by the Maori
are satisfactory. The problem, Phillips argues, is that this is not possible
for Freud because he had already decided that these reasons are inher-
ently senseless.
To this we may reply as follows. First, simply to assume that the rea-
sons the Maori profess are senseless, without properly examining them
in their natural contexts of application, is, indeed, unacceptable. But even
if Freud were guilty as charged, this still does not demonstrate that his
account of the Maori practice is incorrect. Secondly, I fail to see why it
must be confused to say, after due examination and analysis, that the rea-
sons offered by the Maori cannot be true because they are unintelligible.
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If a psychotherapist judges a patient’s account of his reasons to be con-
fused — that is to say, what the patient says is unintelligible and, hence,
cannot be true — this need not be a sign that there is something wrong
with the psychotherapist. Quite the contrary, it might be a first indication
that there is something amiss with the patient. In short, to be a Maori
does not protect one from either neurosis or confusion.
However, I believe Phillips is right to insist, both that the unconscious
motives ascribed must be intelligible to the patient, and that the form of
neurosis and of unconscious desires depend on the kind of society within
which they occur. This means that Freud cannot, without further ado,
equate the two cases we referred to above. As Winch points out, he would
first have to
“take into account any relevant aspects in which [the Maori’s]97 ideas
differed from that current in his own society. And it is almost inevitable
that such an investigation would lead to some modification in the psycho-
logical theory appropriate for explaining neurotic behaviour in this new
situation.”98
Some modification will, no doubt, be necessary. But will this modifica-
tion rule out the possibility that Freud’s account was, after all, correct
in this sense that the Maori practice we discussed may, indeed, turn out
to be neurotic? It would seem that Phillips believes it will. According
to Phillips, despite the flaws in Freud’s analysis, a corrective is possi-
ble which would render the relation between religion and psychoanaly-
sis unproblematic.99 The first point that needs to be emphasised is that
we cannot explain religion, including primitive religion, in terms of
neurosis:
“social institutions, movements and traditions cannot be explained in terms
of neurosis, since it is within the contexts of such institutions, movements
and traditions that neurosis has its meaning.”100
This does not mean that there is no such thing as neurotic religious
behaviour. In such a case, psychoanalytic treatment would have to take
into account whether religious ideas are involved in a patient’s neurosis.
But, Phillips argues, it would be impossible to do so without drawing 
a distinction between normal religious practices and neurotic religious
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behaviour. Phillips admits that this distinction may not always be easy to
draw. But, at any rate,
“one will not be able, in general terms, to call normal religious practice a
neurosis, as Freud did. The task of psychoanalysis, in this context, is to free
a person from his or her neurosis, and bring that person back to normality.
But that normality might well involve the holding of religious beliefs.”101
Here, presumably, we have an example of what Phillips means when 
he says that he is “opposed to the general claims of the hermeneutics 
of suspicion, without denying that some of its suspicions are well-
founded.”102 Although we cannot say that religion as such is neurotic
(or the product of emotional pressure, fear, ignorance, etc.), an indi-
vidual’s religious practice may well turn out to be neurotic (or the prod-
uct of, etc.). Should we also say that, here, we witness a case where a
reductionist, naturalistic explanation has been shown to have an appli-
cation? I suggest Phillips is nearer to the truth when, in conclusion to
the discussion of his corrective version of the relation between psycho-
analysis and religion, he states that, on his account, “psychoanalysis
would no longer be inherently suspicious of religious belief. For that very
reason, however, one would no longer be talking of Freud’s hermeneu-
tics of suspicion.”103
Indeed, we would no longer be talking of a reductionist account of
religion at all. Not because such an account must involve the claim that
religious beliefs are necessarily illusory — as we have seen that claim
may be abandoned — but because Phillips’s corrective rules out the pos-
sibility that religion as such may be illusory. To return to the case at
hand, the reductionist, I take it, would maintain that despite the flaws in
Freud’s analysis it is at least conceivable that religion can be explained
in terms of neurosis. We have already seen two of the arguments Phillips
produces to refute that claim. First, social institutions, movements and
traditions cannot be explained in terms of neurosis, since it is within 
the contexts of such institutions, movements and traditions that neurosis
has its meaning. Secondly, it would be impossible to speak of religion as
neurotic without drawing a distinction between normal religious prac-
tices and neurotic religious behaviour. I do not wish to deny the force of
these arguments. But are they truly decisive?
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As to the first, the reductionist might reply that ‘neurosis’ does not 
so much get its meaning in the variety of social movements, traditions
and institutions but in the specific context of psychiatry. Admittedly, as
Phillips points out, the forms neurosis may take will depend on the kind
of society in which it occurs. But what neurosis is, is to be explained in
psychological terms. Furthermore, although it makes little sense to say
that society as a whole is a form of neurosis, must it be nonsense to
entertain the possibility that a specific institution or movement in a soci-
ety is not what it seems? As to Phillips’s second argument, clearly, to
call a certain type of behaviour neurotic implies a contrast with normal,
non-neurotic behaviour. Consequently, if one calls religious behaviour
neurotic, one must be able to contrast it, in some way, to normal behav-
iour. But why must this normal behaviour be ‘normal religious behav-
iour’? Could not the reductionist claim that religious behaviour is a 
neurotic way of dealing with grief, longing, sorrow, fear, guilt, etc. and
contrast it to other, non-religious ways of dealing with these issues?
If these arguments are valid, they cast doubt on Phillips’s claim that
an amended form of reductionism, in this case psychological reduction-
ism, must, necessarily, recognise the irreducibility of religion as such.
Although the reductionist cannot preclude the possibility that certain
forms of religious practice do not allow of a reductionist explanation,
neither can Phillips rule out the possibility that all the forms of religious
belief we attend to may turn out to be explicable in some such manner.
In short, the reductionist’s claim cannot be ruled out beforehand. We
will just have to wait and see.
Before we may draw this conclusion, however, we need to consider
one further argument which may be brought against it. It is an argument
which, in various shapes, has played an important role in Wittgenstein-
ian philosophy of religion. Perhaps its original expression may be found
in Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science.
As we saw, Winch, too, rejects a wait-and-see attitude when it comes
to giving an account of the nature of social phenomena. To study our
social relations, Winch argues, is, in a non-trivial sense, to study our
forms of language:
“our language and our social relations are just two different sides of the
same coin. To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe how
it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse
into which it enters.”104
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Thus, the issues facing us are not so much empirical as conceptual in
nature. Social phenomena, being essentially linguistic phenomena, are
rule-governed activities. Human society is really made up of an infinitely
extendable number of such activities or ‘ways of life’, each of which
offers a distinct, independent account of the intelligibility of things. There
is no hope of understanding such activities without taking into account
the ideas which inform them. Nor does it make sense to try and explain
these ideas. The best we can do is elucidate the role they play in their
natural contexts of application.
Winch leaves little room for doubt that religion constitutes one such
distinct way of life which is conducted according to considerations of 
its own. It provides its own criteria of intelligibility, criteria which need
not, and, presumably, do not, conform to those constitutive of other
modes of social life. It follows that the expectation that religion as such
— being an autonomous way of life — might be ‘explained away’ in
terms of another, alien way of life is not just futile but incoherent.
For a more recent example of this line of reasoning we may turn 
to Norman Malcolm’s essay Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?
Malcolm presents us with a picture of social reality similar to that of The
Idea of a Social Science. He, too, argues that to compare our lives to our
forms of language, or our language-games, is not actually to compare
two separate things. For what would our lives be without our language-
games? Every human preoccupation, every striving, every emotion seeks
its expression in language. Again, without language there would be no
criticism or reflection, nor anything that would come close to resembling
human love, or hope, or hatred or joy. In short: “The observation and
description of language-games, if it is sensitive and detailed, is actually
the study of human life.”105 Furthermore, Malcolm emphasises, perhaps
even more strongly so than The Idea of a Social Science, that it makes
no sense to try and explain our language-games:
“The inescapable logic of [Wittgenstein’s] conception is that the terms
‘explanation’, ‘reason’, ‘justification’, have a use exclusively within the
various language-games. The word ‘explanation’ appears in many lan-
guage-games, and is used differently in different games. […] An explana-
tion is internal to a particular language-game. There is no explanation
that rises above our language-games, and explains them. This would be a
super-concept of explanation — which means that it is an ill-conceived
fantasy.”106
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‘Explanation’ is embedded in human activities, in the various practices
in which we engage. There is no perspective outside of or beyond our
practices as a whole. Wittgenstein teaches us, Malcolm argues, that our
explanations come to an end somewhere. Where is that? Malcolm’s
answer affirms the irreducibility of our various, individual language-
games and forms of life. Our explanations come to an end
“at the existence of the language-games and the associated forms of life.
There is where explanation has reached its limit. There reasons stop. In
philosophy we can only notice the language-games, describe them, and
sometimes wonder at them.”107
Philosophy can observe a complicated linguistic practice and describe
how one movement is related to another. But philosophy cannot explain
why the practice exists. Lest it be thought that we run up to the limits of
explanation only when doing philosophy, Malcolm immediately adds
that it is not just the philosopher who cannot explain our language-
games: “nor can the ‘hard’ sciences of physics, chemistry, biology; nor
the ‘soft’ sciences of psychology, sociology, anthropology.”108
So far, we have seen that, according to Malcolm, our language-games,
and their associated forms of life, are ‘beyond explanation’.109 The only
thing that is lacking, if we are to counter the reductionist’s claims, is
confirmation of the fact that religious practices constitute distinctive lan-
guage-games. Malcolm wastes little time delivering the goods:
“A religious practice is itself a language-game — a pattern in which words
and gestures are interwoven in acts of worship, prayer, confession, absolu-
tion, thanksgiving. Religious practices are part of the natural history of
mankind and are no more explicable than are other features of this natural
history. […] The existence of religious practices can no more be explained
than can the existence of sports, or of musical composition.”110
Clearly then, both Malcolm and, in his earlier work, Winch provide a
logical argument against the claim that we may reduce religion as such
to its non-religious causes. The question, of course, is whether Phillips,
too, adheres to this line of reasoning.
Arguably, Phillips’s earlier discussion of reductionism implies such an
argument. Making use of typical Wittgensteinian terminology, Religion
Without Explanation reasons that religious beliefs constitute distinctive
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language-games, which need not answer to any criteria of intelligibility
other than their own:
“religious beliefs and practices do not await a further analysis which is sup-
posed to bring a greater clarity, in the light of which one can no longer hold
on to the beliefs and practices in their original form. On the contrary, […]
religious beliefs are themselves limits concerning what it does and what it
does not make sense to say. But if one asks what these beliefs say, the only
answer is that they say themselves. What they say may be elucidated […]
but it cannot be explained. ‘We can only describe and say, human life is
like that.’”111
Of course, one may be interested in investigating the consequences of
various religious beliefs for other social movements and institutions, or
the historical development of religious beliefs, and so on. But it makes
no sense to try and get behind religious beliefs to reveal their underlying
explanations, if by that we mean that religious beliefs can be made intel-
ligible in non-religious terms: “in this sense of explanation, religious
beliefs are irreducible.”112 Faced by the variety of forms of language,
including religious forms of language, the philosopher’s task is not one
of explanation but of description:
“the philosopher’s task is not to attempt to verify or falsify what he sees,
for that makes no sense in this context. His task is a descriptive one; he
gives an account of the use of language involved. He can only say that
these language-games are played.”113
Here, we find an emphasis on ‘the language-games people play’ as the ter-
minus of our efforts to explain social phenomena, similar to that which we
encountered in Winch and Malcolm. Of course, Religion Without Expla-
nation provides a variety of criticisms of various reductionist accounts of
religious belief. These, obviously, need to be judged on their own merits.
But, one might argue, behind these — though never developed as explic-
itly as in Malcolm’s essay or Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science —
there lurks the final, decisive argument that religious beliefs constitute
autonomous ‘language-games’ or ‘ways of life’ which, by their very nature,
are irreducible.
Clearly, if tenable, this line of reasoning should pose a serious prob-
lem for any attempt at wholesale explanatory reductionism of religion. If
we can show religious beliefs to constitute distinctive language-games
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then, by the same token, we have demonstrated their irreducibility. Little
wonder then that critics have demanded Phillips provide strict criteria of
identification of (religious) language-games. We need to know what, pre-
cisely, constitutes a (religious) language-game. Lars Haikola, for exam-
ple, argues that as long as this fundamental problem is not solved, “one
must regard the whole attempt to describe religious belief in terms of
language-games with scepticism.”114 But the fundamental problem lies
not so much in the Wittgensteinian failure to provide strict criteria to
show what is in and what is out, as in the abuse of Wittgenstein’s notions
of a language-game and a form of life. As we have argued, the early
Wittgensteinians misappropriated these notions, making it appear as if
they denote self-governing, onto-linguistic entities. This may result, as it
does in The Idea of a Social Science, in far too static a picture of social
reality; social practices, traditions and institutions are presented as more
or less isolated and self-contained units, each going its own, fairly
autonomous, way. Surely Kai Nielsen is right to insist that various social
activities are not sufficient unto themselves. That is to say, there is
enough overlap between the different activities in which people engage,
for us to be able to formulate some more or less general criteria for what
is to count as true, meaningful, rational, etc. Activities are simply not
that isolated.115 Looking back on The Idea of a Social Science some
thirty years later, Winch agrees that his suggestion that modes of social
life are autonomous with respect to each other was insufficiently coun-
teracted by his qualifying remarks about the overlapping character of
different modes of social life:
“Different aspects of social life do not merely ‘overlap’: they are frequently
internally related in such a way that one cannot even be intelligibly con-
ceived as existing in isolation from others. […] The logico-conceptual diffi-
culties which arise when ways of thinking which have their roots in different
reaches of human life are brought to bear on each other cannot be resolved
by any appeal to a formal system — whether a God-given system of logical
principles or a system of modes of social life, each with criteria of intelligi-
bility peculiar to itself.”116
The extent to which Winch modified his earlier position is also witnessed
by his critique of Malcolm’s essay. Winch agrees with Malcolm that, at
some point, our explanations come to an end. But, Winch continues, it is
highly misleading to say
248 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
114 Haikola 1977, p. 92.
115 Nielsen 1967, p. 208.
116 Winch 1990, p. xvi.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_03  01-02-2006  11:16  Pagina 248
“that ‘Wittgenstein regarded the language-games, and their associated forms
of life, as beyond explanation.’ Language-games are not a phenomenon that
Wittgenstein had discovered with the peculiar property that their existence
cannot be explained!”117
Our explanations come to an end, Winch rightfully reminds us, not
because we run into something which is intrinsically beyond further
explanation, but for a variety of quite contingent and pragmatic rea-
sons. Consequently, Winch also casts doubt on Malcolm’s claim that
neither philosophy, nor the ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ sciences, are in any position
to explain our linguistic practices. Winch observes, correctly in my view,
that this seems neither generally true in itself, nor implied by anything
Wittgenstein wrote.118 Surely, there are many cases in which psycholo-
gists, sociologists or anthropologists give well-founded explanations of
the existence of this or that practice. Why ever not? Wittgenstein was
not concerned with such ‘scientific explanations’ but, rather, with the
peculiar pseudo-sense in which philosophy, at times, seeks ‘explana-
tions’. Spinoza, for example, thought that because explanations have to
come to an end, there must be something which has no further explana-
tion, a causa sui.119 Winch is right to point out that Wittgenstein’s view
is not at all like that; rather, it is a criticism of such an outlook:
“His criticism did not terminate in pointing to the existence of something
that happens to be beyond the reach of explanation; the force of the criti-
cism lay in his exposure of the confusions involved in the search itself and
in the puzzlement that gives rise to it. The concept of a language-game has
to be understood as a logical instrument in the service of that exposure.”120
I take it that Phillips would agree with Winch’s criticism of his own ear-
lier work as well as with his reservations as regards Malcolm’s use of
the notion of a language-game. In the previous chapter we suggested that
the way in which Winch has revised his view corresponds, in Phillips’s
later work, to a gradual shift from a descriptive towards a contemplative
understanding of philosophical enquiry. By reference to Winch’s work,
Phillips seeks to reveal the limits of the analogy between specific uses of
language and games, and warns against the artificiality of strict divisions
between various categories of behaviour and the inadequacy of the com-
partmentalised view of social life such divisions engender. Philosophy’s
task is no longer envisioned primarily as that of describing particular
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language-games. Rather, philosophy aims at a contemplative understand-
ing of possibilities of meaning in the broader context of human life.
These insights all find their way into Phillips’s rewrite of his earlier
discussion of reductionism. In Religion and the Hermeneutics of Con-
templation, the emphasis is no longer on describing religious language-
games: ‘description’ has made way for ‘understanding’ as the book’s
central concept. Consequently, the familiar Wittgensteinian arguments
that ‘religious beliefs constitute distinctive language-games’ which pro-
vide ‘their own, autonomous criteria of meaning’ and, therefore, can only
be said ‘to say themselves’, are couched in far more moderate terms or
have disappeared altogether.
Nevertheless, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation still
seems confident that religion, as such, constitutes an autonomous, irre-
ducible domain of meaning. For example, against Freud’s suggestion
that religion may partially be explained in terms of sexuality, Phillips
argues that “Science, art, morality and religion are just as definite as
sexuality and, therefore, cannot be explained in sexual terms alone.”121
But once the Wittgensteinian line of defence is abandoned, this claim is
left hanging in the air. In fact, if we take Phillips’s contention that the
various reaches of human life stand in a dialogical relation to each other
seriously, it becomes rather suspect.
First, to say that religion is just as definite as science, art, morality,
etc., implies the possibility of drawing clear boundaries between these
various reaches of human life. Now, obviously, we are perfectly able to
distinguish between someone checking in at the laboratory to do some
hard science, and someone going off to church to do some serious pray-
ing. But it is doubtful whether we can draw such distinctions in the 
requisite sense, namely, to support the claim that each of these reaches
constitutes an autonomous domain of meaning. As noted previously,
what is and what is not religious often may be difficult to decide. The
enormous amount of literature on the subject should suffice to remind us
of the way in which moral and religious perspectives impinge on each
other. And, for proof of the manner in which science may enter religious
belief, one need only visit the Church of Scientology, the Church of
Christ, Scientist, or any spiritual healing centre in one’s local vicinity.
Perhaps less exotically, think of the debates concerning creationism in
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biology and of how theology itself makes use of a reductionist approach,
not only in accounting for alien religious traditions, but also with respect
to certain aspects of its own tradition.122
This brings us to a second point. For it is not just that the various
reaches of human life overlap but that, as Winch reminded us, they are
frequently internally related in such a way that one cannot even be
intelligibly conceived as existing in isolation from others. To say, as
Phillips does in Religion Without Explanation, that religion does not
stand in need of further analysis, in the light of which one can no longer
hold on to its beliefs and practices in their original form, is to underplay
the fact that what constitutes the ‘original form’ is not given once and
for all. Social institutions are not artefacts; perhaps one might better
conceive of them as living organisms which, in the course of their lives,
adapt and evolve. Our forms of language and the social activities in
which they are embedded — including religious forms of language and
religious practices — are not static but dynamic. The manner in which
believers perceive their own beliefs and religious practices is subject to
constant reappraisal, reinterpretation and reform.123 Such reform may
be brought on by all manner of causes, including, not in the last place,
the confrontation between religious and scientific discourse. Indeed,
one might argue that the character of religious belief in contemporary
Western society cannot be understood in isolation from this continued
confrontation. To put it in more Wittgensteinian terms, religious lan-
guage-games can only be understood in a dynamic, dialogical context
of mutual interplay and interference with other language-games in a
form of life.
Once again, let me emphasise that I do not mean to imply that we can
never distinguish the religious from the non-religious, that it is impossi-
ble to tell ‘science’ from ‘religion’. To serve particular, practical pur-
poses, such distinctions are perfectly in order. But in generalising these
distinctions we arrive at too compartmentalised, static, and a-historic an
account of social reality. Perhaps the point I am trying to make may be
summarised by the reminder that ‘religion as such’ is an abstraction. In
reality, we are faced not with ‘religion’ but with various, historically
shaped, religions. Moreover, as Phillips himself observes, even within a
single religious tradition, ‘religion’ may mean very different things, at
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different times, to different people.124 Once this is realised, we should
come to see that there is little profit to be made from claiming, in gen-
eral, that ‘religion as such’ constitutes an irreducible domain of meaning.
Of course, the argument cuts both ways. If we should reject the claim
that ‘religion as such’ constitutes an irreducible domain of meaning, so
too should we reject the opposite claim that ‘religion as such’ can be
explained away. We need to address each case separately, if and when it
presents itself.
Let us draw this section to a close by summarising our findings. We
examined Phillips’s discussion of reductionist explanations of religion.
His primary aim is to demonstrate that a radical reductionist approach is
untenable. Although Phillips’s arguments certainly undermine the most
uncompromising forms of reductionism, we suggested that the reduction-
ist theories may be amended in such a way as to remove these problems.
Focusing on his discussion of Freud, we considered the possibility of such
a correction. For Phillips, this correction entails the recognition of an irre-
ducible domain of religious meaning. The arguments Phillips advances to
this effect, however, we found to be inconclusive. We then turned to con-
sider a further, possibly decisive, argument in Phillips’s favour. This argu-
ment trades on a specific reading of Wittgenstein’s notions of a language-
game and a form of life which has been developed in various strands 
of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion and, arguably, is implied by
Phillips’s earlier discussion of reductionism. However, we concluded not
only that this argument is invalid but, moreover, that it is no longer feasi-
ble that Phillips should appeal to it in his later work. Although Phillips’s
shift from a descriptive to a contemplative understanding of philosophi-
cal enquiry may certainly solve some of the problems encountered in his
earlier writings, it also considerably softens his attack on reductionism.
For once the ‘Wittgensteinian line of defence’ is abandoned, the general
claim that religion as such constitutes an autonomous, irreducible domain
of meaning loses its main argumentative support.
Phillips is right to reject a radical reductionism. Although one cannot
preclude the possibility that some forms of religious belief and practice
may be explained in terms of non-religious factors, one cannot claim, in
general, that all forms of religious belief must be thus explicable. There
can be no claims to necessity here. Furthermore, the attempt to explain
‘religion as such’ betrays too abstract and general an approach to be fruit-
ful. But, to repeat, there is no reason to suppose why the reductionist
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could not incorporate these insights into his theorising. Indeed, Daniel
L. Pals tells us that, looking back on the all-embracing reductionist
theories of the past,
“this hope of forming a single theory of all religions astonishes us by its
naïve overconfidence. Thoughtful observers today are inclined to be far
more modest. Impressive books have been written just to explain one
belief of one religion or to compare a single feature — a specific custom
or ritual — of one religion with something similar in another.”125
Attempts at general theories, Pals concludes, are too ambitious: the
future of religious studies lies with the particularists. Here, then, we
have an indication of the direction an amended reductionist approach
might take. Such an approach eschews any claim to necessity. Nor does
it pretend to possess an explanation of all religions or ‘religion as such’.
It claims no more than that it can explain, or has explained, certain spe-
cific religious beliefs and practices. Will all religious beliefs and prac-
tices prove susceptible to some kind of reductionist explanation? Which
is the more fruitful approach: a moderate non-reductionism or a moder-
ate reductionism? I tend to agree with Adriaanse that it is doubtful
whether, by calmly weighing the arguments pro and contra, we can 
settle this issue, once and for all.126 We will just have to wait and see.
Why, as Phillips asks, should we not settle for this suitably modest
conclusion?127 Perhaps the answer is that from an amended reduction-
ism’s point of view, it is still conceivable that all religious beliefs and
practices will turn out to be explicable in non-religious terms. As we
saw in our discussion of Freud, this Phillips will not allow. In this 
sense, Phillips’s ‘anti-reductionism’ seems more radical than the mod-
erate reductionism recommended by Pals. However, if the arguments
we have presented in the course of our discussion are valid, there is no
compelling reason to adhere to it.
5.3 Other possibilities of meaning
Phillips’s attack on reductionism is twofold. He aims to show that the
reductionist theories are both descriptively inaccurate and conceptually
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inadequate. Thus, perspicuous representations of counter-examples are
part of the response to the reductionist’s claim.128 Indeed, if the con-
clusions we drew in the previous section are justified this ‘part of the
response’ becomes of crucial importance. If the reductionist theories
may be amended in such a way as to remove their conceptual inadequa-
cies then the question as to whether or not religion can be explained in
non-religious terms can only be resolved by an appeal to practice. We
cannot avoid getting our hands dirty.
Let us examine for a moment in what kind of circumstances a reduc-
tionist explanation may be called for. Say, for example, that a man
believes his wife is cheating on him. Obviously, he may have good rea-
sons to believe so. When we ask him why he is suspicious of his wife he
tells us that he has caught her lying about her whereabouts, and spotted
her dining with another man. In this scenario, we would have little rea-
son not to accept the man’s account at face value. But now imagine that
the man does not offer us any reasonable grounds for his belief. In fact,
there is not a single shred of evidence to support it. Nevertheless, he
insists that his wife is unfaithful to him, claiming that he can see it in 
her eyes. Now, in this scenario we might well consider the possibility of
another explanation. Perhaps the man’s belief is based on a sense of
insecurity, or perhaps it is the result of his repressed guilt over a former
indiscretion on his own part. Whatever the explanation, in these circum-
stances we would be justified in seeking some explanation for the man’s
belief other than the one he himself offers.
Note, first, that in either scenario our judgement of the man’s account
of his belief does not depend on whether his belief is true or false. In the
first case, it might turn out that the man’s wife was not unfaithful to him
after all. The reason she was lying about her whereabouts was because
she was planning a surprise party for her husband and the man she was
dining with was an accomplice to this. But this need not bring us to
reconsider our judgement and decide that the man must, after all, have
been the victim of some unconscious motive or repressed emotion. He
was simply mistaken, that is all. Likewise, in the second case, it might
turn out that the man’s wife was actually cheating on him. But, once
again, this would not necessarily lead us to reconsider our initial judge-
ment. He just happened to be right, that is all.
In the case of the reductionist theories discussed, matters are somewhat
different. As we saw, according to Phillips, the ‘inheritors of Hume’s
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legacy’ are convinced that religious beliefs cannot possibly be true.
Given the fact that God’s non-existence has already been demonstrated,
belief in God can but be illusory. This means that there is really no point
in first examining the reasons or explanations the believer might offer
for his belief, for no matter what the believer says, his account of 
his beliefs cannot be accepted at face value. There must be some other
explanation. In the example of the wife’s alleged infidelity, a reduction-
ist account of the man’s belief might be called for. By contrast, once we
accept Hume’s terms of reference, a reductionist account of religious
belief is not just a possibility but a necessity.
Now, as we saw, Phillips believes that Hume’s arguments are
irrefutable, if religious belief is what Hume takes it to be. No doubt, the
reductionist would agree, adding only that religious belief is, indeed,
precisely what Hume took it to be. It is precisely for this reason that
some kind of reductionist theory is needed in the first place. Thus, first,
Phillips needs to demonstrate that it is possible to go ‘beyond Hume’ 
by presenting us with possibilities of religious meaning which are not
susceptible to Hume’s critique. Secondly, he needs to show that these
possibilities of religious meaning coincide, not with some Humean ‘true
religion’, but with religion as it is commonly found in the world. In 
this manner, reductionism’s main incentive would be removed. If it can
be demonstrated that there are forms of religious belief which cannot 
be said to be necessarily illusory, the need for a reductionist theory of
religion evaporates. As in our example of the cheating spouse, a reduc-
tionist explanation becomes a possibility rather than a necessity.
Thus, Phillips’s conceptual criticisms of various reductionist theories
must be backed, not in the last place, “by appeal to the use which lan-
guage has in many religious beliefs.”129 Whether or not this appeal is
successful depends not only on the actual content of Phillips’s other pos-
sibilities of religious meaning but also on their formal status, that is to
say, on the sense in which they may be said to be possibilities of reli-
gious belief. These are the central questions we address in this section.
The idea of describing or contemplating possibilities of religious
meaning may seem pretty straightforward. In the course of their lives,
people are caught up and engage in various activities, practices, rela-
tions, and so on.130 Amongst these we also encounter religious activities,
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practices, etc. The philosopher’s task, simply, is to describe, to the best
of his ability, these religious language-games, the language and the
activities into which it is woven. In this way, we may clarify “the nature
of an activity which has almost always been an important feature of
human life.”131
In the course of our discussion, we discovered that things may be a
bit more complicated than that. Such questions as what is required of
the philosopher for him to be able to understand a specific form of lan-
guage, how we may tell whether a given description or clarification is
correct, in what way the philosophical understanding of a practice is
related to the understanding possessed by those engaged in the practice
— none of these questions allows of an easy answer. Obviously, for a
large part, our answers will depend on our understanding of what the
philosopher is doing when he is contemplating possibilities of sense.
Phillips’s claim that his critique of reductionism is backed by appeal to
the use which language has in many religious beliefs should lead us to
expect two things. First, that the contemplation of possibilities of sense
shall be descriptively adequate, in the sense that Phillips is presenting us
with examples and clarifications of the way in which language is actu-
ally used. Secondly, that the contemplation of possibilities of religious
sense shall be non-exclusive, in the sense that there may well be reli-
gious beliefs to which Phillips’s analysis does not apply.
As we shall see, however, although Phillips’s discussions often live
up to these expectations, this is not always the case. At times Phillips
seems to argue that the possibilities of sense contemplated need not be
realised in any actual use of language. It suffices that we can imagine
language being used that way. At the other end of the spectrum, or so it
has been argued, Phillips’s discussions imply that we are contemplating,
not just the way in which language is used in some, or many, religious
beliefs but, rather, the way language must be used if we are to call the
beliefs religious at all. Thus, there are at least three ways of understand-
ing Phillips’s contemplation of possibilities of religious sense. We dis-
cuss these below.
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Non-descriptive possibilities of meaning
To contemplate possibilities of meaning is to do no more than to imag-
ine ways in which language might be used or to suggest ways in which
a given form of language might be understood. Of course, in the first
case, to constitute a possible use of language, what one imagines cannot
be logically contradictory. And, in the second case, there is the addi-
tional requirement that one’s suggested interpretation must, at a mini-
mum, bear some discernable relation to the form of language one is 
clarifying. But one does not commit oneself to the view that language is
used, or has ever been used, in this way, nor that the suggested inter-
pretation of a given form of language is in accordance with the way in
which the people engaged in this linguistic practice understand it.
Phillips’s frequent and extended use of examples may be understood
as a contemplation of possibilities of meaning in this sense. Of course,
examples may be used to clarify or illustrate a previously argued point,
or they may be advanced to confirm a certain hypothesis. In these cases,
the examples do not really constitute an essential part of one’s philo-
sophical approach. They are no more than tools which might prove
helpful. In Phillips’s work, however, examples are awarded a more sys-
tematic role. Reputedly, during a particularly drawn-out philosophical
discussion, Rush Rhees, without saying a word, stood up, moved up 
to the blackboard, chalked down the letters E. G., and sat down again.
Whether or not the story is true, its meaning should be clear. The point
is not that examples are needed to illustrate or support one’s, more gen-
eral, philosophical theory. Rather, examples are needed to rid us of the
idea that such a general philosophical theory is desirable or even possi-
ble. For example, the counter-examples Phillips advances in opposition
to certain moral theories are not intended as a prelude to an alternative,
better theory. Rather, they serve as reminders of the variety of ways in
which morality might enter our lives. This variety is important, “not 
to fix our gaze on the unadulterated form, but to keep us from searching
for it.”132
This strategy has a solid backing in Wittgensteinian philosophy. As
Phillips says, the use of examples, in particular those drawn from litera-
ture, constitutes something of a ‘Wittgensteinian tradition’.133 Indeed,
Wittgenstein himself argues that the language-games he presents for our
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consideration need not be thought of as approximations to our actual 
linguistic activities. Rather, they are set up as objects of comparison by
means of which light may be thrown on the facts of our language, by
way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.134 Wittgenstein
insisted that, for this purpose, invented language-games will do just as
well as actual ones; indeed, often they are better. Furthermore, when 
we feel that a certain practice can only be understood in a certain way,
Wittgenstein suggests other possibilities of understanding. His point in
doing so is not to replace our explanations with alternative, better ones,
but to disabuse us of our methodological assumptions which force a
certain type of explanation upon us.
Now, clearly, examples, whether they be trivial ones, made up on the
spur of the moment, or more elaborate ones drawn, for instance, from
works of literature, do not tell us what a given, troublesome expression
or form of language means. I take it that most of us are familiar with the
reminder, at the end of a movie, that the characters and incidents por-
trayed are fictitious and that any similarity to the name, character or his-
tory of any person is entirely coincidental and unintentional. Of course,
this statement serves a legal purpose. When we recognise ourselves in
the characters or situations portrayed in a novel, it would be nonsense to
suggest that this is purely coincidental, and unintended by the author.
But no matter how well a story succeeds in depicting ‘real life’, it is still
something dreamt up by its author. The point is that Phillips’s critics
might argue that it is all well and good to produce a plethora of possible
interpretations of a given form of language but, surely, the real question
is not what a certain expression might mean, but what it actually means.
To return to the context of the philosophy of religion, J. Samuel Preus
protests: “But possibilities come cheap and are no alternative to well-
argued theories such as Freud’s.”135 Phillips admits that, to some extent,
that is a fair comment: “Examples need to be explored in detail”136
But, surely, the point is not that the examples are not detailed enough, 
but that they are make-belief. That is to say, they are not examples of
what religious beliefs mean, but only of what they might mean. Even if 
the alternative possibilities of meaning Phillips advances are feasible, at
best, they show no more than that a contrary account might be inaccu-
rate. To show that it is inaccurate, one needs to establish, not just that it
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excludes possible ways of understanding the religious practices under
investigation but that it excludes the right way of understanding them.
To summarise: one way of understanding Phillips’s ‘contemplation of
possibilities of meaning’ is as that of imagining or inventing ways in
which language might be used, or of suggesting ways in which a given
form of language might be understood. Such a strategy plays an impor-
tant role, not only in Phillips’s work, but in Wittgensteinian philosophy
as such, including Wittgenstein’s own writings. By means of applying
this strategy, we might bring someone to see a given form of language
in a different light, or we might get him to re-examine his methodolog-
ical assumptions. As such, the strategy is a valid and important one.
However, its usefulness is limited. In order conclusively to undermine a
particular account of a given religious practice one needs to show, not
just that the practice might be understood in ways other than suggested,
but that the suggested account is descriptively inadequate.
Descriptive, non-exclusive possibilities of meaning
Although the strategy of reflecting upon conceivable uses of language
plays an important role in Phillips’s work, there can be little doubt that,
for the most part, Phillips claims to do more than invent or present imag-
inary language-games for our consideration. As we saw, in The Concept
of Prayer, Phillips aims not just to expound various possible ways of
understanding prayer in a Christian context but “to clarify the kind of
activity prayer is.”137 Although, as Phillips admits, there may well be
prayers which do not fit readily into his exposition, it is clear that his
account aims to show “what people are doing when they pray”138 — or
at least, some people. In his second full-length essay on a specific clus-
ter of religious concepts, Death and Immortality, Phillips seems to leave
more room for doubt. After subjecting various notions of ‘survival after
death’ to philosophical censure he asks whether the religious concept 
of immortality, too, can be thus criticised. What if belief in the immor-
tality of the soul does not presuppose the problematic belief that one
may survive death? By examining what this notion might mean in a reli-
gious context we may come to see that our prior, negative conclusions
need to be revised.139
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These remarks may lead one to believe that here, too, Phillips’s ‘alter-
native account’ makes no claims to descriptive accuracy. But that would
be a mistake. It is patently clear that Phillips does not take himself to be
presenting us with an account, merely, of what the religious belief in our
immortal soul might mean but what we, i.e. religious believers, actually
mean by it; what this notion amounts to in its natural setting; the way 
it is expressed in Christianity, etc.140 Although, as Phillips remarks, it
may be true that, in our day and age, only a small number of people
derive sustenance from the ‘pictures of immortality’ Death and Immor-
tality discusses,141 there is never any doubt that these pictures are not
drawn from Phillips’s imagination but, or so Phillips has it, have their
life in an actual, historical religious tradition and its associated practices.
Here, then, we are no longer conducting the thought-experiment of
entertaining mere possibilities of meaning. Rather, in these examples, 
to contemplate possibilities of meaning is to provide perspicuous repre-
sentations, or conceptual clarifications, of actual religious practices and
beliefs. Thus, in contrast to the understanding of ‘the contemplation of
possibilities of meaning’ discussed above, here Phillips is committed to
the view that language is used, or has been used, in the manner contem-
plated, and that a suggested account of a given form of language accu-
rately represents what at least some of its users mean by it. The qualifier
is important. For although, clearly, in this case, the philosophical account
is claimed to have some measure of descriptive accuracy, it need not be
prescriptive. With regards to the prayers which do not fit readily into
Phillips’s exposition, Phillips refuses to deny them the status of being
genuine prayers. In other words, the contemplation of possibilities of
meaning is descriptive, but non-exclusive. Although Phillips’s account
may not include certain actual possibilities of religious meaning — say,
certain genuinely religious prayers — neither does it, or so Phillips
claims, exclude them.
The contemplation of possibilities of meaning understood in this
descriptive, non-exclusive sense, constitutes a dominant feature of
Phillips’s work. Certainly in his earlier work, philosophy’s task is con-
ceived of as, essentially, descriptive. By paying attention to the grammar
which underlies and regulates the concepts at work in a given practice,
the meaning realised in that practice may be revealed. Thus, philosophy
“teaches us differences, the grammars of different practices and the
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different relations in which they stand to each other.”142 Such descrip-
tive accounts, however, are occasioned not just by an urge to under-
stand a particular use of language but also by particular philosophical
problems that confront us. As we saw, in his later work, Phillips more
strongly emphasises this latter aspect. The descriptive accounts are
argued to subserve ‘the central questions’ in philosophy. Still, this does
not mean that they are deemed any less important. To draw our attention
to the variety of distinct uses to which language may be put is still taken
to be “the essential clarificatory task of philosophy.”143 Nor does it
mean that such descriptive accounts are lacking in Phillips’s later work.
Although Phillips has not again embarked on a full-length essay on a
particular religious practice or belief, as he does in The Concept of
Prayer and Death and Immortality, throughout his writings one may find
more or less extended conceptual clarifications of various religious con-
cepts, beliefs, and practices.
It hardly needs saying that the practice of providing perspicuous 
representations of the grammar of our language can be traced back to
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Indeed, this way of putting it is derived
from his Philosophical Investigations.144 As we saw, put briefly, Wittgen-
stein believed that many of our philosophical problems could be resolved
if only we could command a clear view of our use of words. Thus, phi-
losophy’s task becomes descriptive. We need to bring the words back
from their metaphysical use, and remind ourselves of the way in which
we actually use them. Throughout his later writings, Wittgenstein pres-
ents us with numerous of such reminders; descriptive clarifications of
the way we talk about pain, the way such concepts as ‘intention’, ‘imag-
ination’, ‘memory’, etc. enter into our everyday linguistic practices.
Wittgenstein is not of the opinion that we really do not know what these
words mean, or how these concepts are to be applied. In fact, his philo-
sophical project may be said to depend on our language being ‘in order
as it is’. The descriptive accounts are not meant to teach us something
new. Rather, they aim to bring to our attention, that which we already
knew. In this sense, we may agree with Phillips that it would be a mis-
take to think of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as ‘descriptive’ if by this
we mean that Wittgenstein wanted to disclose certain interesting or par-
ticularly puzzling domains of meaning. The reminders are set up for a
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particular purpose, they are instrumental in the context of discussing
broader issues, central to philosophical logic.
Clearly then, Phillips’s ‘contemplation of possibilities of meaning’
has a solid backing in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Furthermore, there 
is no reason to suppose why such an approach may not be fruitfully
applied where the philosophical study of religion is concerned. Indeed,
we have argued that both in his Remarks on Frazer and his Lectures on
Religious Belief, as well as in various scattered remarks, Wittgenstein
gives us some indication of how his later method may be applied in this
area, and of some of the results that flow from doing so. We should note,
however, that this understanding of ‘the contemplation of possibilities 
of meaning’ raises a number of problems which the one discussed above
does not. In general, it should be clear that once the possibilities of
meaning are claimed to have some measure of descriptive accuracy, this
places stricter limits on the philosophy’s contemplative task. In present-
ing imaginary language-games for our consideration, one is limited only
by the extent of one’s imagination. Of course, different examples may be
more or less suggestive, more or less helpful, and so on. But it makes lit-
tle sense to say that a given example is inaccurate or false. By contrast,
once the possibilities of meaning one advances are claimed to describe
or clarify actual uses of language, one can no longer, as it were, do as
one pleases. One needs to show that one’s philosophical rendering of a
given practice connects to our prior, non-philosophical understanding 
of that practice.
Now, for the majority, if not all, of the concepts discussed in the
Philosophical Investigations this, perhaps, does not pose too much of 
a problem. Wittgenstein is discussing forms of language we all under-
stand. The concepts clarified run through a multifarious collection of
activities and situations in which most of us are engaged or find our-
selves on a daily basis.145 Furthermore, as a rule, we are not puzzled by,
nor do we disagree as to our everyday use of such expressions as ‘I’m
in pain’, ‘I intended to…’, ‘I imagine that…’, I know that…’, etc. Of
course, once we start reflecting upon such uses of language, we may be
puzzled and may well disagree as to how our puzzles should be resolved.
But although such conceptual, or philosophical, reflection is not isolated
from, and may well have an impact, directly or indirectly, on our every-
day linguistic practices, in an important sense it remains external to
them. This is not to say that intellectual reflection plays no role in
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everyday life. But unless we are engaged in, a specific strand of, philo-
sophical enquiry, we do not normally reflect on the language we use, but
in it.
Where religious practices are concerned, matters are somewhat dif-
ferent. First, although the concepts Wittgenstein discusses in the Inves-
tigations pervade our everyday activities, religious concepts do not.
Within contemporary Western society, certainly not everyone is engaged
in specifically religious practices. In other words, we are no longer dis-
cussing a language we all use and understand.146 Furthermore, at least in
Christianity, reflection on our religious language has always been a cru-
cial element of religious practice. Here, people have been, and are, puz-
zled about — have disagreed and do disagree as to how — a given reli-
gious concept or, say, a biblical phrase, should be understood.147 In the
light of these considerations, one might well find that, in contemplating
possibilities of religious meaning, the philosopher will not always remind
us of what we know. For some, the philosopher’s account may disclose
possibilities of meaning they had never before recognised. Others may
find that the possibilities of meaning advanced do not remind them of
what they know at all.
So far, we have argued that the turn from contemplating mere pos-
sibilities of meaning to that of providing descriptive clarifications of
actual linguistic practices places stricter limits on the kind of account one
may advance. On a general level, one needs to show how one’s philo-
sophical representations correspond to the phenomena they seek to
account for. On a more specific level, we indicated that, where possibil-
ities of religious meaning are concerned, this may turn out to be more
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for the non-believer, but, to a certain extent, for the believer as well. I do not wish to 
deny that many believers are perfectly comfortable employing a broad range of religious
concepts or expressions. On the other hand, neither do I think one can deny that there are
quite a few religious concepts which are rather difficult to understand for a large group of
believers. In Christianity, for instance, think of the highly developed doctrines concerning
the triune nature of God. As we saw in our discussion of The Concept of Prayer, it will
not do to ‘de-intellectualise’ faith by arguing that such teachings have no role to play in
everyday religious practice, or to deny forthrightly that in gaining a reflective understand-
ing of such matters one is not broadening one’s religious understanding. And, one might
add, perhaps superfluously, that this is not a matter of looking up the troublesome phrases
in a dictionary.
147 Compare Phillips’s analysis of the concept of ‘prayer’ with Wittgenstein’s concep-
tual reminders of the language-games we play with the concept ‘pain’. In the latter case,
would it not be rather curious to say that, although there are instances which do not fit
readily into Wittgenstein’s exposition, we should not say that they are not instances of pain
but, simply, that we do not understand what is involved in them? (Cf. Phillips 1981, p. 8.)
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problematic than with respect to our everyday forms of language.148
On the other hand, we should note that if these problems can be dealt
with satisfactorily, this opens up a potential for criticism which the
presentation of mere possibilities of meaning does not allow. As we
saw, no matter how feasible the possibilities of meaning one advances
are, unless and until one demonstrates that they present not just a pos-
sible but the correct rendering of a given practice, they do not conclu-
sively establish that a contrary account of the practice under investiga-
tion may be rejected. In other words, if Phillips wishes to establish that
his opponents’ accounts distort or ignore real possibilities of religious
meaning, he needs to provide us with credible alternatives.
To summarise: for the majority of cases, Phillips’s contemplations of
possibilities of meaning should be understood as more or less extended
descriptive representations of actual linguistic practices. Although, both
on a general and a more specific level, this is a more challenging task
than that of contemplating mere possibilities of meaning, it is an essen-
tial part of Phillips’s strategy in that it allows him to back up his critique
of contemporary philosophy of religion “by appeal to the use which lan-
guage has in many religious beliefs.”149 We turn to examine a number
of these appeals below. First, however, we need to consider one final
way in which the contemplation of possibilities of meaning may be
understood.
Prescriptive possibilities of meaning
The contemplation of possibilities of meaning understood in either a
non-descriptive or a descriptive, non-exclusive sense, are crucial aspects
of a Wittgensteinian approach in general, and both strategies are explic-
itly developed and utilised in Phillips’s work. This cannot be said of the
third way in which the contemplation of possibilities of meaning might
be read. This interpretation does not reflect Phillips’s understanding of
the matter but that of his critics. It has been argued that, rather than pro-
viding descriptive representations of the meaning of certain religious
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148 No doubt this partly explains why, although many have taken issue with Wittgen-
stein’s philosophical conclusions, few have disputed the actual content of the grammatical
clarifications contained in the Investigations which facilitate these conclusions, whereas,
by contrast, many have argued Wittgenstein’s representations of religious beliefs to be
descriptively inaccurate or, at the very least, biased. Needless to say, similar criticisms
have been offered of Phillips’s writings.
149 Phillips 1976, p. 9.
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beliefs or practices, Phillips’s clarifications are in fact attempts at reform-
ing these practices and beliefs. Phillips rejects this conclusion:
“Many philosophers will say that I have reached my conclusions under the
pressure of certain philosophical arguments which have led me to forsake
what they take to be traditional Christian beliefs. Nothing could be further
from the truth. What I am trying to elucidate I have always found in Chris-
tianity.”150
Phillips tells us that although he is by no means opposed to reform, it
must not be confused with the task of conceptual investigation he is con-
cerned with.151 Part of this task involves trying to give perspicuous rep-
resentations of the religious practices that present themselves. Phillips
insists that, in so doing, he has never sought to reform anything. His
only aim has been to elucidate that which lies before us: “So I am not
reforming anything, not going anywhere, but contemplating an old, old
story and seeing what gets in the way of telling it today.”152
Given Phillips’s disavowals, it would be rather inappropriate to persist
in the claim that Phillips is consciously seeking to reform religious
beliefs and practices. Of course, the critic may still argue that, even if
unintentionally so, Phillips’s descriptive representations are nevertheless
revisions of the beliefs and practices they seek to account for. Swin-
burne, for one, is convinced that Phillips’s account of prayer is “a totally
false account of the meaning of the prayers of most who have prayed in
the Christian and other theistic traditions over many centuries, including
the present century.”153 Although Phillips has never denied the possibil-
ity that his conclusions may turn out to be confused and those he has
criticised turn out to be justified,154 it is clear that he believes it to be
Swinburne’s account, rather than his own, that distorts the meaning of
the prayers of most who have prayed in the Christian tradition. The dis-
pute thus centres around the question whose account can be said to do
most justice to the phenomena under investigation.
Undeniably, this is an important question. Not just because we might
want to know the answer, but, perhaps more significantly, because it
raises the problem as to how we shall determine the criteria to decide
the matter. However, if we focus solely on these concerns we may over-
look a further issue which is at stake. As we saw, when Phillips is not
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151 See Phillips 1993, pp. 242-243; cf. Phillips 1995, p. 123.
152 Phillips 1999, p. 165.
153 Swinburne 1981, pp. 140-141.
154 See Phillips 1999, p. 2; Phillips 2000, p. 15.
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considering imaginary language-games, the possibilities of meaning
advanced lay claim to some measure of descriptive accuracy, yet deny
any claims to exclusivity. Now the problem, it has been argued, lies
not so much in the former but in the latter claim. Thus, pace Swin-
burne, one might feel that, although Phillips’s accounts will not satisfy
all, they will certainly strike a chord with a fair number of believers.155
Yet the point is not how large the number of non-conformers is, but
how Phillips deals with them. It has been argued that, despite of his
assurances to the contrary, those possibilities of religious meaning that
are not included in Phillips’s account, are excluded altogether. They
are thrust aside, treated either as confusions or as forms of supersti-
tion. Thus, Phillips’s approach ceases to be descriptive, becoming pre-
scriptive instead.
Not surprisingly, Phillips rejects these allegations. Of course, the
question is whether he is right to do so. At this stage, it is too early to
provide an answer.156 To do so, we need to examine more closely the
way in which Phillips distinguishes between what is genuinely religious
and what is confused or superstitious. First, however, we need to study
actual examples of the possibilities of meaning Phillips brings to the
fore. The following chapters take up this task.
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156 We return to this topic below, in Chapter Nine.
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6. MIRACLES
In this, and the following two chapters, we examine Phillips’s accounts
of the beliefs in miracles, in immortality, and in the reality of God. While
Phillips provides more or less extended representations of various reli-
gious beliefs and practices, this choice is by no means an arbitrary one.
First, the fundamental role these beliefs play in the Christian religion
needs no argument. Secondly, they occupy a central place in Phillips’s
writings. Clarifications of the belief that God exists can be found from
Phillips’s earliest writings to his latest; the belief in eternal life is dis-
cussed in his monograph Death and Immortality, as well as in various
other publications; and the belief in miracles has occupied Phillips in a
number of essays as well as in his, to date, most recent book, Religion
and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation. These ‘contemplations of pos-
sibilities of meaning’ are to be taken in the descriptive, non-exclusive
sense, discussed in the previous chapter. That is to say, in each case, it
is clear that Phillips’s accounts profess to disclose the role these beliefs
in fact play in actual religious practice. Whether they actually do so
remains to be seen.
6.1 A miracle defined
It would be prudent, upon commencing our discussion, to provide some
indication of what we are talking about when referring to a ‘miracle’.
How should we define the term? Looking up ‘Miracle’ in the Bible Ency-
clopedia one finds the following entry. A miracle is:
“an event in the external world brought about by the immediate agency or
the simple volition of God, operating without the use of means capable of
being discerned by the senses, and designed to authenticate the divine com-
mission of a religious teacher and the truth of his message (John 2:18;
Matt. 12:38).”1
We are told, further, that a miracle is an occurrence at once above nature
and above man; it shows “the intervention of a power that is not limited
1 WebBible Encyclopedia, entry for ‘Miracle’.
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by the laws either of matter or of mind, a power interrupting the fixed
laws which govern their movements, a supernatural power.”2
We should take note of two related aspects emphasised in the above
definition. First, as Aquinas tells us, those things are properly called 
miracles which are done by divine agency beyond the order commonly
observed in nature. Though a miracle is an event which takes place in
our natural world, it is ‘unnatural’ in that it cannot be produced by natu-
ral causes. Hence, the miracle is called ‘supernatural’, because the effect
is beyond the productive power of nature and implies a supernatural ori-
gin. That is to say, miracles are brought about by divine agency; they
are caused by God, and God alone, who, in performing a miracle, over-
rules, suspends, or modifies the operations of the ordinary course of
nature. Thus a miracle is never a coincidence, no matter how extraordi-
nary or significant. For example, if I miss a plane and the plane crashes,
that is not a miracle unless God intervened in the natural order of events
causing me to miss the flight.3 Nor, secondly, are miracles coincidences
in the sense that God, as it were, performs them on a whim. A miracle is
a factor in the Providence of God over men. Therefore, it must be wor-
thy of the holiness, goodness, and justice of God, and conducive to the
good of men. Miracles cannot contain any element which is wicked,
ridiculous, useless, etc.: “The efficacy, usefulness, purpose of the work
and the manner of performing it clearly show that it must be ascribed to
Divine power.”4 Hence, miracles are not on the same plane with mere
wonders, tricks, works of ingenuity or magic. A traditional theist might
even allow the possibility that certain ‘evil spirits’ may also perform,
rather shabby, ‘miracles’: works of skill and ingenuity which, relatively
to our powers, may seem to be miraculous. Yet, these prodigies “lack
the meaning and purpose which would stamp them as the language of
God to men.”5
Now, although ‘the glory of God and the good of men’ are the primary
and supreme ends of every miracle, we may also distinguish secondary
ends. Not the least of these is the evidential value the miracles are said
to possess. Miracles have traditionally been taken as validations of reli-
gious claims, as evidences attesting and confirming the truth of a Divine
mission or of a doctrine of faith or morals. The structure and assump-
tions of this, ‘the argument from miracles’, go something as follows:
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4 Catholic Encyclopedia, online version, entry for ‘Miracle’.
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Granted both that the power of performing miracles could only be con-
ferred upon someone by God, and that God would not confer such
power upon those misrepresenting him, then any person who performs
miracles gives evidence that he has authority from God to deliver a 
revelation, and hence that the revelation is true.6 Thus, according to the
Gospels, Jesus’ ministry was accompanied by miraculous signs and
wonders that testified that it was God working through Him. Surely the
greatest of these miracles, His resurrection from the dead, is, by many
traditional Christian apologists, still frequently taken to be a solid reason
for believing in (the existence of) God. In short, miracles are considered
not just as objects of faith but, moreover, as evidences of faith.
The rise of the Enlightenment worldview led to the credibility of this
conception of a miracle being challenged. The new emphasis upon the
mechanical regularity and orderliness of the universe raised doubts con-
cerning the New Testaments account of miraculous happenings.7 The
critics’ aim was not to deny that if indeed these events occurred as the
Gospels would have us believe they might well be taken as evidences
of faith. The question, rather, is whether we are ever justified in believ-
ing that these events actually occurred, or even whether it makes sense
to assume that such events could occur at all. Hume’s essay Of Miracles
was widely regarded as demonstrating the evidential impossibility of
miracles. Hume stays close to the definition of ‘miracle’ we considered.
“A miracle may be accurately defined”, he writes, “a transgression of 
a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposi-
tion of some invisible agent.”8 Furthermore, it is clear that Hume’s aim
is to undermine the traditional argument from miracles. He argues that
there are two factors to assess in deciding whether to believe any given
piece of testimony: the reliability of the witnesses and the probability of
that to which they testify. For Hume it is a matter of principle that no
human testimony is adequate to establish the occurrence of a miracle.
No doubt to avoid further censure, he does not explicitly single out the
New Testament miracles in his critique. But the reader will have little
difficulty recognising that Hume’s final conclusion — ‘a miracle can
never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion’9 —
directly contradicts the conclusion that one particular miracle, namely
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7 See McGrath 1997, pp. 359-360.
8 Hume 1975, p. 115, n. 1.
9 See Hume 1975, p. 127.
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the Resurrection, has been so conclusively evidenced that it may be used
as the rational ground for accepting the Christian religion.10
There can be no denying, as Phillips notes, the enormous influence
Hume’s critique exerted and continues to exert.11 The classical starting
point for modern and contemporary philosophical discussion of miracles
must be Chapter X of Hume’s Enquiries Concerning Human Under-
standing.12 On either side of the fence, debate still focuses primarily 
on the (im)possibility of reconciling belief in miracles with our under-
standing of the workings of nature, and on the epistemological question
whether belief in miracles can be rationally justified.13
In our previous discussion of Phillips on Hume we noted that Phillips’s
assessment of Hume is ambivalent. On the one hand, Phillips appreciates
Hume’s analysis; Hume’s critique of the argument from design is com-
pletely successful. On the other hand, Phillips is critical of Hume where it
comes to his understanding of religious belief. Hume’s account, Phillips
argues, ignores or distorts various possibilities of religious meaning.
Hume was not enough of a sceptical enquirer to recognise “that in the
argument from design religion was being as intellectually subverted as
reason itself”.14 However, the expectation that Phillips deals with Hume’s
essay on miracles in like manner proves only partially correct. The crit-
ical aspect of Phillips’s assessment remains: where miracles are con-
cerned, once again Hume’s arguments are said to intellectually subvert
the religious beliefs he is discussing. But in this case Phillips’s censure 
is not counterbalanced by an appreciation of Hume’s critique of the
argument from miracles. Phillips certainly does not feel that, if religious
beliefs are what Hume takes them to be, his arguments are completely
successful. Presumably, this explains why Phillips’s examination of
Hume’s Of Miracles is far more concise than that of the Dialogues.
Whereas Hume’s critique of the argument from design is of value to
Phillips in rebuffing certain types of philosophising about religion,
Hume’s critique of the argument from miracles is not. As Phillips has it,
Hume’s arguments are, at best, dubious, or even allow of a simple
confutation. According to Phillips, the most we can say is that Hume’s
analysis reflects where the problem lies: “in the enormous obstacle 
created for the apprehension of miracles by the naturalistic modes of
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12 See Levine 2002.
13 For a recent example, see Philipse 2001.
14 Phillips 2001, p. 86.
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explanation which dominate our culture.”15 But even if Hume may be
said to have come close to localising the problem, he failed satisfactorily
to develop this insight. Phillips does not deny that there may be general
tension between science and religion in a culture. Indeed, where belief in
miracles is concerned, he believes this is true of our own. Yet, as we
shall see, this is not because science and philosophy have established
that belief in miracles is unjustifiable or that miracles are impossible —
a view held by Hume and, one might add, quite a few contemporary
authors, both critical of and sympathetic to religion. Phillips urges us to
shift attention away from ‘the inappropriate and misleading categories
of natural science’ into which the discussion of talk of miracles is typi-
cally cast. To argue that we must first establish whether or not we are
justified in believing that miracles occur(red) before we may determine
their religious significance, is to reverse the conceptual priorities. The
use of a religious perspective is being confused with talk about that per-
spective, as though one were grounding it in some simple way. But to
say that miracles are of God is not to explain miracles, for ‘miracles’ 
is already a religious conception.16 As such, miracles cannot provide
grounds for finding some significance in religion; they presuppose it.
Our philosophical task, then, is to elucidate the religious contexts in
which talk of miracles has its sense. In so doing, we shed light on the
role played by miracles in a religious context, both in Biblical times 
and our own. At the same time this opens up the possibility of a more
fruitful approach to understanding the nature of the conflict between
religion and science.
As Phillips is wont to point out, where religious concepts are con-
cerned, the task of philosophical elucidation turns out to be one of con-
ceptual reclamation. In many ways, the intellectual climate in which 
the believer’s claims are discussed has lost all sense of a miracle as a
religious category. Thus the intellectual modes of discussion, including
philosophical discussion, become ways by which the religious concept
comes to be forgotten: exercises in conceptual forgetfulness. In the face
of such a crisis,
“the real philosophical task becomes one of jogging the memory. But this
can only be done indirectly, by showing the route by which such forgetful-
ness occurred. Only by seeing how we came to forget can we be brought to
recall concepts we have lost.”17
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It seems then, we cannot cut right to the chase. Thus let us begin by trac-
ing our ‘intellectual amnesia’ to its root: Hume’s essay Of Miracles.
6.2 Miracles and testimony
Hume’s Of Miracles possibly has received more critical attention than
anything else Hume wrote on religion. Remarkably, philosophical discus-
sion of Hume’s essay has not been confined to, or even principally con-
cerned with, whether or not Hume’s arguments against justified belief 
in miracles are tenable. Instead, it has focused on exegetical issues con-
cerning exactly what Hume was arguing.18 Our present discussion does
not pretend to offer any significant contribution to this area of enquiry,
nor does it aim to.19 Hume is discussed for no other reason than to set
the stage for Phillips’s analysis of the concept of a miracle.
Although Hume never says so explicitly, it is likely that his essay on
miracles was intended, at least in part, as an answer to Thomas Sherlock’s
highly successful Tryal of the Witnesses of the Resurrection (1729).20
Sherlock sets out to demonstrate that the testimony of the Apostles
establishes the Resurrection as an historical fact. He seeks to refute
various arguments which may be brought against this conclusion. We
shall only concern ourselves with one of these, the one that is central
to Hume’s critique. It is the claim that ‘the wise man’ — the man who
learns from the regularities in his experience and proportions his belief
to the evidence — will only believe in a miracle if it is supported by
overwhelming evidence, evidence stronger than is ever likely to be pro-
duced. Sherlock replies that if the sceptic cannot believe reports of a
resurrection then:
“A Man who lives in a warm Climate, and never saw Ice, ought upon no
Evidence to believe that Rivers freeze and grow hard in cold Countries; for
this is improbable, contrary to the usual Course of Nature; and impossible
according to his Notion of Things.”21
The man’s reasoning is clearly mistaken. Ice may be impossible to his
experience but his experience is limited. Of course, the implication is that
the cases are parallel: the sceptic’s experience is likewise limited, there-
fore his decision to reject the reports of the Resurrection is unjustified.
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In Of Miracles Hume refers to the man in Sherlock’s example as
‘the Indian prince’. He denies that his case is parallel to that of the
sceptic. No Indian prince, it is evident, could have experience that
water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situa-
tion quite unknown to him, and it is impossible for him to tell what
would result from it. Furthermore, the freezing of water may be deemed
extraordinary and, admittedly, should require a pretty strong testimony
to render it probable for people in a warm climate. But still, Hume
continues,
“it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of
nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of
Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freez-
ing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water
in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be
positive what would there be the consequence.”22
Whereas the Indian Prince’s experience has an obvious gap in it, the
sceptic’s experience that men die and do not rise from the dead does not.
There is, as Gaskin puts it, no reply to the sceptic which could take the
form ‘in these conditions, which you have not experienced, resurrections
occur’.23
Should we say that Hume is begging the question? After all, if 
the Gospels are to be believed, a resurrection has occurred and, thus,
the sceptic’s experience is limited in contrast to that of the Apostles,
even if it has no obvious gap in it. But, as Gaskin rightly points out,
for the sceptic the fundamental question is whether the Gospels are
true.24 Hume does not deny that the Indian Prince “reasoned justly”
and that “it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent
to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was unac-
quainted”.25 Of course, once such testimony is produced, the Indian
Prince, as a rational man, is bound to believe in the freezing of water.
Likewise, very strong testimony would oblige the sceptic to believe
reports of a resurrection. Thus, the question becomes whether suffi-
ciently strong testimony has ever, in fact, been produced. At this point
matters become somewhat complicated. For Hume seems to offer us
two ways of answering this question. On the one hand, he argues, sim-
ply, that such testimony has not been produced. But we also find the
MIRACLES 273
22 Hume 1975, p. 114, n. 1.
23 See Gaskin 1978, p. 112.
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25 Hume 1975, p. 113.
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more forceful reply that such testimony could not be produced.26 We
discuss the former answer first.
Hume’s line of argument runs something as follows. In our experi-
ence, certain things happen invariably, for example, that all men die and,
once dead, remain dead. In matters of fact, these invariable experiences
constitute certainties and are called laws of nature. Other things happen
less than always in our experience, for instance, that a day in June is
warmer than a day in December. These constitute probabilities which
range from strong to weak. Normally, the veracity of human testimony
is a strong probability and, as such, constitutes proof that what is reported
took place. But sometimes the veracity of testimony should be deemed a
weak probability as when, for example, the witnesses contradict each
other, they are of doubtful character, etc. Now, when testimony is given
which is contrary to our invariable experience, a probability, be it weak
or strong, is opposing a certainty and, as a weaker evidence can never
destroy a stronger, and the wise man proportions his belief to the evi-
dence, the wise man will believe the certainty.
Where the evidence is weak, Hume’s argument seems to be valid. For
example, few parents would believe their child’s claim that there is a
bogeyman lurking underneath its bed. As the evidence gets stronger,
however, Hume’s conclusion becomes less and less certain. As we saw
in the example of the Indian Prince, when something extraordinary is
reported, the wise man will need more evidence than usual and will
check and re-check the evidence very carefully. But there comes a point
where “in his accumulation of respectable evidence the wise man would
be in danger of becoming dogmatic and obscurantist if he did not believe
the evidence.”27 Hume feels certain, however, that where it matters, i.e.
as regards the miracles and, in particular, the Resurrection, his argument
is valid: these have not been established on so full an evidence. Gaskin
distinguishes between four considerations Hume offers in support of his
conclusion which would justify that no miracle has ever been satisfacto-
rily evidenced. First, Hume argues that evidence for miracles does not
satisfy the requirements for such evidence. There is too little guarantee
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against deception, delusion, falsehood, and so on. Secondly, Hume feels
that the possibility that ‘the religionist may be an enthusiast’ susceptible
to self-deception, or one who ‘for the sake of promoting so holy a cause’
may feel inclined to commit falsehoods, becomes all the more likely
when we observe in human nature an irrational interest for, and love 
of, the marvellous. Thirdly, Hume argues that miraculous narratives are
devalued by abounding among primitive and barbarous peoples and in
‘the first histories of all nations’. Finally, Hume presents what Gaskin
calls ‘the Contrary Miracles Argument’: “If a miracle proves a doctrine
to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be
wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible
as the doctrines.”28
Given the weak probability of miraculous events, Hume feels cer-
tain that, taken together, these four considerations suffice to warrant the 
conclusion that we do not have sufficient evidence for justified belief 
in miracles. Is he right? Phillips, at any rate, does not think so. Like
Gaskin, Phillips, too, distinguishes between two lines of argument in Of
Miracles. On the one hand, Hume argues that we do not have sufficient
evidence to justify belief in miracles. On the other hand, however, Hume
seems to believe that we can never have evidence for miracles, simply
because such events are ‘absolutely impossible’. Phillips summarises the
first argument as follows:
“Hume argues that no testimony is ever sufficient to establish that a mira-
cle has occurred because miracles are violations of laws of nature. Laws of
nature are established, for Hume, by the constant conjunction of cause and
effect. This uniformity of experience counts against any miracle, since it
will always outweigh any testimony for miracles.”29
According to Phillips, this view can be criticised. After all, once we ask
whose experience we rely on in causal generalities, the answer, for most
of us is: not our own. We take these generalities on trust from the tes-
timony of those whose experience we regard as authoritative in these
matters.30 But this means that
“if Hume’s argument relies on the fact that testimony is uniform, this turns
out not to be the case, since there are those who testify to miracles. We
cannot adjudicate between the testimonies on the ground that testimony is
uniform.”31
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Phillips’s reply is questionable for a number of reasons. It is clear that in
causal generalities I often trust in the testimony of others. For example,
I do not believe it is possible to build a perpetuum mobile. I have a rea-
sonable enough grasp of physics to be able, more or less, to explain to
someone why such a device cannot be manufactured. But I would have
to admit that, at various stages in my explanation, I rely on causal gen-
eralities which I myself have not established. Indeed, one might say that
I take these on trust from the testimony of those I regard as authoritative
in this matter. But do I also take it on trust that when, under normal cir-
cumstances, I put my hand in an open flame, the fire will burn me? If we
are to say that my certainty that the fire will burn me is based on any-
thing at all, surely my own experience will suffice.32 To return to the
case at hand: do we take it on trust that people die and do not rise from
the grave? Imagine someone asking us how we know this, or on whose
authority we believe this to be the case. We would be at a loss to know
what manner of answer he could possibly expect. Are we then to con-
clude that our confidence is unjustified? We might reply with Wittgen-
stein: “What people accept as a justification — is shewn by how they
think and live.”33 Other than in horror and ghost stories, our lives make
little room for the dead walking. This, I suggest, is as true of non-believ-
ers as of believers. Perhaps we may understand why certain believers
should say that “in devout minds, there is […] a presumption for and an
expectation of miracles”,34 but we are as unlikely to find the faithful
checking on the graves of their loved ones once a week, just to make
sure they have not yet risen, as we are the stoutest of atheists.35
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32 In fact, Wittgenstein tries to show that it is awkward to think of my certainty as
based on any kind of reasoning at all, let alone an argument from the testimony of others.
Rather such regularities — fire burning me, objects dropping to the floor when dropped
— set the framework within which our reasoning takes place. (See Wittgenstein 1994, I,
324-325.)
33 Wittgenstein 1994, I, 325. Of course, I do not mean to imply that Hume was in a
position to draw such a conclusion, or would even agree with it. Nor do I wish to deny
that there are problems concerning Hume’s analysis of causal reasoning and his theory of
impressions and ideas — a theory, as Levine has it, “that even staunch empiricists should
reject as simplistic.” (Levine 2002.) I do maintain, however, that Phillips’s apparent sug-
gestion that, for all practical purposes, our trust in causal generalities amounts to a trust
in the testimony of others, is overhasty. There is a complex interplay here between rea-
soning, experience, trust, certainty, etc. — issues that are at the centre of Wittgenstein’s
attention in On Certainty, and which Phillips discusses at length at other places in his
work (see, for example, Phillips 1988, pp. 24ff.). Furthermore, I suggest that in develop-
ing these issues one may strengthen rather than weaken Hume’s case.
34 Catholic Encyclopedia, online version, entry for ‘Miracle’.
35 Perhaps we should say that the believer retains the possibility that the dead may rise.
At a minimum, based on the testimony of the Apostles, he believes that it has happened
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It should be clear that the move from talk about conflicting experi-
ences to conflicting testimonies is important to Phillips’s argument. After
all, as we already saw, if we should deal with the problem in terms of
the former category, Phillips could not argue that experience is not uni-
form because there are those who have experienced people rising from
the grave. For the truth of the latter statement is precisely what is at
stake. But let us, for the moment, waive our objections and agree that 
we are dealing with conflicting testimonies. We should then agree with
Phillips that, logically, we cannot adjudicate between the testimonies on
the ground that testimony is uniform. But why should this be considered
problematic for Hume? First, we should note that Phillips presents a
rather uncharitable reading of Hume, turning his argument into a piece
of nonsense. It would be rather comical to suggest that we may reject 
a given testimony on the ground that testimony is uniform: if it were,
there would be nothing to reject in the first place. More importantly, 
secondly, the fact that we cannot adjudicate on the ground that tes-
timony is uniform does not mean we can no longer adjudicate at all.
Quite the contrary, we do so on a regular basis. A child may believe that
there are monsters hiding in the dark, based on the testimony of his
friends who claim to have seen them. Do we accept either belief or 
testimony? Obviously not. This has to do both with the fact that the 
witnesses, being children, are suspect, as well as with the fact that what
they testify to is highly improbable. As Gaskin says, “Disbelief, when
the report is suspect and what is reported is grossly improbable, is both
normal and rational, and Hume’s argument does little more than codify
this response.”36 Now, what about testimony as to a resurrection? I take
it Phillips would agree at least that we are justified in believing this to be
somewhat improbable. Surely it would not be extravagant to approach
reports to this effect with a certain amount of suspicion. We should like
to know whether the witnesses are trustworthy, how many witnesses
were involved, whether errors on their part can be excluded, and so on.
In short, we would be back at all the considerations Hume raises — con-
siderations Phillips does not even begin to address.
We should note that nothing we have said so far rules out the possi-
bility that, after carefully weighing the evidence, we may have to con-
clude belief in miracles — in the Resurrection — to be justified after all.
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this belief shows itself in the believer’s life and thought.
36 Gaskin 1978, p. 115.
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Does Hume’s argument also allow this possibility? Phillips’s recon-
struction of it implies it does not. As we saw, Phillips says that, for
Hume, ‘no testimony is ever sufficient’ to establish that a miracle has
occurred; the uniformity of our experience ‘will always outweigh’ any
testimony for miracles. It should be clear that, even if Phillips does dis-
tinguish between two lines of argument in Of Miracles, the manner in
which he does so does not correspond to Gaskin’s distinction between
Hume’s ‘official’ and his ‘off-duty’ arguments. According to Gaskin, in
Hume’s official argument there is no attempt to rule out a priori the pos-
sibility of miracles or anything else taking place. It is strictly an episte-
mological argument, concerned exclusively with the question whether,
on the basis of the evidence and testimony available, we are justified in
believing in miracles. Its conclusion is not that there cannot be, and,
hence, never will be, sufficient evidence for justified belief but simply
that, as a matter of fact, there is not sufficient evidence.37 Phillips has
not demonstrated that, thus understood, Hume’s argument is logically
flawed.
Of course, one final question remains. Even if Hume’s argument is
workable, is it also valid? That is to say, is Hume right that, on the evi-
dence available, we cannot justifiably believe in miracles? It has not
been my aim to answer this question. But I will hazard to say that, on the
basis of our discussion so far, the odds seem to be in Hume’s favour.38
6.3 Miracles and laws of nature
So far, we have considered Hume’s ‘official’ argument against miracles.
What Hume does not do in this argument, is to establish that miracles
could never happen and that the evidence for a miracle could never be
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37 See Gaskin 1978, pp. 112-115. Even if Gaskin is wrong about this, I see no clear
reason why Hume’s argument could not be restated in such a way as to obviate Phillips’s
objections.
38 Gaskin observes that the New Testament narratives manifestly cannot satisfy the
criteria for evidence Hume produces: “The early spread of Christianity in Roman society
could be accounted for by enthusiastic self-deception together with the interest always
excited by the marvellous or odd. Christianity did start among uncultured and uncritical
people in a remote part of the Roman world, and, because of the exclusivist ‘one true God’
claims of the early Church, Christianity is subject to the Contrary Miracles Argument.”
(Gaskin 1978, p. 119) Gaskin adds that none of this should be very new or shocking, at
least to modern New Testament scholars. The development of modern ‘higher criticism’
of ancient history in general, and of Biblical history in particular, has tended to add sup-
port to, rather than undermine Hume’s conclusion.
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credible to the wise man. This does not constitute a serious flaw in his
argument. I believe Gaskin is right to conclude it is something Hume
really need not do:
“giving his argument the limited application which it requires in order to
upset the position of the eighteenth-century rational apologists (and modern
fundamentalists) it does all that Hume could have required of it.”39
Gaskin has to admit, however, that this success is achieved by playing
down or ignoring the occasional extravagances in Hume’s statements, and
by giving more weight than Hume himself tends to give to the restric-
tions on his argument. For it cannot be denied that at various stages in
his argument Hume seems to be claiming precisely that: that there can-
not be, and could never be, evidence for miracles, simply because mira-
cles are absolutely impossible. For example, considering the miracles
allegedly performed at the tomb of the Abbé Paris, and attested to by a
large number of witnesses, Hume concludes:
“And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute
impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And
this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a
sufficient refutation.”40
Hume’s claim that miracles are absolutely impossible may be related to
his understanding of laws of nature. As we saw, Hume defines a mira-
cle as a transgression of a law of nature. But we also find him talking
of miracles as violations of laws of nature, and arguing that “as a firm
and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against
a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined.”41 This is problematic for at
least two reasons.
First, conceived of as a transgression of a law of nature, a miraculous
event is simply something that is at variance with our past experience.
But such an event could also just be an indication that our experience
has not been sufficiently extensive for us to be able to formulate the laws
of nature correctly. Rather than with a miracle, we are confronted with
no more than a, very uncommon, natural event.42 Hume’s conception of
miracles as violations of laws of nature, laws which are based on unal-
terable experience, allows no real distinction between the miraculous
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40 Hume 1975, p. 125.
41 Hume 1975, p. 114.
42 See Gaskin 1978, p. 122.
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and the extremely unusual and tends to preclude any possibility of us
revising our understanding of laws of nature or reformulating them.
Secondly, Hume seems to think of laws of nature as constraints on
what can happen. Drawing on a distinction between the ‘physically pos-
sible’ and the ‘logically possible’, both Gaskin and Levine argue that this
assumption is not warranted. Obviously, Levine argues, if laws of nature
were descriptive of the scope and substance of everything that could log-
ically happen, instead of their scope being limited to what can happen
naturally, then miracles would not be possible. But “that which is ‘phys-
ically impossible’ — impossible within the constraints of the laws of
nature — has a narrower scope than that which is logically impossi-
ble.”43 In the absence of any further argument to the contrary, one need
not assume that the logically and physically impossible are coextensive.
Gaskin agrees. Nothing prevents us from saying that certain things are
impossible in the sense that they do not happen. But such impossibility
— ‘physical impossibility’ — does not imply ‘logical impossibility’, i.e.
that these thing could not happen. The point is, Gaskin argues, that our
nomologicals certainly imply the physical impossibility of events incom-
patible with them, but their real authority to say certain events could not
happen is no better than the evidence which has been used to establish
the nomologicals in the first place: “there is no means of knowing that
such evidence is of the sort (whatever that sort would be) which could
give the nomological the pseudo-logical strength which it would require
in order to rule out certain events as physically impossible in the sense of
could not happen.”44
Turning to Phillips’s discussion, we find him agreeing that we cannot
appeal to laws of nature to show that certain inexplicable events45 can-
not take place:
“A law of nature does not prevent anything from happening, since it is
simply a description and systematisation of what does happen. […] Given
the status of scientific laws, they do not give us any warrant for saying that
the inexplicable events […] cannot occur. Certainly, we have no idea of
how they can be accommodated within the scientific explanatory context,
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43 Levine 2002.
44 Gaskin 1978, p. 124.
45 We should note that, although not altogether consistent in doing so, throughout 
his discussion, Phillips uses the term ‘inexplicable event’ rather than ‘miracle’. This is no
arbitrary matter. As we shall see, according to Phillips, it is crucial to distinguish between
the two notions. To call something ‘inexplicable’ is not the same as deeming it ‘a miracle’
and, vice versa, the apprehension of an event as miraculous does not depend on its being
inexplicable.
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or even by a modification of the laws. But this does not mean that no inex-
plicable events can occur which fall outside this explanatory context.”46
Apart from the confusions inherent in the appeal to laws of nature as
constraints on what can happen, there is, Phillips argues, also a far more
mundane reason which makes it difficult to say that inexplicable events
cannot occur. The problem is that it would involve us in claiming all
those who testify to such events to be confused, deluded, or lying. But,
Phillips argues, we may have no grounds for such accusations. For
example, most of us are familiar with cases where patients, after their
doctors had already given up hope, recover from ‘incurable diseases’,
or so we are told. One might argue that, even if we have no grounds for
such accusations, it is not inconceivable that the witnesses were con-
fused, deluded, or lying. This cannot be denied. But, in the absence of
a convincing a priori argument against the occurrence of inexplicable
events, the claim that no such events ever take, or took, place does seem
near impossible to justify.
How may we react to such ‘inexplicables’? It will not do, Phillips
argues, to insist that there ought to be a scientific explanation of them,
and that one day there will be. This, Phillips feels, is simply faith in
science. It need not follow from the character of scientific investiga-
tion: “there is nothing in the account given of scientific laws which
justifies the view that anything can be brought within their orbit.”47 In
fact, so far as science is concerned, these inexplicable events are not
even on the agenda of unsolved problems. At best, “they are irrelevant
curiosities.”48
To say that certain events are inexplicable is to say no more than that
they are not brought under the aegis of science. It is not to say that
these events are essentially or necessarily inexplicable. A unique event,
or one that happened only once or twice, “may ultimately have to be
just accepted by the sceptic as an unpalatable aberration in the nature of
things. But an odd event repeated several times would almost certainly
be taken as a challenge to explanations of the way the world works”.49
Thus, although it will not do to say that such events must be, and will
be, explained by science, neither will it do to say that they will never be
explained. This, Phillips argues, is also a kind of faith:
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49 Gaskin 1978, p. 121.
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“Historically it has been embarrassed on a number of occasions. The story
of ‘the God of the gaps’ testifies to this fact. Too often God’s territory is
mapped out only for science to encroach on it with explanations which
believers had said were impossible.”50
Indeed, if history has taught us one thing, it is that what seemed inexpli-
cable yesterday may well be explained tomorrow.
So far, Phillips does not seem to introduce any new elements into our
discussion. Like Gaskin and Levine, he argues that we cannot appeal to
the laws of nature to show that certain inexplicable events cannot occur.
We should note, however, that Phillips does so without invoking the 
distinction between the ‘physically possible’ and the ‘logically possible’.
In fact, his discussion of what Phillips calls ‘open-door epistemology’
implies a critique of this way of looking at things. Consider the example
of turning water into wine. The open-door epistemological argument
runs as follows:
“The possibility of turning water into wine makes no sense in science. From
this is does not follow that the possibility has been shown to be meaning-
less. All that has been shown is that the possibility is relatively meaningless:
meaningless relative to scientific modes of explanation. We cannot conclude,
according to this argument, that the possibility of turning water into wine is
absolutely meaningless.”51
It is not difficult to see why Phillips should call arguments of this kind
‘open-door epistemology’. On this view, anything could be an object 
of belief for nothing can be shown to be absolutely meaningless. The
problem, Phillips argues, is that the notion of ‘absolute meaningless-
ness’ on which these arguments depend is highly misleading. When we
say that the possibility of an inexplicable event is only relatively mean-
ingless, rather than absolutely meaningless, the impression is given that
a certain kind of meaning has been rescued for these possibilities:
although they are ruled out in one context, this does not mean that they
are ruled out in any context. But, of course, as Phillips points out, that
new context must then itself be invoked if we want to say that the words
have a meaning. Until this is done, “We are talking about an abstract,
not a real possibility.”52
It should be clear how these remarks bear on our discussion. As we
saw, Gaskin and Levine distinguish between the ‘physically possible’ and
the logically possible’, arguing that these categories are not coextensive.
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It is physically impossible to turn water into wine, yet the possibility
cannot logically be excluded. Thus, we are told that although this is
impossible in the sense that it does not happen, it nevertheless could
happen. Phillips’s reply is that in the absence of any specific context of
meaning, we have no idea what it means to say that water was turned
into wine. But might not Gaskin and Levine retort that the story of the
wedding at Cana provides us with the necessary context? Here, we are
told of an extraordinary event. The phrase ‘Jesus turned water into wine’
adequately describes this event. And, an apologist might add, ‘God per-
formed a miracle’ provides the only rational explanation for the event.
Where lies the problem?
The problem, Phillips argues, is that we cannot take the phrase ‘Jesus
turned water into wine’ as a descriptive statement, nor does ‘God per-
formed a miracle’ provide us with any explanation. These conclusions
owe much to Winch’s discussion of an example drawn from a story by
Isaac Bashevis Singer.53 In it we are told about a man, Reb Zelig, who
owns a shed. One morning, Zelig gets up only to find that the shed has
gone. At first, Zelig believes he has gone mad. But everyone else con-
firms that the shed is no longer there, leaving not a single trace. Various
investigations are undertaken but they lead nowhere. Any natural explana-
tion seems to be ruled out: the shed has simply vanished. Winch’s main
question is what could be meant by the phrase ‘the shed has vanished’.
One might wonder why Winch should raise this question in the first
place. After all, the story we have been told specifies the truth-condi-
tions of ‘the shed has vanished’ clearly enough for us to be in no doubt
what is meant: the shed was there on Monday, it was not there on Tues-
day. Winch agrees that no problem is raised by the truth-condition of
‘There is a shed in the field on Monday’, nor by the truth-condition of
‘There is no shed in the field on Tuesday’. Furthermore, we so far have
no reason to doubt that these two statements are perfectly consistent
with each other. Of course, Winch points out, we shall have expectations
that there will be some acceptable story which accounts for the removal
of the shed between Monday and Tuesday, and, very importantly,
“these expectations will be shaped by our understanding of what sheds,
fields, etc., are. […] We should suppose the shed to have been, perhaps,
burned down in the interim, dismantled, destroyed by an earthquake, bull-
dozed — or destroyed in some other way consistent with our understand-
ing of what a shed is.”54
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Now, one might argue that there are, indeed, all these sorts of ways in
which the shed may have disappeared. But our acceptance of the con-
junction — ‘There is a shed in the field on Monday’, ‘There is no shed
in the field on Tuesday’ — as consistent, does not depend on any partic-
ular story about what happened in the interim. As Winch puts it, a very
simple-minded logician might think that we have two propositions p and
q which are consistent with each other. There are all sorts of proposi-
tions r1, r2, r3 … rn, each of which describes a way in which the shed
ceased to exist. The consistency of p and q is quite independent of the
truth or falsity of any one of those propositions r1 … rn. Hence we can
assert p and q and not- r1 and not- r2 … and not- rn. But, as Winch rightly
points out, this conclusion does not follow. From the fact that the con-
junction p and q is consistent with the falsity of any one of the proposi-
tions r1 … rn, it does not follow that it is consistent with the falsity of all
of them taken collectively. Nor, Winch concludes, is this in fact true:
“our understanding of the conjunction: ‘The shed existed on Monday 
and did not exist on Tuesday’ is such as to presuppose that the shed was
destroyed between Monday and Tuesday in some intelligible way. And what
is an intelligible way is limited by our understanding of what a shed is. That
is clear enough if one tries as a substitution for r1 … rn a proposition such as
‘It died’, ‘It dissolved in a tumbler of water’, ‘It went into liquidation’ —
that is, some report of a mode of ceasing to exist which is conceptually
inapplicable to a shed.”55
If Winch’s argument is correct, which I believe it to be, we have not got-
ten any closer to an answer to the question as to how we should under-
stand the expression ‘the shed has vanished’. Winch proceeds on a rather
long argument which we shall not follow in detail. Instead let us focus
on one of his main conclusions, a conclusion which plays a crucial role
in our current discussion. According to Winch, the phrase ‘the shed has
vanished’ can be understood neither as a description nor as an explana-
tion of what has happened. Rather it functions as an expression of bewil-
derment. Two of Winch’s claims, I feel, need little argument. That the
phrase ‘the shed has vanished’ may express bewilderment at the turn of
events seems obvious enough. That it does not explain what has hap-
pened to the shed seems equally clear. Imagine us asking Zelig what 
has happened. Zelig replies that his shed has vanished. We should ask:
‘How do you mean, vanished?’, and we would probably suggest various
possible explanations of the shed’s not being there anymore. But if Zelig
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replies: ‘No, no, it simply vanished!’, we would either reject this, and
continue to look for some explanation, or resign ourselves to the fact of
there being no explanation.56 In short, ‘it has simply vanished’ is not 
an alternative to such explanations as ‘it burned down’, etc. Rather, it
emphasises that there is no explanation available, as well as, no doubt,
expressing a certain amount of bewilderment as to this fact.
However, Winch’s suggestion that ‘the shed has vanished’ cannot
function as a description of what has happened is less clear-cut. It seems
difficult to deny that it does not tell us what has happened to the shed.
After all, ‘vanishing’ is not something that can be meaningfully said of
a shed, like ‘creaking’ or ‘collapsing’. Taken in this way, ‘the shed has
vanished’ still masquerades as some kind of explanation which, we have
already argued, it cannot be. But what if we take the phrase as a descrip-
tion in a more general sense; not so much as ‘what has happened to the
shed?’ but ‘what’s going on?’. What I mean is that unless Zelig’s words
have some descriptive content, unless they tell us in some sense what has
transpired, there would be nothing to be bewildered about, nothing which
allows of no explanation.
Winch is aware of this problem. He argues that he intends to do 
no more than raise some doubts about what it would be to understand
Singer’s story as a straightforward factual report. Winch does not argue
that a sentence like ‘it has vanished’ is meaningless. It obviously is not;
it has a perfectly good meaning, for example, in a story like Singer’s.
But, Winch insists, being confronted “with a story about a vanishing
shed is nothing like being confronted with a vanishing shed. From the
fact that I understand the former nothing follows about the possibility
of my understanding the latter, or about my ability to envisage what
that would be.”57 Of course, we can, without great difficulty, imagine
ourselves in circumstances in which we have the impression that there
was a shed a moment ago which is no longer there, with no possibility
of explaining what has happened. Furthermore, we can imagine our-
selves being driven to say ‘It has vanished’, accompanying the utter-
ance with successive mental pictures in which the shed is first there in
front of us and then not there. But, if anyone wants to insist that to
imagine this is to imagine the shed having ceased to exist, Winch tells
us he can do no more
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“than remind him again how thin a context of utterance this is, how many
of the connections with other ideas, expectations, possibilities of investiga-
tions, etc., are lacking which normally surround our thoughts concerning
the coming to be and ceasing to be of things. And the thought can hardly
remain unaffected by such a drastic impoverishment of its surroundings.”58
Our, rather lengthy, discussion of Winch’s article may perhaps be excused
when we come to see how crucial his conclusions are to Phillips’s discus-
sion of miracles.59 As we saw, it is argued that, although certain things
may be ‘physically impossible’, this does not necessarily mean they are
‘logically impossible’, which is to say, they could happen. But Winch’s
discussion casts doubt on the possibility of drawing this distinction.
‘Although it is physically impossible it could still happen’ would seem to
be a candidate for philosophical therapy rather than the prelude to a solid
philosophical argument. The problem is that our understanding of what
is ‘physically possible’ is internally related to our understanding of what
counts as ‘a happening’. Once we separate these notions we are left with,
in Winch’s words, so ‘thin a context of utterance’ that it is difficult to see
what the words are supposed to mean. Or, as Phillips puts it:
“If we say that the possibilities of inexplicable events are not absolutely
meaningless without involving any context, all we are saying is that these
words, meaningless to us, could have a meaning in some other context
were such a context to be provided.”60
But, we asked, does not the story of the wedding at Cana provide us with
the necessary context? Having examined Winch’s discussion of ‘the
shed has vanished’, Phillips’s reply should not come as a surprise. He
argues that the phrase ‘Jesus turned water into wine’ cannot be under-
stood as straightforwardly descriptive. Talk about miracles is not
“talk which describes the events which defy explanation. It would be mis-
leading to suggest that ‘brought back from the dead’, ‘turning water into
wine’, are familiar descriptions to us, the only thing missing being the
explanations of them.”61
Nor will it do to insist that in calling the turning of water into wine a
miracle, we have provided such an explanation. Against the background
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60 Phillips 2000, p. 134.
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of Winch’s conclusions, Phillips may argue that there “is not enough
substance in the example to allow us to say what ‘turning into’ comes to
in this context.”62 It is of no use to say that we cannot logically exclude
the possibility of a supernatural explanation as “a viable alternative 
and the one that might plausibly be chosen in a case like the Red Sea 
parting”,63 for how is the reference to a ‘supernatural cause’ supposed to
explain anything? How are we to explain what a ‘supernatural cause’ is
other than by reference to its effects, namely, miracles? But the notion
of a ‘supernatural cause’ was invoked precisely to explain miracles. We
are caught in a vicious circle.
Phillips’s conclusion that it is highly problematic to think of talk 
of miracles as either straightforwardly descriptive or explanatory seems
difficult to avoid.64 This does raise the question, however, whether we
have any way left of understanding such talk at all. Ironically, while we
began by criticising Hume’s claim that miracles are simply impossible,
Phillips’s final conclusions seem to strengthen rather than weaken the
argument against miracles. On the basis of Phillips’s discussion one
might well conclude that, indeed, we cannot justifiably believe that mir-
acles occur because we have no idea what kind of event would constitute
a miracle. We cannot even describe such an event, let alone explain it.
Not surprisingly, Phillips rejects this conclusion. Rather than searching
for a use for talk of miracles, we should recognise that such talk already
has a use: “The language concerning the miraculous is already with us,
and our philosophical task is to clarify its grammar as far as we are
able.”65 This is the final task to which we must now turn.
6.4 The religious concept of a miracle
As noted at the start of our discussion, Phillips’s main aim is to shift
attention away from what he takes to be the inappropriate and mislead-
ing categories of natural science into which the discussion of talk of
miracles is typically cast. In such a setting, one cannot rest content with
the inexplicable nature of miracles. There must be an explanation; if not
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a natural one, then a supernatural one. Thus, Phillips argues, religion
appears as a form of super-science, God is turned into a super-scientist.66
By contrast, Phillips insists on the inexplicable character of miraculous
events. Such insistence, however, does not render the grammar of the
language of miracles unproblematic for “the inexplicable character of
the miracles does not, of itself, reveal their religious significance as
miracles.”67
Phillips does not say that we can no longer speak of miracles today,
nor that we can never justifiably believe in miracles, nor that miracles,
as such, are impossible. His point, rather, is that the resources from which
belief in miracles draws its sustenance are largely lacking in our culture.
Even if we allow that extraordinary events did happen, and even if they
inspire awe and humility in us, we are still likely to wonder at them as
extraordinary natural events. But that is not to see them as miracles.68
To see them in that way would be to see them as revelations of God;
something that they clearly are in the Biblical accounts:
“In the Bible, it is the various religious contexts which give significance to
the inexplicable events. We, by contrast, hunt for inexplicable events in the
hope of hanging on to, or finding some significance for religion.”69
One might reply that, surely, a person need not be religious first, before
he can witness miracles. After all, thousands claim to have come to reli-
gion for the first time through witnessing a miracle. But, according to
Phillips, this misses the point at issue: “What must be available is a
religious surrounding which makes available for an individual the pos-
sibility of coming to religion for the first time through witnessing a mir-
acle.”70 These surroundings, Phillips argues, are what is largely lacking
in contemporary Western society: “What has declined is a pervasive
religious culture in which the language of the miraculous has its signif-
icance.”71
I take it few would wish to dispute Phillips’s claim that a pervasive
religious culture in which ‘the reality of miracles is taken for granted’
has declined.72 The disagreement arises with respect to what kind of
account we give of this decline. Many would contend that, given our
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scientific understanding of the workings of nature, we simply can no
longer believe in miracles. In reply, Phillips argues that this conclusion
faces a serious problem:
“It is not feasible to believe that people in Biblical times did not have ordi-
nary causal and technical understanding, yet they believed in miracles. So
the mere presence of that understanding clearly does not make it impossi-
ble to believe in miracles.”73
Phillips does not deny that there may be general tension between science
and religion in a culture, nor that this is the case in our own. Yet, given
our arguments in the previous section, this cannot be because of a sup-
posed contradiction between belief in the laws of nature, and a belief in
miracles as violations of those laws. Rather, Phillips argues, the real
anomaly lies between what natural explanation asks of us, and what is
asked of us in the acknowledgement of a miracle.74 Thus, for example,
Moses’ natural reaction, on seeing the burning bush, is to enquire what
is happening, but he is told not to do this, but to kneel. In our culture,
Phillips argues, it is increasingly difficult not to pursue such enquiries.
Or, if we do try to find a place for God, it will more than likely be a
supernatural causal power. Such is the prestige of science that, in an
attempt to show that religion is free of science, God’s agency is thought
of in quasi-scientific terms. Thus, ironically enough, the search for mir-
acles, for inexplicable events, as reasons or evidence for speaking of
divine intervention, is itself a symptom of the cultural displacement of
religion.75
What are we to make of Phillips’s argument so far? Phillips empha-
sises that we cannot establish that miracles take place by proving that
certain inexplicable events may occur. To recognise that a certain event
is inexplicable is not yet to apprehend it as a miracle. The latter reaction
is only possible, and has its sense, against the background of a specific
religious tradition.76 What is essential “is the religious significance of the
events which occur, a significance which has little sense outside the
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contexts of worship and devotion.”77 These are good points, and a valu-
able contribution to the discussion. Furthermore, Phillips’s observation
that the kind of religious context in which talk of miracles may be taken
for granted has eroded, is hard to dispute, as is his suggestion that this
has much to do with the enormous influence of science. We may even
agree that there is a real tension “between the attitude which science
asks of us in response to nature, one of explaining, examining, etc., and
the wonder involved in response to a miracle which may ask one to rule
out or desist from the very responses naturalistic enquiry asks of us.”78
Perhaps one might point out that if miracles are inexplicable events, then
to call a certain event miraculous presupposes at least some form of nat-
uralistic enquiry. We must have determined at some stage that the event
in question is, indeed, inexplicable.79 At any rate, as we shall see below,
this certainly seems to be the attitude taken by the Catholic Church in
determining whether or not an occurrence is ‘worthy of belief’. Never-
theless, to say that ‘science’ has an enormous influence on our culture 
— not just in terms of what it has accomplished, or the technological
advances it has made possible, but also in terms of its ‘prestige’ — and
that in such a way that it has become increasingly difficult to see mira-
cles in nature, does not seem altogether implausible.
There is, however, a far more serious problem that Phillips has not yet
tackled. At the end of the previous section we concluded with Phillips
that is highly problematic to think of talk of miracles as either straight-
forwardly descriptive or explanatory in nature. This raised the question
whether we can have any idea as to what kind of event would constitute
a miracle. What Phillips has done so far, is show that we cannot talk of
miracles at all without invoking a religious tradition in which this notion
is embedded. We need not just inexplicable events, but also a religious
context in which these events may be seen to have religious significance.
Agreed. But the problem seems to be that, on Phillips’s argument, we
have no idea what we are talking about in referring to the ‘inexplicable
events’ which are, from a religious point of view, seen as revelatory of
God.
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Now, it would be absurd if Phillips’s argument would make it impos-
sible to speak of inexplicable events at all. For one thing, it would no
longer be possible to understand how scientific enquiry could proceed.
New theories are often devised precisely to explain certain inexplicable
phenomena. Such ‘inexplicables’ get their sense from the state of the
subject, the explanatory power of rival theories, etc.80 Where faith heal-
ings are concerned, matters are already somewhat more difficult. But
even here we may have some idea as to how to explain a ‘miraculous’
healing. Perhaps we would refer to the psychologically therapeutic effects
of such a healing session. And in some cases we may at least understand
what must, physically, have happened to explain the current status of the
patient, even if we have no explanation for how it could have happened,
say, so quickly. Where Winch’s discussion of Zelig’s shed is concerned,
however, matters are different. Here, the whole point of the argument 
is that no surroundings have been provided in which the proposal ‘The
shed has vanished’ has sense, either as a description or as an explana-
tion, of what happened to Zelig’s shed.81 But now the question is: is it
any different for the kind of inexplicable events such as ‘changing water
into wine’, ‘being raised from the dead’, which are said to be miracles?
Phillips seems to agree with Rhees that the problem concerning the Bib-
lical miracles is not in accepting that they occurred. With respect to
Lazarus, Rhees says ‘if it happened, it happened’.82 But what are we
asked to accept as having occurred? What is it that has supposedly hap-
pened? Either Phillips must admit that such phrases as ‘Lazarus return-
ing from the dead’ and ‘the turning of water into wine’ are descriptive of
certain occurrences after all, or he still owes us an explanation of what
he means when he refers to “events such as Lazarus returning from the
dead and the turning of water into wine.”83
Perhaps Phillips would reply that all we need to do is to look at how
such phrases are taken up in religious contexts of devotion and worship,
at how they are used in religious practice. But if we do so, I suggest, we
shall come to see that they are used, at least in part, to refer to events
which occurred in the course of history and which may be accepted 
as such even by those who do not, as of yet, award these events any 
religious significance whatsoever. In short, as we already noted at the
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beginning of our discussion, for the Christian believer, the New Testa-
ment miracles are not just objects but also evidences of faith.84
In Phillips’s discussion, by contrast, the ‘evidence part’, that is to say,
the inexplicable event, seems to drop out of the equation. This may be
seen by a brief look at two examples Phillips provides of the way in
which we may still speak of miracles today, despite the enormous obsta-
cles created by the naturalistic modes of explanation which dominate our
culture. The first is drawn from Winch. Winch tells us of a small church
in the United States where a statue of the Virgin Mary was reported to
be shedding tears. There were many interviews with people who, in the
main, either maintained that this was a genuine miracle — by which
they meant that there was no natural explanation of it; or maintained that
it was indeed explicable, for example in terms of fraud and trickery.
Winch confesses that he found the speakers on both sides of this issue
equally disgusting, or at least mediocre, in their response to what was
happening:
“What had all this to do with worship of God or veneration of the Virgin
Mary? There was one interview, however, that to my mind stood out from
the rest: with a woman who simply asked: why would the Holy Mother not
shed tears at the terrible spectacle of human life in our time?”85
What Winch found striking about the woman was that she evinced no
interest in the questions about how what was happening might have been
caused; and equally she had no interest in trying to show that it had no
natural causes.
The first thing to note is that, given Phillips’s and Winch’s argu-
ments, we should conclude that the phrase ‘the statue is shedding tears’
cannot be taken as a descriptive or explanatory. ‘Shedding tears’ is just
as conceptually inapplicable to a statue as ‘vanishing’ is to a shed. Of
course, we are told, the woman Winch refers to had no interest in pro-
viding an explanation of ‘what was happening’. That may be so. But,
first, we should ask: what does Winch mean by ‘what was happening’?
This seems to imply some possible description of an event which has
not yet been provided. Secondly, whereas it seems clear that in Winch’s
and Phillips’s view, the woman is witnessing a miracle, this view would
not be shared by the Catholic Church of which, I take it, the woman in
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question was a member. The 1978 document from the Sacred Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith lists several criteria to determine the
legitimacy of an alleged supernatural occurrence.86 We find such condi-
tions as that the persons involved should be obedient to ecclesiastical
authority; that the content of the message must be in conformity with
Catholic doctrine; that one must be able to point to ‘good fruit’ resulting
from it and enduring: conversions, deeper commitment to prayer, etc.;
and so on. All these clearly show that the significance of the alleged
experiences depends on their being embedded in a religious context of
meaning. As Phillips puts it, “we call them revelations from God by
virtue of the relations in which they stand to the Faith and to the fruits
of the spirit.”87 Personal convictions are insufficient. They have to be
tested in a scriptural context.88 All this is true. And, obviously, I have 
little desire to claim that the woman in the example should not pass
these tests. But we should also note that the first step of the process 
is to assign “a commission of experts — theological, medical, psycho-
logical — to investigate everything and everyone concerned” and to
determine that there is certitude “that the event is miraculous, that is,
that normal human explanations fail, at least initially.”89 As we already
noted, this hardly seems to imply a giving up of our inclination to exam-
ine and explain. Quite the contrary, we are told that throughout this often
lengthy and detailed process “Church authorities operate from what we
might call a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’. In other words, the claim must
be proved, not presumed.”90
From the point of view of the Sacred Congregation, it is clear that, in
order to speak of a miracle in this example, we must determine whether
something actually occurred, something which does not allow of a natu-
ral explanation. The woman evinces no such interest. In fact, this is why
Winch and Phillips feel that her reaction stands out from the mediocrity
of the other persons interviewed. But it is also clear that the notion of an
‘inexplicable event taking place’ plays little or no role in her reaction.
There is really no reason to assume that her remark could not have been
made in the absence of any alleged occurrence. That is not to say that we
cannot judge her words to express a deep religious insight — some may
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feel that they do.91 But I do not believe this example sheds any light on
the relation between ‘inexplicable events’ and ‘talk of miracles’.
The same goes for the second example Phillips discusses. This con-
cerns R. F. Holland’s well-known account of the way in which a young
boy, stuck on a railway track in his toy motor-car, is saved, against all
odds, from the oncoming train. There is nothing inexplicable about the
child’s escape. It is due simply to an amazing sequence of coincidences.
Nevertheless, Phillips argues,
“it is natural to call the child’s deliverance a miracle. This is because of the
extent of the odds against the child’s survival, the significance of the child’s
life, etc. A believer would say that the child’s life was in God’s hands. The
deliverance of the child is regarded with awe and thanksgiving.”92
The event need not lead to the reaction mentioned. But, Phillips argues,
it is surely not difficult to see how it can lead to such a reaction. At any
rate, what is important is to appreciate that the presence of religious tra-
ditions of piety and devotion, however threatened they may be, gives
such reactions their sense.
There is little reason to object to the conclusions Phillips draws from
the example. One might want to ask in what way this use of the word
‘miracle’ differs from a secular use of the word, as when we are talk-
ing of ‘the miracle of childbirth’, or ‘the miracle of love’, etc. Indeed,
it is not difficult to imagine non-believers, having experienced such an
event, saying that it is a miracle their child was saved. Evidently, the
answer lies in the religious significance the event has for the believer,
a significance which, as Phillips rightly points out, is dependent upon
the presence of a religious tradition. Used in this way, the example may
be instructive.
We might also note that in stating, explicitly, that there is nothing
inexplicable about the child’s survival, the example does not qualify, at
least from the perspective of the Sacred Congregation, as a ‘miracle’ at
all. As Peter Kreeft puts it:
“You can empty any word of meaning by stretching it so thin that it covers
everything. Sunsets and babies and acts of love are wonderful and beautiful,
but they are not miracles. Miracle means supernatural wonder, not natural
wonder.”93
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This may be going too far, but it is clear that there is a difference
between these kinds of ‘miracles’ and the kinds we have been discussing
so far, which are essentially connected with inexplicable occurrences.
Phillips admits that there are important differences but insists that “in
both cases what is essential is the religious significance of the events
which occur”.94 Agreed; but that is not in dispute. The problem, rather,
is how, with regards to the latter kinds of miracles, we may speak of an
‘event’ occurring at all. As in the previous example we discussed, no
light has been shed on that issue.
In referring to a miracle, traditional theism would appear to refer to 
an event which takes (or took) place in the course of history and which
is ‘supernatural’ in that it cannot be produced by natural causes. This 
is certainly the case where the greatest of miracles is concerned: the res-
urrection of Christ. There can be little doubt that, for the traditional
believer, the Resurrection is taken to constitute an historical event. The
New Testament is saturated with the belief that something new has hap-
pened in the history of humanity, in and through the life and death of
Jesus Christ, and above all through his resurrection from the dead.95 Fur-
thermore, given the nature of this ‘event’, at least for the believer, any
natural explanation is ruled out. Christ’s resurrection is taken both as 
an object and as an evidence of faith. Any attempt to explain the Resur-
rection in non-historical or natural terms would seem to minimize the
magnitude the event has for the believer and the role it played in the for-
mation of Christianity.96
Our examination has shown that Phillips’s analysis raises difficul-
ties on both counts, the alleged historical nature of the event as well as
its supernatural element. For Phillips, talk of miracles as supernaturally
caused events tends to turn religion into some kind of ‘super-science’,
presenting God as the ‘super-scientist’. Phillips hopes to steer us away
from what he takes to be the inappropriate and misleading categories of
natural science into which the discussion of talk of miracles is typically
cast and redirect our attention towards the religious contexts of worship
and devotion against the background of which such talk has its life. We
argued that while Phillips’s analysis offers a valuable contribution to the
discussion of miracles, his critique is so fierce as to leave one wonder-
ing whether, when all is said and done, we may still find our way back
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to an understanding of miracles as events which are revelatory of God.
A seemingly insurmountable chasm opens up between, on the one hand,
Phillips’s claim that the problem with miracles is not in accepting that
they occurred — ‘if it happened, it happened’ — and, on the other hand,
his insistence that talk of miracles cannot be taken to be either explana-
tory or descriptive.
As a result, Phillips’s analysis seems to amount to an argument against
miracles rather than a conceptual reclamation of the religious concept of
a miracle. For, surely, many believers have thought of miracles as events
in the external world, brought about by the intervention of a power not
limited by the laws of nature, a supernatural power interrupting these
laws, in a word, God. Indeed, this, more or less, amounts to the classical
definition of a miracle referred to at the beginning of this chapter.
Phillips still owes us an account of this religious concept. For although
his discussion may shed light on miracles as objects of faith, it does not
seem to allow miracles to function as evidences of faith because it pro-
vides no account of the ‘inexplicable events’ to which these miracles are
essentially linked. The examples we discussed either seem to treat the
supposed inexplicability of the event as irrelevant, or exclude any refer-
ence to something inexplicable right from the start. Given the arguments
Phillips develops, it is difficult to see how he could do anything else.
If these conclusions are sound, we may well expect similar difficulties
to arise in relation to another central Christian belief, the belief in the
immortality of the soul. If Phillips’s analysis has difficulty accounting
for the belief that at least one has risen from the grave, how shall it deal
with the belief in the future resurrection of the multitude? After all, the
emergence of Jesus from the tomb, as told in the Gospels, was the guar-
antee, not only of Christ’s mission and the seal of redemption, but also
of the resurrection of all men. Christ’s resurrection gives both foundation
and substance to the Christian hope of eternal life.97 Phillips’s account of
this hope is the main topic of the next chapter.
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7. IMMORTALITY
In this chapter we examine Phillips’s account of the belief in immortality.
By cleansing this belief of its metaphysical accruements, Phillips hopes to
reveal ‘the soul’ of religious language about life everlasting. There can be
no doubt that Phillips provides us with a picture of ‘immortality without
metaphysics’. However, whether this picture is one in which the believer
shall be able to recognise his or her beliefs is rather more doubtful.
7.1 The doctrine of the resurrection
The doctrine of the general resurrection, or the resurrection of the body,
constitutes one of the most fundamental tenets of the Christian religion.
The final clauses of the Apostles’ Creed express the belief in the resur-
rection of the body, and life everlasting. How are we to understand this
notion of ‘life everlasting’? To be sure, such notions as ‘resurrection’,
‘eternal life’, ‘immortality’, have been developed in diverse ways in dif-
ferent periods of the history of the Church.1 Although we cannot begin
to consider the various teachings and doctrines connected with them, it
may prove helpful to provide some preliminary indication of what we
are talking about. Corliss Lamont defines immortality as:
“The literal survival of the individual human personality for an indefinite
period after [physical] death, with its memory and awareness of self-iden-
tity essentially intact.”2
Lamont’s definition captures two key elements which have traditionally
been associated with the Christian doctrine of immortality. First, the doc-
trine implies the possibility of us living on, or living again, after we have
died. As the Catholic Encyclopedia tells us, by immortality “is ordinar-
ily understood the doctrine that the human soul will survive death, con-
tinuing in the possession of an endless conscious existence.”3 Secondly,
1 In the remainder of our discussion these terms will be used more or less indiscrimi-
nately. Though this is both historically and systematically imprecise, I do not believe it to
affect the main line of our argument.
2 Quoted in Augustine 1997.
3 Catholic Encyclopedia, online version, entry for ‘Immortality’.
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the doctrine asserts that people ‘survive death’ as distinct individuals.
We ourselves shall in some fashion do things and suffer things after our
own deaths. In other words, “immortality means personal immortality,
the endless conscious existence of the individual soul. It implies that the
being which survives shall preserve its personal identity and be con-
nected by conscious memory with the previous life.”4 For the purposes
of our discussion, we should draw attention to a further crucial element
connected with a traditional Christian understanding of immortality,
which Lamont’s definition does not refer to. This is the moral argument.
Paul’s conclusion that “If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and drink,
for tomorrow we die’”5 reveals the tenable resolution of materialistic
hedonism when the resurrection of Christ and the ensuing general resur-
rection are dismissed. Surely, ours would not be a rational universe, and
it would be in irreconcilable conflict with the notion of the moral gov-
ernment of the world by a Just and Infinite God, if goodness were left to
suffer and wickedness outwardly triumphs. But were this the only life,
were there no future vindication, this would seem to be the case.6 From
this point of view, theodicy is resolved by bodily resurrection. After all,
as Flew puts it, “what are three-score years and ten compared with all
eternity?”7 One might argue that the result of such logic led Paul to
declare that “If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are to be
pitied more than all men.”8
In the intensely rationalist atmosphere of the Enlightenment, the doc-
trine of immortality was subjected to scathing criticism. The Christian
hope for ‘eternal life’ was argued to be an ignorant superstition devoid
of any basis in real life. The moral argument, which was used by apolo-
gists to justify belief in immortality, was turned against them. Marx’s
argument that religion seeks to comfort those suffering in the present
through persuading them of the joy of an afterlife, thus distracting them
from the task of transforming the present world so that suffering might
be eliminated, provides a well-known example.9 In contemporary phi-
losophy of religion, too, we find criticisms of the moral argument. For
example, for Rhees, the idea that belief in an afterlife, where all debts
are settled, provides us with a reason to believe in God or be good, is
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repugnant.10 On the whole, however, philosophers have targeted the
other two key elements of the belief in immortality. Flew, for instance,
has argued that the idea that we may survive our own deaths, at best,
defies apparent empirical impossibilities or, at worst, is logically inco-
herent.11
As we shall see, Phillips tends to agree with Flew that the belief in
immortality, conceived of in terms of ‘survival after death’, involves seri-
ous logical and empirical difficulties. Moreover, there are also difficulties
in certain views of immortality connected with notions of divine provi-
dence. Whereas such views seek to provide a rational basis for moral
considerations, Phillips argues, they succeed only in depicting concerns
which seem antithetical to such considerations. Having drawn these con-
clusions, Phillips acknowledges that it would be appropriate to admit that
the belief in the immortality of the soul is the product of a number mis-
takes and confusions.12 If this were all there is to it, it would seem we can
safely attribute the hope for life everlasting to the pathology of religion.
However, in Phillips’s view, this conclusion is premature. It is based on
the assumption that what we have taken to be presuppositions of belief in
immortality really are necessary presuppositions of the belief. But what,
Phillips asks, if this were not the case? Surely then we should drastically
revise our conclusions. Needless to say, Phillips believes such a revision
is called for. He suggests that there are other possibilities of meaning,
possibilities which cannot be said to be empirically mistaken, logically
confused, or morally reprehensible. In the philosophy of religion, Phillips
feels, these possibilities of meaning have, for the most part, been either
ignored or misrepresented. When many philosophers of religion speak of
‘traditional religious beliefs’, what they are really referring to is the tra-
ditional philosophical accounts they give of them. But these accounts,
Phillips argues, fail to capture what it means to believe in the immortal-
ity of the soul.13 Phillips describes this failure as ‘a dislocation of lan-
guage’:
“In philosophy of religion we are often offered analyses which pay no
attention to and, hence, fail to capture the ‘soul’ in the words of religious
beliefs. When this happens we have a dislocation of language, including a
dislocation of language concerning the soul.”14
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14 Phillips 2000, p. 138.
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Once again, our task is one of conceptual reclamation. We stand ‘to heal
these dislocations’ by taking due account of the very different ways in
which the picture of the soul leaving this life enters into the lives of
human beings. In other words, Phillips’s aim is to provide what philos-
ophy in the past has failed to provide: a plausible discursive exposition
of religious beliefs about the immortality of the soul which is sensitive
to the natural habitat of the words used to express these beliefs, and
which avoids the confusions he detects in philosophical treatments of
the subject.15
As Phillips has it, the belief in immortality does not entail the prob-
lematic assumption of the possibility of ‘surviving death’, nor does 
it entertain the dubious postulation of a world beyond the world we
know. Questions about the immortality of the soul are seen not to be
questions concerning the extent of a man’s life, and in particular ques-
tions concerning whether that life can extend beyond the grave, but
questions concerning the kind of life a man is living.16 Hyman has
observed that Phillips presents us with “a picture of immortality without
metaphysics”.17 “True”, Phillips replies, but “what prevails at present is
metaphysics without immortality.”18 This chapter examines Phillips’s
account of the belief in immortality — can the religious belief in the
immortal soul survive the death of metaphysics? In other words, does
Phillips’s account adequately represent what believers have taken their
belief in life everlasting to mean?
7.2 Our dislocated soul
Could we survive our own individual deaths? Surely, Flew argues, it is
obvious that we do not, that we could not. Who would be prepared, Flew
asks, to contest the truth of the major premise in that most famous of 
all exemplary syllogisms: ‘All men are mortal’; ‘Socrates is a man’;
and, therefore, ‘Socrates is mortal’? Again, after some disaster when the
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tainly reflects Phillips’s view on the matter.
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‘Dead’ and the ‘Survivors’ have both been listed, what logical space is
left for a third category, ‘Both’? In short, the idea that we shall survive
our own deaths, or are immortal, faces both logical and empirical diffi-
culties:
“Any doctrine of personal survival or personal immortality has got to find
some way around or over an enormous initial obstacle. In the ordinary,
everyday understandings of the words involved, to say that someone sur-
vived death is to contradict yourself: while to assert that we all of us live
forever is to assert a manifest falsehood, the flat contrary of a universally
known universal truth, namely, the truth that ‘All men are mortal.’”19
We may note that the prelude to Flew’s argument against immortality
does not yet refer explicitly to any religious conception of ‘life ever-
lasting’. And, one might argue, at least where Christianity is concerned,
‘immortality’ is something rather more than us surviving our deaths or
living forever. The ‘immortality’ the Bible contemplates is
“not a condition simply of future existence, however prolonged, but a state
of blessedness, due to redemption and the possession of the ‘eternal life’ in
the soul; it includes resurrection and perfected life in both body and soul.”20
This can hardly be denied. However, it does not really affect Flew’s pro-
posed line of argument. We may well admit that to guarantee survival
does not yet guarantee immortality, as conceived of traditionally. But,
Flew would insist, we cannot be assured of a life everlasting — what-
ever that may involve — unless we establish first that it both makes
sense and is true that we shall survive our own deaths. As Keith Augus-
tine puts it:
“Arguments for survival establish nothing in favour of immortality; how-
ever, arguments against survival are arguments against immortality. In other
words, immortality presupposes the possibility of survival.”21
Let us assume for the moment that this is correct, that the possibility of
survival is, indeed, a necessary presupposition of any belief in immor-
tality. Can the enormous obstacles which stand in its way be overcome?
Phillips considers various ways in which one might seek to do so. He
argues that none of these stands up against criticism.22 There is no 
circumventing the fact that if the claim that man is immortal is construed
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Immortality’.
21 Augustine 1997.
22 See Phillips 1970(a), pp. 1-19.
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as a factual claim it contradicts our common understanding of nature:
“we know with certainty that all human beings die.”23 Perhaps more
importantly, Phillips argues, it is doubtful whether we can conceive of
the question of life after death as a factual question at all:
“The question is not whether there is or there is not life after death, where
affirmative or negative answers to the question would both be considered
intelligible, possible answers, whether they were true or false. The question
is whether it means anything to talk of life after death. If one understands
what is meant by ‘survival’ and what is meant by ‘death’, then one is at a
loss to know what it means to talk of surviving death.”24
It would seem, then, that Phillips agrees with Flew that the empirical
and logical difficulties entailed by the presupposition that we shall sur-
vive our deaths are insurmountable. If, indeed, the belief in immortality
necessarily involves this presupposition, we can only conclude that it is
riddled with difficulties and confusions. The whole thing would seem to
be a big mistake.25
We shall not examine at length Phillips’s criticisms of the various
attempts at providing a coherent account of the possibility of survival.
The main reason for not doing so is that Phillips’s own discussion does
not amount to a detailed treatment of these topics. As Phillips himself
points out, he does little more than indicate lines of thought, and suggest
how they might be developed. Indeed, Phillips admits that his observa-
tions will hardly satisfy philosophers who have worked on these points
in detail.26 Now, one might argue that this constitutes a rather serious fail-
ing on Phillips’s part. Hyman, for instance, says that one of the reasons
he finds Phillips’s account of the belief in immortality unconvincing is
because Phillips does not prove that the traditional Christian belief in
immortality cannot be formulated precisely without bringing an implicit
contradiction to light. According to Hyman, Phillips is wrong to ignore
the substantial efforts of Thomist philosophers to expound an interpreta-
tion of the doctrine which is coherent.27
Phillips does not rate the chances of providing such an interpretation
to be very high. He says that most philosophers think that the difficulties
we have considered are insurmountable, and that, therefore, the presup-
positions of the belief in immortality are seen to be confused.28 Given
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the history and state of the subject, it is hard to disagree with Phillips.
Most philosophers would indeed regard the attempt to overcome these
difficulties with scepticism.29 Still, one might argue, this does not excuse
Phillips from examining such attempts and, if possible, demonstrating
their supposed incoherency. Phillips, however, has a further reason for
neglecting to do so. He argues that he has, in the main, ignored such 
pursuits because he does not believe they take us finally to anywhere of
very great interest: “success or failure in resolving the logical difficul-
ties we have noted do not have important consequences as far as belief
in immortality is concerned.”30 So far, our discussion has been based 
on one crucial assumption, namely, that the possibility of survival is a
necessary presupposition of belief in immortality. This is precisely what
Phillips denies. Should we agree, it follows that our main task still lies
ahead:
“I do not think that belief in the possibility of the survival of disembodied
spirits after the death of human bodies, or in the possibility of non-material
bodies living on after the death of material bodies, or in the possibility 
of bodies resurrecting after death, are […] necessary presuppositions of a
belief in the immortality of the soul. Indeed, our major task is still before
us, namely, to ask whether an account of a belief in the immortality of the
soul can be given which is different from those we have discussed.”31
On the account we have considered so far, the question of immortality
would resemble the question about whether human beings can or cannot
exist below a certain temperature. There may be disagreement: ‘Yes,
they can exist’ — ‘No, they can’t’. It seems, Phillips argues, that what we
can say about immortality of the soul depends on such findings. Either
‘p’ is or is not the case; either we can or we cannot survive our deaths.32
What we have here, Phillips suggests, is a radical ‘dislocation’ of reli-
gious expressions concerning immortality. What does Phillips mean by
this notion?
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such philosopher. (See Hyman 1996, pp. 253, 285.)
30 Phillips 1970(a), p. 18.
31 Phillips 1970(a), p. 18. The last sentence of this passage raises some suspicion.
Surely, the question is not merely whether it is possible to provide a different account but
also, and importantly so, whether that account engages with what believers take, or have
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32 See Phillips 2000, p. 148.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_04  01-02-2006  11:20  Pagina 303
Phillips introduces the idea of a ‘dislocation of language’ by means
of a number of examples. It would be a mistake, he argues, to think that
a dislocation of language occurs every time expectations are not ful-
filled; for example, when intentions or promises are not kept. Thwarted
intentions, broken promises — these are part of the lives and discourse
we share with each other, in which intending and promising have their
sense. We may give reasons why we did not keep a promise, or why 
we did not act as intended. But now consider a scene from Beckett’s
Waiting for Godot: one character says to another, ‘Let’s go’. The other
replies, ‘Yes, let’s’; but neither moves. Here, Phillips argues, we can
speak of a dislocation of language. This is because whereas, normally,
we would expect someone to explain the incongruence between his
words and his behaviour, Beckett’s tramps do not think they owe us any
reasons for their immobility. If someone asked them, ‘Why aren’t you
going? You said you intended to’, they would reply, ‘What’s that got to
do with anything?’. The words have been dislocated from their familiar
contexts. They no longer carry their normal implications.33
Phillips invites us to consider some further examples which may
appear even stranger:
“A person says ‘I’m off’, but does not move. No contexts […] are present
to help us understand the situation. The same person says, ‘The house is on
fire’ quite passively, with no reactions at all. At other times, the following
words come out of the person’s mouth, ‘I’m in agony, are you?’, again
without any facial expression or reactions of any kind.”34
We would certainly have trouble knowing what to make of such a person.
The problem is that words and phrases with which we are perfectly famil-
iar have been dislodged from their familiar surroundings in which they
have their meaning. We should think of our use of language, Wittgenstein
teaches us, as an activity — our linguistic utterances are embedded in
language-games, they carry certain implications, are enmeshed in specific
patterns of behaviour, reactions, gestures, facial expressions, and what
more. If these connections are severed, language becomes ‘like an engine
idling’;35 we might say, with Phillips, that words “are mentioned, but not
used.”36
The examples we have considered illustrate what Phillips means by 
‘a dislocation of language’. They may be strange examples, Phillips
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admits, but we may note even stranger facts about them. For one thing,
Phillips argues, they are quite compatible with the way in which many
philosophers speak of the soul. According to such philosophers, we fail
to appreciate the possibility of the soul because we concentrate on the
body. The well-formed sentences that come out of the mouth are indirect
communications from the thinking part — the soul — of a person. We
understand these sentences. It is only a contingent fact that the behaviour
normally accompanying these words is missing.37 Of course, according
to Phillips, this will not do. As we have seen,
“No amount of uttering of the words will yield sense devoid of practice,
and by ‘practice’ we mean the familiar features of the relationships and
everyday lives we share with each other, features which include the various
facial expressions we recognise, the gestures we make, the bodily postures
we adopt, our laughter and our tears, and so on.”38
In treating the relation between language and practice as a contingent,
external one, “This philosophical picture of the soul dislocates words
from practice and tries, in vain, to infuse them with sense.”39 Now, if
Phillips is right, if this ‘philosophical picture of the soul’ is, indeed,
incoherent, it follows that any belief in the immortality of the soul con-
strued along these lines is equally incoherent:
“If the notion of an inner substance called ‘the soul’ is the philosophical
chimera we have suggested it is, whatever is meant by the immortality of
the soul cannot be the continued existence of such a substance.”40
Where does that leave us? With the task, Phillips answers, of healing 
the dislocation of language concerning the soul. We need to wait on the
practices in which talk of the soul, and of the immortality of the soul,
has its life. Should we do so, we shall find that there are other possibili-
ties of meaning, possibilities which do not depend on the incoherent
notion of the survival of our (dislocated) soul. We turn to consider these
possibilities of meaning in a moment. First, however, we should consider
a rather serious criticism which has been brought to bear on Phillips’s
analysis up to this point.
It should be clear, Hyman argues, that the philosophical picture Phillips
is referring to is the Cartesian doctrine that the soul is an immaterial think-
ing substance which interacts with a living body. As Phillips indicates,
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this doctrine implies both that we learn language by associating words
with thoughts, ideas or sensations, and that understanding a language, or
words within a language, is a matter of having certain mental experi-
ences. Hyman agrees with Phillips that this picture of the soul is demon-
strably incoherent, something Wittgenstein shows in the so-called private
language arguments.41 Hyman is less satisfied, however, with the con-
clusion Phillips draws from his analysis. According to Hyman, the sen-
tence we have quoted — ‘If the notion of an inner substance called 
‘the soul’ is the philosophical chimera we have suggested it is, whatever
is meant by the immortality of the soul cannot be the continued exis-
tence of such a substance’ — contains the crux of Phillips’s argument.
Hyman suggests that Phillips is arguing that if a belief is incoherent, 
it cannot be espoused.42 Clearly, this inference does not follow. There 
is no reason why it should be impossible to espouse, seriously and sin-
cerely, doctrines that are demonstrably incoherent:
“The trick, presumably, is to avoid explicit contradictions; but while it
may sometimes take a philosopher’s ingenuity to do this, when challenged
or cross-examined, a like-minded community with a reassuring intellectual
elite seems, to me, quite likely to make it as easy as falling of a log. If the
immortality of the soul is a contradictory doctrine, it does not follow that
one cannot believe it.”43
It is difficult to disagree with Hyman. What is more, his criticism seems to
be supported by traditional teachings concerning the doctrine of immor-
tality. For example, under the heading ‘Justification of the Doctrine of
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Phillips draws between this philosophical picture of the soul and the examples we have
considered, for instance, that of the man who said he was off, but wasn’t. Hyman points
out that what makes the man who was off difficult to figure out is his failure to act in a
way which makes it plausible that he intends to leave or wants us to believe that he does,
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(See Hyman 1996, p. 254.) Hyman certainly has a point but, perhaps, it is one we need
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but to make the more general point that words get their meaning in practice, in the sense
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42 See Hyman 1996, pp. 257, 283.
43 Hyman 1996, p. 254.
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Immortality’, the Catholic Encyclopedia sums up the chief propositions
involved in the building up of the doctrine. The human soul, we are told,
“is a substance or substantial principle” which is “simple, or indivisible,
and also a spiritual being, that is, intrinsically independent of matter”;
furthermore, we learn that by the soul “is meant the ultimate principle
within me by which I feel, think, and will, and by which my body is ani-
mated”.44 On these remarks, it does seem that something as close to the
philosophical picture of the soul as makes no difference has found its
way into the Church’s understanding of the nature of the soul. Hyman,
then, is right to say that people are quite capable of holding incoherent
beliefs for, evidently, they do. The problem is that Phillips insists that he
has not in any way sought to deny this. In a reply to Hyman, Phillips
suggests that Hyman’s objection comes from a misunderstanding:
“I am not saying that because X is incoherent, people can’t have sincerely
and seriously enjoined X. Of course not: if their espousal were not sincere
and serious I shouldn’t think it worth combating. […] But if a view is inco-
herent, then it follows that it cannot mean what its espousers want it to mean.
If the immortality of the soul means anything, it cannot be what Cartesian
dualism tries to mean by it.”45
In fairness to Hyman, the crucial sentence on which he builds his case
does, indeed, favour Hyman’s interpretation. The phrase, I think we may
agree, is a rather unfortunate one. Still, it would be a mistake to take 
it to reflect the crux of Phillips’s argument. Phillips is not saying, as
Hyman suggests, that his account of the immortality of the soul must be
the correct one because the traditional philosophical account is incoher-
ent and people simply cannot believe what is incoherent. Of course, this
still leaves the question as to whether Phillips’s account adequately
reflects what, at least some, believers have taken their belief in immor-
tality to mean. The answer to that question will have to wait until we
have had a chance to witness Phillips’s account for ourselves.
7.3 Pictures of the soul
One source of philosophical confusion, Wittgenstein tells us, are the
‘pictures’ which are embedded in our use of language. Simply put, by
pictures Wittgenstein means ‘illustrated turns of speech’, or ‘figurative
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expressions’.46 Such pictures present iconographic representations of 
the grammatical structures of our language. As such, they are not false.
But misapprehension about their application in our language-games may
lead us astray when we are philosophising. Indeed, Wittgenstein later
diagnosed this to be one of the main problems with the Tractatus: “A
picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”47
Phillips discusses three of Wittgenstein’s examples of the use of such
pictures, and the kind of confusion they might engender.48 Consider the
following expressions: ‘While I was speaking to him I did not know
what was going on in his head’; ‘In my heart I understood when you
said that’ (pointing to one’s heart); ‘I can’t speak to his soul’. In each
case, Phillips argues, we have a vivid picture which may mislead us. As
to the first expression, we might be tempted to start looking for the psy-
chical essence of ‘thinking’; perhaps certain brain or thought-processes
go on inside the head. The second expression may lead us to wonder
what kind of processes go on inside the heart whereas the third expres-
sion may lure us into postulating some kind of immaterial substance
which is actually the thinking part of a person. Of course, Phillips argues,
these are not the applications the pictures actually have in our language-
games. To demystify them, we might remind ourselves that the expres-
sions mentioned may be replaced by far more mundane expressions,
respectively: ‘I wonder what he is thinking’; ‘I felt a close affinity to
you when you said that’; ‘I could not relate to him’. If this is so, one
might wonder, why then do we not simply drop these misleading figura-
tive forms of language? One answer, Phillips argues, is to say that there
is nothing wrong with the picture — it is we who are confused about its
use. More importantly, although, to avoid confusion, the expressions can
be replaced as suggested, the alternative ones cannot be equated in all cir-
cumstances to the original, figurative expressions. The pictures, Wittgen-
stein insists, should be taken seriously. Although they are figurative
expressions, they are not just turns of phrases, not similes or mere fig-
ures that we may choose to use. We really mean them.49 In other words,
the figurative expressions offer their own contribution to what we (want
to) say, and cannot be replaced without loss.
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Now, we might want to reject the implied contention that the kind of
figurative expressions Phillips discusses have played a historically dom-
inant role in giving rise to certain philosophical theories as an oversim-
plification.50 Be that as it may, Phillips is surely right to insist that the
application of these expressions in our language-games does not entail,
nor depend upon, the kind of theoretical, quasi-empirical considerations
mentioned. Furthermore, I have no quarrel with Phillips’s claim that these
expressions may be indispensable, in that it may be impossible to replace
them, without loss, with non-figurative expressions. The question, per-
haps, is why Phillips should be interested in such figurative expressions
at this stage of our discussion. The answer is pretty straightforward. He
believes our expressions about the soul to be figurative expressions in
the sense discussed. Here, too, we have a vivid picture — a picture which,
although it can mislead us, cannot be replaced without loss. Wittgenstein
too implies as much:
“What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls? What am I
believing in, when I believe that this substance contains two carbon rings?
In both cases there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the
background; that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey.”51
To believe that men have souls is not per se to cling to Cartesian meta-
physics. Rather, it is to cleave to a certain form of representation of human
experience, relations, and values. If this seems mysterious, Wittgenstein
suggests, why then does the scientific picture of carbon rings not seem
equally mysterious? In both cases we need to examine the application of
the picture, the role it plays in certain language-games.52
It is not difficult to think up various expressions figuring the word
‘soul’. Consider the following: ‘The poor soul’; I can’t talk to his soul’;
‘He is a mean-souled man’; ‘He’d sell his soul for a buck’; and so on.
Such expressions, Phillips remarks, are perfectly natural. He adds, quite
rightly, that their application does not depend upon, nor entail, any philo-
sophical theory about a duality in human nature. In the cases considered,
talk about the soul is not talk about some strange sort of ‘thing’; some
kind of incorporeal substance. Rather, it is a way of talking about human
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beings. In some cases, the word ‘soul’ can be used to refer to a person 
as such. In others, ‘a man’s soul’ refers to his integrity, to the complex
set of practices and beliefs which acting with integrity would cover for
that person.53 Now, if we agree with these conclusions, Phillips asks,
why should we not agree that talk about the immortality of the soul plays
a similar role, i.e. that it is talk bound up with certain religious reflec-
tions a man may make on the life he is leading?
Flew provides Phillips with one possible answer. He agrees with
Phillips that any number of expressions concerning the soul are per-
fectly familiar and quite intelligible. Furthermore, he does not deny
that, in their everyday understandings, such words as ‘mind’ and ‘soul’
are not words for sorts of — in the philosopher’s sense — substances.
The nature of this ‘philosopher’s sense’, Flew suggests, is best appre-
ciated by considering passages from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
and Through the Looking Glass:
“For to construe the question whether she has a mind of her own, or the
assertion that he is a mean-souled man, as a question, or assertion, about
some putative incorporeal substances is like taking the Red Queen’s dog’s
loss of temper as if this was on all fours with his loss of his bone; or like
looking for the grin remaining after the Cheshire Cat has vanished.”54
If certain philosophers have been led into confusion by a misunderstand-
ing of our figurative forms of language, Flew is not one of them. There
is no dislocation of language here. But Flew is not yet done. He argues
that the fact that we can say so many sensible and intelligible things
about minds or souls shows that we have concepts of minds or souls;
just as the fact that we can talk sensibly about grins and tempers shows
that we have concepts of both grins and tempers. But, Flew continues,
“none of this shows: either that we can talk sensibly of grins and tempers
existing separately from the faces of which they are configurations or of
the people who sometimes lose them; or that we can talk sensibly about the
mind or soul surviving the dissolution of the flesh and blood person whose
mind or soul it was.”55
Of course, this still does not take us to the heart of the matter. For 
we have already seen that Phillips, on his part, agrees that the notion of
surviving death, in the sense Flew has in mind, is unintelligible. The 
disagreement between them lies elsewhere. The crux of the matter is
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that whereas the everyday use of the concepts of ‘souls’ and ‘minds’ is
quite intelligible, according to Flew, the religious use is not. When the
believer claims that we shall meet again after death, that the righteous
shall enjoy life everlasting, that our soul is immortal, etc., the only way to
make sense of these claims is to recognise that they imply some sort of
dualist view of human nature, as well as the possibility of survival. Unfor-
tunately, although we may thus ‘infuse some sense’ into the believer’s
claims, at the same time we demonstrate their intrinsic incoherence.
Phillips, I take it, would reply that whereas Flew may have jumped
the first hurdle, he stumbles on the second. Flew sees correctly that we
need not construe our everyday talk of souls along Cartesian lines. He
fails to recognise, however, that the same conclusion should be drawn
concerning religious talk about saving or damning our immortal souls:
“talk about the immortality of the soul too [has] its place within the
same contexts that talk about the soul is appropriate.”56 These expres-
sions are like the figurative ones we discussed above in that, they too,
employ certain pictures which offer their own contribution to what we
want to say and cannot be replaced without loss. The problem is that the
nature of their contribution is easily misunderstood:
“The trouble is that the language so often offered by philosophy of religion
to discuss the soul is one which pays little attention to the ‘soul’ in expres-
sions concerning the soul. We are offered talk of immaterial substances, dis-
embodied spirits, and so on. Here, too, the religious pictures have misled us.
The resultant analyses are a dislocation of the religious expressions.”57
How should this disagreement be resolved? Perhaps the problem, Phillips
suggests, is that Flew simply cannot see any other possibility of sense 
for the religious expressions than the problematic, metaphysical ones we
have been discussing so far.58 If so, then Phillips is happy to be of assis-
tance. In the next section we turn to examine Phillips’s disclosure of
these other possibilities of meaning.
7.4 Our immortal soul
In the previous section we saw that Phillips rejects the view that the 
religious picture of the soul leaving the body must involve a dualist
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57 Phillips 2000, p. 145.
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understanding of human nature and belief in the possibility of survival.
There are other possibilities of meaning. That is not to say, however,
that the metaphysical understanding of the belief in immortality which
Flew, and others, criticise, has not had, and does not have, its fair share
of adherents. Rather than claiming that people cannot sincerely and seri-
ously espouse such a belief, it being incoherent, Phillips admits that it
has a certain appeal.59 He distinguishes four ways in which the hope for
a metaphysical immortality may enter into a person’s life.60
First, the belief in immortality may arise from the desire that virtue
should be rewarded and vice punished. If we are dependent on our for-
tunes in this world alone, it seems plain as day that there is no correla-
tion between morality and worldly prosperity. The picture of the soul
leaving the body is understood as the promise of a future life after death,
where all shall receive their just rewards. Phillips reacts rather harshly to
this view. God, he argues, is turned into ‘a police-man in the sky’. The
obedience induced would not be a virtue since conformity to morality is
simply a means to self-interest: ‘You’d better be good or you’ll get it in
the end’. The conception of religion involved, Phillips has it, cheapens
morality, and the apologetic appeals made on such a basis are themselves
morally despicable. On this view,
“there is no sense of saying farewell to life. On the contrary, this life’s
lowest motives and desires seem to determine the conception of immortal-
ity involved.”61
In the second view Phillips considers, the picture of our immortal soul
enters our lives as a direct result of tensions and contradictions within
morality itself. Morality asks the impossible of us; there is a gap between
what we ought to be and what we are. These, our own imperfections, call
for an extension of life after death. Although this reaction has a certain
strength to it, Phillips reasons that it is hard to see how it addresses the
limitations of moral endeavour. After all, would not any further endeav-
our, after death, be equally imperfect? More importantly, here, too, there
is a failure to say farewell to life:
“There is the feeling that it is intolerable that I should end like this with all
my flaws and imperfections, in the tangle of circumstances over which, for
the most part, I have no control. My improvement, it seems, must be part
of the final story.”62
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The third view Phillips discusses may seem far more sympathetic. It
conceives of immortality as a hope, not for my own improvement, but
for the improvement of others. Even if one can say farewell to one’s
own life, is it not intolerable that others should do the same when their
lives have been so wretched? This reaction, Phillips admits, is a pow-
erful one. It recognises that religion must address the conditions in
which people live their lives. The belief that we are children of God,
vehicles of grace, is empty if it does not have implications for the way
we behave towards our fellow beings. Of course, no matter how hard
we try, there are no guarantees; the world may not smile upon us. This,
Phillips argues, is a further source of power for this view. It recognises
the belief that if in this life only we have hope we are the most miser-
able. Yet, according to Phillips, this reaction still involves an inability
to say farewell to life. For what it offers “is a compensatory extension
of it; a temporal eternity.”63
Finally, Phillips argues, the most fundamental source of a metaphysical
belief in immortality is, simply, our desire for self-preservation. Indeed,
some of the reactions we have considered may be seen to be manifesta-
tions of it. This is an instinct that goes deep with us: “The thought that we
should cease to exist is intolerable to us. The promise of a temporal eter-
nity allays this fear.”64
What binds the four reactions we have considered together, Phillips
argues, is that they all involve an inability to say farewell to life. It is
various concerns within this life that determine the nature of immor-
tality. Life after death seems to be just more life, a prolongation of life
which meets our desire for compensation for the various ills and imper-
fections that characterise our earthly lives. This is why Phillips speaks 
of such belief as a belief in ‘temporal eternity’. On this view, ‘the other
world’ and ‘immortality’ seem to be versions of this world writ large.
Ironically, Phillips argues, such apologists for the supernatural are, in
fact, wedded to the natural world. They treat Jesus’ promise to the
thief on the cross — ‘today you will be with me in paradise’65 — as a
transcendentalised version of ‘See you later’.66
In the four cases discussed, it could be said that the mortal determines
the nature of the immortal. This cannot be said of the belief in immortal-
ity Phillips wishes to bring to our attention:
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“In the religious belief in immortality I am concerned to elucidate, the mor-
tal does not determine the immortal. Rather, it is the eternal which gives
sense to the temporal.”67
How are we to understand these words? Phillips draws upon Simone
Weil’s writings to elucidate them. We feel, Weil writes, that we have a
right to a compensation for every effort, be it work, suffering or desire.
We live our lives on the expectations of these compensations. Death is
horrible chiefly because it forces the knowledge upon us that these com-
pensations will never come.68 For Weil, Phillips tells us, renouncing our
desire for compensation is a condition for passing over into religious
truth. This renunciation, Phillips suggests, is what the believer means by
‘dying to the self’:
“He ceases to see himself as the centre of his world. Death’s lesson for the
believer is to force him to recognise what all his natural instincts want to
resist, namely, that he has no claims on the way things go. Most of all, he
is forced to realise that his own life is not a necessity.”69
According to Phillips, the metaphysical belief in immortality, as it were,
reduces the status of death to the status of sleep: we hope to wake again
to a new and better life. But then the lesson religious believers see in
death is lost, since death “no longer reveals the fact that there is to be 
no compensation, but is seen as an additional fact for which compensa-
tion must be sought.”70 This, Phillips suggests, is why Weil says that the
desire for a temporal eternity is harmful: “this belief is in fact a belief in
the prolongation of life, and it robs death of its purpose.”71
The contrast between the desire for compensation and the religious
conception of dying to the self, Phillips argues, is precisely the contrast
between the temporal — that is, concern with the self — and the eter-
nal — that is, concern with self-renunciation. In turning away from the
temporal to the eternal, the believer is said to attain immortality and to
overcome death:
“The soul which is rooted in the mortal is the soul where the ego is dom-
inant in the way which Simone Weil describes in such penetrating detail
in her works. The immortality of the soul by contrast refers to a person’s
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relation to the self-effacement and love of others involved in dying to 
the self. Death is overcome in that dying to the self is the meaning of the
believer’s life.”72
It will be clear that, on Phillips’s account, speculations about continued
existence after death are really beside the point. Eternal life is not some
kind of appendage to human existence, something which happens after
human life on earth is over. Rather, for the believer, eternal life is par-
ticipation in the life of God, a life that has to do with dying to the self,
seeing that all things are a gift from God, that nothing is ours by right or
necessity.73 To believe in the immortality of the soul, is to want to give
one’s life to God. Death is overcome, not by the promise of more life to
come, but by saying farewell to life in giving it to God:
“To die in God is to be able to see one’s death as part of the majesty of
God’s will. Saying farewell to life is not a negative act. It is part of what is
meant by giving glory to God. It is in this way that the believer becomes
more than he or she is; it is in this way that the mortal puts on immortal-
ity, and the corruptible puts on incorruption.”74
How different this is, Phillips remarks, from those analyses of the belief
in immortality where the mortal determines the immortal, and the tempo-
ral determines the eternal. As does Flew, those who propose such analy-
ses assume that the interest in immortality must be an interest in tempo-
ral immortality. After all, ‘what are three-score years and ten compared
with all eternity’? According to Phillips, the atheist critic is correct in
seeing in belief in temporal eternity an inability to say farewell to life.
What the critic does not see, however, is a mode of saying farewell to life
in which the mortal puts on immortality, and the corruptible puts on
incorruption. To appreciate this possibility, Phillips concludes, “is to see
the importance of the ‘soul’ in the words of religious belief.”75
7.5 Truth and descriptive adequacy
The previous section sought to reproduce Phillips’s alternative account
of the belief in the immortality of the soul, an account which, Phillips
believes, captures the ‘soul’ in the words of religious belief. Now, even if
we accept Phillips’s account as a possible way of interpreting the belief
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in immortality we should still want to ask whether it is true. This ques-
tion can be taken in two ways. First, it can be understood in rather a
straightforward way: ‘Is the belief that our souls are immortal true?’.
Secondly, it can be taken as a question concerning the descriptive accu-
racy of Phillips’s account: ‘Does Phillips’s account adequately represent
what believers have taken, and take, their belief to mean?’. We discuss
these questions in turn.
First, then, is the belief in immortality true? As we saw, no matter
what further elements are involved in the ‘traditional’76 belief in immor-
tality, they are all dependent on the factual truth of survival after death.
The question of the possibility of survival at least purports to allow for a
straightforward ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer.77 It has been argued that Phillips’s
account, by contrast, allows for no such possibility. Hyman, for exam-
ple, suggests that on Phillips’s interpretation “the belief that the soul is
immortal cannot be true or false because it is, in the final analysis, an
attitude towards death.”78
Phillips’s reply is twofold. On the one hand, he agrees that to ask
whether expressions of the belief in immortality are true as if they were
would-be empirical propositions is to ask the wrong kind of question.
On the other hand, this does not mean that the concepts of ‘truth’ and
‘falsity’, ‘reality’ and ‘illusion’ have no application here. Phillips asks us
to consider the following example: a devoted married couple who trav-
elled extensively, their main interest being church architecture. They 
had a photograph of a church which interested them, but they did not
know its location. They hoped to find the church one day, but when the
husband died they still had not done so. His wife, along with another
widow, continued on her travels. One day, she discovered the church in
the photograph. She turned to her side, where no one was standing, and
said, ‘Here’s our church’.79
Whenever she found the church, Phillips tells us, the widow believed
her husband would be by her side. Now, we might perhaps be inclined
to ask whether her belief was true; that is, whether her husband was
really there. And, should she reply that, indeed, he was, we might want
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to enquire as to his exact position. However, according to Phillips, we
would then be distorting the situation. We would be taking the picture
in a direction it is not meant to go.80 Clearly, her husband was not there
in the same sense as the lady’s travelling companion was there. But,
Phillips argues, it does not follow either that her belief must therefore
be deemed false or illusory, or that it is best described as an ‘attitude’
which can be neither true nor false. Phillips refers us to a passage in
Weil’s writings:
“To lose somebody: we suffer at the thought that the dead one, the absent
one should have become something imaginary, something false. But the
longing we have for him is not imaginary. […] The loss of contact with
reality — there lies evil, there lies sorrow. There are certain situations
which bring about such a loss: deprivation, suffering. The remedy is to 
use the loss itself as an intermediary for attaining reality. The presence of
the dead one is imaginary, but his absence is very real; it is henceforth his
manner of appearing.”81
When Weil says that the presence of the dead one is imaginary, Phillips
explains, she is thinking of illusions, superstitions and imaginings of
various kinds. In such cases, we lose contact with reality. Rather than
facing the void left by the departed, we fill it with our imagination. To
avoid this, we must look for what is real in our situation. This, Weil sug-
gests, is to be found in our very loss, our longing, in the void created 
by the beloved’s absence. This longing, which is undoubtedly something
real, cannot be grasped except as a longing for that person. He has not
become something unreal, imaginary, because mention of him is indis-
pensable to describing the reality of the world as it is: he makes a differ-
ence to the world by virtue of his absence. Consider, for example, how,
after the death of a loved one, the empty chair at a favourite café table at
which one used to sit with him can acquire a new significance. Here,
there is no loss of contact with reality. Quite the contrary:
“it is precisely reality that is embraced, despite the fact that the reality
embraced is the realisation that the dead one can only be present in the form
of absence.”82
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To return to the example of the travelling widow; we may want to ask
whether it makes sense to speak of the ‘real presence’ of a dead husband.
In certain circumstances it may even be important to do so, if only to
avoid the confusion of thinking that we are engaged in a quasi-scientific
investigation of the kind so often associated with the Society for Psychi-
cal Research. But, Phillips argues, as soon as that option is denied, this
does not mean that the only alternative is to say that the wife’s convic-
tion concerning her dead husband is, essentially, an attitude she has, say,
towards his memory. The reality of her husband ‘being there’ may be
understood, in the sense indicated, as a spiritual reality. Too crude a dis-
tinction between ‘facts’ and ‘attitudes’ only tends to obscure these mat-
ters. Says Phillips:
“Certain philosophers, uneasy of this talk of spiritual realities, will try to
domesticate my remarks within the parameters of their philosophical cate-
gories. Often, they operate with a simplistic distinction between facts and
attitudes. […] Apart from contrasting it with facts, they seldom bother to
tell us what they mean by ‘attitude’.”83
Phillips reminds us of Wittgenstein’s remarks on our attitude towards
another as a soul in a way which includes our most primitive responses
to others as human beings.84 Who, Phillips asks, would want to contrast
this attitude with the facts?
Similar conclusions to the ones we have drawn concerning the exam-
ple of the widow, can be drawn with relation to religious pictures, such as
those related to the doctrine of immortality. The belief in life after death
cannot be treated as we would a belief that coffee will be served after din-
ner. As we have seen, according to Phillips, the religious picture of the
soul leaving the body should not be understood as a prediction that cer-
tain things are going to happen but, rather, as “the expression and embod-
iment of a reflection on, or vision of, the meaning of life and death.”85
Now, if this is what one means by saying that we are not dealing with
‘the facts’ but with ‘an attitude’, fair enough.86 But, Phillips argues, it
does not follow that, because in this context the notion of truth has little
to do with verifying whether a future state of affairs is to take place, 
it cannot play any role at all. That would be to rule out any other notion
of ‘truth’ than the one we employ in relation to empirical propositions.
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Rather, we need to explore what truth comes to in various contexts. In so
doing, Phillips argues, we shall find that, in the religious context we are
currently discussing, ‘truth’ is confessional in nature:
“It is of the utmost philosophical importance to recognise that for the
believers these pictures constitute truths, truths which form the essence of
life’s meaning for them. To ask someone whether he thinks these beliefs
are true is not to ask him to produce evidence for them, but rather to ask
him whether he can live by them, whether he can digest them, whether they
constitute food for him.”87
If one answers affirmatively, then this will have factual consequences
for one’s life. If a man does believe, say, that death has no dominion
over him, that his family are one in heaven, he will make decisions and
react in ways very unlike the man who holds ideas such as that everyone
has his own life to live, that the old have had their chance and should
make way for the young, that life is for the living, and so on. In this way,
Phillips concludes, “belief may not simply determine one’s reactions 
[or ‘attitude’] to events that befall one, but actually determine what one
takes the alternatives facing one to be.”88
I tend to agree with Phillips that a simple distinction between ‘facts’
and ‘attitudes’ is too crude to be of any real significance. Furthermore, 
I see no immediate reason to object, on some general principle, to the
suggestion that the question as to whether or not a certain belief is ‘true’
may not be a matter of awarding a truth value to a proposition ‘p’. That
is to say, if we accept Phillips’s account of the belief in immortality,
then we might as well accept that ‘truth’ in this context is confessional,
in the sense indicated. But then, should we accept Phillips’s analysis?
This brings us to our second question, the question concerning the
descriptive adequacy of Phillips’s account.
According to Hyman, “it would be perverse to deny that the attitude
Phillips describes can be an admirable one.”89 It has some affinity with
the attitude which the fifteenth-century treatises on the art of dying were
meant to foster — an attitude, Hyman suggests, which will enable a
Christian to overcome the temptations that can assail him or her as death
approaches. Be this as it may, Hyman feels he should warn Phillips that
such an attitude also has a corrupt version; “the morbid egoism of some
overenthusiastic martyrs, such as Ignatius of Antioch”, and that, more-
over, “its diametrical opposite (‘Rage, rage against the dying of the light’)
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can be just as admirable and at least as sympathetic.”90 Hyman’s remarks
echo Clack’s observation concerning Weil’s ‘love of nothingness’ we
referred to in our discussion of The Concept of Prayer. We then asked,
do we really need to go this far? That, I replied, is for the reader to
decide. According to Hyman, however, Phillips leaves the reader little
choice: Phillips’s aim is to establish, philosophically, that his account of
the belief in immortality is preferable, because contrary accounts are,
first, incoherent and, secondly, motivationally culpable.91 Now, I agree
with Hyman that, even if the traditional account of belief in immortality
can be shown to be incoherent, it does not follow that, therefore, it is
worthless. Furthermore, I agree that the ‘four examples of beliefs in
temporal eternity’ Phillips discusses are dealt with far too harshly. To
provide one example: the first, as the reader will recall, sought recom-
pense for pursuing a virtuous life. I do not wish to deny that this desire
has its perverse forms, as Phillips indicates. But, surely, such a desire
may also be understood as arising from a love of and hope for justice.
In such a case, it would be grossly unfair to say that, here, “life’s lowest
motives and desires determine the conception of immortality involved.”92
Furthermore, Phillips’s claim that, in each of these examples, we may
recognise ‘a failure’ or ‘an inability’ to say farewell to life clearly has
pejorative overtones. It should be replied that, rather than a failure, we
may also be witnessing a refusal to do so — an indictment of the patho-
logical forms of self-abasement to which Hyman and Clack draw our
attention.
Hyman does well to make these points. I am less certain, however,
about his suggestion that Phillips’s aim is to establish that his account 
of the belief in immortality is preferable to traditional accounts, and that
this can be demonstrated philosophically. Clearly, Phillips believes his
account to do the more justice to the way in which believers understand
their belief. If this is what Hyman means by saying that Phillips believes
his account to be preferable, then there is no objection. But Hyman seems
to imply something else, namely, that Phillips aims to demonstrate, philo-
sophically, that his account is ‘religiously preferable’. Such a motive can-
not be attributed to Phillips. For it would conflict with Phillips’s under-
standing of religious truth as confessional. Even if Phillips should confess
to the belief in immortality as he himself describes it, in Phillips’s view,
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that confession would itself be a religious act. In making such a decision,
the philosopher, Phillips insists, is on the same footing as anyone else —
he would be speaking for himself.93
Let us, however, return to our main question: is Phillips’s account
descriptively adequate? We may begin by noting that his elucidation of
the belief in immortality will certainly strike a chord with many Chris-
tians. As Clack points out, Christianity undeniably preaches a message of
self-denial.94 Phillips’s account certainly captures this aspect of Christian
belief. What is more, we may agree with Hyman that Phillips has suc-
ceeded in showing that this ‘spirit of self-denial’ can be expressed figu-
ratively by saying that the soul is immortal.95 Even so, Hyman is not
convinced that this suffices to justify Phillips’s claim that his account
reflects what ordinary believers believe. On the contrary, Hyman sus-
pects it to be a creation of a minority within contemporary philosophy 
of religion: “this is what is meant by the immortality of the soul only
within a philosophy of religion, albeit an unorthodox one.”96
Phillips replies that if he thought his account were his own creation,
he would give it up tomorrow.97 He is convinced that his elucidation are
elucidations of the belief in immortality as it has been understood his-
torically:
“What I am trying to elucidate I have always found in Christianity. When I
read certain writers such as Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Simone Weil, Thomas
Merton and Rush Rhees, they gave me perspicuous representations, in a philo-
sophical context, of what I had already known in a religious context.”98
How is this dispute to be resolved? One way to decide whether or not
Phillips’s elucidation of the belief in immortality is descriptively ade-
quate would be to examine the breadth of its scope. Is it capable of pro-
viding a plausible account of the broad variety of expressions, pictures,
reflections, etc., which have historically been associated with the belief
in immortality? Of course, Phillips’s account need not be complete in
the sense that it should encompass everything we can think of in this
context. That would be a foolish demand. Nevertheless, when more and
more aspects are excluded, one’s account becomes less and less credible.
Particularly so, when the aspects one fails to incorporate clearly play a
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crucial and central role in the context of the belief one is trying to eluci-
date. Now, I do not wish to deny that what Phillips’s account reveals 
to us may be found in Christianity. The point, rather, is that much else
is to be found besides. For one thing, it might be argued that Phillips’s
account tells us something only about the relation of the individual to
God during this present life. It says little about the destiny of the soul
after death, and since this is an essential part of what has been meant by
the immortality of the soul, the offered account is inadequate.99 Phillips
tries to meet this objection by considering the way in which ‘eternal
predicates’ can be ascribed to the dead. While some of his descriptions
are unobjectionable,100 others, I feel, are somewhat strained. Consider, for
example, Phillips’s version of the belief that the dead pray for the living,
or might intercede on their behalf. First, Phillips argues that when we
ascribe prayers to the dead, ‘prayer’ means something else than what it
means when the living pray. Secondly, Phillips explains to us what it
does mean:
“The prayers of the dead are prayers from or in eternity. […] The activity
of the dead is the activity of the eternal in them. What is more, the possi-
bility of this activity depends on the extent to which the eternal was in their
lives when they were alive. It is because of the presence of the eternal in
the life of the Virgin Mary and of the saints that they, though dead, can yet
speak.”101
Is Phillips’s claim that, in this context, ‘prayer’ means something else,
anything more than an ad hoc argument to dispose of a religious practice
which sits uneasily with his account of the belief in immortality? As to
his description of the dead praying for us, if I understand him correctly,
Phillips means to say that the lives of dead — depending, of course, on
the kind of lives they led — may become objects of contemplation for the
living, “a measure in terms of which the individual assesses himself or
understands himself and the world.”102 I agree that this can be expressed
(figuratively) by saying that the saints still speak to us or, even, that they
can still help us. But I find it difficult to accept that the expression ‘the
dead pray for us’ can likewise be accounted for.
Even if I am wrong about this, and my objection should be waived,
there is a further point which, I believe, cannot so easily be dismissed.
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Phillips’s account concentrates on pictures of the soul: the soul leaving
the body, the immortality of the soul, the eternal destiny of the soul, etc.
We should not forget, however, that the Christian hope for immortality
is a hope for the immortality of the whole person, not just the soul, but
also the body. The notion of the resurrection of the body has always
played a crucial role in the Christian belief in immortality. Apart from
rejecting the notion as non-sensical,103 Phillips’s account does not in any
way address this aspect of the belief in immortality. In this context we
would do well to remember that it is Christ’s resurrection which gives
both foundation and substance to the Christian hope of eternal life.
Phillips suggests that the belief that we shall all meet again beyond the
grave functions as a picture which expresses the belief that people should
act towards each other, “not according to the status and prestige that
people have acquired or failed to acquire, during the course of their lives,
but as children of God, in the equality which death will reveal.”104 Should
one account for Christ’s emergence from the tomb, and his subsequent
appearing to the Apostles, along similar lines? If so, one had better 
be prepared to forsake a good deal of what, beyond any doubt, should 
be called traditional Christian beliefs. I feel certain that Phillips would
agree to this; that Christ’s resurrection calls for another sort of elucida-
tion. And it is difficult to see how he could deny the intimate relation
between the hope for eternal life and the resurrection of Christ. Any
account of the belief in immortality cannot afford to fail to incorporate
this aspect. However, given the problems we encountered in the previ-
ous chapter, it is difficult to see how Phillips should accomplish this.
Let us consider a second criterion one might apply to judge whether
or not a given account of a certain practice is descriptively adequate. It
is a rather simple and straightforward one: one should compare one’s
account to those given by the participants of the practice under investi-
gation. This criterion becomes all the more important when one agrees
with Wittgenstein that one’s philosophical account should in no way
interfere with what people believe in religion.105 There can be little doubt
that Phillips feels his account satisfies this criterion. As we saw, he refers
us to such authors as Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Simone Weil, Thomas
Merton and Rush Rhees. Now, as to the appeal made to Wittgenstein and
Rush Rhees; obviously this will not take us very far. First, they can
hardly be taken as representative of average Christian believers. Indeed,
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neither of them thought of himself as a Christian. Secondly, given the
tight connections between Wittgenstein’s, Rhees’s and Phillips’s work, it
is clear that if one disagrees with either one of them, one disagrees with
all of them. As to Kierkegaard, Weil and Merton; I take it few would
wish to deny that these authors enjoy a certain authority in matters reli-
gious and that their writings constitute an indispensable part of the history
of Christianity. It is equally clear, however, that their views can hardly
be considered orthodox. If Phillips’s account accords with theirs, this
tends to confirm rather than refute Hyman’s suspicion that Phillips’s
account shows us what is meant by the immortality of the soul only
within a philosophy of religion, albeit an unorthodox one. We may agree
with Richard Messer that there are major strands within Christianity
which seem more suited to Phillips’s account than to that of his critics.106
But there are at least equally major strands within Christianity, and prob-
ably more so, which Phillips’s account cannot be said to accommodate.
When we turn from the ‘professional’ to the ‘everyday’ believer, mat-
ters do not seem to improve. Quite the contrary. Phillips admits that if
we were to ask an ‘average’ believer whether he believes, say, that we
shall really meet after death, he would, in all likelihood, answer that we
shall.107 In other words, Phillips does not deny that there will be believ-
ers who truly believe, in the metaphysical sense, that we shall meet
beyond the grave. Says Phillips:
“more often than not the believer’s faith is a complex tangle of beliefs and
confused accounts of those belief. What I wish to stress is the logical inde-
pendence of the beliefs from the confusions attributed to believers by many
philosophers”108
If the believer’s faith is actually an amalgam of beliefs and confused
accounts of these beliefs, as the first sentence says,109 then surely it is no
longer convincing to claim that these beliefs are logically independent 
of the accounts of them the believer entertains. Both being part of the
believer’s faith, it seems more plausible to conclude that there will be
patterns of interference: the account the believer feels correctly to reflect
his belief, confused or not, will have an effect on his beliefs, moulding
them and giving shape to the way the believer practices his beliefs. 
To put it somewhat differently, I do not think it is possible sharply to
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106 See Messer 1993, p. 54.
107 See Phillips 1970(a), p. 69.
108 Phillips 1970(a), pp. 69-70.
109 Note that the second sentence seems to imply that the confused accounts are imposed
externally, by certain philosophers.
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distinguish between the account a believer gives of his belief and the
belief itself. If the former is confused, the latter will not remain com-
pletely unaffected. Furthermore, if it is true, as I have suggested, that
there are major strands in Christianity which incorporate the kind of
metaphysical beliefs and assumptions Phillips believes to be confused,
then the faith of a not inconsiderable group of believers will contain not
just confused accounts of the religious beliefs in immortality, but, sim-
ply, confused or incoherent beliefs as such.
In conclusion: we began by asking how we should understand the
religious belief in immortality. According to Phillips, if this belief is
based on the assumption that we shall, in some way, survive our deaths,
we can only conclude that it is incoherent. However, Phillips argued,
there are other possibilities of understanding. In the previous sections 
we examined the way in which Phillips develops his alternative account
of the meaning of the belief in immortality. Finally, we asked whether
Phillips’s account is descriptively adequate. We proposed two criteria 
to settle the issue. First the descriptive range of the proposed account.
We argued that Phillips’s account fails to address a singularly impor-
tant datum: the Christian hope for a bodily resurrection, substantiated 
by Christ’s resurrection. Phillips might well be able to incorporate this
aspect of the belief in immortality into his account. However, given the
conclusions we drew in the previous chapter, this may prove no easy
task. The second criterion demands that we measure the proposed account
of a given religious practice by the accounts the participants of that prac-
tice themselves provide. If we do so, we argued, we find that Phillips’s
account fails to accommodate the beliefs of a not inconsiderable group
of believers. The implications of that conclusion are dealt with in the
ninth chapter of this book. First, however, we turn to examine that reli-
gious belief, the meaningfulness and truth of which, one might say, must
be established before we may even begin to entertain the beliefs in mir-
acles and immortality: the belief that God exists.
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8. THE REALITY OF GOD
In the previous two chapters we have examined Phillips’s account of,
respectively, the belief in miracles and the belief in immortality. It might
be argued, however, that these beliefs presuppose a more fundamental
belief, viz. the belief that God exists. After all, it is said to be God who
performs miracles, God who grants eternal life. The main question thus
seems to be how we are to understand this primary belief in the exis-
tence or reality of God. Once again, Phillips criticises received opinions
on this matter. In his view, rather than being logically prior to religious
practice, the belief that God exists acquires its sense in its religious con-
texts of application. Rejecting both theological realism and theological
non-realism, Phillips seeks to do justice to the role the belief plays in the
contexts of worship and praise in which it has its natural home.
8.1 Realism and non-realism
The point of departure in our previous discussions consisted in giving a
definition of the object of the belief under examination. Where belief in
the existence of God is concerned, however, this procedure hardly seems
promising. The difficulty is that the concept of God is used in a bewil-
dering variety of ways. Detailed discussions soon show that innumerable
meanings have, at one time or another, been given to the word ‘God’ or
its equivalents. There seems little hope of tracing a single dominant con-
ception of God, even within Christianity.1
Faced with this problem, one might opt for a philosophically inspired,
minimal definition. Bailey, for example, suggests that to believe in God
is to believe ‘in the existence of a causally efficacious divine being’.2
Of course, such a definition has problems of its own. Being minimal to
the point of becoming vague, it cannot hope to encapsulate the wealth of
practices and ideas surrounding the belief in the reality of God. Further-
more, it begs the question as to how we are to understand the notion of
1 See Messer 1993, pp. 53-55.
2 See Bailey 2001, p. 119ff. I allude to Bailey’s phrase merely for the purposes of
illustration. Although Bailey believes it to be more or less synonymous to ‘God’, he does
not present it as a definition proper.
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a divine being. After all, it is not as if we are already acquainted with 
a number of divine beings, just not the one called ‘God’. Nevertheless,
one might feel that the phrase succeeds at least in capturing what must
be taken as the bare essentials of the belief in the reality of God. Namely,
that there exist some being, with whom one can enter into a relation-
ship, and who is capable of interacting with the world. And, obviously,
the notion of divinity is introduced to exclude such ‘beings’ as, say, my
brother and my pet guinea pig from satisfying these conditions. God’s
attributes are said to be such as cannot be ascribed to human beings and
animals — e.g. God is timeless, omnipotent, pure spirit — and God is
said to be capable of interacting with the world in such a manner as 
no human being or animal can — e.g. performing miracles, granting
eternal life.
It will be clear that the suggested definition carries with it the impli-
cation that the belief in the existence of God shall be understood to be
both cognitive and factual in nature. It states that a certain state of affairs
holds true; that things are thus and not otherwise. It follows that the
belief is, at least in principle, open to verification or falsification. Thus,
Bailey’s claim that, at its base level, faith contains the belief in the exis-
tence of a causally efficacious divine being, implies that such faith is
susceptible to external criticism. Like any other causal belief, it can be
assessed as reasonable or unreasonable in the light of the principles of
causal reasoning we all employ in our everyday lives. Any person who
is capable of making competent judgements about the humdrum causal
mechanisms that operate in his or her immediate environment, Bailey
feels, is potentially someone who can arrive at an appropriate determi-
nation of the rationality or irrationality of the kind of religious faith
embraced by most believers.3
There can be little doubt that Phillips would object to Bailey’s con-
clusions. In his view, to talk about God is not to talk about some kind 
of object, the existence of which could be either verified or falsified by
some kind of an investigation. Though, admittedly, they might appear
thus, such statements as ‘God exists’, ‘God is real’, Phillips argues, are
not statements in the indicative mood; rather, they are expressions of
faith: “If a person believes in God this is something which shows itself
in his praise and worship. ‘I believe in God’ is, above all, an expression
of faith.”4
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I assume that Phillips’s critics, Bailey included, would not disagree
that to say one believes in God is to express one’s faith. They would
insist, however, that in confessing one’s faith, there must be something to
confess. As Herman Philipse puts it, “one cannot believe without believ-
ing that some proposition is true.”5 Thus, it is all well and good to sug-
gest, as Phillips does, that eternal life for the believer is participation in
the life of God, and that this life has to do with dying to the self, with see-
ing that all things are a gift of God. But to speak of self-renunciation as
an imitation of the act of divine self-renunciation at creation and on the
Cross, is not to prove the existence of a divine subject who so renounces
Himself. Again, to say that everything is a gift from God is not to prove
the existence of the Giver.
Phillips anticipates such a reaction. He argues that it is based on a fun-
damental misunderstanding:
“I believe these popular philosophical objections to be radically miscon-
strued. In learning by contemplation, attention, renunciation, what forgiving,
thanking, loving, etc. mean in these contexts, the believer is participating in
the reality of God; this is what we mean by God’s reality.”6
These remarks have met with different replies. On the one hand, Phillips
has been accused of conflating the existence of religious perspectives and
their associated practices with the existence of God. Clearly, this will
not do. Far from establishing the reality of God, these perspectives and
practices presuppose that God exists. After all, we cannot believe in God
unless there is a God to believe in; it makes no sense to worship and pray
unless there is a God worthy of receiving our worship and capable of
hearing our prayers in the first place. In short, Phillips fails to realise the
fact, or refuses to acknowledge it, that belief in the existence of God is
logically prior to any other religious belief or practice.
On the other hand, Phillips’s account of the reality of God has been
received, perhaps more charitably, not as a thinly veiled attempt to dodge
the whole issue concerning the existence of God but, rather, as a thor-
oughly non-realist analysis of religious belief and practice. Briefly put,
theological realism interprets religious language as referring to a tran-
scendent divine reality, the existence of which is independent of our
thoughts, actions, and attitudes. Theological non-realism, by contrast,
interprets religious language, not as referring to a transcendent reality, but
as expressing our emotions, or our basic moral insights and intentions, or
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as referring to our moral and spiritual ideals.7 On this reading, Phillips 
is not claiming, absurdly, that the fact that believers refer to God demon-
strates that there exists ‘a causally efficacious divine being’. Rather, he
is arguing that religious language does not endeavour, successfully or
unsuccessfully, to refer to such an entity at all. This would be one way
of developing Wittgenstein’s remark that religious belief is something
like ‘a passionate commitment to a system of reference’. Although the
belief in God is a ‘belief’, Wittgenstein suggests, “it’s really a way of
living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this
interpretation.”8 To say that God exists is not to assert the existence of
some kind of entity: “what is here at issue is not the existence of some-
thing.”9 Rather, it expresses one’s commitment to leading a life in which
certain questions will be asked, obligations will be acknowledged, deci-
sions taken and actions performed, which can only be explained or under-
stood in terms of religious concepts.
There is certainly plenty of prima facie evidence for such a non-real-
ist interpretation of Phillips’s account of the reality of God. For exam-
ple, Phillips tells us that, if someone where to show us pictures of cer-
tain exotic plants as proof of the reality of the plants, one might say,
with justification, ‘I shan’t be convinced if you can only show me these
pictures. I shall only be convinced when I see the plants’. If, on the
other hand, having heard of people praising the Creator of heaven and
earth, feeling answerable to the One who sees all, someone were to say,
‘But these are only religious perspectives, show me what they refer to’,
this, Phillips argues, would be a misunderstanding of the grammar of
such perspectives:
“The pictures of the plants refer to their objects, namely, the plants. The
religious pictures give one a language in which it is possible to think about
human life in a certain way. The pictures […] provide the logical space
within which such thoughts can have a place. When these thoughts are
found in worship, the praising and glorifying does not refer to some object
called God. Rather, the expression of such praise and glory is what we call
the worship of God.”10
Now, from the realist’s perspective, the type of religious belief that 
is offered by the non-realist is but a pale shadow of genuine religious
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7 See Scott and Moore 1997, p. 402; Hick 1993, p 7.
8 Wittgenstein 1984, p. 64.
9 Wittgenstein 1984, p. 82: “daß es sich hier um eine Existenz nicht handelt”. Hyman
suggests that the translation ‘what is here at issue is not an entity’ may be preferable. (See
Hyman 2001, p. 11, fn 3.)
10 Phillips 1976, p. 149.
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belief.11 Admittedly, believing that God exists is unlike believing a
hypothesis in history or in science. The differences have to do with the
ways in which we may be led to the belief that God exists, and the ways
in which this belief will influence our other beliefs and our feelings,
commitments and actions. But it does not follow that believing that God
exists is nothing but ‘a passionate commitment to a system of reference’.
Indeed, one’s belief that God exists will typically be among one’s rea-
sons for having and retaining that commitment.12 Thus, the realist reiter-
ates his contention that the belief that God exists is logically prior to,
and stands in an explanatory and, if true, justificatory relation to, a per-
son’s commitment to lead a religious life. To dispose of this belief would
amount to no less than disposing of religious belief altogether:
“The minimal content of a religious belief is the proposition that a god, or
God, exist or exists, and according to my definition of religion there sim-
ply is no religion without acceptance of such a proposition.”13
According to the realist, then, the non-realist account of religious belief
is reductionist. It seeks to retain religious language whilst doing away
with the primary object to which this language refers. Thus it dispenses
with what is logically indispensable for any notion of belief. What we
are left with, one might say, is a kind of ‘semantic atheism’.14
Whether or not one agrees with this assessment, many have assumed
that Phillips’s account is best understood as a non-realist account of the
nature of religious belief, akin, in many ways, to the kind of accounts
presented by, for example, R. M. Hare, R. B. Braithwaite, and Don Cupitt.
Phillips’s version of theological non-realism, however, may appear to
be somewhat more radical than that of the authors mentioned. Non-real-
ists like Hare, Cupitt, and Braithwaite seem little inclined to claim that
theological realism has not been integral to the faith ‘as it is’. Rather,
they dispense with something which they admit was once vital to faith,
in the interest of preserving and revitalising the rest of it. In this sense,
to be a non-realist, is to be a revisionist. By contrast, as noted previ-
ously, Phillips does not take himself to be reforming anything at all.
Apparently, or so Terence Penelhum concludes, Phillips believes “faith,
as it is, to be a non-realist phenomenon.”15
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This conclusion, however, would seem to be premature if only for the
simple reason that Phillips explicitly denies that he has sought to present
a non-realist account of the belief that God exists or, for that matter, of
any religious belief or practice at all. True, Phillips believes the realist’s
account to be radically confused. The problem is not that realism is a cor-
rect analysis of ordinary beliefs, but just not of religious beliefs. Rather,
“realism is a confused account of any kind of belief: believing that my
brother is in America, that a theorem is valid, that fire will burn me. In
short, realism is not coherently expressible.”16 If this accusation is jus-
tified, Phillips adds, it follows that “realism has never been integral to
faith.”17 This remark raises two important questions.
First, does this not, after all, support a non-realist reading of Phillips’s
position? That is to say, if realism is incoherent, should we not turn to
non-realism for a proper understanding of religious belief? According to
Phillips this is not the case. We shall examine Phillips’s arguments more
thoroughly in a moment. But, in brief, Phillips’s main complaint is that
theological realism detaches religious belief — the paradigm case being
the belief that God exists — from the religious practices in which it has
its sense. This effects a divorce between belief and practice which would
render any kind of believing unintelligible. Now, since only the realist
wishes to maintain such a distinction between belief and the ‘fruits of
belief’, Phillips’s argument might be seen as playing into the non-real-
ist’s hands. But Phillips intends to argue against the cogency of the dis-
tinction between belief and fruits of belief, and thereby indirectly argues
against the non-realist who takes the distinction to be intelligible but
false.18 Thus, even if we reject theological realism, it does not follow that
we must therefore embrace non-realism, and, Phillips argues, his critics
are wrong to suggest that he has done so. If realism is confused, so too is
its opposite, non-realism: “Theological non-realism is as empty as theo-
logical realism. Both terms are battle-cries in a confused philosophical
and theological debate”.19
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16 Phillips 1993, p. 34. As is evident by his choice of examples, Phillips supports this
conclusion — that realism in general is incoherent — by his reading of Wittgenstein.
(The examples are taken from Wittgenstein’s writings; see Wittgenstein 1999, pp. 66-68,
Wittgenstein 1994, I, 578, and Wittgenstein 1976, p. 136, respectively.) While I agree
with Phillips that it would be a mistake to present Wittgenstein either as a realist or as a
non-realist, I shall concentrate on Phillips’s arguments against theological realism rather
than on his arguments against realism in general or his arguments in support of a certain
reading of Wittgenstein.
17 Phillips 1993, p. 35.
18 See Scott and Moore 1997, p. 402, n. 3.
19 Phillips 1993, p. 35.
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Secondly, Phillips’s claim that, if the realist’s position is incoherent,
realism has never been integral to faith, might remind one of the kind of
argument we encountered in our discussion of Phillips’s account of the
belief in immortality. Phillips seemed to argue that, if the notion of an
inner substance called the soul is incoherent, then whatever is meant by
the immortality of the soul cannot be the continued existence of such a
substance. Quite rightly, Hyman objected that there is no inconsistency
involved in supposing that people hold incoherent beliefs. Likewise, one
might argue that, even if realism is incoherent, it does not follow that it
is not, or has not been, integral to faith.
Whether that objection is valid, however, depends on what one takes
to be involved in theological realism. If theological realism is a species
of a more general philosophical theory which purports to explain the
nature of belief and language, including, but not limited to, religious
belief and language, and if this theory is indeed incoherent, then it fol-
lows that realism has never been integral to faith. That is to say, an inco-
herent theory does not offer a correct explanation of the phenomena it
seeks to explain. On the other hand, if one takes theological realism to
imply no more than that most believers understand the object of their
belief to be ‘a causally efficacious divine being’ whose existence is inde-
pendent of our thoughts, actions, and attitudes, then Phillips’s conclu-
sion that realism has never been integral to faith is far from self-evident.
Even if such a ‘realist’ belief is incoherent, it does not follow that peo-
ple cannot believe it. What is more, it would seem extremely difficult to
deny that many Christians have held such a belief, and continue to do so.
Thus, the main question becomes whether the descriptive claim 
— ‘when believers say that God is real they affirm their belief in the
existence of a causally efficacious divine being called ‘God’’ — must
involve the allegedly incoherent methodological assumption that we can
detach the belief that God exists from the religious practices which it
supposedly engenders. I shall argue that there is no compelling reason to
presume this to be the case. One can accept descriptive realism while
rejecting methodological realism, and vice versa.
Although Phillips does not do so, he seems aware of the possibility of
drawing such a distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘methodological’
theological realism. As we shall see, he develops two distinct lines of
argument. On the one hand, theological realism is charged with method-
ological, or conceptual, confusion. On the other hand, Phillips also claims
that theological realism should be rejected on the grounds of descriptive
inaccuracy. It misreads what believers are actually doing. In the following
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sections, these two lines of argument are discussed in turn. I argue that
although Phillips develops a number of forceful arguments against a rad-
ical form of methodological realism, he does not successfully demon-
strate either that descriptive realism is incoherent, or that it is obviously
descriptively inadequate.
8.2 Theological realism is methodologically incoherent
In their article Can Theological Realism be Refuted?, Michael Scott and
Andrew Moore assess the arguments Phillips presents for answering this
question affirmatively. Scott and Moore do not uncritically attribute a
non-realist position to Phillips. They recognise that, “far from support-
ing non-realism above realism, Phillips […] wishes to upset the realist /
non-realist debate by showing that the two theories offer equally con-
fused accounts of belief and language, and specifically religious belief
and language.”20 Theological realism, Scott and Moore tell us,
“is the theory that there is a transcendent divine reality, the principal object
of religious belief and language, the existence of which is not contingent
upon (or, positively, is independent of) our thoughts, actions and attitudes.”21
In opposition to his realist opponent, Scott and Moore argue, the non-
realist maintains that “meaningful religious faith and language are pos-
sible without there being any such independently existing entity.”22
Scott and Moore argue that Phillips opposes the realist’s position on
two crucial issues. First, whether religious practices are grounded in 
the belief that God is real. Secondly, whether God may be considered to
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20 Scott and Moore 1997, p. 401. Phillips might object to this way of putting the
matter. As noted above, his point is not that realism offers a confused account of reli-
gious belief and language in particular. Rather, realism in general is incoherent. Thus,
in Phillips’s view, a realist account of the belief that it is going to rain shall be no less
misguided than a realist account of the religious belief that God is real.
21 Scott and Moore 1997, p. 402. This, I feel, overstates the realist’s case. Scott and
Moore seem to imply that to be a realist about religious language is to be a believer. But
why should the former entail the latter? Non-realism certainly does not entail non-belief.
Cupitt and Braithwaite, for instance, provide a non-realist account of religious belief. 
But they clearly do not present themselves as non-believers. Similarly, could one not be
a realist about religious language in that one insists that religious faith and language is
meaningful if, and only if, there exists a transcendent divine reality, etc. (or if, and only
if, this supposition makes sense), without ascribing to the theory, or belief, that, as a mat-
ter of fact, there is such an independent entity? In other words, I would prefer to portray
the realist’s position more along the lines of Scott and Moore’s depiction of that of the
non-realist.
22 Scott and Moore 1997, p. 402.
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be an object.23 These two issues correspond roughly with what I have
termed Phillips’s ‘methodological’ and ‘descriptive’ lines of argument,
and Scott and Moore do well to keep them apart. The second line of
argument addresses the realist’s assumption that the belief that God is
real should be construed, essentially, as the quasi-empirical hypothesis
that, as a matter of fact, a certain object (or entity) exists. It is discussed
in the next section. Phillips’s first line of argument purports to establish
that in separating the belief that God exists from the religious practices
in which it is embedded, the realist “effects a divorce between belief and
practice which would render any kind of believing unintelligible.”24
Thus, theological realism becomes vacuous. It fails to (and cannot) give
an account of what believing in God — what ‘God exists’ — means. In
this section we examine whether Phillips can make good on this claim.
Theological realism, Phillips argues, takes itself to be the expression
of a truism: we cannot believe in God unless there is a God to believe
in. If that were denied, it seems the belief that God exists would be
robbed of its object, namely, God. Aren’t we all realists? What we need
to realise, Phillips replies, is that, as of yet, no grammatical work has
been done to elucidate the relations between belief and its object. Instead
of elucidating these relations, Phillips adds, somewhat sarcastically, the-
ological realists often indulge in ‘philosophy by italics’.25 We are told
that we would not worship unless we believed that God exists. We are
told that we cannot talk to God unless He is there to talk to. We are told
that, for the believer, God’s existence is a fact. And so on. But, Phillips
remarks, nothing is achieved by italicising these words. The task of clar-
ifying their grammar when they are used remains:
“by all means say that ‘God’ functions as a referring expression, that ‘God’
refers to a sort of object, that God’s reality is a matter of fact, and so on. But
please remember that, as of yet, no conceptual or grammatical clarification
has taken place. We have all the work still to do since we shall now have to
show, in this religious context, what speaking of ‘reference’, ‘object’, ‘exis-
tence’, and so on amounts to, how it differs, in obvious ways, from other
uses of these terms.”26
THE REALITY OF GOD 335
23 See Scott and Moore 1997, p. 401.
24 Phillips 1993, p. 40.
25 See Phillips 1993, pp. 29, 35.
26 Phillips 1995(a), p. 138. I believe Scott and Moore to be mistaken in their claim that
this way of putting the matter reflects a ‘recent change’ in Phillips’s position. (See Scott
and Moore 1997, p. 414.) From his earliest work onwards, Phillips’s critique has been
aimed, not at certain phrases we may or may not use, but at what we take these phrases
to mean. The words do not really matter, it is what you do with them that counts.
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Theological realists, Phillips argues, speak of the relation between
belief and its object as though the character of that relation can be taken
for granted. But is the relation between a belief and its object the same,
no matter the character of what is believed? According to Phillips, we
cannot give the same account of ‘belief’ in every context. To say that
the relation between a belief and its object varies, is to say that the con-
texts of application vary.27 For example, the belief in the immortality of
the soul might be taken to involve a belief that a future state of affairs
will take place. On this account, the belief is similar, in relevant ways,
to the beliefs, say, that my brother will return home tomorrow, or that I
shall be unemployed come spring. Phillips, we saw, does not deny the
viability of this account; that is to say, he does not deny that, for some
believers, this is what believing in eternal life amounts to. But must it
reflect what believers take the belief to mean; are there no other possi-
bilities of meaning? This is a genuine question; a question, Phillips
argues, which can only be answered by attending to the contexts of
application of the belief, i.e. to the role the belief plays in religious
practice. The problem with realism is that it “prevents us from answer-
ing this question by ignoring the very circumstances which would enable
us to answer it; the circumstances in which really believing has its
sense.”28 The realist accuses the non-realist of conflating ‘believing’
with ‘the fruits of believing’. The fruits of believing — the role a belief
plays in human life, the commitments it engenders, the actions it induces,
etc. — are said to be the consequences of believing. Thus, we first
believe in the reality of various states of affairs, and then, as a result, act
and behave in the characteristic ways we do. On this view, Phillips
argues, the essence of believing cannot be found in our shared practices,
in anything we do or say, since, according to the realist, these practices
are themselves based on something called ‘belief’. Phillips’s criticism is
that this is tantamount to trying to give an account of the meaning of a
belief, of the relation of that belief to its object, without reference to any
context of application.29 Such an attempt, Phillips concludes, is doomed
to fail. What, Phillips asks, does this conception of belief amount to? Is
it not entirely vacuous?
“The realist, by placing ‘belief’ outside all possible language-games, places
it beyond all possible techniques of application in which it could have any
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sense. The belief would have to tell you what it is without any such context
— an incoherent supposition.”30
To return to the case at hand, the realist’s claim is that believing in God
is logically independent of the role it plays in religious life. That is to
say, the belief that God exists is logically prior to religious language-
games. After all, we would not pray unless we believed there to be a 
god capable of hearing and, perchance, answering our prayers. But, once
again, what does this conception of belief amount to? Having cut off 
the belief that God exists from its religious context(s) of application, the
realist, Phillips claims, is no longer able to provide a coherent answer to
this question:
“Religious language does not determine the truth of the proposition ‘God
exists’. What that depends on is there being a God.31 What religious lan-
guage determines is the sense of the proposition. By placing religious belief
outside all religious practices, realists like Penelhum, Trigg and Badham can
give no indication of that sense.”32
Thus, if I have understood it correctly, runs Phillips’s first line of argu-
ment. Its first premise is that what believing something amounts to is
shown in the context of application of a belief, i.e. the activities, com-
mitments, practices, etc. that surround the belief. Its second premise is
that realism severs belief from the activities, commitments, practices,
etc. which give it its sense. Given the truth of both premises, the objec-
tion then arises that the realist makes as a contingent consequence of 
an agent’s belief the very activities, commitments and practices that
must be in place for the belief that the agent holds to have meaning.33
In other words, realism, in general, is unable to give an account of what
believing something amounts to. More to the point, theological realism
cannot specify what it means to believe in God. The argument, as it
stands, seems valid enough. To uphold the realist position, one would
have to take issue with the truth of either of its premises. Thus, for
example, Scott and Moore argue that Phillips claims too much in his
remarks on the relationship between belief and behaviour, and that 
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he fails to appreciate the importance of establishing the second premise
altogether.34 Let us take a closer look to see whether these criticisms are
valid.
Now, it does seem rather difficult to deny that our believing various
things may lead us to do various things. To believe that p provides us
with reasons to act in certain ways, depending on what is believed, that
is, depending upon the nature of p. But, surely, it does not follow,
therefore, that the nature of the relation between belief and object varies
from case to case? To believe any given p is simply to affirm or assert
p. We may readily agree that the content of p may vary and, accord-
ingly, the actions we may or may not undertake on the basis of our
believing any given p. But why should we accept that what ‘believing’
various p’s amounts to must vary correspondingly? Furthermore, one
might argue that Phillips has not yet provided any compelling reason to
force us to abandon the realist’s claim that a belief that p is logically
prior to the actions or behavioural patterns to which it may or may not
give rise. This seems no more than common sense. For a simple exam-
ple, consider my belief that it is going to rain. Surely, it will not do, as
an account of what this belief amounts to, to point out that I might take
an umbrella with me when I go out. Rather, my taking an umbrella,
should I do so, is a consequence of my antecedently held belief that it
is going to rain. Phillips, one might conclude, is really advocating some
form of behaviourism: a reductionist analysis of belief in terms of
behaviour. Now, admittedly, a person’s behaviour is often important in
determining the sincerity or, indeed, the nature of that person’s belief.
But it goes too far to claim, as Phillips does, that there is an ‘internal
relation’ between a belief and the behaviour associated with it, such
that ‘a belief is not conceivable without the endeavours it informs’.35
This seems a wholly implausible position. First, having a particular
belief does not prescribe any particular form of behaviour: people who
act in different ways may nevertheless be judged to share the same
belief and, vice versa, people who act in similar ways need not share
the same beliefs. Secondly, even if one allows that an agent’s actions
provide the evidence upon which we attribute beliefs to that agent, one
need not accept that, independently of that agent’s actions or capacity
for performing actions, attribution of meaningful beliefs to that agent is
confused or even mistaken. A believer may be disposed to act in certain
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ways but never do so because the appropriate occasions never arise. Or,
again, an agent may form a belief but never act on it as a result of being,
for example, completely paralysed.36
To summarise, Phillips, it might be argued, has not established that
what ‘believing’ amounts to varies, depending upon the nature of what is
believed. Nor has he demonstrated that we cannot think of a given belief
as being logically prior to the endeavours it informs. Nor, yet again, that
reference to an agent’s behaviour is both necessary and sufficient in
determining what that agent believes. In other words, Phillips has not
established the first premise of his argument, namely, that what believ-
ing something amounts to is shown by the role the belief plays in the
believer’s life, i.e. the activities, commitments, practices, etc. that sur-
round the belief. Should we accept this conclusion?
I do not think Phillips should be overly concerned about the objec-
tions raised so far. He need not hold to the thesis that the slightest differ-
ence in practice evinces a distinct, unique relation between a belief and
its object, requiring a distinct, unique account of what that belief, in
those surroundings, amounts to. That thesis tends to become absurd, for
we would end up with an innumerable number of different relations, not
just for different beliefs, but even for the same belief. After all, one and
the same belief provides reasons for an indefinite number of actions or
behavioural patterns. All Phillips has to do is show, first, that the rela-
tion between belief and the object of belief does not always amount to
the same thing and, secondly, that these differences are shown in the
context of application of the belief in question.
Phillips adduces a number of examples, drawn from Wittgenstein’s
writings, to show that we cannot give the same kind of account of ‘belief’
in every context. What are the criteria that we believe something? There
is, Wittgenstein argues, no single, general, answer to this question. Con-
sider the following: I believe ‘that fire will burn me’; ‘that every rod has
a length’; ‘that it is going to rain’; ‘that love will conquer all’; ‘that the
earth existed long before I was born’. My saying that ‘I believe that ‘…’’
will have different properties and different consequences in these various
cases. The differences are shown in the practices into which the beliefs
enter, in the things we do and say, in our shared language-games and
form(s) of life. Says Phillips:
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“The differences in character of these beliefs are shown by the practices of
which they are a part. The practices cannot be cut off from the beliefs in
the way suggested by the realist’s account of ‘believing’.”37
To underscore his point, Phillips invites us to consider the difficulties we
should have in ascribing beliefs to agents who fail to act in appropriate
ways. For example, imagine an observer who, as it were automatically,
says what he is observing. He sees, say, the enemy approaching, and
reports it, describes it, but he does not act according to his observations.
Of him, one might say that he speaks what he sees, but that he does not
believe it. We already discussed examples similar to this one — exam-
ples which ask us to imagine “a severe dislocation between a man’s
words and his beliefs”38 — in our discussion of the belief in the immor-
tality of the soul. The point of presenting such examples is to remind us
of the fact that our linguistic utterances, including our avowals of belief
and ascriptions of belief to other agents, are embedded in language-
games: they carry certain implications, are enmeshed in specific patterns
of behaviour, reactions, gestures, facial expressions, and what more. If
these connections are severed, language becomes ‘like an engine idling’;39
“words are mentioned, but not used.”40
One cannot divorce belief from practice, as the realist would have 
one do, for it is to practice, to what people do, that one would look to
determine whether someone believes something or not, and to determine
what believing that something amounts to. Nor will it do to say that, as
a matter of grammar, we can reduce all these instances of believing to a
single case in this sense that believing something is believing some
proposition to be true. This simply relocates our problem. For now “the
sense of the proposition seems to be given independently of any context
of application.”41 We must determine what ascribing to the truth of a
proposition amounts to in various cases. Once again, we shall find that
saying that ‘‘…’ is true’ will have different properties and different con-
sequences. For example, Wittgenstein draws a contrast between empirical
propositions and, what he calls, grammatical propositions.42 Although
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Wittgenstein does not deny that we would say that the grammatical
proposition ‘Every rod has length’ is true, he does urge us to examine
what we mean by saying this. It is important to note that it is not like
saying that an empirical proposition is true. For one thing, of an empiri-
cal proposition we can say what it would be like if it were false. We can
understand it without knowing whether it is true or false. And to under-
stand an empirical proposition is also to understand its negation. None of
these features characterises grammatical propositions. For the negation
of a grammatical proposition does not yield an untrue proposition but a
piece of nonsense. To allow for the truth of a grammatical proposition
does not make it any more like an empirical proposition. After all, to say
that a proposition is true is to affirm or assert it. But what assertion or
affirmation amount to may differ from one context to the next.43
Consider a further example. Anne Frank said that she kept her ideals
in spite of everything because she still believed that people are really
good at heart. What was it for her to believe this? Perhaps we should say
that Anne Frank took the (empirical) proposition ‘all men are good at
heart’ to be true. We might challenge her to provide circumstances in
which one could say that this proposition had been falsified.44 Sadly, the
evidence is pretty much against it. Given the path Anne Frank’s life
took, we might be somewhat surprised that she did not herself draw the
conclusion that the belief is false.
Would not this betray a gross misunderstanding? I am inclined to
think of Anne Frank’s belief, not as expressing a would-be empirical
proposition, but as expressing her commitment to certain moral ideals,
as expressing, if one pleases, her faith in humanity. The truth of this
belief depends not on what others did to her, but on how she did unto
others, how she lived her life. But perhaps I should suppress my initial
inclination to reject the contrary account. Perhaps Anne Frank’s belief
should be understood as an hypothetical description of human nature,
which has predictive value, and is therefore susceptible to either confir-
mation or rejection on the basis of the evidence available. The fact that
Anne Frank seemed to hold on to her belief no matter what, might be
seen as a telling indication of her need to believe it, rather than as a sign
of the inadequacy of the suggested account. Perhaps so. But we should
note, first, that the possibility of our contemplating these two distinct
accounts of Anne Frank’s belief depends upon there being the relevant
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and distinct contexts of application which set the conceptual parameters
for both beliefs. Thus, taken in the moral sense, the belief that people are
really good at heart would have its sense against the background of our
shared moral practices, in which we talk of good and evil, of virtues and
vices, of the state of a man’s soul, and so on. Taken in the empirical
sense, it will function against the background of our everyday empirical
forms of discourse, or perhaps our scientific practices, in which talk of
checking the facts, verifying an hypothesis, etc., has its sense.45 Sec-
ondly, although either account is conceivable, and no doubt, we could
think up more possibilities, it is difficult to see how we should decide
which account is most accurate without referring to the way in which
Anne Frank took up this belief, without referring to the role it played in
her life. The matter cannot be decided in vacuo. As Phillips says, it is to
practice one must turn to determine what a given belief amounts to, and
whether someone believes it or not.
It will not do simply to assume that we can give the same account of
‘belief’ for every instance of ‘believing that p’. Indeed, I tend to agree
with Phillips that we shall not be able to do so. Of course, that conclu-
sion may be challenged; one might insists that a single unified account
of ‘belief’ shall prove possible after all. But it is difficult to see how
such a claim could be justified in the absence of any appeal to practice:
we will have to look and see. However, even assuming that Phillips’s
critics recognise this point, a further objection may be brought forward.
Phillips’s emphasis on the importance of an agent’s behaviour in deter-
mining what that agent believes might lead one to suspect that he is
actually proposing a behaviourist analysis of belief. Indeed, Scott and
Moore suggest that Phillips adheres to “a neo-behaviourist position,
which makes reference to an agent’s behaviour the essential part of 
any satisfactory account of an agent’s belief.”46 From this point of view,
the essence of belief is found in action rather than in what the believer
thinks or feels. In a footnote, Scott and Moore add that Wittgenstein
seems to have had a rather more measured view, by which they mean that,
in contrast to Phillips, Wittgenstein allowed that, in certain circumstances,
believing is characterised by what goes on in the ‘believer’s soul’.47 But
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nothing Phillips says rules out such a conclusion. His point, rather, is
that we learn what goes on in a person’s soul through his behaviour, 
i.e. the things he does and says, the way he reacts in certain circum-
stances, the way he lives his life. If this connection were cut, we could
say that anything or nothing goes on in his mind. In this sense, a per-
son’s behaviour is, indeed, an essential part of any satisfactory account
of an agent’s belief.
Although this may allay the critic’s worst fears, he is unlikely to be
satisfied. Perhaps Phillips does not then deny us the possibility of talking
meaningfully of what goes on in a person’s mind, that is, of attributing
certain ‘mental states’ to a person. Nevertheless, Phillips still seems to
claim that reference to an agent’s behaviour is both necessary and suffi-
cient in determining what that agent believes. But, surely, that will not
do. As noted already, first, a particular belief does not prescribe any par-
ticular form of behaviour, and, secondly, even in the absence of any sig-
nificant actions on the part of the believer, we may still meaningfully
attribute beliefs to him. How does Phillips deal with these problems?
It is certainly true that people who act in different ways may never-
theless be judged as sharing the same belief. After all, a particular
belief may mean different things to different people, and people may
react in various ways in response to a particular belief. For example,
believing that one is about to be consumed by flames, one might be
expected to do anything to avoid them. But equally, one might do noth-
ing if one were, say, incapacitated by fear; one might even approach
such an end fearlessly, if one believed it to be one’s fate.48 Consider, if
you will, the beliefs that one will die, in the near future, due to a seri-
ous illness, or that one’s spouse is cheating on one. One could associate
innumerable patterns of behaviour with these beliefs. Evidently then, a
person’s behaviour alone often will not suffice to tell us what that per-
son believes. Someone takes his umbrella with him when he leaves the
house. Does he believe that it is already raining, that it is going to rain,
in an hour, two hours, three? Surely this casts doubt on the claim that a
believer’s actions alone are sufficient to show what is believed.
Indeed, it does. However, one might provide Phillips’s critic with a
preliminary reply by pointing out that he leaves us empty-handed as to
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an alternative. For example, Scott and Moore argue that Phillips places
far too high a degree of confidence “in the evidence of a believer’s
actions alone being sufficient to show the meaning of what is believed,
when it is often an inadequate basis for judging what is believed.”49
However, I see no reason why Phillips should not agree that we can 
easily imagine situations where, going on a person’s behaviour, on the
things he says and does, the practices he engages in, etc., we may well
turn out to be mistaken in attributing any particular belief to that person.
How does the critic propose to remove this possibility of a mistake? He
cannot say that we should ask the believer what ‘mental state’ he is in at
present, i.e. what he believes. For one cannot rule out the possibility that
one may be lied to, or that the believer himself is unclear about what
state he is in. Moreover, one would be attributing a very narrow under-
standing of behaviour to Phillips: what a person says is no less ‘behav-
iour’ than what he does. Nor will it do to say that we can circumvent 
reference to a person’s behaviour in that we can attribute beliefs to that
person on the basis of his disposition to act in certain ways, should 
the appropriate conditions arise. For how do we decide whether or not
someone has the disposition to act in certain ways, given certain circum-
stances? The answer, I suggest, is either retrospectively, by witnessing
what he actually does in those circumstances, or else by reference to
other things he says and does, has said and done.
At this point the second objection mentioned will come in to play. 
It will be argued that, even if we allow that an agent’s actions provide
the evidence upon which we attribute beliefs to that agent, it does not
follow that, independently of that agent’s actions or capacity of perform-
ing actions, attribution of meaningful beliefs to that agent is confused 
or mistaken. For example, there seems to be no inconsistency involved
in saying that a person may form a certain belief but never act on it
because, e.g., he is completely paralysed.50 Scott and Moore do not
develop their example, nor do they provide any examples of the kind of
beliefs we might meaningfully attribute to such a person. Perhaps they
agree that extensive use of such an example to make a philosophical point
tends to become somewhat distasteful. Although we will need to take a
closer look at the example, fortunately, we need not dwell on it too long.
For it soon becomes clear that it does not present as big a challenge to
Phillips’s position as Scott and Moore seem to think.
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It makes sense, I suppose, to say of a person who is completely paral-
ysed that he believes that, given his physical disabilities, his life is 
no longer worth living. I suppose it also makes sense to say that, on the
contrary, he believes that his condition does not rob his life of all pur-
pose or value. Although our attributing either belief to him cannot be
based on any current behaviour on his part — assuming that the person
in question has also lost the capacity for communicating with us in any
way — this does not establish that we can sever the connection between
belief and behaviour. Quite the contrary; for our judgements concerning
the paralytic’s current state of mind will be based on our prior acquain-
tance with, and understanding of, that person, i.e. on what he did and
said before he became paralysed.
It might be argued, however, that this does not yet settle the issue. No
doubt, should a dispute arise, we would support our claim that the para-
lytic holds either of the two beliefs mentioned above by referring to our
prior acquaintance with him. But it does not follow that, in the absence
of such prior acquaintance, attribution of meaningful beliefs to that per-
son is confused. Perhaps this becomes clearer when we think of exam-
ples which do not involve a person’s views on what makes life worth
living, examples which do not involve, one might say, his moral or reli-
gious beliefs. For instance, he believes that the alarm on the heart-mon-
itor will go off should his heart rate drop below a certain rate; that, as
time goes by, his relatives will visit his sickbed less frequently; that the
lights will be turned off at ten; and so on. Although we have no way of
knowing whether the person in question actually holds any one of these
beliefs, it is still logically conceivable that he does.
Perhaps this should be admitted. Note, however, first, that on this
account, we can attribute any belief to the person in question. As far as
we are concerned, anything goes. This, I believe, should cast some doubt
on the claim that it makes sense to attribute any particular belief to him.
Secondly, even if we waive this point, we should not forget that the attri-
bution of such beliefs to a person depends upon us treating him as ‘a
normal person’. By this I mean that it only makes sense to suppose that
a person holds any of these beliefs if that person understands what it
means to believe any of these things, if he has learnt what is involved in
believing such things by participating in our shared human practices, our
language-games and form(s) of life. This becomes clear when we imag-
ine a person whose paralysis is not the result, say, of some tragic acci-
dent, but who has been paralysed and unable actively to participate in
common human activities from birth. Of course, I do not mean to say
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that we should not treat such a person ‘as a person’. But here it is far
from obvious that it makes sense to say that this person believes today to
be a particularly pleasant day.
These latter remarks, I believe, point us in the right direction. As indi-
cated, the above may provide a preliminary reply to Phillips’s critic.
However, it does not get to the heart of the matter. It might still be
thought that Phillips’s position implies some sort of behaviourist analy-
sis of belief, or, at the very least, that Phillips overestimates the relation
between a belief and the actions and behavioural patterns associated
with that belief. To disabuse the critic of this idea, one needs to empha-
sise that when Phillips says that ‘the meaning of a belief is shown in the
context of application of that belief’, he is not referring exclusively, nor
even primarily, to the believer’s behaviour. Phillips should insist, rightly,
I believe, that it is to a person’s behaviour, to what he says and does, that
one would look to determine whether someone believes something or
not. However, if I have understood him correctly, Phillips is not claim-
ing that the meaning of a particular belief is constituted by however any
individual believer happens to behave. That would completely miss the
fact that it is only within the broader context of our common practices,
our shared language-games and form(s) of life, that a certain kind of
behaviour is intelligible as behaviour properly associated with a particu-
lar belief. A particular belief may not prescribe any particular form of
behaviour, but this does not mean that any behaviour, whatsoever, can
be associated with a particular belief. After all, not only do we attribute
beliefs to agents on the basis of their words and deeds, but we also judge
the sincerity of their beliefs, the trustworthiness of their avowals of
belief, etc., on this basis. The criteria by means of which we do so are not
dependent on the particular behavioural patterns of any single individ-
ual. Rather, they are laid down in our common practices, “through acts
of mutual acknowledgement in the lives we share with one another.”51
One would do well to remember that, with regard to the belief that God
exists, Phillips argues that the meaning of ‘God exists’ is determined,
not by the behavioural patterns of individual believers, but by religious
language; that is to say, the meaning of the proposition ‘God exists’ 
is laid down in the broader context of our shared, historical, religious
practices.
Once it is realised that, for Phillips, ‘the context of application of 
a belief’ does not refer exclusively to the behaviour of any individual
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believer, but should be understood in a far broader sense, the objections
we have been discussing lose their sting. One or two examples should
clarify this point. First, consider one’s belief that a person is in pain.
Whether or not someone believes another to be in pain, and what that
belief means to that person, is shown in his behaviour, in what he says
and does.52 True, there are many forms of behaviour compatible with
that particular belief. For some, it will be a great source of sorrow — it is
their best friend who is suffering. For certain others it may be a source
of joy — it is their worst enemy. But there are limits to what will count
as intelligible behaviour. These limits rest on our broader understanding
of the concept of pain and of the various ways in which it enters into our
shared lives. Consider: we see someone scratching his nose and pulling
his left ear. We assume that he is itching, or perhaps the movements are
part of some kind of sign language? But, to our surprise, the person tells
us he is doing so because he believes his friend to be in pain. Should we
also find him tending to his friend’s pain, commiserating with him, etc.,
then we might disregard his odd behaviour, considering it a nervous
twitch. But, in the absence of any such further patterns of behaviour,
would we say, ‘Well, that’s just another way of expressing the belief that
one’s friend is in pain’, or ‘that’s what the belief means to him’? Surely
not. Rather, we should conclude that, if he is not simply mad, he does
not understand what it means to believe that someone is in pain.
For a final example, consider ordinary beliefs concerning matters 
of fact, for instance, the belief that there is a chair in the next room.
According to Phillips, one cannot say that one holds this factual belief,
and yet have nothing to do with the familiar ways in which we check
this fact:
“[I]f I said ‘[I believe] there is a chair in the next room’, while ignoring the
familiar ways of checking, I would not be making an assertion at all. I would
not be saying anything.”53
It has been suggested that these remarks reveal that Phillips is operat-
ing with a covert positivism.54 That conclusion, however, is mistaken.
Phillips is not so much asserting a link between the sense of a proposi-
tion and the method of its (empirical) verification. Rather, he is drawing
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our attention to the broader context of our shared practices in which talk
about naming, counting, locating, etc., physical objects has its sense. In
other words, he is clarifying the grammar of ‘there is a chair in the next
room’, which determines what would and would not be sensible to say
or do in connection with this proposition. Thus, when someone says 
that (he believes that) there is a chair in the next room,55 it makes sense
to ask him how he knows, whether he is sure, whether he has checked
recently, and so on. Of course, this does not mean that we must have
actually witnessed someone checking the next room to see if there is a
chair before it makes sense to attribute to him the belief that there is a
chair there. Nothing Phillips says is meant to deny the fact that people
may not act on their beliefs, for example, because they want to keep
their beliefs secret, or, indeed, are incapable of acting on them. But this
does not undermine the claim that there is a ‘normative’, ‘conceptual’ or,
if one pleases, ‘internal’ relation, between belief and behaviour. For
there is no doubt as to what will count as intelligible behaviour on the
part of those who do not act, if they were willing to do so or capable of
doing so.56 Should a person act, as it were, in violation of these internal
relations — for example, when asked whether he has checked that there
is a chair in the next room, he replies, like Beckett’s tramps, ‘What has
that got to do with anything?’ — we would not know what to make of
his avowal of belief. The words he uses no longer carry their normal
implications; they have been torn from their familiar contexts. To be
sure, the point is not that the words he uses have no meaning. Rather, the
use he makes of them is unintelligible, or, perhaps better, his utterance 
of these words does not constitute an intelligible use. In this sense, as
Phillips puts it, the person would not by making an assertion, would not
be saying anything at all.57
Our discussion so far should suffice to show that Phillips’s claim that
one cannot divorce belief from practice, i.e. from its context of applica-
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tion, is not based upon a behaviourist analysis of belief which encoun-
ters difficulties in accounting for the fact that having a particular belief
does not prescribe any particular form of behaviour, and for the fact that,
independently of that agent’s actions or capacity for performing actions,
attribution of meaningful beliefs to that agent need not be confused or
mistaken. There is, however, one final objection we need to consider. As
we saw, one reason to uphold a distinction between belief and the fruits
of belief is to accommodate the seemingly common-sense supposition
that, often enough, we act on the basis of antecedently formed beliefs,
e.g. I take an umbrella with me because I believe it will rain. Does this
not imply that a belief is logically prior to (at least some of) its conse-
quences, and does this not cast doubt on Phillips’s claim that one cannot
divorce a belief from its context of application, in that a belief is not
conceivable without the endeavours it informs?
By now, the answer to that question should no longer pose any dif-
ficulties. To say that we cannot divorce belief from practice is not to
say that the belief that it will rain is the actions we may or may not
perform on the basis of that belief, nor yet to say that in the absence 
of certain predetermined patterns of behaviour it makes no sense to
attribute that belief to a person. Rather, it is to remind us of the fact
that the broader context of our shared practices in which we talk about
the weather, make weather forecasts, prepare for the coming rains, etc.,
operates as a background to the belief that it will rain. Although, evi-
dently, one might well form the belief that it will rain prior to one’s
deciding to take an umbrella with one, one’s belief that it will rain can-
not sensibly be said to be logically prior to the contexts of application
of that belief, to this broader context in which it is determined what it
means to say that it will rain, and in which the conceptual parameters
are set as to what it makes sense to do and say in relation to the belief
that it will rain. A similar case can be made with regards to the (reli-
gious) belief that God exists. Perhaps we should allow that it makes
sense to say that someone can form this belief prior to being engaged
in ‘the endeavour it informs’, i.e. prior to being engaged in any reli-
gious practice, such as praying, worshipping, etc. However, what we
cannot allow, Phillips argues, is the realist’s claim that the belief that
God exists is logically prior to the totality of our religious practices,
that is, to any religious context of application. For it is within the
broader context of our shared religious practices and the historical tra-
ditions in which they are embedded that the proposition ‘God exists’
has its sense. Belief, one might say, is ‘a phenomenon of human life’;
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to have significance, it requires an appropriate surrounding and an
antecedent history.58
Let us take stock of our argument so far. Phillips’s conclusion that
(theological) realism is incoherent, we argued, depends on the truth of
the following two premises: first, that the meaning of a belief is shown
in the context of application of that belief, and, secondly, that realism
severs belief from the activities, commitments, practices, etc. which give
it its sense. We considered a number of possible objections to the first
premise. We sought to defuse these by emphasising that in referring 
us to the context of application of a belief, Phillips is not referring us to
the contingent behavioural patterns of individual believers. If my argu-
ments are sound, the upshot of our discussion is that Phillips successfully
establishes the first premise of his argument. One cannot separate belief
from practice, from its contexts of application. The question, of course,
is whether the realist is committed to doing so. In other words, does
Phillips establish the second premise of his argument?
If one upheld a distinction between belief and fruits of belief, such
that one argued the latter to include the totality of possible contexts of
application of the belief, including all actions and dispositions intelligi-
bly associated with it, then one would indeed be in difficulty explaining
what belief could consist in. But there is no reason why the realist should
uphold such a rigorous distinction between belief and fruits of belief. He
could easily adopt a more moderate distinction between belief and fruits
of belief. That is to say, he may admit that it is not possible to give 
an account of the meaning of ‘God exists’ without reference to some
context of application, and yet insist that it is possible to do so without
referring to any religious context of application, that is, without referring
to our historical religious practices and the attitudes, forms of behaviour,
commitments, etc., associated with them. For example, Scott and Moore
argue that “there is no a priori reason why the realist should not be able
to do this in terms of, for example, scientific practices, i.e. the belief that
God exists can be understood as a type of scientific hypothesis.”59
Now, I take it Scott and Moore do not mean to suggest that the 
primary or paradigmatic contexts of application of the belief that God
exists are to be located within science. That would be a rather curious
suggestion. For, unless I have been very much misinformed, the hypoth-
esis that God exists plays, at best, a rather marginal role in contemporary
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scientific practices. Rather, their point seems to be akin to Bailey’s which
was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. That is, the belief that
God exists can be understood as the hypothetical, factual, and cognitive
belief that a certain being or entity, called God, exists. In other words,
we can account for the belief that God exists in much the same way as
we would account for many of our ordinary, everyday empirical beliefs.
It has its sense in our talk about physical objects, a familiar feature of
which, one might add, is our indifference to the existence of many of
them. Thus, just like, for example, the (false) belief that unicorns exist,
or the (true) belief that platypuses exist, the belief that God exists, true
or false, need not involve any commitment, affective state or attitude at
all, let alone of a religious kind.
Phillips is not ignorant of the kind of objection entailed by such a
more moderate version of theological realism. He recognises that his
conclusion that theological realism is methodologically incoherent may
be argued to be premature:
“What the realist is urging, it may be said, is not that the essence of religious
belief can be understood without reference to a context of application, but
that the context involved does not feature the characteristic commitments of
the religious life.”60
Although Phillips believes that this is ‘too generous’ to the philosophi-
cal implications of realism, he is willing to suppose that the objection
stands, and consider its implications. The revised realist’s argument is not
obviously invalid. It is at least logically conceivable that belief in God’s
existence can be understood in the manner specified. However, one
should not forget that in designating ‘our talk of physical objects’ as the
correct context of application for the belief that God exists, one has set
the conceptual parameters within which our talk of God is to take place.
That is to say, it should make sense more or less to do and say the same
things in connection with the belief that God exists as it makes sense to
do and say in connection with our other beliefs concerning the existence
of certain physical objects or entities. This is precisely what Phillips
denies. He argues that there are profound disanalogies between talk of
God and talk of matters of fact, disanalogies which the realist either
ignores or fails to take into account. This conception of belief in God
provides, “not the essence of believing the realist seeks, but, at best,
deviations, distortions, and approximations, when compared with what
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really believing in God involves.”61 To put it differently, to treat ‘God’
as a substantive and to say that one is indifferent to the existence of the
‘something’ it ‘stands for’ is
“to import an alien grammar into our language concerning God. To make this
assertion of God’s existence the essence of believing, the realist would have
to show otherwise; he would have to show that grammar is appropriate.”62
It should be clear that Phillips is no longer accusing the realist of method-
ological confusion. Rather, his claim is that the realist’s account of ‘God
exists’ is descriptively inadequate. Can Phillips substantiate that claim? We
turn to that question in the next section. However, we shall approach this
question, not primarily, as Phillips suggests, by asking whether the realist
can show that his account of the grammar of ‘God exists’ is appropriate
but, rather, by asking whether Phillips can establish that it is inappropriate.
8.3 Theological realism is descriptively inadequate
“Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is.”63 If we want to
understand the meaning of a certain concept, if we want to understand in
what sense, if any, the concept can be said to refer to an object, we must
investigate the grammar of the concept in question. We need to reflect on
the contexts of application in which the concept is embedded. According
to Phillips, in the case of the reality of God this requirement has all too
often been overlooked or taken for granted:
“Because the question of divine reality can be construed as ‘Is God real or
not?’ it has often been assumed that the dispute between the believer and
the unbeliever is over a matter of fact. The philosophical investigation of
the reality of God then becomes the philosophical investigation appropriate
to an assertion of a matter of fact.”64
More often than not, Phillips argues, it is assumed that the word ‘God’
functions as a name. One then starts looking for the object or entity it
stands for. In this way, talk about God comes to be treated as talk about
matters of fact. According to Phillips, such a treatment misrepresents the
religious concept. An investigation of the grammar of the concept shows
that talk about God’s existence cannot be construed as talk about the
existence of an object or about a matter of fact:
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“To say that x is a fact is to say something about the grammar of x; it is to
indicate what it would and would not be sensible to say or do in connection
with it. To say that the concept of divine reality does not share this gram-
mar is to reject the possibility of talking about God in the way in which one
talks about matters of fact.”65
As noted, Phillips does not claim that ‘God’ cannot refer, or that the
believer must be confused when he says that it is a fact that God exists.
The point is that we need to contextualise such expressions. We need to
examine what they amount to in their natural contexts of application.
Once we do so, Phillips argues, it becomes clear that talk about God
cannot be assimilated to talk about matters of fact:
“The main reason for these differences is that God’s reality is not one of a
kind; He is not a being among beings. The word ‘God’ is not the name of
a thing. Thus, the reality of God cannot be assessed by a common measure
which also applies to things other than God.”66
Phillips provides a number of reasons why we should reject a factual
understanding of ‘God’ as grammatically improper. To begin with, to
say that God’s existence is a matter of fact implies that God is revealed
and discovered in the world in the same way that physical facts are
revealed and discovered. Furthermore, this suggests that God’s reality is
a contingent matter and that, as with the existence of physical objects or
entities, it should make sense to say that God may cease to exist, or pass
away. Finally, like our normal beliefs concerning the existence of a cer-
tain objects or entities, one should expect the belief that God exists to 
be held more or less tentatively, depending upon the evidence available.
According to Phillips, when we examine belief in God in its natural, reli-
gious contexts of application, we come to see that none of these sugges-
tions holds true. Let us consider them in reverse order.
When someone tells us he believes that some type of being exists, say
the platypus, it makes sense to ask him whether he is quite sure, whether
he has checked the facts, how long such a strange animal has existed,
whether it still exists, where, exactly, it is located, and so on. None of this,
Phillips argues, makes any sense in relation to the belief that God exists.
Again, Phillips reminds us, we find religious believers saying that it is a
terrible thing not to believe in God. Believing in God is called a virtue,
and failing to believe a sin. Believing is something capable of growth, and
this growth is said to be the increasing presence of God in one’s life. None
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of this makes any sense where belief in platypuses is concerned. If believ-
ing in God is to believe in the existence of a thing, or a certain type of
being, one might wonder why it is so terrible to say that the thing in ques-
tion might not exist. Indeed, one might be puzzled as to why there is such
a fuss about these matters anyway, since religious believers only believe
them to be true. We might say, as we would normally in such cases, ‘You
only believe — Oh, well…’.67 But, Phillips asks, surely this is not the way
in which the word ‘belief’ is used in religion? Would it not be queer to say
of worshippers, ‘They only believe there is a God’?
Phillips’s point is that in treating the belief in God as a factual belief,
we fail to capture the conviction involved in a confession of faith. Where
our beliefs concerning matters of fact are concerned, there is always 
logical space for some degree of uncertainty. It makes sense to ask for
further evidence in support of any given belief and, should the evidence
turn out to be inconclusive, either to exercise some reserve towards the
belief, or abandon it altogether. No such uncertainty and tentativeness,
Phillips argues, enters into talk about God’s existence.
This might lead one to think that talk about believing in God is better
served when compared with talk about knowing something. When some-
one claims to know something there also does not seem to be any uncer-
tainty involved. That God exists, one might conclude, is something 
the believer claims to know beyond reasonable doubt. But, according to
Phillips, this still misses the point. God’s existence is still construed as a
matter of fact, something which can be argued. After all, when someone
claims to know something it makes sense to ask how he knows; what
evidence or proof he has. But in the case of religious beliefs such ques-
tions would be out of place. It would be an insult to the God of Scripture
to argue for His possible existence as such an argument presupposes the
possibility of His non-existence:
“Making God subject to the assessment of probabilities makes Him subject
to criteria of assessment which seem to be endowed with greater authority
than the divine object of assessment. […] for the believer, God is the sov-
ereign measure of all things. For him, how can such a measure be subject
to measurement?”68
The point is that whereas empirical matters are matters of contingency,
God’s existence is not; it is characterised by a kind of necessity; it can-
not be questioned. Religious believers are not prepared to say that God
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might not exist. Not, Phillips adds, because “as a matter of fact God will
always exist”, but because “it makes no sense to say that God might 
not exist.”69 The question of God’s existence, as something for which
evidence must be sought, simply does not find a place in the traffic of
religious discourse.70 Religious beliefs, Phillips insists, are not taught as
beliefs which require further evidence or reasons to justify them. The
word ‘God’ may be among the earliest learnt. We learn it through pic-
tures, stories, catechisms, etc. But, Phillips warns us, this does not have
“the same consequences as with pictures of aunts. I wasn’t shown [that
which the picture pictured]”.71 Normally, we come to learn about the
existence of something or someone by having this thing or that person
pointed out or presented to us. But, surely, we do not make our acquain-
tance with God by getting to meet Him and shake His hand.72 Although
there are images of God, there are no pictures of God. And although 
the believer may say God is present in his life, God cannot be presented
to us as we could be introduced to an aunt we have not yet met. In this
sense, God, unlike physical objects or persons, is necessarily unavailable.
This point may be expanded by considering the way in which we estab-
lish identities where objects or persons are concerned: the same aunt, the
same animal, the same planet, and so on. Nothing of this kind, Phillips
argues, enters into considerations as to whether two people worship the
same God:
“In a dispute about whether two people are discussing the same person there
are ways of removing the doubt, but the identity of a god is not like the
identity of a human being. To say that one worships the same God as some-
one else is not to point to the same object or to be confronted with it.”73
How did Paul, for example, know that the God he worshipped was also
the God of Abraham? What enabled him to say this, Phillips argues, was
not anything like an objective method of reaching an agreement as, say,
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in the case of two astronomers who check whether they are talking about
the same star. Rather, what enabled Paul to say that he worshipped the
God of Abraham was the fact that although many changes had taken
place in the concept of God, there was nevertheless a common religious
tradition in which both he and Abraham stood:
“it is to these contexts of religious traditions and above all, of worship, that
we must turn if the idea of God’s identity is to have any sense. So if some-
one asks how a person knew it was God, he could only answer in terms of
what worship and praise mean to him. The question cannot be answered in
the way one could answer the question, ‘How do you know it was that per-
son and not another one?’”74
To see whether two people mean the same by ‘God’, we need to refer,
not to some object called ‘God’, but to what belief comes to in their
lives, to what worship and praise amount to for them.75 In other words,
we need to examine the contexts of application of religious beliefs, to
see how their sense is mediated in the lives of the believers. Now, in the
previous chapters, we have sought to do so where the belief in miracles
and the belief in eternal life are concerned. No doubt the realist would
argue that these beliefs are logically dependent upon the (factual) belief
that there is a God; a causally efficacious divine being, who can perform
miracles and grant eternal life. Phillips, as we saw, rejects these conclu-
sions. To apprehend a certain event as a miracle is not to explain the
inexplicable in terms of divine causality. Rather than the inexplicable
giving significance to religion, it are the various religious contexts which
give significance to the inexplicable; a religious significance, which has
little sense outside the contexts of worship and devotion. Again, to talk
of life after death is not to refer to some future state of affairs which only
God can be said to bring about. Rather, the immortality of the soul refers
to a person’s relation to the self-effacement and love of others involved
in dying to the self. Death is overcome in that dying to the self is the
meaning of the believer’s life; this is what is meant by giving glory to
God. In short, the belief in miracles and the belief in immortality are not
to be construed as factual beliefs, as explanations or hypotheses which
are based on the axiom that there exist a causally efficacious divine
being. Rather, they provide the religious contexts which constitute the
meaning of the believer’s life. Far from being prior to them, the sense of
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the reality of God has its significance in these religious contexts. Let us
examine one final example to complete the picture.
Consider, if you will, how the notion of the inscrutable will of God
may enter into human life. Once again, the realist will insist that the 
possibility of talking of the will of God depends on the prior belief that
there is a god who can will certain things. And, once again, Phillips
reject this assumption. The first thing we should realise, Phillips argues,
is that God’s will does not happen to be inscrutable to us. Rather, the
notion is born of what is necessarily inscrutable to us. It is when con-
fronted with the contingencies of human life — such as the death of a
child — that people may react by saying ‘It is the will of God’. Accord-
ing to Phillips, this is not a consequence of some previously held belief.
People do not react in this way because they have reached the prior con-
clusion that, because they are not responsible for the death of the child,
someone else, namely God, must be. On the contrary, the sense of belief
in God is itself rooted in reactions such as these. Neither is the reaction an
attempt to explain what has happened. To say ‘It is the will of God’ is not
to answer the question ‘Why is this happening?’. Rather, it is one way
of coming to terms with the explanations that have been given, e.g. ‘the
child died of pneumonia’. The notion of God’s will “is formed, not in a
search for explanations, but in the abandonment of explanations.”76
Of course, Phillips reminds us, people need not react like this. There
are many other possibilities:
“Faced with the events which befall them men have said, ‘It’s Fate’, ‘It’s
absurd’, ‘It’s meaningless’, ‘That’s how things are’, ‘That’s life’, ‘That’s
the way the cookie crumbles’ as well as ‘It’s the will of God’.”77
What is important, Phillips argues, is that all these other possibilities are
just as much reactions as the religious response. They are not inferences
or arguments; none of them represents the rational reaction as opposed
to the others. According to Phillips, no further justification can be given
of these reactions, nor can any alternative account explain them away.
The best one can do is to bring out their force by showing the life — or
lack of life — which surrounds them. For example, recognition of the
will of God will have a bearing on specific events in people’s lives. A
sense of ‘being in God’s hands’ leads the believer to see that nothing is
his by right and this will have consequences for the satisfaction and dis-
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appointment of his desires. After all his efforts are done, he sees the out-
come is in the hands of God:
“For the Christian, the necessity and unavoidability of death show the essential
contingency of all things, his own creature-hood, that all things are a gift, that
nothing is his by right. His response to this is one of humility and gratitude.”78
In this way, the sense of the will of God is mediated in the life of the
believer. It provides him with a perspective which makes it possible to
think of human life in a certain way. Phillips insists that it would be a
grave misunderstanding of the grammar of such religious perspectives to
say that they are descriptive or referential. Rather, one should say they
are expressive. What they express is called the worship of God. The reli-
gious perspectives
“give one a language in which it is possible to think about human life in a
certain way. [They] provide the logical space within which such thoughts
can have a place. When these thoughts are found in worship, the praising
and the glorifying does not refer to some object called God. Rather, the
expression of such praise and glory is what we call the worship of God.”79
According to Phillips, when someone comes to see that there is a God,
when God becomes a reality in his life, one can hardly say that this has
come about by his discovering an object. What has happened “is that he
has found God in a praise, a thanksgiving, a confessing and an asking
which were not his before.”80
“Coming to see that there is a God is not like coming to see that an addi-
tional being exists. If it were, there would be an extension of one’s knowl-
edge of facts, but no extension of one’s understanding. Coming to see that
there is a God involves seeing a new meaning in one’s life, and being given
a new understanding.”81
Clearly then, Phillips concludes, to ask whether God exists is not to ask a
factual question. Despite appearances, such expressions as ‘God exists’
or ‘God is real’ are not statements in the indicative mood but, rather,
expressions of faith. Whether or not God exists is not something that can
and should be determined before one commits oneself to leading a reli-
gious life.82 To find one’s way to God is to embark on a spiritual journey;
embracing the reality of God is itself a religious act: “Acknowledgement
358 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
78 Phillips 1976, p. 147.
79 Phillips 1976, p. 149.
80 Phillips 1976, p. 181.
81 Phillips 1970, pp. 17-18.
82 The ‘before’, of course, should be understood in a logical rather than a temporal or
biographical sense.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_04  01-02-2006  11:20  Pagina 358
of a spiritual reality takes the form, not of a factual assertion, but a con-
fession: ‘Thou art God.’”83
At this stage of the discussion, it may be helpful to remind ourselves
of the thread of the argument so far. Phillips’s aim is to establish that the
realist’s analysis of the reality of God is descriptively inadequate: it
“obviously fail[s] to capture the primary language of faith.”84 To this
end, Phillips draws our attention to certain disanalogies between talk of
God and talk about matters of fact which, or so Phillips claims, the real-
ist either neglects or fails to account for. At the same time he presents 
an alternative analysis of the reality of God which, Phillips believes, is
capable of taking these differences into account, and does justice to 
the role belief in God plays in its religious contexts of application. Are
Phillips’s arguments conclusive? I do not believe they are. First, I am
not convinced that the realist is unable to accommodate the disanalogies
Phillips brings to the fore. Secondly, Phillips’s suggestion that religious
beliefs function as ‘grammatical’ or ‘basic’ propositions raises a number
of questions which are not so easily resolved. Finally, one may well
doubt whether Phillips’s account performs any better than that of the
realist where its descriptive adequacy is concerned. In the remainder of
this section I hope to justify these contentions.
First, then, is the realist really at a loss to account for the disanalogies
between talk of God and talk of matters of fact to which Phillips draws
our attention? As we saw, Phillips reminds us that denials of God’s exis-
tence tend to attract moral condemnation whereas the existence of any-
thing or anyone else can be denied without attracting such criticism. But,
as Bailey points out, even if we accept this as a fact, it is not at all clear
why it should pose a problem for the realist. If ‘God’ is the name of a
causally efficacious divine being of surpassing power and goodness who
has freely chosen to create and further the welfare of all human beings,
and if the statement ‘God exists’ is true, then this is a fact about the world
that is of overwhelming importance to everyone. Now imagine a non-reli-
gious statement about something that would be regarded by most people
as a matter of considerable importance, say, someone tells me my son
suffers from a serious disease which requires immediate medical atten-
tion. It seems obvious that, if my only reaction is to reply ‘Possibly, I’m
not so sure myself’, I actually believe that this statement has no chance of
being true at all. Thus, as Bailey observes, the realist can readily argue
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“that it is the potential importance of the claims made by these statements
that accounts for the way in which a response like ‘Well, possibly’ constitutes
a dismissive rejection of such statements rather than an acknowledgement that
there might be something of substance to be said on their behalf.”85
Phillips’s other examples are likewise inconclusive. The doctrine that God
cannot begin to exist or cease to exist, the realist might admit, reveals a
difference between the object ‘God’ and the object ‘table’. But it does
little to establish that, as Wittgenstein puts it, what is here at issue is not
the existence of something. To adopt an example of John Hyman’s: “If
Democritus believed that atoms cannot begin or cease to exist, it does
not follow that he did not believe that an atom is eine Existenz — an
entity, or something which exists.”86 Again, Phillips’s reminder that
believing in God is something capable of growth, and that this growth is
said to be the increasing presence of God in one’s life, does not demon-
strate conclusively that the belief that God exists cannot be thought of as
a factual belief about the existence of a certain entity. In overcoming my
doubts, reservations, temptations, etc., my belief that God exists may
grow, in the sense that it becomes more of a certainty for me and, con-
sequently, begins to play a more important role in my life: God’s pres-
ence in my life is increased. To put it differently, the realist can argue
that the fact that God’s presence in my life can be said to increase does
not indicate a grammatical peculiarity about the belief that God exists
but refers to the way in which my relation to and participation in reli-
gious practices, such as prayer and worship, may change over time. After
all, believing in God involves more than asserting the existence of an
entity. The realist only claimed that the former implies the latter, not that
it can be reduced to it.
Let us consider one final example. Phillips observes that, unlike any
other physical object, God is not identified by being pointed to or pre-
sented. According to Scott and Moore, this observation is unlikely to
impress the realist. He can simply claim that the fact that we cannot
point to or present God does not prove that ‘God’ does not designate
something, but is due to the peculiar properties of God. God, unlike any
other physical object, is transcendent, and one cannot point to or present
something that is transcendent.87 As Scott and Moore realise, Phillips
would reject this conclusion as an attempt to explain away what is an
evident grammatical difference between talk about God and talk about
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physical objects. According to Scott and Moore, it is a crucial part of
Phillips’s argument “that God’s unavailability is a grammatical fact
about the concept ‘God’ rather than a fact about God”.88 Although this
is partly right, it is also misleading, for it seems to imply that we simply
stand to choose: ‘unavailability’ could indicate either a difference in
grammar or a property of a particular object. But what would it mean to
say that a certain object is unavailable in the relevant sense? If I have
understood him correctly, Phillips’s point is not to deny, as intelligible
but false, that God is an object, though, as it happens, a transcendent
one. Rather, he aims to remind us of the fact that where our talk about
physical objects is concerned, such notions as ‘unavailability’ and ‘tran-
scendence’ have no clear application. To understand these notions we
have to examine them in their natural, religious contexts of application.
Once we do so, Phillips argues, we come to see that ‘transcendence’ or
‘unavailability’ are not God’s way of hiding from our view. Quite the
contrary; they are His mode of appearance. Coming to know God is
coming to see He is a hidden God:
“language is not a screen which hides God from us. On the contrary, the
idea of God in the language we have been explaining, is the idea of a hid-
den God — Vere tu es Deus absconditus.”89
In other words, God’s unavailability is part of the very grammar of 
the concept of God. It is the way in which this notion is mediated in the
believer’s life which determines the sense it has.90 I agree; at least to the
extent that I believe it is not very helpful to insist that it is highly debat-
able that it is a criterion for x being a physical object, or something anal-
ogous to a physical object, that x can be pointed to or depicted. Scott and
Moore argue that a physical object can be so small, or have such a brief
existence, or undergo such rapid changes, or be so chaotic or diffuse, that
it would be impossible for us to construct an accurate depiction of it.
Again, they ask us to consider sub-atomic particles. These, too, cannot
be pointed to — indeed under certain circumstances they lack a posi-
tion — and can only be presented indirectly by their effects on other
objects. Surely, Phillips would not wish to deny, bluntly, that sub-atomic
particles are objects. Rather, his position would have to be that, because
they cannot be picked out ostensively, their reality is not the same as the
reality of mountains, books, people, etc. But, for the same reason, the
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reality of sub-atomic particles is analogous to the reality of God. Surely,
this must weaken Phillips’s argument?91
Perhaps so. While I do not wish to deny the ingenuity of Scott and
Moore’s line of reasoning, I cannot help but feel that a comparison
between God and sub-atomic particles tends to comedy rather than to 
a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of God. Scott and
Moore might reply, however, that I have misunderstood the drift of their
argument. They are not suggesting that we can learn what is meant by
saying that God is real by means of an investigation of sub-atomic par-
ticles. Rather, they are questioning the adequacy of Phillips’s notion of
‘grammar’. Talk about God is, quite clearly, not on a par with talk about
tables or chairs. Again, believing that God exists is admittedly very
unlike believing a hypothesis in history or in science. Then again, talk
about my loved ones is also very different from talk about tables and
chairs, and believing that there is some milk left in the fridge cannot,
without further ado, be assimilated to believing in the theory of evolu-
tion. To say that there are grammatical differences between our talk about
God and our talk about matters of fact glosses over the fact that ‘talk
about matters of fact’ does not designate a clearly demarcated area of
discourse characterised by a uniform grammar. In other words, we need
not deny the grammatical disanalogies Phillips brings to our attention.
But we do need to ask what these differences imply. Are they superficial
or profound? What aspects of a term’s grammar enter into a decision
about the sense in which that term designates?92 Scott and Moore’s com-
plaint is that Phillips does not supply an adequate notion of ‘grammar’
to determine these issues; Phillips does not “explain what he means by
‘grammar’ in sufficient detail to show what would be entailed by our
conceding that ‘God cannot be pointed to’ is a grammatical statement.”93
This, I believe, is a serious criticism of Phillips’s account, and one which
deserves careful attention. This brings us to the second problem concern-
ing Phillips’s analysis of the reality of God.
Phillips’s account of God’s existence as inescapable, unquestionable,
in a word, as necessary existence, raises at least two questions. First, it
might lead one to suspect that Phillips is advocating some revised ver-
sion of the ontological argument. However, this argument, in its various
forms, has been subjected to severe criticism and is widely held to be
invalid. Is Phillips’s account not similarly vulnerable? Secondly, if God’s
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existence is indeed necessary in such a way that it makes no sense to
question or deny it, then how does Phillips account for the undeniable
fact that it is questioned and that such questioning is not seldom the
prelude to rejection?
As to the first question, it is easy to see how one might reach the con-
clusion that Phillips’s account suffers from problems not unlike those
that plague the ontological argument. As far as the realist is concerned,
Phillips’s talk about certain perspectives within which the reality of God
has its meaning obscures the main issue, namely, the fundamental dis-
agreement about the existence of God. Some say there is a God, some say
there is not. The dispute centres around the assertion or denial of some-
thing or other, an entity of some kind. Talk of perspectives obscures this,
since these perspectives presuppose the reality of God. Just as we cannot
pass from various assertions concerning the kind of being God would
have to be if He existed, to His existence, so, too, no talk of perspectives
can replace enquiry into the question as to whether God exists.
Needless to say, according to Phillips, this argument is misconceived,
in that it is based upon the assumption that God is a being who may 
be said to exist, and that this existence is such that it makes sense to say
that God may or may not exist. As we have seen, Phillips insists that it
makes no sense to suppose that God might not exist. Of course, the onto-
logical argument also purports to establish that one cannot sensibly deny
God’s existence. The problem is that it may still be taken as an attempt
to establish that a certain state of affairs holds true, albeit necessarily
true. What is correct about the ontological argument is that it recognises
that ‘God exists’ is a necessary, rather than a contingent empirical propo-
sition. But whereas empirical propositions can be said to describe possi-
ble states of affairs, necessary propositions cannot be said to describe
necessary states of affairs. Their role is normative rather than descrip-
tive. This, Phillips argues, is what Wittgenstein is after when he says
that the believer has “what you might call an unshakeable belief. It will
show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but
rather by regulating for all in his life.”94 As Phillips puts it, religious
beliefs, such as ‘God exists’, provide the believer with a language in
terms of which the believer’s conduct is to be understood:
“It is a language which in itself gives the believer certain possibilities in
which to live and judge his life. Hence the kind of necessity connected with
religious beliefs. They are certainly not hypotheses. It is even misleading to
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call them propositions. Though the term has dangers of its own, to avoid
the associations of the above terms, it would be better to call the religious
beliefs dogmas: the absolutes of faith.”95
Given these remarks it should not come as a surprise that Phillips sug-
gests that we should compare the role these ‘dogmas’ play to the role
played by what Wittgenstein calls ‘grammatical propositions’. As we
saw, according to Wittgenstein, necessary propositions function as, or
are linked to, grammatical propositions; sentences which are typically
used to express grammatical rules. Although, like empirical propositions,
grammatical propositions can be said to be true, their ‘truth’ consists not
in stating how things are, but in accurately expressing a rule. These rules
are standards for the correct use of an expression, which determine its
meaning: to give the meaning of a word, is to specify its grammar.
Clearly, there is no such thing as an empirical falsification of a grammat-
ical proposition. For its normative status means that the grammatical
proposition itself is constitutive of the meaning of its constituent terms.
For example, the role of the grammatical proposition ‘All bachelors are
unmarried’ is not to make a true statement of fact about bachelors but to
explain the meaning of ‘bachelor’. It cannot be overthrown by the puta-
tive statement ‘This bachelor is married’ for the latter is a nonsensical
combination of signs. We do not call a married man a bachelor. Thus, as
Hans-Johann Glock observes, the denial of a grammatical proposition
“displays not factual ignorance but linguistic misunderstanding. Most
importantly, it excludes not a genuine possibility, but only a nonsensical
form of words.”96
Now, does Phillips propose to treat religious beliefs as grammatical
propositions in the sense explicated above? One important indication
that this is indeed the case may be found in the way in which Phillips
develops Wittgenstein’s rather cryptic remark ‘theology as grammar’.97
According to Phillips, theology is best understood as ‘the grammar of
religious belief’, in the sense that it provides the rules that regulate the
use of religious concepts, constituting their meaning. In this way, “the-
ology decides what it makes sense to say to God and about God.”98 Thus,
in Phillips’s view, at least certain religious expressions can be under-
stood as grammatical propositions:
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“our talk of God, for example, saying that ‘God is love’ is constitutive of
what we mean by divine reality. ‘God is love’ is not a description of God
which may be true or false, but a grammatical rule for one use, albeit a pri-
mary one, of the word ‘God’. In the mouth of the believer it takes the form
of a confession of faith.”99
Evidently, to treat ‘God is love’ as a rule for the use of the word God,
i.e. as a grammatical proposition, has the advantage that it supports
Phillips’s contention that this expression cannot sensibly be denied. How-
ever, it also raises a number of questions. First, it is important to note
that Wittgenstein has a functional or dynamic conception of grammatical
rules. A grammatical proposition as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is a
logical or an analytical truth in the traditional sense of the term. It can be
reduced to a tautology by substituting synonyms for synonyms.100 Thus,
‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is transformed into ‘All unmarried men
are unmarried’. However, as Glock points out, Wittgenstein’s distinction
between grammatical and empirical propositions deviates from the posi-
tivists’ analytic/synthetic distinction, at least in this respect that many of
his grammatical propositions do not fit into even the most generous list
of analytical truths. Wittgenstein characterises grammatical propositions,
not in terms of their form or structure, but by reference to linguistic
behaviour. Whether a given utterance expresses a grammatical propo-
sition, i.e. is used to express a linguistic rule, depends on its role on
occasion of utterance, on whether in the particular case it is used as a
standard of correctness.101 Thus, should Phillips wish to stay true to
Wittgenstein’s account of grammatical propositions — and there is noth-
ing that indicates otherwise — he cannot mean to say that the fact that
‘God is love’ is a grammatical proposition follows from the nature of
this expression as such. Phillips needs to show that this expression is, in
fact, used as a standard of correctness. Now, although one can perhaps
imagine circumstances where ‘God is love’ is employed to express a
rule,102 it does not seem plausible to suggest that this is the only role the
expression plays. As Phillips himself indicates: ‘in the mouth of the
believer the expression takes the form of a confession of faith.’ But,
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surely, to confess one’s faith is to do something more, or something else,
than to provide a rule for the meaning of ‘God’.
It seems evident that these considerations point to an important differ-
ence between religious beliefs, and such grammatical propositions as
‘All bachelors are unmarried’. After all, it makes little sense to say that
in the mouth of the ‘ordinary language speaker’ the latter takes the form
of a confession of faith. In this respect, von Stosch reminds us that gram-
matical propositions regulate our linguistic practices, and our behaviour,
for the most part without us being consciously aware of this. By con-
trast, religious expressions, e.g. ‘God is love’, are, on Phillips’s account,
constitutive of a way of looking at and judging one’s life to which the
believer must explicitly and consciously commit himself.103 In Wittgen-
stein’s words, religious belief is something like a passionate commit-
ment to a system of reference; it’s passionately seizing hold of this inter-
pretation.104
The second question I wish to raise concerns the way in which we
teach someone the meaning of a word (or correct someone’s misuse of a
word). Evidently, in order to explain the meaning of a word or expres-
sion to someone, this person must be acquainted with the meaning of 
the words in which our explanation is couched. For example, one cannot
explain the meaning of ‘bachelor’ by saying ‘All bachelors are unmar-
ried’ to someone who does not know what ‘unmarried’ denotes. To apply
this to the case at hand, in order for the explanation of the meaning of
the word ‘God’ by means of the grammatical proposition ‘God is love’
to be successful, the person addressed must already know how meaning-
fully to apply the word ‘love’. The problem is that, according to Phillips,
the Christian concept of love has little in common with our ‘normal’ con-
cept of love, i.e. the love between husband and wife, children and parent,
friend and friend, or the love for a particular type of food, a particular
type of sports, and so on. In fact, Phillips argues, the religious concept
of love can only be understood in relation to the concept of an eternal,
loving God.105 If so, then ‘God is love’ tells the uninitiated next to noth-
ing about what it makes sense to say of God. We might as well say that
‘God is love’ provides a grammatical rule for the use of the word ‘love’
rather than the other way round. Of course, Phillips might reply that
these concepts, in their religious contexts of application, simply are inter-
related and connected to one another in a myriad of ways. One cannot
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explicate one, without explicating the other. Fair enough. Neverthe-
less, one would like to know whether there is any overlap, as it were,
between the grammar which regulates our non-religious practices and
the grammar which regulates religious practices. It is difficult not to
share von Stosch’s suspicion that, sometimes, Wittgensteinian philoso-
phers of religion seem to claim that all religious expressions either are,
or can be derived from, grammatical propositions.106 For example,
Robert L. Arrington argues that not only ‘God is love’ should be under-
stood as a grammatical proposition, but, so too, should ‘God exists’,
‘God is omnipotent, omniscient and eternal’, and ‘God is my Creator’.
Likewise, the belief that Jesus rose from the dead, and belief in miracles
in general, should be understood in terms of “a commitment to a way of
conceptualising the world, a commitment to a set of grammatical propo-
sitions.”107 At one stage, Arrington seems to take a step back, reassuring
us that his thesis does not entail that all religious statements are gram-
matical in nature. Some may be understood as factual or descriptive, for
example, ‘I am a sinner’, ‘God loves me’ and ‘God has a purpose in tak-
ing this child’.108 However, this concession is short-lived; in a footnote
Arrington adds that we could just as well argue that these assertions,
too, express grammatical propositions. Indeed, a few pages further on, we
find that the believer who moans ‘I am a thoroughly worthless wretch’
or ‘I have sinned’ is, according to Arrington, “simply applying to him-
self the religious grammatical rules defining human nature.”109
Arrington’s, in my opinion, over-enthusiastic utilisation of the notion
of a grammatical proposition may lead one to wonder whether religious
believers ever get round to saying something about something.110 Sure;
to play a game one needs some set of rules. But where religious lan-
guage-games are concerned it starts to seem as if the whole point of the
game consists in citing the rules! Perhaps more importantly, the more
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religious assertions one designates as grammatical propositions, the more
one immunises religious language and religious practices.111 Such a
strategy may seem appealing to an apologist. That same apologist should
be aware, however, that such immunity does not come cheap. By claim-
ing a grammatical status for a given religious expression one insulates it
from external criticism. After all, nothing counts against a grammatical
proposition. At the same time, however, one drains it of meaning. For, in
a rather significant sense, grammatical propositions are also not about
anything.
Now, in spite of his understanding of ‘theology as grammar’, and his
remarks concerning the grammatical status of ‘God is love’, I believe 
it is clear that Phillips has no intention of claiming that all religious
expressions should be treated as grammatical propositions. Rather, his
claim is that certain (basic or fundamental) religious expressions should
be treated as grammatical in nature. In the context of our present dis-
cussion, the main question, of course, is whether ‘God exists’ should be
considered as a grammatical proposition, and, if so, what this implies.
Does it follow that ‘God’ does not refer to an entity, and that there is
nothing factual involved in the religious belief that God exists? Before
we can answer this question, we need to take one further step in our
argument. For although Phillips claims some sort of grammatical status
for ‘God exists’, he does not compare it to such grammatical proposi-
tions as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’. Rather, Phillips suggests that ‘God
exists’ should be explored as we would explore, what Phillips calls, the
‘basic propositions’ which are at the centre of Wittgenstein’s attention in
On Certainty: ‘The earth has existed for many years past’, ‘I have two
hands’, ‘I have never been on the moon’, ‘Human beings sleep’, etc.
Are these propositions ‘grammatical propositions’? As we have already
noted, the class of what Wittgenstein calls grammatical propositions is
not a homogeneous one. What is important, however, is that we note not
only similarities, but also a number of crucial differences between these
‘basic propositions’112 and a grammatical proposition as ‘All bachelors
are unmarried’. First, in contrast to ‘All bachelors are unmarried’, with
many of these basic propositions, it seems quite natural to add ‘I believe’
to them, for example, ‘I believe that the earth has existed for many years
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past’. This is connected, perhaps, to the fact that they seem to express
straightforward empirical matters of fact, rather than linguistic rules. In
this respect it is important to note that there is no logical contradiction in
imagining their denial; they are not in the usual sense a priori proposi-
tions.113 This does not mean, however, that their ‘truth’ can be denied at
will. The reason, Glock suggests, “is not that their negation is excluded
as nonsensical by a specific grammatical rule, but rather that abandoning
them would undermine our whole system of beliefs.”114 From this, it
should not be concluded that we simply decide, for pragmatic reasons,
not to abandon these basic propositions. The rejection of a basic propo-
sition would not be considered a mistake, nor an irresponsible decision,
but rather perhaps some sort of mental disturbance. As Wittgenstein puts
it, were someone to deny a basic proposition, “we should not just not
share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.”115 There is sim-
ply no room for doubt here. Nor can there be any question of providing
reasons or evidence for basic propositions. With an ordinary empirical
belief it is the evidence of experience that justifies the belief; we test the
belief against experience. Note, however, that for something to count as
evidence for a claim, there needs to be a conception of what would count
for the claim, and what would count against it. With such propositions
as ‘The earth has existed for many years past’ or ‘I am a human being’,
everything counts for them, nothing against them.116 The point is that
although we might well call these basic propositions ‘true’, they are not,
or no longer, tested by experience. Rather, they have become rules or
measures of testing experience; they form the background or ‘scaffold-
ing’ of our thinking: “The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs
to our frame of reference.”117
One might counter that, at least where certain basic propositions are
concerned, we can quite easily imagine circumstances where their denial
not only makes sense, but could correctly describe a state of affairs. For
example, ‘I do not have two hands; one has been surgically removed’. It
should be clear, however, that this does not count as an argument against
Wittgenstein’s treatment of basic propositions. Wittgenstein’s account
is, as noted, a functional one. The logical status of basic propositions
depends, not on their form or structure, but on the role they play in our
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linguistic practices and, hence, is subject to change: “any empirical
proposition can be transformed into a postulate — and then becomes a
norm of description.”118 It is also quite possible to imagine a move in
the opposite direction: what was once a norm of description, turns into a
‘normal’ empirical proposition. For example, On Certainty was written
before the days of space travel. It is now easy to imagine circumstances
where it would make sense to say ‘I doubt whether I have been on the
moon’. Although some critics have thought that this fact shows a short-
coming in Wittgenstein’s remarks, Phillips argues that it simply illus-
trates the point he is making:
“namely, that he is not talking of propositions which cannot be questioned
because of their inherent nature. They enjoy the status they have because of
the place they occupy in the language people use, a language the content of
which is not independent of the complex of activities which go to make up
the culture of a people. In these activities there are things we do not ques-
tion, things we take for granted, and it is the propositions which are con-
nected with such things that Wittgenstein is interested in.”119
Wittgenstein’s treatment of basic propositions is a topic that has inspired,
and continues to inspire, a great deal of discussion. Our brief exposé
does not pretend to contribute to this discussion. Rather, I wish to focus
on Phillips’s contention that ‘God exists’ can be understood as a basic
proposition. The first thing to note is that, in calling ‘God exists’ a basic
proposition, Phillips does not mean to imply that it is, either in a logical
or temporal sense, the first proposition a person must accept in order to
become a believer. In other words, religious practices are not, as the
realist assumes, grounded in the belief that God exists. The basic propo-
sitions Wittgenstein examines in On Certainty, Phillips argues, are not
the foundations or the first principles on which all other propositions are
based. We could not start with these basic propositions, “because they
have their sense, are held fast, by all that surrounds them”; they “have
their life in the ways we think and behave.”120 According to Phillips, 
a child is not first taught ‘the basics’. Rather, it is introduced to basic
propositions in being taught other things.121 For example, the child does
not believe in the existence of chairs and tables because it has been
taught that material objects exist. It is taught to sit down on a chair or 
at a table, and that, Phillips argues, is what shows its belief in material
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objects. Again, a child comes to know people in its dealings with them
— its mother, father, brothers, sisters, friends, the butcher, the milkman,
the grocer, etc., etc. In this, Phillips argues, is shown its belief in human
beings. That is to say, “the belief is not the presupposition of its actions,
but shows itself, has its sense, in those actions.”122 These beliefs, the
basic propositions, Phillips argues, hang together; they constitute what
Wittgenstein calls our ‘world-picture’.123 The child is introduced to this
world-picture as it grows up, but not by being given a course of instruc-
tion in it. To repeat, Phillips insists that our world-picture cannot be
thought of as the foundation of our thinking. If anything, it is the other
way round: our world-picture is ‘grounded’ — held fast — by our ways
of thinking and acting. It is what shows itself by being taken for granted
in our ways of acting and thinking. Similarly, we cannot think of our
world-picture as the presupposition of the ways in which we think and
act, as though those ways of thinking and acting could be derived from it.
We cannot, as Phillips has it, first identify our world-picture and then go
on to describe the ways in which we think, because it is only in terms of
how we think that we can speak of our world-picture. In short: “We are
not talking of any priority over the ways we think, logical or temporal,
when we speak of our world-picture.”124
According to Phillips, similar conclusions can be drawn with respect
to the proposition ‘God exists’. This proposition, too, is not prior to 
religious practice in either a temporal or logical sense. A child — or 
perhaps we might also say a convert — is not taught, first, that God
exists.125 Rather, it is told certain stories, it is introduced into religious
practices, such as prayer and worship, and so on. The notion of the real-
ity of God, Phillips argues, is formed in the actual story-telling and reli-
gious services.126 It would be a mistake to think that these religious
practices are grounded in the belief that God exists. Quite the contrary;
these practices
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“constitute the context within which belief in God has its life and meaning.
The meaning of belief in God is shown in the light it casts on all that sur-
rounds it. Not: ‘God be the foundation of my thinking’ but ‘God be in my
thinking’. The basicality of the belief is shown in this involvement.”127
The import of these perhaps somewhat cryptic remarks may become
more clear once we recognise that, in Phillips’s view, they point to an
important difference between his account of the necessity connected
with the belief that God exists and that entailed by the ontological argu-
ment. In the latter, Phillips argues, this necessity comes from the intrin-
sic nature of the concept of ‘God’. If we understand what ‘God’ desig-
nates, we can no longer deny the existence of God. Thus, that God exists,
can be established without reference to religious practice and, conse-
quently, can function as its foundation. By contrast, according to Phillips,
the reality of God
“does not get its unshakeable character from its inherent nature, or from
the kind of abstraction which philosophy tries to make of it so often, but
from its surroundings, from all the activities that hold it fast. Above all,
those activities involving the language of praise and worship.”128
The ‘unshakeability’ of the proposition ‘God exists’ comes from the role
it plays in a whole complex of thought and action, that is, from the role it
plays in its religious contexts of application. That is why it is so mislead-
ing to say that religious perspectives presuppose the reality of God. We
cannot think of ‘God exists’ as the presupposition of religious practice, as
though the latter could be derived from it, because it is only within the
context of our religious practice that ‘God exists’ has the meaning it has.
The upshot of this discussion should be clear: according to Phillips,
‘God exist’ should be taken as a basic proposition of the religious world-
picture. It should be equally clear that to construe ‘God exists’ in this
manner has the advantage that it explains the necessity connected with
belief in God, and that it can account for the fact that, as Phillips con-
tends, it makes no sense to ask for evidence in support of this belief.
Furthermore, it lends further support to Phillips’s claim that we cannot
give an account of what it means to believe in God without referring to
the religious contexts of application in which this belief is embedded.
Unfortunately, it also raises a number of questions. These questions, as
will become clear, are interrelated. I have, however, tried to divide them
into five groups.
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First, some of the questions raised above remain equally valid in this
context. For one thing, there seems to be an important difference between
such basic propositions as ‘I have two hands’ and ‘The earth has existed
for many years past’ and the proposition ‘God exist’, in this respect that,
in contrast to the latter, the former do not function as confessions of
faith, nor do they require or evoke anything like the conscious, passion-
ate commitment associated with belief in God’s existence. Furthermore,
whereas we do not seem to have any alternative for such basic propo-
sitions as ‘I am a human being’ or ‘I have two hands’, religious asser-
tions, like ethical ones, certainly allow for many alternatives. As von
Stosch observes, the diversity of religious forms of life can hardly be
overestimated.129 This also raises the question as to how our ‘general’,
or non-religious world-picture(s) interact with a religious world-picture.
The debate between evolutionary theory and creationism springs to mind.
Should we construe this dispute as a clash between distinct basic propo-
sitions, or world-pictures, where ‘each man declares the other a fool and
heretic’?130 No doubt, these sentiments sometimes play a role. But it is
difficult to deny that many of the participants, on either side of this dis-
pute, seem to think that there is something more at stake:131 that is, a con-
flict between distinct hypotheses which offer distinct, mutually exclusive,
explanations of certain facts and phenomena. We should also remind
ourselves of our discussion of miracles. Here, there seemed to be a con-
flict between what can intelligibly be said about the world and what
believers want to say. ‘When people are dead, they stay dead’ might well
be taken as a basic proposition, one which sits rather uneasily with 
the believer’s (basic?) belief that Jesus rose from the dead. As we saw,
Phillips’s attempt to resolve this difficulty is far from satisfactory.
The second question I wish to raise is somewhat similar to the one Scott
and Moore submitted earlier in our discussion. What would be entailed
by our conceding that ‘God exists’ is a basic proposition? According to
Phillips, “Just like ‘Physical objects exist’ or ‘Human beings exist’ so
‘God exists’ should be explored in this way.”132 But even if we accept
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that there is no room to doubt that human beings and physical objects
exist, nor any question of providing evidence for either assertion, it still
does not follow that talk about ‘human beings’ does not refer to entities,
nor, absurdly, that talk about ‘physical objects’ does not refer to phys-
ical objects.133 Nor does it follow that I cannot have straightforward
factual beliefs about either physical objects or human beings. Similarly, 
if we accept that ‘God exists’ is a basic proposition, it follows that, for
those who share the relevant religious world-picture, there is no room to
doubt God’s existence, nor is there any question of providing evidence
for it. But should we also accept that, therefore, ‘God’ does not refer to
an object or an entity, or that nothing factual enters into the belief that
God exists?
The third question, or rather a set of questions, is related to the kind
of propositions Wittgenstein discusses in On Certainty. Phillips appreci-
ates that one prominent feature of Wittgenstein’s discussion is the fact
that the contrast drawn between the empirical and the grammatical is not
a sharp one.134 Most of the propositions Wittgenstein examines have the
form of straightforward, empirical propositions. Indeed, it would be ludi-
crous to argue that many of them do not make claims about how things
stand. After all, I am a human being, I actually have two hands, and the
world has, in fact, existed for many years past. What is interesting about
them, one might argue, is not that they have the form of empirical propo-
sitions yet do not state matters of fact, but rather that, like empirical
propositions, they state matters of fact but are not held, and cannot be
rejected, on the basis of evidence. Furthermore, as we saw, we can imag-
ine circumstances where a basic proposition, e.g. ‘I have two hands’, can
function as a falsifiable empirical proposition. Finally, given Wittgen-
stein’s functional conception of basic propositions, it is clear that the
logical status of certain propositions can change. Empirical proposi-
tions are ‘hardened’ into basic propositions,135 while basic propositions
may have their status revoked. Such changes can be motivated by vari-
ous reasons, ranging from new experiences to simplicity, fruitfulness or
sheer beauty.136 Sometimes, as the example of space-flight demonstrated,
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changes may be incited by scientific advances, or the bringing to light of
new, hitherto unknown, matters of fact.
Now, the question is whether Phillips allows us to draw the same con-
clusions with respect to the, allegedly, basic proposition ‘God exists’.
Thus, first, does Phillips allow that we cannot draw a sharp contrast
between ‘God exists’ and regular empirical propositions? Secondly, does
Phillips allow that, like ‘I have two hands’, ‘The world has existed for
many years past’ etc., ‘God exists’, too, states a matter of fact, even
though it is not held, nor can be rejected, on the basis of evidence?
Finally, does Phillips allow that scientific discoveries, or the bringing to
light of new matters of fact, could lead to the basicality of ‘God exists’
being revoked? With respect to all of these questions: if so, then what are
the implications for our understanding of the proposition ‘God exists’; if
not, then does this not point to certain disanalogies between the basic
propositions Wittgenstein discusses and the proposition ‘God exists’; dis-
analogies which need to be accounted for?
A fourth question arises in connection with one of the differences
between such grammatical propositions as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’
and such basic propositions as ‘The earth has existed for many years
past’. As we saw, although, like grammatical propositions, basic propo-
sitions leave little room for denial, unlike grammatical propositions, their
negation is not excluded as nonsensical by a specific grammatical rule;
there is thus no logical contradiction in imagining their denial. If this is
correct, and ‘God exists’ is, as Phillips contends, a basic proposition,
then Phillips’s oft repeated claim that ‘it makes no sense to say that God
might not exist’ is rather misleading.
This brings us to the fifth and final question. We have already touched
upon it several times, but it still awaits adequate discussion. It is this: how
does Phillips account for the fact that God’s existence, necessary as it may
be, is nonetheless often questioned and denied? If everything counts for,
nothing against a basic proposition, it would seem that Phillips’s analysis
leaves no room for such denials. Of course, Phillips does not think so.
Quite the contrary; he insists that his “thesis is as necessary in explaining
unbelief as it is in explaining belief.”137 Says Phillips:
“Clarifying the grammar of religious beliefs is important, not simply in
order to see what worship means, but also in order to see what rebellion,
fear, dread, etc., may come to in this context.”138
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Here, too, one must be very careful not to distort the character of what
one is trying to clarify. One form such a distortion may take is that of
presenting the non-believer as someone who contradicts the believer; as
someone who asserts the opposite of what the believer asserts. Accord-
ing to Phillips, this is misconceived in that it is based upon the assump-
tion that the believer and the non-believer participate in the same mode
of discourse. After all, contradictions can only be located within a shared
mode of discourse.139 But, as Phillips has it, the disagreement between
the believer and the non-believer cannot be construed as such. Rather,
their dispute is of a grammatical nature:
“The dispute between belief and unbelief is not one in which probabilities
and evidence are weighed within a common system. The gap between what
the believer wants to say and what the unbeliever denies is itself a grammat-
ical gap. To reject religion, or to come to God, is not to reject a hypothesis
within a common way of looking at things, but, rather, to reject or embrace
a whole way of looking at things.”140
It is not a question of the non-believer believing the opposite of what 
the believer believes, but of his not sharing or having that belief at all.
He has no use for the religious belief, he does not live by it, it does not
regulate his life. In other words, the non-believer does not share the reli-
gious world-picture, its basic propositions are not ‘held fast’ in his life.
Clearly then, Phillips does not deny that there are alternatives to 
religious belief. His claim is that the conflicts or tensions between such
alternatives are falsified if one presents them as conflicts between mutu-
ally exclusive hypotheses or explanations. Rather, they present different
frames of reference, different ways of making sense of one’s life:
“one cannot say that there is no alternative to ‘God created heaven and
earth’, since ‘I don’t believe it’ or ‘I don’t accept that’ expresses such alter-
natives. These are genuine alternatives since they indicate that the person
has no use for the religious belief, that it means nothing to him, that he
does not live by such a belief, or that he holds other beliefs that exclude
religious faith. In this latter case, however, the alternatives are not alterna-
tives within the same mode of discourse, but rather, different perspectives
on life.”141
Phillips’s insistence that it makes no sense to say that God does not exist
need not entail that all propositions to the contrary are meaningless.
Non-belief is no non-sense. What about a person who says ‘There is no
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God’, meaning something along the lines of ‘As a matter of fact the
being in which the believer believes does not exist although he might
have’? I take it Phillips should not say that the rejection of religious
belief is nonsensical, in that it will surely have an effect on a person’s
life, on the way in which one understands oneself and others. On the
other hand, presumably we should also say that that person is confused,
at least in this sense, that he does not understand what it means to talk
about God, what role the concept plays in religious language-games. 
No doubt, in certain cases, the rejection of religious belief may take this
form. But, Phillips insists, nothing forces us to construe all instances of
non-belief in this manner. Denial may mean something altogether dif-
ferent. It may simply point to the fact that a person does not pray, does
not praise. As Wittgenstein puts it, he thinks differently, in a different
way; says different things to himself; has different pictures.142 Religious
beliefs and activities play no role in his life, he does not live by such
beliefs or, perhaps, holds other beliefs which exclude religious faith. No
general answer can be given. We will have to consider each case sepa-
rately and look at the role these denials play in the lives of those who
utter them. Then we should come to see that just as ‘There is a God’ is
not an indicative statement, neither is ‘There is no God’. Rather, it is “a
denial; it may indicate one of a number of possible negative relations in
which a man may stand to the affirmation of faith.”143
Phillips’s portrayal of the conflict between belief and non-belief is suc-
cessful in that it shows that his account of God’s existence as necessary
or unquestionable does not commit him to the view that God’s existence
cannot be denied, or that such denials must be confused or nonsensical.
This, Phillips tells us, is what is wrong with Anselm’s ontological argu-
ment, and also Malcolm’s reading of it.144 On one level, Phillips argues,
we can see that Anselm throws light on the logic of belief in God: God’s
existence is necessary, it cannot be denied. On this view, his conclusions
can be seen as grammatical conclusions. However, Anselm wanted to go
further. He wanted, by means of his proof, to end with the recognition,
‘And this being Thou art, O Lord, our God’. He wanted his proof to 
end in praise, to issue in an affirmation of faith, such that all denials of
these truths are ruled out. This, Phillips argues, is where Anselm (and
Malcolm) go wrong. For the grammatical insights they give us can be
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shared by believers, atheists, or others who may not want to describe
themselves in either of these ways:
“Here Anselm was confused, since he abstracted the affirmation from the
very contexts which could give birth to it, so introducing the kind of
ambiguity into his arguments which we have also found in Malcolm’s
discussion of them. There is a mixture of what must essentially be kept
apart; a mixture of philosophical grammatical observations and affirma-
tions of faith.”145
Phillips’s main claim is that denials and affirmations of faith cannot 
be located within a shared mode of discourse. I do not wish to deny 
— indeed, it could hardly be denied — that, often enough, believers and
non-believers talk at cross-purposes. But must this always be the case?
We should not forget that, although the believer and the non-believer
obviously do not share a religious frame of reference, there is much that
they do share, certainly within contemporary Western society. Does this
not provide them with enough common ground, not just to understand
one another, but also to contradict one another? The belief that God
exists, Phillips argues, is basic; it is not taught as a belief which requires
further reasons or evidence to justify it. But this seems to fly in the face
of the fact that both believers and non-believers do pretend to be able to
give reasons and evidence for their beliefs (or non-beliefs). Throughout
history, they have engaged one another in conversation, each of them
convinced that, at the end of the road, the other should recognise the
force of the arguments presented and either abandon or embrace their
religious beliefs. Of course, Phillips might say that, in so doing, both the
believer and the non-believer are confused. Just as Anselm was confused
when he thought that his proof could issue in an affirmation of faith.
Although there is no logical contradiction in such a claim, it seems nei-
ther very feasible nor very palatable.
This brings us to the third and final problem concerning Phillips’s
account of the reality of God. Is it descriptively adequate, that is, can 
it do justice to role belief in God plays in the lives of the faithful? One
important aspect of the way many Christians talk about God, Bailey
argues, is their willingness to construct or deploy in argument with non-
believers alleged proofs of God’s existence.146 Bailey kindly presents us
with a number of examples, the first of which we have already come
upon: Anselm’s ontological argument. The other examples he mentions
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are Bishop Berkeley’s arguments, Paley’s teleological argument, and 
St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument. Now, it should be clear
that a realist like Bailey, who argues that believers conceive of God as a
causally efficacious being, will have little difficulty in accounting for the
fact that believers have sought to provide such proofs for His existence.
How does Phillips deal with them? He does not deny that the formal
proofs of God’s existence have played a role in the history of Christian-
ity, nor is he overlooking the fact, or so he argues, that the abstract con-
cepts contained in these proofs have found their way, by various routes,
into creeds and declarations of Faith. Phillips insists, however, that “to
the extent that they have any life there, it will not be by forming the
abstract foundations of Faith, but by having a lively application within
them.”147 The formal proofs of God’s existence should be understood as
attempts to intellectually elucidate the religious responses which are log-
ically prior to them:
“so far from it being the formal proofs which give a rational foundation to
the beliefs of the faithful, it was the lives of the faithful which breathed into
the formal proofs whatever life they had.”148
If these religious reactions should fall into decline, the intellectual argu-
ments would lose any force they may have had; they would become no
more than empty shells.
There are at least two problems with Phillips’s reply. First, one may
agree with Phillips that the formal proofs of God’s existence arose out of
living faith, and that their force and import depends on their having an
application within that faith. One may well wonder, however, what kind of
application they could possibly have. Given Phillips’s account of the real-
ity of God, to attempt to prove the existence of God is to fall prey to
confusion. Rather than ‘intellectual elucidations’, it would seem that, on
Phillips’s account, we have no option but to consider them intellectual
misunderstandings and distortions. Does this not commit us to the view
that the bishop, archdeacon and saints mentioned by Bailey have failed to
understand correctly the status of their own religion?149 Arrington seems
to have little qualms in ascribing such a view to Wittgenstein. Anselm and
Aquinas, he tells us, “would be held responsible by Wittgenstein for much
of the confusion that surrounds the question of the existence of God.”150
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I am not at all certain that Wittgenstein would share that opinion. At any
rate, I agree with Hyman that it would be foolish to maintain that Anselm
and Aquinas were peddling superstitions.151 As Bailey observes point-
edly, although other Christians encountering the formal proofs have
often accused them of being fallacious or useless as a means of bringing
about a genuine religious conversion, “the allegation that they misuse the
word ‘God’ is a relatively rare response and one that has attained a sig-
nificant degree of prominence only in the twentieth century.”152
As we saw, according to Phillips, theology may be understood as
grammar in that theological doctrines “are seen as laying down the gram-
matical parameters of the faith: they are concerned with what should and
should not be said of God.”153 Does this mean that the whole of theology
is grammar, in other words, does theology only concern itself with what
is meaningful to say of ‘God’ rather that what is true to say of God?
Phillips rejects this conclusion. He argues that seeing theology as a kind
of grammar does not entail that the theologian can no longer talk of God
as an independent reality, nor that he must cease to make truth claims
concerning God. However, in saying this, Phillips is conceding nothing to
the realist, for he immediately adds that “such talk should be understood
within the grammar of the religious discourse in which it is made.”154
Thus, although the theologian can certainly be said to make truth-claims
about an independent reality, these are not to be construed like the kind
of truths-claims we might make concerning the ‘independent reality’ of an
object or a person. This claim, it seems to me, can certainly be disputed.
We may agree that certain doctrines present grammatical rules, and it
seems clear that certain theological disputes can best be understood as
grammatical controversies, controversies over what it makes sense to say
about God. However, it seems equally clear that we cannot entirely dis-
pense with the element of propositional truth in religion. Surely, Patrick
Sherry is not too far off the mark when he says that the “early Fathers 
of the Church clearly intended the Creeds and other doctrinal formula-
tions to express true propositions, i.e. ones giving correct descriptions of
actual states of affairs, difficult though it be for us to understand the
metaphysical and eschatological strands in them.”155 I do not think it is
credible to suggest that this is not what they took themselves to be doing.
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Furthermore, even if we should wish to maintain that, in doing so, they
were confused, it is difficult to see how this could be established by 
reference to the grammar of religious discourse. For their confusions, 
if such they be, form a not inconsiderable part of that very grammar. 
Theology does not just arise out of a living Faith, it partly constitutes that
living Faith, giving shape and substance to the religious community of
which it is a part. Needless to say, a religion, or at any rate Christianity,
is not a homogeneous whole. There are various religious communities,
various theologies, some further apart than others. One could of course
argue that a certain theology, i.e. a certain grammar, is misconceived, by
reference to another grammar. But such a strategy cannot escape being
charged with being preferentialist, or with having revisionism as its aim.
It is time to draw some conclusions. We began by considering certain
disanalogies between talk about God and talk about matters of fact.
These disanalogies cannot be denied, and they certainly challenge too
facile an assimilation of religious language to physical object language.
However, we argued that they do not demonstrate conclusively that ‘God’
cannot be construed in realist terms.
We then turned to consider Phillips’s account of the reality of God 
as necessary and unquestionable. Phillips’s analysis provides us with 
a viable account of the nature of the conflict between belief and non-
belief, an account which manages to retain the necessity associated with
religious beliefs without denying the possibility of a rejection of these
beliefs. Phillips is right, I believe, to insist that religious belief is not 
so much a matter of entertaining certain hypotheses as the embracing of
a frame of reference, or a world-picture. Furthermore, the notions of a
‘grammatical proposition’ and a ‘basic belief’ may well help us better 
to understand the way in which certain propositions or beliefs function
within this religious frame of reference. Phillips’s claim that the realist’s
treatment of certain religious assertions fails to take account of their
grammatical status, should not go unheeded.
However, we also argued that Phillips’s analysis raises a number of
rather irksome questions; questions which require further attention. Per-
haps most importantly, it is not obvious that, should we accept Phillips’s
suggestion that ‘God exists’ constitutes a basic belief, this demonstrates
that ‘God’ cannot de said to refer to an entity, in the realist sense, or that
nothing factual enters into the belief that God exists. It is not obvious
that a religious world-picture cannot involve falsifiable factual and his-
torical beliefs, and even metaphysical beliefs, as well as ‘basic beliefs’,
which are not held on the basis of evidence, each in a mutually supporting
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relation.156 Furthermore, it does seem extremely difficult to deny that the
Christian world-picture has involved, and still involves, such beliefs. The
suggestion that they are the result of a misunderstanding of the grammar
of religious belief fails to convince, and casts doubt on the descriptive
adequacy of Phillips’s analysis. Does this mean that Phillips’s account
should, after all, be deemed to be revisionist in nature? The following
chapter seeks to answer that question.
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9. A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF?
The contemplation of possibilities of meaning plays a central role in
Phillips’s work. It can be understood in either a descriptive or a non-
descriptive sense. The latter involves imagining or inventing ways in
which language might be used, or of suggesting ways in which a given
form of language might be understood. As we have seen, although such
an approach may be helpful, its usefulness is limited. For no matter how
feasible the possibilities of meaning one advances are, unless and until
one demonstrates that they present not just a possible but a correct ren-
dering of a given practice, they do not conclusively establish that a con-
trary account of the practice under investigation may be rejected.
The second, descriptive approach, however, does make claims to some
measure of descriptive accuracy. Here, the suggested possibilities of
meaning should be understood not as mere possibilities, but as more or
less extended representations of actual linguistic practices. There can be
no doubt that Phillips’s accounts of the belief in miracles, the belief in
immortality, and the belief in the reality of God, examined in the previ-
ous chapters, belong to the latter category. Phillips claims his accounts
to represent, not just what these beliefs might possibly mean, but what
they actually do mean, in their historical contexts of application.
Phillips’s critics, however, are not convinced. It has been argued, time
and again, that Phillips’s conclusions do little justice to the nature of reli-
gious belief. The suggested ‘possibilities of religious meaning’ are said
to depart from traditional religious belief to such an extent that we may
wonder whether we should call them religious at all. Hyman, for exam-
ple, opines that we should regard ‘a passionate commitment to a system
of reference’ “not as a religious belief — certainly not Christian reli-
gious belief — but as one of the heirs of what used to be called Christ-
ian religious belief.”1 As to whether or not one should bid Christianity’s
successor a warm welcome is a question Hyman does not address. Stew-
art Sutherland, by contrast, is more explicit. He writes that he indeed
welcomes Phillips’s accounts of, for example, petitionary prayer and
belief in eternal life. However, he agrees with Hyman in that he wel-
comes them as
1 Hyman 2001, p. 10.
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“interesting constructions upon or revisions of the Christian tradition rather
than as they are apparently offered, descriptions of the most essential or
continuing elements of that tradition.”2
The main point, it seems, is not so much whether or not we should
embrace Phillips’s alternative to traditional Christian religious belief
but, rather, that we should recognise that it is, in fact, an alternative.
That is to say, we should recognise that rather than providing descriptive
representations of the meaning of certain religious beliefs or practices,
Phillips’s clarifications are in reality attempts at reforming or revising
these practices and beliefs.
As we have seen, Phillips rejects this conclusion. He argues that
although he is by no means opposed to reform, it must not be confused
with the task of conceptual investigation he is concerned with.3 Part of
this task involves trying to give perspicuous representations of religious
practices. Phillips insists that, in doing so, he has never sought to reform
anything. His only aim has been to elucidate that which lies before us.4
As noted, given Phillips’s disavowals, it would be inappropriate to per-
sist in the claim that Phillips is intent on reforming religious beliefs and
practices. Even so, this does not rule out the possibility that his accounts
may, after all, be misconceived. Of course, Phillips does not deny the
possibility that his conclusions may turn out to be erroneous and those 
he has criticised turn out to be justified.5 However, it is clear that he
believes it to be his critics’ accounts, rather than his own, that distort the
nature of religious language. The issue thus becomes whether Phillips or
his critics is providing a more accurate account of the phenomena under
investigation.
That question is extremely difficult to answer if only for the fact that
the ‘phenomena under investigation’ display a bewildering diversity,
even when we narrow our investigation solely to the Christian religion,
with which both Phillips and his critics are concerned almost exclu-
sively. According to Messer, this alone suffices to undermine the charge
of Phillips as a revisionist:
“There is simply too great a diversity amongst religious believers to be
able to assert one historically dominant strand against the others. Equally,
there are simply too many different conceptions of what constitutes the
normative essence of Christianity, and the ways in which we could decide
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which conception is correct, for us to expect the simple charge of revision-
ist […] made against Phillips to stand.”6
While Messer does not deny that there are forms of Christianity which
Phillips’s account does not accommodate, he argues that, on the other
hand, there are “major strands within Christianity which seem more
suited to Phillips’s account than to that of his critics.”7 Similarly, Clack
argues that
“whenever [Phillips] is dealing with matters of Christian faith, what he
writes is generally convincing. At any rate, he certainly stands full square
within a reputable branch of Christianity, that characterised most ably by
Kierkegaard and Simone Weil.”8
I agree; at least to the extent that it would go too far to suggest that
Phillips’s possibilities of religious meaning fail utterly to engage with the
way in which believers have practiced, understood, and experienced their
faith throughout the history of Christianity. Our examination has shown
that Phillips’s accounts undeniably capture certain key elements and
aspects of ‘traditional Christian belief’. As such, they will undoubtedly
strike a chord with a fair number of believers. On the other hand, our dis-
cussion in the previous chapters also indicates that we cannot expect
everyone to be satisfied with Phillips’s conclusions. His analyses are
unorthodox in that they exclude certain crucial elements which have tra-
ditionally been associated with the beliefs in question. Despite Phillips’s
vehement objections, there is some justification to the claim that Phillips
presents a non-realist analysis of the nature of religious belief. And while
Clack and Messer are right to suggest that Phillips’s account is tailored
to suit certain strands of Christian belief, one should perhaps not overes-
timate the magnitude of these strands. Surely Terrence W. Tilley has 
a point when he says that, rather than representative of ‘mainstream’
Christianity, Phillips’s exemplars are, as Tilley puts it, the ‘odd ducks’ of
religious communities:
“[Phillips’s] modern favorites include Søren Kierkegaard, Simone Weil,
and ‘Revelation’, the short story by Flannery O’Connor. While no one would
deny their significance and deep interest, they are clearly not anywhere
near the ‘standard’ of religious practitioners. They are post-Reformation
Christians who stand in opposition to many of the everyday beliefs and
practices held by members of their traditions.”9
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The point is not to insist that Phillips’s clarifications can only be seen as
attempts at reforming traditional Christian religious beliefs, nor to con-
tend that, as descriptions of these beliefs, they are wholly inaccurate.
Rather, it is to insist that although Phillips may accurately describe cer-
tain possibilities of religious meaning, there are many other possibilities
besides, possibilities which have played at least as important a role in
the history of Christianity, if not more so. How does Phillips deal with
these other possibilities? As we shall see, the extent to which Phillips’s
account of religious belief may justifiably be said to be revisionist in
nature depends, in no small part, on the answer to that question.
In the following sections we discuss three ways in which Phillips
might deal with forms of religious belief which his account fails, or
refuses, to accommodate. Each of these entail certain problems. The
first two options diminish the number of non-conformers by eliminating
seeming counterexamples. They may be discarded as confusions, either
on the part of the philosopher or on that of the believer. I argue that
although these strategies are not entirely invalid, unless their applica-
tion is strictly limited, it is difficult to see how Phillips may evade being
charged with revisionism. The third option, by contrast, permits of the
possibility of genuine counterexamples to Phillips’s analysis. Although
this allows Phillips to avoid the charge of revisionism, he also runs the
risk of seriously weakening his own position.
9.1 Descriptive licence
Phillips’s emphasis on the descriptive nature of philosophical enquiry
may be taken to imply that the validity of an account of a given reli-
gious belief or practice can be determined by reference to what the
believers themselves say of that belief or practice. Any discrepancy
between their account and the philosopher’s should cast doubt on 
the feasibility of the latter. If this is so, Phillips’s critics have argued,
Phillips is surely in trouble. We have already noted that, to Swin-
burne’s mind, Phillips’s account of the meaning of Christian beliefs is
simply false. This would be confirmed, Swinburne feels certain, by a
straightforward survey of what religious believers take their words to
mean. As we saw, according to Phillips, the reality of God cannot be
construed as the reality of an object; to say that there is a God, is not
to assert, as a matter of fact, the existence of a particular being. I have
little doubt that Swinburne would approve of John Searle’s remark that
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“You have to be a very recherché sort of religious intellectual to keep
praying if you don’t [believe] there is any real God outside the language
who is listening to your prayers.”10 John Hick, too, seeks to cast doubt
on the descriptive accuracy of Phillips’s clarifications by means of an
appeal to the testimony of the faithful. According to Hick, when asked
‘Are you assuming that there actually is a Being whom you are address-
ing (or referring to) and who is eternal, omnipotent, etc.?’, the ‘typical
religious man’ will unhesitatingly reply ‘Yes’.11 Does this not indicate
clearly that Phillips’s Wittgensteinian portrayal of religious language is
revisionary rather than descriptive?12
How does Phillips respond to such a line of argument? The first thing
to note is that Phillips feels little inclined to contradict the suggested
examples. As to Searle’s remark, Phillips argues that surely everyone, he
himself included, would say that it is futile to pray to God unless there
is a God to pray to. However, Phillips adds, the conceptual disagreement
is precisely over what saying that amounts to. In other words, as Phillips
has it, one cannot say, as though it were an argument against his account
of the reality of God, or his account of prayer, ‘when ordinary people
pray it is because they think there is a God up there listening’, since it is
precisely the grammar of such ‘ordinary’ talk that is being discussed. One
cannot take that grammar for granted.13 As Phillips has it, this becomes all
the more clear where Hick’s example is concerned. Once again, Phillips
does not deny that, when asked ‘Are you assuming that there actually 
is a Being whom you are addressing, etc.’ most if not all believers will
answer with assent. Put like that, Phillips asks, how could the reply be
any different? After all, the unstated alternative is to say that ‘God’ is an
illusion. Phillips suggests, however, that Hick may be too quick in draw-
ing his conclusion. Says Phillips:
“I have no doubt, however, that the same believers who say that the exis-
tence of God is a fact would, if pressed, admit that the discovery of God is
not like the discovery of a matter of fact, and that there is no question of
God ceasing to exist, of having existed for a certain length of time, or of
having come into existence.”14
Now, assuming that Phillips is right, an atheist critic might conclude 
that this just serves to demonstrate the incoherency of the grammar of
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8558-05_Bloemendaal_04  01-02-2006  11:20  Pagina 387
the would-be religious language-game. Religious beliefs, he might argue,
are a mixture of implicit, very vague, empirical hypotheses — crude,
plainly false, empirical propositions plainly disconfirmed — and rather
esoteric metaphysical claims which should be held to be nonsensical not
just by positivists, but by Wittgensteinians as well.15 Of course, this is
not the conclusion Phillips would have us draw. In his view, it just goes
to show that we cannot take the grammar of religious expressions for
granted. The believer may well say that God is real, that the existence 
of God is a fact, that there is a God ‘up there’ listening to our prayers,
and so on. But in pursuing philosophical clarification we cannot take 
the grammar of such expressions at face value. We need to examine 
the role they play in the believer’s life, the way they function in their
proper contexts of application, etc. This, one might say, is to investigate
the ‘depth grammar’ rather than the ‘surface grammar’ of, e.g., ‘God
exists’ where ‘God exists’ appears to be of the form ‘a particular fact is
the case’.16
Having already examined Phillips’s account of the ‘depth grammar’
of talk of God’s reality in the previous chapter, there is no need to return
to that topic now. What is important here is to see how Phillips, without
actually contradicting the examples brought to the fore, may nevertheless
eliminate them as counterexamples to his analyses of religious belief. The
problem lies not with the language itself, but with the gloss the philoso-
pher puts on it: mesmerised by the form of the expressions, the philoso-
pher misconstrues their grammar.
While this strategy has some application, it will not take us very far.
It is one thing to warn us not to be misled by the ‘surface grammar’ of
religious expressions. But, surely, it will not do to discard any account
opposing one’s own as the result of one’s opponent’s misapprehension
of the grammar of the expressions under investigation. Phillips’s critics
may well agree that the conceptual disagreement is precisely over what
saying such things as ‘God is real’, ‘There is a God listening to our
prayers’, etc., amounts to. But, obviously, in their view, it is Phillips’s
account, rather than their own, which is guilty of misconstruing the
grammar of these expressions. Surely, the only way to settle the issue is
by an appeal to the faithful. The believer’s account is final. One should
present one’s philosophical account to those who hold the beliefs it
seeks to account for. If they reject it, their rejection is the last word on
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the matter. Phillips’s critics feel certain that, were this procedure fol-
lowed, Phillips’s clarifications would not be well received.
Phillips agrees that, in distinguishing the good from the bad accounts,
the ultimate appeal is to actual usage itself. The account must be judged
on the grounds of whether it accommodates the various features which
the activity under investigation exhibits. However, this does not mean
that the philosopher is simply conducting a survey of what religious
believers say of their beliefs, when asked. Analytical issues, Phillips
insists, cannot be solved in that way: one cannot philosophise by Gallup
poll. This is true not just for the philosophy of religion, but for any form
of philosophical enquiry, e.g., the philosophy of mind. Says Phillips:
“Imagine conducting any philosophical enquiry in this way. Would we set-
tle the conceptual issue of what it is to think about something, by asking
people to tell us what they do when thinking? […] We would not dream of
answering questions in the philosophy of mind by counting heads and con-
cluding ‘The Cartesians have it!’ Why do we contemplate such a procedure
in the philosophy of religion?”17
Thus, Phillips has no intention of denying the possibility that his
account(s) of religious belief(s) may not accord well with what many
religious believers say about their beliefs, when asked. Quite the con-
trary; he readily admits that the disagreement undoubtedly exists, but
what of it? Why should we be any more impressed by that fact than we
would be by the fact that many give Cartesian answers when asked
about the nature of thinking?18 One cannot take the testimony of the
faithful at face value. The ability to believe is not the same as the ability
to give a philosophical account of one’s belief. A person may pray, and
know what he is doing when praying, but may be unable to give a reflec-
tive or conceptual analysis of what they are doing when praying. There
is no inconsistency, Phillips argues, in saying that a person may be both
a ‘spiritual giant’ and an ‘intellectual invalid’.19 Consequently, one must
look not so much at what a person says, but at what he does, at the way
he lives his life:
“It is not sufficient to listen to what he says about his beliefs, since what
he says may be radically confused. What one must pay attention to is the
role a belief plays in a person’s life, the difference it makes to his life. It is
in this context that the meaning of the belief is discovered best.”20
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In disputing the gloss on religious beliefs which theologians, believers
or philosophers may give, Phillips does not take himself to have tam-
pered with these beliefs in any way. His touchstone is what is shown “in
a believer’s practice, not in his philosophisings about them.”21 This,
Phillips argues, is what Wittgenstein means when he says that he is
merely making grammatical remarks, which can only be verified by the
consequences a person does or does not draw: “All I wished to charac-
terize was the conventions he wished to draw. If I wished to say any-
thing more I was merely being philosophically arrogant.”22
It should be clear that the distinction between ‘the ability to believe’
and ‘the ability to give an account of one’s beliefs’, the distinction
between the way a believer practices his beliefs and what he says about
them, his ‘philosophisings’ about them, provides Phillips with yet another
strategy by means of which apparent counterexamples to his account of
religious belief may be eliminated. It cannot be denied that this strategy
has some application. However, once again, its use is limited.
Phillips may well be right that conceptual issues cannot be decided ‘by
Gallup poll’. At times, however, Phillips makes it appear as if it really
matters little whether or not the participants can recognise the clarifica-
tions provided. For example, Phillips tells us that when The Concept of
Prayer appeared in 1965 it annoyed many philosophical attackers and
defenders of religion because it urged them to give up a common game
they were playing. Religious newspapers, however, greeted the book as
characterising a faith they knew. Phillips does not quote this fact to
counter his critics’ appeal to the faithful, “but to show that you cannot
philosophise by Gallup poll.”23
Now, the example seems designed to accomplish precisely what
Phillips denies it is meant to do, namely, to counter his critics’ appeal to
the faithful. After all, it shows that those taking up, as it were, an exter-
nal point of view — ‘the philosophical attackers and defenders of reli-
gion’ — rejected the book, whereas the actual believers themselves wel-
comed it. If matters were reversed, one wonders whether Phillips could
so confidently present the example. More to the point, if an account of
a given religious practice is welcomed by some, yet rejected by others,
why should we conclude that this just goes to show that one cannot
philosophise by Gallup poll? Would it not be just as reasonable, if not
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more so, to say that the account manages accurately to characterise the
faith of some, but not of others?
Certainly, to conduct a philosophical enquiry into religious belief 
is not just to take an opinion poll. Were that the case, all we needed 
to do was to have a significant number of representative believers fill
in a questionnaire. Even so, it seems to me that one cannot do away
with any notion of empirical confirmation whatsoever. As noted above,
once the possibilities of meaning advanced are intended as descriptions
or clarifications of actual uses of language, one can no longer do as
one pleases. One needs to show that one’s philosophical rendering of 
a given practice connects to the participants’ prior, non-philosophical
understanding of that practice. When the gap between the philosopher’s
account and that of the believer becomes unbridgeable, this tends to
raise suspicions with respect to the former rather than the latter. One
can only go so far in saying that although the believer may think that
this is what he believes, what he actually believes is ‘…’, before one
damages one’s credibility.
Note that this does not contradict Phillips’s point that we must not
expect every believer to be capable of giving a philosophical account of
his beliefs. There may well be cases where we should wish to say that a
believer’s account of his own beliefs must be rejected. Such a claim is
justified if we can show there to be significant disparity between what
the believer says of his belief and the way he practices it. However, as 
I have already argued, it will not do to ‘de-intellectualise’ faith. The
aspiration of attaining a reflective understanding of one’s faith is by 
no means foreign to religious practice, certainly not where the Christian
religion is concerned. In this context, we do well to bear in mind that 
a believer’s ‘philosophisings’ are not just his own invention, but are
received from the religious community in which he lives. His belief, and
his understanding thereof, are basically determined by what he learns
from the Scriptures and their interpretation by the church to which 
he belongs. Theological reflection on the nature, function or meaning 
of religious belief will have a bearing on the actual religious practice of
individual believers. Or official statements issued by the Church will
have their bearing on theological research as stimulating, refraining, pro-
voking, etc., or on believer’s religious practices, etc. Of course, Phillips
never denies these interdependencies. Nevertheless, his rather narrow
focus on the role a belief plays in a particular individual’s life tends to
underplay the role of this larger religious community which, as Ignace
D’Hert points out, constitutes in the most fundamental sense of the word
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the context of life within which the believer understands his faith. This
means, D’Hert concludes, and rightly so, that the meaning of religious
beliefs cannot simply be read off from the meaning they have for any
particular small group, or individual, irrespective of tradition and world-
church which constitute exactly the touch-stone quarry for the authentic-
ity of these beliefs.24
To reflect upon one’s beliefs, to reassess them, justify them, criticise
them — such activities have always been part of religious ‘practice’, and
will have an influence on what a belief means to a person and the role it
plays in his life. Of course, more so for one individual than the next. But
it simply will not do to draw too hard a distinction between the way
believers practice their faith, and their ‘philosophisings’ about it. This
becomes patently clear when we turn from ‘ordinary’ believers to what I
have, in jest, called ‘the professionals’. I guess it is up to the individual
to decide whether or not such authors as Anselm, Augustine, Aquinas
were spiritual giants. But I for one would not care to regard them as
intellectual invalids.25 Phillips may of course try to demonstrate that their
writings have been misconstrued, and that, properly understood, their
understanding of religious belief — of the nature of God, of immortality
and miracles, etc. — does not conflict with his own. But if the conclu-
sions we have drawn in the previous chapters are anywhere near correct,
this seems a difficult task to say the least. At any rate, to date, it is not
one on which Phillips has embarked.
In summary: we have considered two possible strategies Phillips might
employ in order to reduce the number of counterexamples to his account
of religious belief. Although both these strategies have a valid applica-
tion, their use is limited. It will not do to discard every example which
is brought against Phillips’s account as the result of either the philoso-
pher’s or the believer’s misunderstanding of the grammar of religious
belief. Phillips cannot deny the existence of genuine counterexamples,
i.e. examples which can be justified by an appeal to religious practice.
How may Phillips deal with these? He may either regard them as the
product of confusion — confusion not so much about the grammar of
religious belief or practices, but confused beliefs or practices. Or he may
recognise them as genuine forms of religious belief, possibilities of reli-
gious meaning other than those he has sought to account for. We discuss
these possibilities in turn.
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9.2 Superstition
Phillips’s descriptive accounts of the religious beliefs in miracles, immor-
tality and the reality of God present themselves as accounts of what these
beliefs actually mean, in their historical contexts of application. Wittgen-
stein once wrote that the philosopher
“ought to be no more than a mirror, in which [the] reader can see his own think-
ing with all its deformities so that, helped in this way, he can put it right.”26
It cannot be denied, we argued, that some believers will recognise them-
selves in Phillips’s mirror. Others, however, shall judge the mirror to be
deformed, rather than their own thinking. For them, Phillips’s accounts
do not characterise a faith they know. The main point, we argued, is not
so much how large the number of ‘non-conformers’ is, but how Phillips
deals with them. To misrepresent their understanding of religious belief
or to fail to account for it are, as it were, philosophical misdemeanours.
A far more serious crime is committed when they are excluded from par-
taking in the religious domain as such. But this, or so it is argued, is pre-
cisely what Phillips’s strategy results in. Despite his assurances to the
contrary, those possibilities of religious meaning that are not included in
his account, are excluded altogether. William Wainwright, for example,
complains that Phillips refuses to call any beliefs he cannot endorse
‘religious’, calling them ‘confusions’ or ‘superstitions’ instead.27 Clack,
too, has criticised Phillips’s use of the term ‘superstition’. Not only is it
impossible entirely to shake off the pejorative overtone of the term but,
moreover, Clack fears that if we accept Phillips’s understanding of the
nature of superstition, practically everything that has formerly gone by
the name of religion is in fact superstitious.28 This leads Clack to suspect
that Phillips’s motive for using the distinction between genuine religion
and superstition is not that of disinterestedly describing our religious
forms of language:
“[Phillips] is in many ways a present-day Henry Bourne, the eighteenth cen-
tury clergyman and antiquary, who under the guise of describing the super-
stitions of the vulgar was in fact passionately seeking to reform what he saw
as (Romish) religious abuses. In such a manner, then, Phillips is best seen as
making propaganda for what he sees as ‘true religion’, and employing the
religion / superstition distinction to do so.”29
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Tilley has expressed similar concerns. On the whole, Tilley tells us,
he is very sympathetic to Phillips’s work. Like Clack, however, he
finds fault with Phillips’s distinction between ‘genuine religion’ and
‘superstition’:
“‘Superstition’ is at home in critical discourse in which religious rituals or
beliefs — typically of others’ rather than one’s own tribe — are rejected as
not worthy of one’s practice or belief. To redefine ‘superstition’ as a merely
descriptive term is not a move Phillips could make and be consistent with
his philosophical practice.”30
The general thrust of these remarks is clear. Phillips’s accounts of reli-
gious belief are said to be prescriptive rather than descriptive. We are
contemplating, not just the way in which language is used in some, or
many, religious beliefs but, rather, the way language must be used if we
are to call it religious at all.
Not surprisingly, Phillips rejects these conclusions. We have already
noted that he disavows having any interest in theological reform. What
is more, he also denies the suggestion that in distinguishing between
‘genuine religious belief’ and ‘superstition’, the philosopher’s account
ceases to be descriptive, becoming prescriptive instead. Evidently, if 
one is convinced that a certain religious belief or practice is confused 
or superstitious, it is difficult to see how one could still endorse it. But,
Phillips argues, this does not mean, as Wainwright implies, that in apply-
ing these categories, one is doing no more than dismissing those beliefs
or practices one does not approve of. The conclusion that a given reli-
gious practice is superstitious does not flow from personal preference,
nor from some prior distinction between what is genuinely religious and
what is not. Philosophy waits on practice. Whether or not a given prac-
tice is confused or superstitious will show itself in the character of that
practice, in what its participants do and say, in their expectations and in
the tensions between these and our common understanding of ourselves
and our surroundings.31 The question as to whether a given religious
practice or belief is confused or superstitious, is not one to which the
philosopher can give any general, theoretical answer. The relation of
philosophy to religious practice cannot be summed up in any once-and-
for-all fashion. Neither can the practices themselves be summed up in
this way. To demand that philosophy shall once and for all separate the
wheat from the chaff “would simply be a refusal to let the interests of
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human beings be the ragged, mixed phenomena they are.”32 Philosophers,
Phillips tells us, are reluctant to leave things alone. They are tempted 
to make matters tidier than they are. But, as Wittgenstein teaches us:
“what is ragged must be left ragged.”33 I agree. As we shall see, how-
ever, matters might well be a bit more ragged than Phillips’s account
may lead us to believe.
9.2.1 The nature of superstition
What is the nature of superstition? In 1948, Wittgenstein draws a dis-
tinction between religion and superstition as follows:
“Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of them results
from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is a trusting.”34
Wittgenstein’s characterisation of superstition is not too far removed
from what one might find in a dictionary; for example, superstition is
“a belief or practice resulting from ignorance, fear of the unknown, trust in
magic or chance, or a false conception of causation […]”35
Central to both definitions is the claim that superstition springs, not so
much from reason, but from fear or ignorance, and involves a misunder-
standing of how nature works — ‘a kind of false science’, ‘a false con-
cept of causation’. In Phillips’s discussion of superstition we find the
same emphases. Consider the following examples: a boxer crosses him-
self before a fight; a mother places a garland on a statue of the Virgin
Mary; parents pray for their child lost in a wreck.36 Are these supersti-
tious acts? For an answer, Phillips argues, we must look at that which
surrounds these activities. That is to say, we must look at what the peo-
ple involved say of their actions, what they expect of them, what role
they play in their lives. Does the boxer believe that if he crosses himself
before a fight he cannot come to serious harm? Does the mother believe
that the garland’s value is prudential? Do the parents believe that all true
prayers for the recovery of children lead to that recovery? If so, Phillips
argues, the beliefs are clearly confused:
“If these questions are answered in the affirmative, the beliefs involved
become testable hypotheses. They are, as a matter of fact, blunders, mistakes,
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regarding causal connections of a kind. We can say that the people involved
are reasoning wrongly, meaning by this that they contradict what we already
know. The activities are brought under a system where theory, repeatability,
explanatory force, etc., are important features, and they are shown to be
wanting, shown to be blunders.”37
In other words, the role these beliefs play — if taken in the way indi-
cated — is the same as that of causal explanations. Therefore, they are
answerable to the criteria which are valid in the mode of discourse in
which talk of causal explanations has its life. Clearly, according to these
criteria, they fail miserably; they are mistakes, blunders. After all, we
know that the causal connections in which the beliefs place their trust do
not exist. We know that being hit on the nose is no less painful when I
have crossed myself an hour previously than when I have neglected to
do so. It is in this sense that the beliefs may be said to ‘contradict what
we already know’.
Now, I believe Phillips is right to suggest that the examples above
may all involve a belief in ‘some kind of queer causal connection’.38
On the other hand, it seems somewhat strained to say that the beliefs
simply become testable hypotheses which can readily be shown to be
mistaken. For one thing, it seems highly unlikely that these beliefs shall
be taken seriously as testable hypotheses, and actually shown to be mis-
taken. This point may become more clear when we turn to consider some
examples other than the ones provided. Phillips’s examples all have a
clear connection to religious practices and religious beliefs. But there 
are many beliefs or practices which most people would consider to be
superstitious which do not necessarily involve any reference to religion.
For example, a person may knock on wood to avert misfortune, or avoid
walking under ladders. A gambler may attribute his sudden luck at black-
jack table to the ‘lucky chair’ he is sitting on rather than to the law of
averages. Clearly, we might wish to say that these examples involve a
belief in some queer causal connection — a connection so queer, in fact,
that I believe many would hesitate to say that ‘this particular chair
causes me to win at cards’ is a testable hypothesis which can simply be
shown to be mistaken.39 One is reminded of Wittgenstein’s remark: ‘this
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is too big to be a blunder’.40 One might also point out that many people
who hold superstitious beliefs cannot be said to be completely ignorant
of causal connections. It is not at all unimaginable that the person who
is an accomplished scientist is the same person who places his trust in a
lucky charm, when he visits the casino.
Considerations such as these have led Phillips to correct his account
of the examples we have considered. Looking back on his earlier analy-
sis, Phillips argues that it is an error to say that the beliefs are brought
under a system where theory, repeatability, etc., are crucial features, and
are thus shown to be mistaken. Says Phillips:
“But this is of course what we do not do. Just as it would be crazy to accept
the invitation to treat some patients medically and to pray over others, with
a view to comparing results. That makes them look like competing treat-
ments within the same system, one of which is mistaken.”41
Phillips’s later analysis does not deny that the examples discussed involve
a belief in some queer causal connection. However, it emphasises that
such beliefs are not so much mistakes as confusions. The difference
between a mistake and a confusion, Phillips argues, may be brought out
by the following example:
“A person who wants to poison another mistakenly buys a harmless potion.
His belief that the potion is poison is false, but it might have been true. But
can we say the same when I stick pins in a picture of someone, believing it
will harm him? Can we say that sticking pins in the picture might have
been effective, but in fact is not?”42
Surely, Phillips answers, we cannot; we have not the slightest idea of what
it could mean to say that sticking pins in a picture could harm someone
else. Such a belief is not so much mistaken as nonsensical:
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42 Phillips 2001, p. 170; cf. Phillips 1988, p. 308, Phillips 1993, p. 108, Phillips 1995,
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“What we have here is not a false, but a meaningless belief. Yet people may
feel a strong compulsion to believe it. This should not surprise us, since we
are by no means immune from such compulsion ourselves. Although we
may not be ignorant of causal connections, our superstitions may still flour-
ish alongside them.”43
For the reasons mentioned, I think Phillips does well to correct his 
earlier analysis. His later emphasis on treating superstitious beliefs as
confused or meaningless, however, raises some new problems. For one
thing, it is somewhat awkward to say that although the beliefs are mean-
ingless, people may nevertheless believe them. ‘What, exactly, do they
believe?’, one is inclined to ask. If the beliefs are truly meaningless, in
the logical or grammatical sense of the term, it is difficult to see how
this question may be answered. According to Phillips, however, we need
not draw this conclusion. He asks us to imagine a person who tells us
that the misfortune which has befallen him is the result of the ghosts 
of slain warriors. According to Phillips, the belief is clearly confused,
involving a belief in some queer kind of causal connection which is
manifestly absent. But although the belief makes no sense, we should
not conclude that it can therefore not be believed:
“Can a man believe what does not make sense? It is important here to
resist the temptation to answer in the negative, just as it is important not to
deny that the metaphysician means what he says. It is not that these people
do not mean what they say. They do. The point to emphasize is that what
they want to say cannot be said.”44
These remarks, I feel, are not as straightforward as Phillips seems to
believe. One is still inclined to reply that, if what they want to say can-
not be said, so, too, what they want to believe cannot be believed. Let
us, however, focus upon another aspect Phillips brings into the discus-
sion, namely, the reference to the metaphysician. Phillips suggests that
we may distinguish between a ‘magical’ and a ‘logical’ conception of
language. The former involves a ‘belief in the power of words’, a belief
that the meaning of a word resides, not in its application, its use, but in
a power which resides in the word itself. For example, a person might
think, confusedly, that it is an inherent power in the gesture of beckon-
ing which makes someone come to him. He does not see that the gesture
has its sense in the application, an application which he shares with the
person beckoned. It is not so hard to recognise, Phillips argues, how
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such a confusion may enter into ritualistic activities. For example, when
someone beckons in a ritual, in the absence of the person beckoned, one
can see how he may feel that his gesture has an inherent power to make
the person summoned come to him.45 According to Phillips, the confu-
sion involved here is not so much a mistake about causal connections.
Rather, it is
“a confusion which springs from a misunderstanding of the logic of our
language, a misunderstanding which has a deep hold on us. These misun-
derstandings give rise to metaphysics.”46
I shall not go into the question as to whether or not this is a feasible diag-
nosis of the source of metaphysics. The point is that, on this account, the
confusion involved in superstitious or magical beliefs is determined as 
a linguistic confusion, the result of a misunderstanding of the logic of
our language.
The idea that magical or superstitious beliefs have their roots in a
‘magical conception of language’, in a belief in ‘the inherent power of
words’ may perhaps shed light on some cases.47 On the other hand,
Phillips should take care to maintain some distinction between what is
‘linguistically confused’ and what is ‘superstitious’. Surely not every lin-
guistic confusion counts as a superstitious belief. If Phillips is right that
philosophical problems arise mainly out of a misunderstanding of the
logic of our language, then philosophers should be considered the most
superstitious people on earth! This would be a rather idiosyncratic use
of the notion superstition.48 Conversely, there are many acts, commonly
thought of as superstitious, which are not so easily recognised as linguis-
tic confusions. Think of such practices as knocking on wood, the use of
a lucky charm, the refusal to walk under a ladder, the saluting of mag-
pies, and so on. It is not immediately obvious that such activities, and the
beliefs surrounding them, can be accounted for as linguistic confusions.
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46 Phillips 1993, p. 109.
47 I do not mean to imply that Phillips’s suggestion that magical or superstitious ideas
may have their source in a ‘magical conception’ of language, a belief in the ‘inherent
power of words’, has no merit whatsoever. Wittgenstein, too, suggested such a compari-
son, and, as Clack points out, the thought that, for example, ‘name magic’ (the belief that
one can harm a person by acting on his name) has its roots in a primitive philosophy
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cal literature. (See Clack 1995, p. 118.)
48 In this context, however, it is interesting to note that Wittgenstein’s earliest uses of
the term ‘superstition’ are in fact applied to philosophy and our general tendencies, rather
than to religion. See Ferreira 2002, p. 162.
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Tilley provides us with the following, rather charming example. He tells
us about a girl who attempted to stand perfectly still during the reading
of the Gospel of John on Good Friday. Her Irish-American tradition had
taught her that, if one did that, a soul would be released from Purgatory.
She did devoutly attempt to be perfectly still during that reading because
she thought it sad that anyone would have to be in Purgatory on Easter,
and she wanted to help as much as she could.49 Now, perhaps one would
want to say that the girl was confused, although I am not quite sure what
one would gain by doing so. However, even if we decide she was indeed
confused, it is not at all self-evident that her confusion was the result of
a misunderstanding of the logic of our language.
The main point is that although we might want to say that supersti-
tious beliefs or practices involve some form of confusion, be it linguis-
tic or otherwise, it will not do to say that every time we are confused, we
are in the grip of a superstition. Unfortunately, Phillips’s analysis makes
it difficult to see how we should draw such a distinction. Clack, too, has
remarked on this, criticising Phillips for failing to make the distinction
between confused and superstitious beliefs or rites entirely clear, and
often blurring it altogether.50 Phillips’s reply to this criticism places it 
in the context of the difference between his earlier and later accounts 
of superstition. He seems to assume that Clack is accusing him of not
being consistent in his account of superstitious beliefs or rituals, treating
them sometimes as mistakes, sometimes as confusions. As we have seen,
Phillips admits that his earlier analysis, which, indeed, suggests that
superstitions are some kind of mistake, is inadequate. He insists, how-
ever, that, in his later corrections, he is “consistent in referring to super-
stitious rituals as confused.”51 Now, perhaps due to the fact that Clack
does not further develop his criticism, I fear that Phillips may have mis-
understood his objection. The point is not that Phillips is not consistent
enough in referring to allegedly superstitious rites as confused but, rather,
that he is somewhat too consistent in referring to supposedly confused
rites as superstitious.52 This makes it appear as if there is no distinction
between a confused and a superstitious rite — surely a questionable
assumption. In a moment, though, we shall see that Phillips’s judge-
ment of a belief or ritual as superstitious does seem to imply something
more than the mere presence of confusion in that belief or ritual. First,
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however, we need to discuss a further objection to analysing the confu-
sions inherent in superstitious or magical beliefs as linguistic confusions.
An objection brought to our attention, once again, by Clack:
“The problem with producing an account of magic which appeals to lin-
guistic confusions and specifically to a ‘misunderstanding of the logic of
language’ is that it is all too simple to slip toward a view of the worth-
lessness of magic.”53
Clack feels that there is a curious depth to the kind of acts and beliefs
we have been considering, a depth which goes beyond their characteri-
sation as merely ‘mistakes about causal connections’ or ‘linguistic mis-
understandings’. Most superstitious actions, he argues, manifest the
idea that something extremely important depends upon the performance
(or withholding) of something apparently insignificant. In this manner,
our everyday superstitions have much in common with actual magical
actions. Consider the Cambodian ‘King of Fire’, possessor of a magic
sword, which if ever drawn from its scabbard would bring about the
end of the world.54 Looked upon in an overly rationalistic manner, one
will undoubtedly conclude that there is some deep confusion involved
here. However, rather than concerning ourselves with the confusions
involved in thinking that a sword could have this property, we should
reflect on the fascination that envelops us when we entertain the notion
that it might:
“We may then come to recognise the essentially poetic nature of such acts:
a sword is drawn and the world ends, a raven cries and calamity falls. And
this is the case for all sorts of actions hastily dismissed by Phillips as
‘superstitious’; actions which are rife in our society. […] Indeed, we may
understand these actions, not in the pejorative sense of ‘superstition’, but
under the rubric of Aberglaube, that which Goethe referred to as ‘die Poe-
sie des Lebens’.”55
In Phillips’s understanding of religion, Clack suggests, there may be no
place for such thoughts and actions, simply because it is exceptionally
‘high-minded’. Phillips, of course, rejects that conclusion. In reference
to the Cambodian ‘King of Fire’, he says he agrees wholeheartedly with
Clack’s assessment of the essentially poetic nature of such a thought.56
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Kings, volume two (London: MacMillan, 1911). See Clack 1995, p. 114.
55 Clack 1995, p. 114.
56 See Phillips 1995, p. 124.
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I suspect, however, that this agreement is an apparent, rather than a real
one. Although I am not quite sure how Phillips would analyse the exam-
ple, it seems unlikely he should have us reflect on the fascination that
envelops us when we entertain the notion that the King’s sword might
actually have the property ascribed to it. Consider, for instance, the way
in which Phillips develops an example mentioned above, that of a man
who attributes his current misfortune to the ghosts of the slain warriors.
Beliefs concerning the dead need not be the product of confusion; they
need not imply any kind of theory concerning causal relations between
the dead and events in people’s lives. Rather, they may be understood as
expressing certain values and concerns which play an important role in
the lives of the people concerned. Thus, Phillips argues, we may come to
recognise the depth of these beliefs and the actions and rituals associated
with them.57 Perhaps so; but this analysis does appear to leave little
room for ‘the fascination that envelops us when we entertain the notion
that the dead might be the cause of our misfortunes’. That notion, we
saw, is clearly confused, superstitious, perhaps even pathological.
More generally, Phillips does not deny that metaphysics and certain
forms of superstition may make a deep impression on us. Although we
may not be able to formulate exactly why this is so, we feel certain that
whatever is going on here cannot be something trivial or insignificant.
But this perceived depth, Phillips argues, lies not in the metaphysical
conclusions or superstitious beliefs themselves, but rather in the kind of
questions and problems, the kind of hopes and fears, they address. Once
this depth is correctly located, one will no longer hold on to the meta-
physical or superstitious beliefs. In fact, until this is done, the true nature
of the depth involved cannot be recognised:
“In the case of metaphysics and superstition or neurosis the recognition of
what is deep involves no longer being in the grip of the metaphysical or
superstitious statements […] While the metaphysician clings to his system
and conclusions we cannot say that he has attained an understanding of his
problem open to him. While the neurotic or superstitious person clings to
his beliefs he cannot be said to possess the understanding of his situation
open to him. To possess this understanding they must give up that which
grips them.”58
These remarks leave little to the imagination. Although superstitious
beliefs may arise from things that go deep with us — our hopes and
fears — the beliefs themselves are confusions of which we should 
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rid ourselves. They are worse than worthless, in that they prevent us 
from attaining a true understanding of ‘what is deep’. Now, admittedly,
should a person truly believe, say, that his streak of bad lack is caused,
in ‘some queer way’, by the ghosts of the dead, it would not be unrea-
sonable to suppose that he is in some way mistaken or confused. And,
depending on the kind of hold such a belief has on a person’s life, we
may even need to speak of a form of neurosis. On the other hand, I
find it hard to disagree with Clack that there is a curious depth to such
notions. They are the heart and soul of ghost stories and fairytales,
where the dead may wander the earth and swords can bring about the
end of the world. Perhaps we cannot actually believe such things, but
we can imagine them. Such imaginings, in various shapes and forms,
have, throughout the history of mankind, enthralled and captivated peo-
ple. I have little doubt that Phillips would agree. But it is difficult to
see how an analysis which seeks to account for superstitious beliefs
exclusively in terms of mistakes, linguistic confusions, or neuroses,
should enable us to come to grips with the fascination such notions
exert.
9.2.2 Religious belief and superstition
So far, we have raised some concerns about Phillips’s account of the
nature of superstition. These alone may serve as a warning against too
eager a philosophical appropriation of the term. But there are further rea-
sons still why we should exercise caution in applying it. These may be
brought out by examining Phillips’s analysis of the distinction between
what is ‘genuinely religious’ and what is ‘superstitious’. According to
Phillips, such a distinction is extremely important.59 I tend to agree with
Clack, however, that it is an unfortunate, and radically unworkable one.60
Let us return to the examples mentioned at the outset of our discus-
sion: a boxer crosses himself before a fight, a mother places a garland at
a statue of the virgin Mary, parents pray for the recovery of their chil-
dren lost in a shipwreck. At times, Phillips seems to imply that the con-
fusion involved in these practices and the associated beliefs — their
dependence on ‘non-existent quasi-causal connections’ — shows them
to be superstitious. But, as argued above, this does not seem a sufficient
account of superstition. Even if we accept that a given practice or belief
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is confused, why should we accept the additional claim that it is, there-
fore, superstitious?61
It soon becomes clear, however, that the kind of confusion supposedly
inherent in the examples is not the sole criterion on the basis of which
Phillips judges them as being superstitious in nature. Consider the way in
which Phillips develops the example of the mother placing a garland on
a statue of the Virgin Mary. What characterises her act as superstitious?
First, Phillips replies, there is the trust in ‘non-existent, quasi-causal con-
nections’: the belief that someone long dead can, if she so desires, deter-
mine the course of an individual’s life, keep him from harm, and so on.
However, this is only part of the reason why we should call her act
‘superstitious’. More important is the fact that the Virgin Mary
“is seen as a means to ends which are intelligible without reference to 
her: freedom from harm, successful ventures, etc. In other words, the act of
homage to the Virgin Mary has no importance in itself; she is reduced to
the status of a lucky charm.”62
What distinguishes superstition from religion is not just the confusion
involved in placing one’s trust in ‘non-existent quasi-causal connections’.
Rather, superstition enters into religious practice by “changing internal,
religious relations into external, prudential relations.”63 The mother’s acts
have only an extrinsic relation to the results she seeks to attain. That is 
to say, paying homage to the Virgin is only important in so far as it pro-
duces the desired results. If there were other, better ways of obtaining the
same results then these would be adopted. This, Phillips argues, com-
pletely ignores the religious character of the homage paid, reducing it to
its efficacy as one way among others of securing certain ends which can
be understood without reference to the Virgin.64 It is for this reason that
we should call the mother’s acts superstitious rather than religious.65
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It should be clear that these conclusions presume the possibility of
contrasting the superstitious act of bringing one’s child to the Virgin, 
to the religious one. And, indeed, Phillips warns us that it would be a
mistake to conclude that all acts of homage to the Virgin must be under-
stood in the manner suggested above. Although the example is presented
as an example of a superstitious act, it is important to recognise that
Phillips’s judgement is hypothetical. It takes the form: ‘If it is the case
that … then we should say that …’. As we saw, whether or not a given
belief or act is superstitious depends on ‘what surrounds it’. In this sense,
Phillips argues, the distinction between religion and superstition is a per-
sonal one.66 That is to say, the same religious pictures, the same form of
words, may be superstitious in one context, but not in another. This does
not mean that it is up to the individual to decide whether a given belief
or act is superstitious. Someone else may recognise it to be such when
the agent or believer does not. It does mean, however, that we cannot
decide the matter in general, without examining the application the belief
or act has in human life. In short, the point is that although bringing a
child to a statue of the Virgin may be superstitious for the reasons given,
it need not necessarily be thus:
“A mother may bring her new-born baby to the mother of Jesus in an act of
veneration and thanksgiving; one mother greets another at the birth of a
child. Connected with this act of greeting are a number of associated beliefs
and attitudes: wonder and gratitude in face of a new life, humility at being
the means of bringing a child into the world, and, in this case, recognition
of life as God’s gift, the givenness of life.”67
Of course, it is still true to say of this mother that she seeks protection
for her child. But what needs to be recognised is that this protection
must be understood in terms of her religious beliefs and attitudes:
“These virtues and attitudes are all contained in the person of Mary, the
mother of Jesus. For the believer she is the paradigm of these virtues and
attitudes. They constitute her holiness. Now, when her protection is sought,
the protection is the protection of her holiness: the mother wants the child’s
life to be orientated in these virtues. The first act in securing such an orien-
tation is the bringing of the child to the Virgin. This orientation is what the
believer would call the blessing of the Virgin Mary.”68
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66 See Phillips 1993, p. 247.
67 Phillips 1993, p. 74.
68 Phillips 1993, pp. 74-75.
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Here, first, there is no distortion of what we already know, no trust in
‘non-existent quasi-causal relations’. Secondly, and more importantly,
in this case, the relation between the act of paying homage and its 
consequences is internal, rather than external or prudential. It is not the
protection received which determines whether the act of bringing the
child to the Virgin and the alleged holiness of the Virgin have been effi-
cacious or not, but the holiness of the Virgin which determines the
nature of the protection. The blessing of the Virgin is not one way
among many of obtaining certain results which can be understood with-
out reference to her. On the contrary, the request for a blessing can only
be understood by referring to the religious significance the Virgin has
for believers.69
Thus, Phillips provides us with a second criterion to distinguish reli-
gion from superstition. But this hardly improves matters. For one thing,
it is doubtful that it will be possible always to distinguish clearly between
cases where the relation between an act and its expected or intended
consequences is strictly ‘internal’ and cases where it is merely ‘external’
or ‘prudential’. It is not at all unimaginable that a mother brings her
child to the Virgin, as Phillips puts it, ‘to orientate it in the virtues con-
tained in Mary’, while at the same time believing that the Virgin can, if
she so wishes, intervene on the child’s behalf, say, to protect it from
physical harm, or from falling into vice. The act of bringing the child 
to the Virgin is seen as the first step in securing both consequences.
Again, certain groups of believers will refuse certain kinds of medical
treatment even if this puts their lives at risk. They pray for their sick, and
such prayers may well involve the belief that God can, if He so wishes,
intervene on their behalf. Clearly, the prayers involve an instrumental
rationale. But I fail to see why this should entail that, therefore and
thereby, the religious significance of the prayers is completely ignored,
or reduced to their efficacy as one way, among others, of securing the
desired consequences. Clearly it will not do to say that the prayers are
important only in so far as they produce the desired results and that, if
there were other, better ways of obtaining the same results, then these
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would be adopted. If that were the case, the medical treatment would not
have been refused in the first place. As to the ‘religious significance’ of
petitionary prayer — the prayers may well be motivated by a wish ‘to
make one’s desires known to God, wanting the situation which occa-
sioned them to be met in Him’,70 as well as by the belief, and hope, that
these desires may be realised through such prayers. The one does not
rule out the other.
Phillips might reply that nothing he has said rules out the possibil-
ity of mixed motives and expectations of practitioners within what is,
nominally, the same practice.71 While this, obviously, cannot be denied,
our discussion of the examples above may lead one to suspect that the
motives of the devout may be more consistently mixed than Phillips’s
account assumes.72 However, even if we allow that we can distinguish
between internal and external relations in the manner Phillips suggests,
this still leaves the question whether, in so doing, we are distinguishing
between religious and superstitious practices. Bear in mind that Phillips
is not just contrasting various motives and expectations that may play 
a role in religious practice. Rather, he claims to be contrasting religion
to superstition. But this simply begs the question. To return to our pre-
vious example, why should we say that petitionary prayers which involve
an instrumental rationale are superstitious? Of course, one can call this
superstitious if one wants. But this seems more of a stipulation than a
description. One is simply stipulating that a religious practice motivated
by instrumental concerns is not genuinely religious.
In Phillips’s earlier discussions, the contrast between superstitious 
and genuinely religious beliefs is particularly strong. By taking account
of what the people involved say of their actions, what they expect of
them, what role they play in their lives, etc., we come to see “that many
religious practices can be distinguished from superstition, while other
so-called religious practices turn out to be superstitious.”73 Clearly, the
implication is that superstitious practices are not genuinely religious.
Ferreira has suggested, however, that in his later discussion of supersti-
tion, Phillips softens the contrast:
“Initially Phillips contrasted superstition and religion; on such a view 
one can see why philosophy cannot correct religion, although it can show
that what purports to be religion is not. Later he claims that religion and
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superstition are not mutually exclusive: there are ‘superstitious’ forms of
religion, as well as ‘ugly’, ‘banal’ and ‘vulgar’ forms of religion.”74
Phillips does indeed refer to ‘ugly’, ‘vulgar’ and ‘banal’ forms of reli-
gion. He warns us, however, not to conclude that if a certain religious
belief is, in our opinion, ‘ugly’, etc., it must be superstitious or confused.
Whether we find particular expressions of belief ‘high’ or ‘low’ is a per-
sonal matter. It will not do to conclude that because we find it low, it
cannot be a genuine form of religious belief:
“This is something the philosopher of religion ought to point out. It means
that in considering reactions to religious beliefs, we cannot divide them
neatly into reactions to beliefs we find spiritually impressive, and reactions
to beliefs we find superstitious or confused. Philosophers must find room
for the ugly, the banal and the vulgar for these, too, may be forms of reli-
gious belief.”75
Rather than demonstrating that religion and superstition are not mutually
exclusive, these remarks tend to affirm the contrast between them.
As to the claim that there may be ‘superstitious forms of religion’;
Phillips does not in fact say this. What he actually says is that “super-
stition sometimes takes a religious form”, and that religion “is capable
of making a distinctive contribution to superstitious practices.”76 It is
unfortunate that Phillips does not expand on these remarks, for, as they
stand, their import is far from clear. Unless the notion of a ‘religious
form’ is taken in a technical or theoretical sense, to say that superstition
may take a religious form seems to imply no more than that superstitious
practices may resemble religious ones in their outward appearance. Sim-
ilarly, to say that religion may make a distinctive contribution to super-
stitious practices seems to imply no more than that religious practices
may generate superstitious ones, or may themselves degenerate into super-
stitious ones. In short, once again, Phillips confirms rather than refutes the
possibility of contrasting between what is superstitious and what is gen-
uinely religious.
It is doubtful, then, that Phillips’s later discussion entails a substan-
tive modification to his (earlier) account of the distinction between reli-
gion and superstition. This is confirmed when, in the same paper to
which Ferreira refers, we find Phillips affirming both the possibility and
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the importance of drawing such a distinction, employing the following
examples to expound it:
“For example, it is superstitious to think that there is some kind of queer
causal connection between sin and worldly punishment. Being distanced
from God is not a causal consequence of sin. Sin, pride and envy, for exam-
ple, create the distance in simply being what they are. Praying to avoid
God’s anger is thus not a praying to avoid consequences, but a praying to
avoid becoming a certain kind of person.”77
When a person believes his sins have caused God to punish him, he mis-
understands the nature of sin. When he prays to avoid God’s anger in the
hope of avoiding certain horrific consequences, it seems we can but con-
clude that he is, in fact, not praying at all. In other words, superstition
misconstrues the grammar of religious belief; it distorts the meaning of
religious concepts. Such a conclusion, however, presupposes a normative
conception of religion. Thus, we are brought back to our initial problem.
Why should we say that praying to avoid God’s anger is not a praying 
to avoid consequences? Do we know this in any other way than by stip-
ulative definition? Surely, that is prescription, rather than description.
Phillips, one might conclude, is simply imposing his view of religion on
practices that deviate from it.
This would certainly be the case if we should agree with Ferreira that
Phillips’s account of the distinction between religious and superstitious
beliefs reveals, at heart, a moral critique of superstitious beliefs:
“It seems to me that [Phillips’s] objections to the boxer, mother and par-
ents who rely on quasi-causal connections or instrumentalism are objec-
tions to what one could call moral unworthiness, perhaps specifically moral
cowardice.”78
I doubt whether Phillips would welcome this conclusion. As we saw,
some may find certain religious beliefs shallow, trivial, meaningless, or
even evil. These responses, Phillips argues, cannot be justified in any
external way. Of course, one can still criticise such beliefs. Nothing pre-
vents us from saying that they are ugly, vulgar or, indeed, immoral. But it
would be a misunderstanding to characterise such criticism as philosophi-
cal criticism. There may be no grounds for philosophical criticism, which
is to say, one may find such beliefs vulgar, etc. but this does not mean they
are necessarily confused or superstitious.79 Thus, even if Phillips would
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morally object to the beliefs Ferreira refers to, that objection cannot jus-
tify the charge of superstition.
In fairness to Ferreira, however, she does offer some further consider-
ations with which, I believe, Phillips will be more likely to concur. She
agrees that the distinction between religion and superstition cannot be
justified externally. Rather, the superstitious character of a given prac-
tice or belief “can be determined, and only determined, by reference to
the other commitments held by religious believers.”80 Thus, the problem
with an instrumental construal of petitionary prayer is not so much that
it is morally blameworthy — if indeed we should deem it so — but that
it distorts the character of religious belief:
“The qualifier ‘Not as I will, but Thy will be done’, which is inherent in the
absoluteness to which the believer is, at least at one level, committed, is
ignored when someone relies on quasi-causal connections, which have only
an extrinsic relation between the religious and the ‘good’ consequence. […]
‘Not as I will…’ is a metaphor for the unconditionedness, the absoluteness,
of religious belief — describing this element of religious practice is the
corrective to the other expressions of religious practice which attempt to
belie it.”81
On this view, the normative conception which enables us to distinguish
between religion and superstition is not imposed from the outside, but
derived from religious practice. Rather than a stipulative presupposition,
it is itself the result of a descriptive account of religious belief. In short,
the charge of superstition is justified by an appeal to practice.
Unfortunately, this suggestion will not do. The reason is obvious:
unless one has decided beforehand that instrumentally motivated ‘reli-
gious’ acts, involving, perhaps, a belief in ‘queer causal connections’,
are not part of genuine religious practice, then no descriptive account
can justify their exclusion. Phillips cannot have it both ways. Either we
admit that so-called superstitious acts and beliefs are genuinely religious.
If so, then it will not do to say that they ignore or distort the character or
significance of religious practices; in part, they determine the character
of these practices, and constitute their significance. In that case, the pos-
sibility of contrasting between religion and superstition, in the manner
suggested by Phillips, simply collapses. Or we decide that the so-called
superstitious acts and beliefs are not genuinely religious. That conclu-
sion, however, presupposes a normative conception of religion which is
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impossible to reconcile with Phillips’s supposedly descriptive approach.
Of course, this does not mean that we can no longer say that certain reli-
gious beliefs display confusions. Phillips may well be right that a belief
in some kind of causal connection between petitionary prayer and cer-
tain consequences, say, the retrieval of my long lost car keys, does not
bear closer scrutiny. Nor does this mean that we cannot distinguish peti-
tionary prayers which express a commitment to such prudential con-
cerns, and those which express a commitment rather to ‘the uncondi-
tionedness and absoluteness’ of religious belief.82 And, finally, this does
not mean that there shall be no tension between these kinds of commit-
ments.83 What it does mean, first, is that neither the presence of confu-
sion, nor that of instrumental concerns in a religious practice, justifies
the identification of that practice as superstitious.84 Secondly, one can of
course, as Ferreira suggests, employ one’s description of certain expres-
sions of religious belief as a corrective to other expressions of religious
belief. But while this may be a worthwhile theological endeavour, it is
impossible to reconcile with an explicitly descriptive or contemplative
philosophical approach, such as Phillips professes to adhere to.
Let us review our findings. In the first part of this section we argued
that, while it seems quite natural to say that superstitious beliefs or
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tions. For example, someone who thinks that eating the wafer at mass cleanses one from
sin, in the same sense in which a tablet clears up a stomach upset is, surely, superstitious.
Indeed, Phillips asks, “was not the Church’s condemnation of mechanistic views of the
Mass meant, in part, to combat that superstition?” (Phillips 2000(a), p. 357.) Tilley’s reply
is a perceptive one: “No. Those views may have been eventually condemned as ‘heresy’,
but not as superstition. Having as part of its arsenal Phillips’s allegedly descriptive con-
cept of ‘superstition’ would be hard, if not impossible, for a church condoning relics,
indulgences, and bleeding hosts.” (Tilley 2000, p. 363.) Of course, Phillips is right in this
sense that Tilley would not deny that the concept of ‘superstition’ has been employed 
in the history of religion. But, here, the philosophical task would be one of clarification
rather than appropriation.
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practices involve some kind of error, or some form of misunderstanding,
Phillips’s analysis of the nature of superstition in terms of causal mis-
takes or, in later corrections, (linguistic) confusions is inconvenient. It
may be said to be both too broad and too narrow. Too broad, because
some beliefs and practices which are commonly regarded as supersti-
tious in nature are not obviously mere mistakes or linguistic confusions.
Nor will it do to say that whenever we happen to be mistaken or con-
fused we are in the grips of a superstition. Too narrow, in that neither the
notion of a ‘mistake’ nor that of a ‘linguistic misunderstanding’ manages
to cover the way in which certain superstitious thoughts or actions tend
to capture our imagination.
The second part of this section focused on Phillips’s account of the
distinction between genuine religion and superstition. According to
Phillips, superstition ignores or distorts the character of religious beliefs
and practices by changing internal, religious relations into external, pru-
dential relations. We argued that, even if we allow the possibility of
drawing such a distinction, the identification of the latter category as
superstitious presupposes a normative concept of religion which, though
perhaps theologically valid, cannot be justified philosophically by an
appeal to practice.
9.3 Grammars of faith
In this chapter we have been concerned with the question whether
Phillips’s account of religious belief can be said to be revisionist in
nature. I suggested that the answer to that question depends on the way in
which Phillips deals with counterexamples: examples of religious beliefs
and practices which his account fails, or refuses, to accommodate. We
examined two possibilities, possibilities which diminish the number of
non-conformers by eliminating seeming counterexamples to Phillips’s
analyses. First, Phillips may try to show that, despite appearances, these
beliefs do fit his analyses. Secondly, he may simply say that these beliefs
are confused. They are not genuine religious beliefs, but superstitions.
Both ‘solutions’ entail certain problems. As to the first; sometimes the
believer’s account of his beliefs may indeed be confused. Such a claim is
justified if one can show that there is significant difference between what
the believer says of his belief and the way he practices it. But one can
only go so far in saying that although the believer may think that this 
is what he believes, what he actually believes is ‘…’. As to the second;
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I have tried to show that there are serious flaws in Phillips’s account of
the distinction between religion and superstition. Even if I am wrong
about this, it will hardly do to call all beliefs that do not fit into one’s
analyses forms of superstition, particularly given the large group of
beliefs and practices which seem to fit Phillips’s criteria for superstition.
It seems clear, however, that Phillips admits that there are certain reli-
gious beliefs or practices which his account fails to accommodate. They
cannot be made to fit his analysis by an appeal to the believer’s misun-
derstanding of his own beliefs, nor can they be discarded as confused or
superstitious:
“In face of prayers which do not fit readily into my exposition, all I can do
is to note them and leave it at that. I do not say that they are not prayers
(who is a philosopher to say that?), but simply that I do not understand
what is involved in them.”85
Here, we see the third and final way in which Phillips may deal with reli-
gious beliefs which do not fit his analysis. Rather than eliminating them,
he may simply accept them as authentic counterexamples. Perhaps we
might say that they constitute ‘other possibilities of religious meaning’.
Of course, whether or not this allows Phillips to evade the charge 
of revisionism depends upon the number of such authentic counterex-
amples Phillips is willing to accept. With regards to the prayers men-
tioned in the quote above, Phillips says that he does not understand what
is involved in them. This seems to rule out as possible candidates for
authentic counterexamples the kind of religious practices which involve,
for example, a belief in bodily resurrection, in a natural God who can
intervene in this world by bringing about miracles, or in the instrumen-
tal efficaciousness of petitionary prayer. In the previous chapters, and
the previous sections, we have seen that Phillips knows only too well
what to make of such beliefs: they are confusions, misunderstandings of
the grammar of religious belief, superstitions. However, surprisingly
enough, sometimes Phillips seems inclined to a different interpretation.
Let us return for a moment to Phillips’s account of the reality of 
God. As we saw, the reality of God cannot be construed as the reality of 
an object. God is not a being among beings, not an agent among agents.
To think of God in such a way misconstrues the grammar of religious
belief. It might be said to constitute ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in religion. This
fallacy, Phillips suggests, can be found in two contexts:
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“First, it can be found at a religious level. I may say that certain prayers are
not talking to God because they commit this fallacy. In doing so, I am mak-
ing a moral and religious judgement. Secondly, the naturalistic fallacy can
be found at a philosophical level. If a philosopher is aware that the God of
whom he is giving an account is a natural God, an existent among existents,
and an agent among agents, there is no philosophical objection to what he
is doing. On the other hand, if he thinks that this conception of God is the
only possible one, the only intelligible notion of divinity, he is making a
mistake.”86
Given our previous discussion, these remarks may come as something 
of a surprise. First, consider the ‘religious level’. Phillips argues that if
the naturalistic fallacy is committed at this level, if a person’s belief can
be shown to be belief in a natural God, we may morally and religiously
criticise it. But surely we should expect Phillips to say that it can also 
be philosophically criticised? After all, has not Phillips gone to great
lengths to show that one cannot construe the reality of God as a being
among beings, that it would be confused to do so? Confused, both in the
sense that it misconstrues the grammar of religious belief, as well as in
the sense that the notion of a natural God entails precisely those meta-
physical assumptions Hume has shown to be logically flawed? Certainly
then, there are many philosophical objections to this kind of belief.
When we examine the second, philosophical level at which the natura-
listic fallacy may be encountered, similar questions arise. Phillips argues
that if a philosopher is aware that his account is that of a natural God,
there is nothing wrong with it. Only if he thinks that this is the only pos-
sible conception of God, the only intelligible notion of divinity, is he
mistaken. This seems to imply that Phillips thinks the notion of a natural
God is an intelligible one, albeit not the only one. But, again, has not he
shown that such a notion of God is not intelligible; that the notion of a
natural God is incoherent, as Hume so successfully demonstrates?
It is difficult to understand why Phillips should suddenly be so hesi-
tant. One would expect him to conclude that such naturalistic notions 
of God are confused, perhaps even superstitious. But the same kind of
reserve — or perhaps one should say tolerance — can be found at other
places in his writings. In his paper Religion and Epistemology: Some
Contemporary Confusions,87 Phillips discusses the kind of belief the
truth of which depends on the way things go in the world. Here, belief
in God plays the role of an explanatory hypothesis. Such a belief,
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Phillips writes, can certainly be questioned and would be rejected by
many. Phillips tells us he has no wish to defend those people who hold
such beliefs, he only wants to stress that there is another kind of belief
in God.88 These remarks seem to indicate that Phillips considers belief 
in God as a kind of ‘super-explanation’ to be a genuine form of religious
belief. He does not find it impressive, he may even go so far as morally
and religiously rejecting it, but, from a philosophical point of view, there
is nothing wrong with it.
Once again, given our discussion in the previous sections, these
remarks are somewhat puzzling. One would have expected Phillips to
point out that this kind of belief is clearly superstitious. Phillips comes
close to doing so earlier in the same paper. He considers the example of
a mother of a mentally handicapped child who says: ‘It is terrible for my
child at the moment, but he is to be compensated later on.’ It need not
necessarily be so, but let us assume that, in this case, the difference the
mother’s belief makes is the difference between a set of empirical facts
being or not being the case. Her hope is in certain facts being realised.
Says Phillips:
“Although I sympathize with the mother’s hope, I do not find it impressive
religiously. Indeed, I should want to go further and say that it has little to
do with religion, being much closer to superstition.”89
Here, clearly, Phillips does point out that this kind of belief is not so
much religious as superstitious. But, as we have seen, in what follows,
he does not drive the point home.
On the basis of these remarks alone, one might be tempted to conclude
that Phillips is not trying to give an account of the grammar of religious
belief; rather, his aim is to clarify a grammar of religious belief, one pos-
sible use of religious language. To be sure, there are many others, many
different forms of religious belief. Some of these involve a natural God,
others take the shape of an explanatory hypothesis. Perhaps one does not
find such beliefs spiritually impressive or morally uplifting; if so, one is
making a religious or a moral judgement. But it will not do to deny either
that, for some believers, this is what religious belief means, or that such
beliefs are not genuinely religious. They constitute authentic counterex-
amples to Phillips’s account.
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It should be clear that if one takes this to be his position, Phillips
avoids the charge of revisionism. The problem, obviously, is that the
few remarks we have considered above can hardly be taken as represen-
tative of Phillips’s writings. Phillips’s clarifications of religious beliefs
are not presented as clarifications of what these beliefs may mean.
Rather, they are presented as descriptions of what these beliefs actually
do mean, in their historical contexts of application. Furthermore, the
results of these clarifications form a crucial weapon in Phillips’s criti-
cal arsenal. If they are taken as accounts of one possible grammar of
religious beliefs, one in a variety of grammars of faith, they can no
longer play this role. The point may be brought out by examining one
of Phillips’s examples of the possibility of criticising certain notions of
God. Phillips tells us that Yuri Gagarin’s concept of God as an object
that he would have observed, had it existed, during his first space
flight, can be shown to be confused in two ways: “first, by reference to
what one can reasonably expect to observe in space, and secondly, by
reference to what is meant by the reality of God.”90 But if Phillips were
to admit that the construal of the reality of God as the reality of an
object among objects does not constitute a misunderstanding of the
grammar of the religious belief in the reality of God but, rather, consti-
tutes one possibility of religious meaning, then he can no longer say
that Gagarin’s concept of God can be shown to be confused by refer-
ence to ‘what is meant’ by the reality of God. As if there were only one
notion of the reality of God. The question would be: ‘God’s reality
according to whom?’ The most Phillips could say is that Gagarin’s
concept can be shown to be confused by reference to what some mean
by the reality of God. To understand the meaning of religious beliefs,
Phillips insists, one must look at the role they play in their contexts 
of application. By exploring the way believers talk about God we can
come to understand what is meant be the reality of God. But now, the
first question would be ‘which believers are we talking about?’. The
concept ‘God’ can apparently be used in many ways. Surely we can
never discover ‘what is meant by the reality of God’, but only what
some mean by it, and what others mean by it. And, if Phillips consid-
ers the notion of a natural God to be, not so much a misconstrual of
religious grammar as one possible grammar in a variety of grammars of
faith, people may mean very different things indeed.
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In the end, then, it appears that the existence of religious beliefs which
do not fit his account presents Phillips with a dilemma. He may deny
that there are such beliefs, or deny that these beliefs should be called
religious, but I believe Phillips would thereby lay himself open to the
charge of revisionism. Or he may admit that there are such beliefs and
that these simply constitute other kinds of religious belief, other possi-
bilities of religious meaning. None of these can be said to distort the
grammar of religious belief; each, in its own way, constitutes a part of
that grammar. In that case, however, Phillips would seriously weaken
his own position. As a result, his persistent dismissal of the practice of
traditional philosophy of religion will have to be significantly moder-
ated, if not rejected altogether.
A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF? 417
8558-05_Bloemendaal_04  01-02-2006  11:20  Pagina 417
8558-05_Bloemendaal_04  01-02-2006  11:20  Pagina 418
CONCLUSION:
PHILLIPS’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
From a ‘classical point of view’, philosophy of religion is concerned with
the rational justification of religious belief. While there have always been
dissenters, the dominant strand of Western philosophical thought has con-
sidered it entirely appropriate to either prove or disprove that God exists.1
Precisely such an understanding of philosophy of religion has prompted
Fergus Kerr to call for a change of subject. Kerr does not deny that these
questions are important, yet he feels they evince a one-sidedness and too
strong an identification, at least within the Anglo-American analytical
tradition, of philosophy of religion with one particular set of problems
— what used to be called natural theology or Christian apologetics.2 From
Kerr’s point of view, this state of affairs is detrimental to the philosophy
of religion as such. Phillips could not agree more. As we saw, Phillips
suggests that we may look on his work as “a series of charges against the
immodest methods employed by some philosophers in the philosophy of
religion.”3 As philosophers, Phillips argues, we are tempted again and
again to become too familiar with holy things by putting religion at the
mercy of our philosophical methods. As a result, we lose sight of the role
religious concepts play in our lives. Phillips’s main aim, one might say, is
to reclaim the conversations of mankind by bringing religious language
back from its metaphysical to its everyday use. The clarification of mean-
ing is to rescue religion, in the philosophical field, from being the aim of a
believing or atheistic apologetic.4 Writing in 1976, Phillips seemed confi-
dent that philosophical enquiry, by the aid of such grammatical reminders,
“should at least put an end to much idle speculation carried on in the name
of the philosophy of religion.”5 Yet, despite Phillips’s best efforts, now,
some thirty years later, such ‘idle speculation’ seems to continue unabated.
Religious belief is still “at the mercy of a method which rides roughshod
over the conceptual distinctions which need to be drawn.”6
1 See Messer 1993, pp. 4ff.
2 See Kerr 1986, p. 171.
3 Phillips 2000, p. 1; cf. Phillips 2000, p. 259, Clack 1995, p. 112.
4 See Phillips 2000(a).
5 Phillips 1976, p. 190.
6 Phillips 2000, p. 3.
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Phillips attacks the classical approach in philosophy of religion on two
fronts. On the one hand he challenges the conception of philosophical
enquiry it involves. Philosophy, Phillips argues, cannot tell us whether
or not we should believe in God. It has the far more modest task of con-
templating possibilities of meaning, possibilities of belief and unbelief.
Phillips’s conception of philosophical enquiry as a form of contempla-
tion is informed, first and foremost, by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
Phillips follows Wittgenstein’s lead in emphasising the conceptual nature
of philosophical investigations. Philosophy does not so much contribute
to human knowledge but to human understanding — an understanding of
our forms of language. The philosopher’s concern is not with whether it
is true to say this or that, but with the concepts of truth and falsity. By
contemplating various possibilities of meaning, the philosopher seeks to
do justice to the reality of our concepts, to the application they have in
our lives. The contemplation of religious possibilities of meaning is sim-
ply an application to religion of the more general contemplative character
of philosophy itself. Here, too, the philosopher seeks to do justice to the
reality these concepts have in our lives, to show them for what they are
without meddling in them in any way. In this sense, philosophy is ‘on a
road to nowhere’: everything is left as it is.
Phillips second line of attack is based on an appeal to the use which
language has in many religious beliefs. When religion is placed at the
mercy of our philosophical methods, matters are not left as they are.
Possibilities of religious belief are either ignored, or distorted. Here, too,
Wittgenstein’ philosophical methods are of immense importance. They
would involve discussions of uses, possibilities of meaning which, per-
haps, we never recognised, or which we have distorted by imposing
alien criteria of meaning on them. Such discussions, Phillips feels, are
sorely needed in contemporary philosophy of religion. And it is such dis-
cussions that Phillips hopes to provide.
Phillips’s hermeneutics of contemplation constitutes a powerful appli-
cation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical methods to the philosophy 
of religion. More than any other, Phillips has developed Wittgenstein’s
methods and fragmentary writings on religious belief, and highlighted
their significance for philosophical reflection on religion. We may cer-
tainly agree with Clack that we owe a great debt to Phillips for his trail-
blazing work.7 In many ways, Phillips’s account of religious belief can be
said to develop Wittgenstein’s insight that religious belief is something
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like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. By means of often
compelling examples, Phillips presents an elegant and persuasive account
of the way in which religious belief may grab hold of a person, shaping
his life and his understanding of himself and the world in which he lives.
Phillips’s contemplations of religious possibilities of meaning give us an
insight into the, perhaps irreducible, reality of the religious domain of
meaning. As such, they offer a valuable and stimulating contribution to
contemporary philosophy of religion.
We have, of course, also encountered a number of difficulties. Phillips’s
suggestion that a contemplative philosophy is concerned, in some way,
with giving an account of reality proves difficult to reconcile not only 
with aspects of Wittgenstein’s work, but with Phillips’s own writings as 
well. Furthermore, Phillips’s account of the independent and disinterested
nature of philosophical enquiry implies too strong a dichotomy between a
first-order, participant’s understanding and a second-order intellectual or
philosophical understanding of our various modes of discourse. Finally,
Phillips’s demonstration of the conceptual confusions in reductionist theo-
ries of religion is only partially successful. In the end, the attempt to estab-
lish the irreducibility of the religious domain of meaning trades on a spe-
cific reading of Wittgenstein’s notions of a language-game and a form of
life which has been developed in various strands of Wittgensteinian phi-
losophy and, arguably, is implied by Phillips’s earlier discussions of reduc-
tionism. We argued not only that this argument is invalid but, moreover,
that it is no longer feasible that Phillips should appeal to it in his later work.
Where Phillips’s account of religious belief is concerned, we argued
that his claim that he is doing no more than clarifying the meaning reli-
gious beliefs actually have in their historical contexts of application can
be questioned. His analyses exclude certain crucial elements which have
traditionally been associated with these beliefs. Phillips’s account of the
belief in miracles adequately reflects the way in which miracles function
as objects of faith. But his insistence that talk of miracles cannot be con-
strued either as descriptive or explanatory in nature leaves little room for
the traditional understanding of miracles as evidences of faith. Again,
Phillips’s interpretation of the belief in immortality as a message of self-
abnegation undeniably captures an important strand of thought within
Christianity. However, it fails to address a singularly important datum:
the Christian hope for a bodily resurrection, substantiated by Christ’s res-
urrection. Finally, Phillips’s analysis of the belief that God exists effec-
tively manages to cast light on the necessity associated with the reality of
God, and provides a provoking account of the fundamental role the belief
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plays in religious practice. Furthermore, it contains a scathing critique of
too intellectualist a reading of God’s reality, demonstrating the unten-
ability of an overly facile assimilation of the belief that God exists to the
matter of fact belief that a certain state of affairs holds true. However,
Phillips’s contention that no factual element whatsoever enters into the
belief that God exists, fails to convince. It drives an intolerable wedge
between our religious and our everyday, empirical modes of discourse,
leaving us unable to account for the fact that, throughout history, believ-
ers and non-believers alike have sought to provide natural reasons and
factual evidence in favour either of embracing or rejecting the belief that
God exists. Phillips’s suggestion that such attempts display a misunder-
standing of the concept of God is far from credible. It all but commits us
to the view that many, if not most Christians, have failed to understand
correctly the status of their own religion.
While it cannot be denied that Phillips’s analyses capture certain key
elements of ‘traditional Christian belief’, it is equally clear that they either
overlook or discount at least as many others. Despite Phillips’s vehement
objections, his resolute refusal to incorporate any straightforwardly fac-
tual, historical, and/or metaphysical components into the religious frame
of reference marks his account as an unorthodox account of (Christian)
religious belief. This conclusion immediately raises the question whether
Phillips’s analyses are revisionary in nature. The answer to that question
depends on the way in which Phillips deals with possibilities of religious
belief which his account fails to accommodate. At times, Phillips seems to
suggest that these should be discarded as either confusions or forms of
superstition. Such a strategy, however, can no longer lay claim to be doing
no more than elucidating the meaning religious beliefs have in the lives of
the faithful. It would be hard here not to suspect that some sort of revision-
ary exercise is being undertaken, rather than the purely descriptive work
avowedly performed.8
Perhaps a more modest reading sees Phillips as presenting, not the
grammar of religious belief, but one possible grammar amongst a variety
of conflicting and overlapping grammars of faith. Phillips, one might say,
aims to establish an order in the use of religious language; “one out of
many possible orders; not the order.”9 While this necessitates a modera-
tion of Phillips’s critique of classical philosophy of religion, I believe it to
be by far the more sympathetic and, indeed, the more fruitful reading. Of
course, whether Phillips should agree is not for me to say.
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AFTERWORD
‘The difficulty here is: to stop’
In Zettel, paragraph 314, Wittgenstein describes what he calls ‘a remark-
able and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation’:
“the difficulty — I might say — is not that of finding the solution but
rather of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only
a preliminary to it. ‘We have already said everything. — Not anything that
follows from this, no this itself is the solution!’
This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation,
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right
place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get
beyond it.
The difficulty here is: to stop.”1
Wittgenstein is referring to the urge we might feel, as philosophers, to
go beyond a certain point in a search for explanations, justifications and
foundations.2 He asks us to resist this urge; to recognise that what we
are really looking for already lies open to view. Many commentators on
Wittgenstein have written penetratingly on these matters, and I have no
intention of furthering that discussion in these final pages. What I would
like to do, is to borrow Wittgenstein’s remark and consider a number of
contexts where one might say that the difficulty lies, in some way or
other, in knowing when to stop.
My main objective was to present a critical study of Phillips’s phi-
losophy of religion. It soon became clear that, given the influence of
Wittgenstein’s writings on Phillips’s work, and the importance Phillips
bestows upon Wittgenstein’s writings, there was no way of getting around
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Thus, in the first part of this book I set out to
explore Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief, both in the context of
his earlier and his later work. Several commentators have suggested that
Wittgenstein’s writings contain the makings of a comprehensive philoso-
phy of religion. Others have gone further and argued that an understand-
ing of Wittgenstein’s religious thought may well be crucial to an under-
standing of his philosophy in general, or even that Wittgenstein’s work is
fundamentally religious as it stands. Given the importance religious belief
1 Wittgenstein 1981, 314.
2 See Phillips 1993, p. 79.
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played in Wittgenstein’s life, it is certainly tempting to award his remarks
on religion a more central role in his philosophical oeuvre. But one must
take care not to go too far; one must know when to stop. Thus, I empha-
sised the fragmentary and incomplete nature of the material available to
us. Some, or even many, of Wittgenstein’s observations are inspiring and
thought-provoking; others seem obscure or one-sided. Together, they can-
not be said to constitute a coherent philosophy of religion, let alone the
key to understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
That is not to say, as some commentators have suggested, that
Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods are ill-suited to deal with religious
belief. Quite the contrary, I believe that the application of his methods to
the study of religion has proven to be a fruitful addition to contemporary
philosophy of religion. The point is that in elaborating a Wittgensteinian
philosophy of religion, one faces the task of interpreting and further
developing Wittgenstein’s insights. In the second part of this book, I
examined the works of a number of authors who, at quite an early stage,
played a crucial role in this regard: Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, Norman
Malcolm, and D. Z. Phillips. These ‘early Wittgensteinians’ have often
been criticised for (ab)using Wittgenstein’s methods in an effort to immu-
nise religious belief from philosophical censure. In 1967 Kai Nielsen
coined the term ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’; a label which, perhaps unfor-
tunately, seems here to stay. Although Phillips was not on Nielsen’s orig-
inal list of Wittgensteinian Fideists, he has become the author primarily
associated with this position. By far the majority of critical commentators
on Phillips’s work has, at one time or other, affirmed that Phillips is,
indeed, a fideist. Conversely, those sympathetic to Phillips’s work have
taken it upon themselves to defend Phillips from these charges. With
occasional lapses, the debate continues up unto this day.3
Clearly, any examination of Phillips’s philosophy of religion cannot
simply ignore this discussion. On the other hand, I was somewhat reluc-
tant to get caught up in it. For one thing, I feel that while the matter 
is certainly not irrelevant, the dominant role the Fideist label has played
in the reception of Phillips’s work has drawn away attention from far
more interesting topics of discussion. More importantly, I am not at all
convinced that Phillips ever held, let alone argued in favour of, any of
the fideist theses attributed to him. The charge of Fideism, I argued, is 
a half-truth. Although there are certain passages in Phillips’s earlier 
writings which encourage a fideist reading, the fideist conclusion is never
424 GRAMMARS OF FAITH
3 For two recent examples, see Addis 2001 and Amesbury 2003.
8558-05_Bloemendaal_04  01-02-2006  11:20  Pagina 424
explicitly advanced. Moreover, in his later work, Phillips provides the
critic no reason to suspect him of any fideistic foul play. The time has
come, I suggested, to lay the charge of Fideism to rest, and put a stop to
the debate. Perhaps Clack is right to say that it may be too optimistic to
think that the label of Wittgensteinian Fideism will ever entirely be
dropped from discussions of Phillips’s work.4 But if my conclusions are
correct, I hope they may go some way towards accomplishing this.
The third and by far the larger part of this book engages critically 
with Phillips’s philosophy of religion. I focused my examination on two
central topics: Phillips’s discussions on philosophical methodology, and
his descriptive accounts of religious beliefs. On each topic, I strove to
present Phillips’s points of view as truthfully as I could, in an effort to
show not only their possible weaknesses, but also their strength. I began
by developing the distinction between Phillips’s earlier and his later
work, implied in the second part of my discussion, aiming to show that
it is both justified and fruitful to draw such a contrast. Although there
are no clear breaks in Phillips’s oeuvre, there is a gradual shift in atten-
tion. Phillips’s mature understanding of philosophical enquiry as a form
of contemplation shows him to be primarily a philosopher, rather than 
a philosopher of religion. The philosopher seeks to attain a clear under-
standing of our various forms of discourse, to show the grammars of 
different practices and the different relations in which they stand to 
each other. He does so, not for the sake of these practices, but for his
own sake. That is to say, the clarifications subserve the central questions
of philosophy, questions which have to do with combating scepticism,
the denial of the possibility of sense in various contexts.
To treat Phillips’s work as if it presents a comprehensive, systematic
account of the nature of philosophy would be to distort its character. But
it is true to say that the philosopher’s aim, as well as the methods he
employs to achieve it, remain the same whether the questions addressed
arise in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of mathematics, or,
indeed, the philosophy of religion. This idea, that philosophy, despite
the differences in the problems it addresses, reflects a unified approach
comes largely from Wittgenstein. On Wittgenstein’s (later) view, philo-
sophical problems are the products of a certain lack of clarity in the way
in which they are formulated, a lack of clarity which has its roots in con-
fused ways of extracting sense from our forms of language.5 To solve our
AFTERWORD 425
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problems, we stand in need, not of new information, but of a clear view
of what lies before us. More than anyone else, Phillips has shown the
power of such a ‘grammatical’, or ‘contemplative’, approach in the phi-
losophy of religion.
Phillips presents us with a vision of philosophy as the pursuit not of
knowledge but of understanding. This is a task of enormous difficulty,
not just on a technical level, but also because of the moral demands it
makes on both the writer and his audience, who may have strong moral
or religious commitments and be hostile to certain other possibilities of
meaning. In some cases, we may well refuse to understand. In others, we
may simply fail to understand. What we lack is not so much an under-
standing of the logic of a given form of language, but a certain sensibil-
ity which would allow us to make sense of it. The language ‘does not get
off the ground’ for us, we do not take it ‘in the right spirit’.6
If anything, Phillips’s clarifications of religious belief display remark-
able sensibility for the language of the spirit. With apparent ease, Phillips
presents a wide range of examples of how religious belief may shape a
person’s life, drawing our attention to possibilities of sense which we
may have never recognised before, or which we may have been led to
ignore. Phillips’s reminders often seem intuitively correct;7 a testimony to
Phillips’s affinity with his subject matter. One is almost inclined to sus-
pect Phillips of a religious virtuosity, a virtuosity seldom encountered in
academic discussions of religion.
The possibilities of religious meaning Phillips would have us contem-
plate may not appeal to everyone. And there is no reason to think that
this could not be true of those who actually hold the religious beliefs
Phillips seeks to account for. The language simply does not get off 
the ground for them. In this context, Klaus von Stosch has suggested 
that Phillips’s analyses should be awarded a ‘regional worth’.8 What he
means is that Phillips’s account of religious belief is an unorthodox one;
it may appeal to a (relatively small) group of believers, but certainly not
to all. In my discussion, I have tried to show that there is some truth to
this claim. At this point, however, I would like to draw attention to
another way in which Phillips’s account may be said to be a ‘regional’
one. Phillips’s philosophy of religion is, on the whole, an account of that
particular religious tradition called Christianity. Phillips has seldom, if
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8 See von Stosch 2001, p. 232: “Diese Neuinterpretation mag zwar der Herangehens-
weise einer Minderheit von Gläubigen in ihren Glauben entsprechen, und insofern kann
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ever, applied his contemplative approach in the context of other religious
traditions. Of course, this is not all that surprising. As Winch points out,
most contemporary philosophical discussions of religious meaning take
as their starting point certain expressions which are thought to be funda-
mental in the religious beliefs and theological doctrines of the world reli-
gions of today. And, quite naturally, in Anglo-Saxon discussions the
examples used tend to be taken from the religions with which the authors
are most familiar, roughly the Judaeo-Christian.9 That Phillips has con-
centrated his writings on the Christian religion, one might say, is just 
a matter of prudence. As regards other religious beliefs or practices, say,
Islamic or Buddhist, Phillips’s contemplative approach simply awaits
application by someone more at home with these traditions.
Although I do not wish to deny this, I believe that there are some 
further questions to be asked here. First, Phillips’s subject matter is, in a
word, language. His philosophical approach is directed primarily at the
clarification of possibilities of meaning realised in human discourse, and
the dissolution of philosophical problems. But it has been shown that,
for example, Anselm’s ontological proof and Kant’s criticism of it do not
even make sense in Chinese.10 Again, in his account of religion Phillips
focuses primarily on (the meaning of religious) doctrines and beliefs.
But it would seem that in many Asian traditions doctrines and beliefs
play a negligible role. If they are mentioned at all, they are not primary,
but added as ‘after-thoughts’.11 I am not saying that Phillips’s contem-
plative approach could not be applied in such a context, but I suspect
this would require some amount of extension and modification. A fur-
ther investigation into this matter may well lead to a deepening of our
understanding not just of the nature of religion, but of the nature of phi-
losophy as well.
A second, related question concerns the ‘phenomenon’ of religion as
such. Could a philosophy of religion be concerned with religious prac-
tices and forms of discourse, rather than with the practices or forms of
discourse characteristic of any particular tradition? What marks a given
practice or form of discourse as religious in the first place? Is it possi-
ble to speak of religion as a human phenomenon rather than a cultural 
phenomenon? Could we arrive at a perspicuous representation of reli-
gion as such, drawing the connections between various rituals, practices,
beliefs, etc., and revealing, as it were, their secret law?
AFTERWORD 427
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Such questions might be said to harbour deep confusions. After all, 
to talk about ‘religion as such’ is to talk about an abstraction. In reality,
we are faced not with ‘religion’ but with various, historically shaped,
religions; or better: with a variety of practices and forms of language
which are embedded in specific contexts of application or, if one pleases,
specific forms of life. From a Wittgensteinian point of view in particu-
lar, the attempt to transcend these various practices to arrive at some
common notion of religiosity, may be taken to be a primary example of
failing to realise when one should stop. Maybe so. But perhaps a cautious
consideration of these questions may turn out to be of some merit. Such
an enquiry could do worse than begin by further developing Wittgen-
stein’s remark that we could almost say that man is a ceremonious ani-
mal. He immediately adds that this is partly false, partly nonsensical;
but insists there is also something in it.12
Let us return, however, to the present work. In his introduction to the
Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us that he is convinced of the truth of the
thoughts the book communicates; the problems have, on all essential
points, been finally solved. Although I hope to have offered a contribu-
tion to the problems and questions discussed in this book, I have no illu-
sion that I have managed conclusively to solve or answer them. I doubt
whether, in philosophy, such a thing is at all possible. Old problems keep
coming back in new forms, and various developments may occasion new
problems. No doubt, as Phillips puts it, “someone, and perhaps myself,
will ask of the present work, ‘What about this? What about that?’ And
so it will go on.”13 Indeed, in the introduction to the Philosophical Inves-
tigations, Wittgenstein writes that he was forced to recognise grave mis-
takes in what he wrote in his earlier book. I have little doubt that I, too,
will be forced to recognise mistakes in what I have written here.
It is no coincidence that, having arrived at the final pages of this book,
I was reminded of Wittgenstein’s remark in paragraph 314 of Zettel.
When one has worked on a body of text over an extended period of time,
it is difficult to resist the temptation to add one further paragraph, one
further argument. To try and remove that one ill-conceived expression
and replace it with a better one. Of course, there comes a time when one
must let others be the judge of what one has written. Perhaps, here too,
the difficulty is: to stop.
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SAMENVATTING
D. Z. Phillips is de bekendste voorvechter van een Wittgensteiniaanse
benadering in de filosofische studie van de religie. Zijn werk is toonaan-
gevend en heeft nieuwe richting gegeven aan het hedendaags godsdienst-
filosofisch debat. Het heeft veel – vaak kritische – reacties opgeroepen,
maar tot dusver ontbreekt een grondige studie. Dit boek wil in die lacune
voorzien. Het is opgebouwd uit drie delen die ieder hun eigen rol spelen
bij het tot stand komen van een kritische evaluatie van Phillips’ oeuvre.
In het eerste deel (Hoofdstukken 1 en 2) worden Wittgensteins opmer-
kingen over religieus geloof besproken in de context van zijn vroege en
late filosofie. Door zijn beschouwingen over de religie zorgvuldig tegen
de achtergrond van zijn bredere filosofische methode te plaatsen komt het
onderzoek tot een weloverwogen oordeel over Wittgensteins godsdienst-
filosofie. Tegelijkertijd wordt daarmee een maatstaf gegeven waaraan
iedere poging een meer uitgebreide Wittgensteiniaanse godsdienstfilosofie
te presenteren moet worden gemeten. In het tweede deel (Hoofdstuk 3)
wordt uiteengezet hoe in de late jaren vijftig en het begin van de jaren
zestig Wittgensteins methode werd betrokken op de wijsgerige bestude-
ring van de religie. Na een bespreking van de vroege werken van Rush
Rhees, Peter Winch en Norman Malcolm, wordt Phillips’ eerste boek
The Concept of Prayer behandeld. Hier staan Phillips’ inspanningen om
vorm te geven aan een meer uitgewerkte Wittgensteiniaanse godsdienstfi-
losofie centraal. In het derde en omvangrijkste deel van het boek (Hoofd-
stukken 4 tot en met 9) verschuift de aandacht van Wittgensteiniaanse-
naar Phillips’ eigen godsdienstfilosofie. Phillips’ opvatting van filoso-
fisch onderzoek als een vorm van contemplatie wordt geanalyseerd en
zijn beschrijvingen van godsdienstig geloof en religieuze praktijk worden
aan een nader onderzoek onderworpen.
In hoofdstuk 1 worden aan de hand van zowel passages uit Wittgensteins
dagboeken en aantekeningen als biografisch materiaal de rol en het belang
van de mystieke passages in de Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus verhel-
derd. Duidelijk wordt, dat de ethisch-religieuze opmerkingen in de Trac-
tatus op gespannen voet staan met het daaraan voorafgaande geheel van
logische stellingen. Wittgenstein kan deze spanning in de Tractatus niet
oplossen, wellicht wilde hij dat ook niet. Het hoofdstuk besluit met een
bespreking van Wittgensteins Lecture on Ethics. Deze tekst werpt niet
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alleen licht op de manier waarop in de Tractatus over religieus geloof
wordt gesproken maar bevat ook de kiem van Wittgensteins latere
behandeling.
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een analyse van een aantal van de centrale
thema’s en concepten uit de Philosophical Investigations. Daarna
komen Wittgensteins latere beschouwingen over de religie aan de orde,
waarbij de nadruk ligt op de Remarks on Frazer en de Lectures on Reli-
gious Belief. Steeds wordt gewezen op de fragmentarische aard van het
materiaal. Hoewel Wittgenstein enige aanwijzingen geeft aangaande de
manier waarop zijn filosofische methode zou kunnen worden gebruikt
bij de studie van de godsdienst en ook over de resultaten die hij daar-
van verwachtte, kan men zijn opmerkingen niet zien als een uitgebreide
of systematische filosofie van de religie. Wie een Wittgensteiniaanse
godsdienstfilosofie wil presenteren is gehouden Wittgensteins summiere
opmerkingen toe te lichten en uit te breiden.
In het derde hoofdstuk worden de eerste toepassingen van Wittgen-
steins latere filosofische methode binnen de godsdienstfilosofie onder-
zocht. Het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk richt zich op de vroege werken
van Rush Rhees, Peter Winch en Norman Malcolm. Aangetoond wordt
dat deze auteurs verscheidene aspecten van Wittgensteins filosofie ver-
keerd geïnterpreteerd hebben. Met betrekking tot Phillips’ eerste boek
The Concept of Prayer moet een soortgelijke conclusie getrokken wor-
den. Net als zijn voorgangers legt Phillips te veel nadruk op de logische
autonomie van religieuze taalspelen en levensvormen waardoor te wei-
nig ruimte wordt gelaten voor de overlap tussen het religieuze en het
niet-religieuze. Door bovendien de betekenis van religieuze concepten te
relateren aan bepaalde religieuze ervaringen laadt Phillips de verdenking
op zich een fideïstisch motief te hebben. Ondanks deze kritische conclu-
sies wordt in het laatste deel van het hoofdstuk beargumenteerd dat 
een heroverweging van Phillips’ godsdienstfilosofie in het licht van zijn
latere werk noodzakelijk is. De wijze waarop Phillips zijn positie heeft
aangepast en ontwikkeld, heeft tot dusver te weinig aandacht gekregen.
In het vierde hoofdstuk wordt het contrast tussen Phillips’ vroege 
en late werk nader uitgewerkt. Getoond wordt dat het maken van een
dergelijk onderscheid gerechtvaardigd en vruchtbaar is. Al is er geen
duidelijke breuk in Phillips’ oeuvre, wel is er sprake van een geleidelijke
verschuiving van de aandacht, een verschuiving van een descriptieve
naar een contemplatieve opvatting van de filosofie. Het onderzoek ver-
heldert de aard van deze verschuiving en haar implicaties. In plaats van
de nadruk te leggen op de logische zelfstandigheid van verschillende
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taalpraktijken, besteedt Phillips steeds vaker aandacht aan de hun ver-
wevenheid en samenhang. Daarmee wordt een belangrijke stap gezet tot
het oplossen van de centrale problemen die besloten liggen in zijn eer-
dere denken. Het onderzoek brengt echter ook een aantal nieuwe pro-
blemen aan de dag. Met name Phillips’ bewering dat de filosofie dient
om een zekere weergave van de realiteit te geven wordt weersproken op
andere plaatsen in zijn werk. Verder impliceert Phillips’ kenschetsing
van de onafhankelijke en belangeloze aard van filosofische contempla-
tie een te sterke dichotomie tussen een filosofisch- en een deelnemers
perspectief.
Phillips’ kritiek op reductionistische verklaringen van religie, die een
belangrijke rol speelt in zowel zijn eerdere als zijn latere werk, staat cen-
traal in het vijfde hoofdstuk. Het hoofdstuk bevat een grondige analyse
van Phillips’ lezing van David Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion. Phillips wil Hume als mede- en als tegenstander naar voren
brengen. Het onderzoek toont aan dat op beide strategieën het nodige valt
af te dingen. Bovendien wordt beargumenteerd dat Phillips’ bewering
dat reductionistische verklaringen van de religie conceptueel verward
zijn, geen stand kan houden. Hoewel Phillips’ kritiek de meest radicale
vormen van reductionisme ondermijnt, kunnen de theorieën zo geher-
formuleerd worden dat ze zijn kritiek omzeilen. De overgang van een
descriptieve naar een contemplatieve opvatting van de filosofie mag 
dan sommige van de problemen in Phillips’ eerdere werk ondervangen, 
het leidt er ook toe dat zijn kritiek op het reductionisme aanmerkelijk
moet worden afgezwakt. De algemene stelling dat religie als zodanig een
autonoom, irreducibel betekenisdomein constituteert kan niet langer wor-
den volgehouden.
De hoofdstukken 6, 7 en 8 bevatten gedetailleerde analyses van Phillips’
beschrijvingen van, respectievelijk, het geloof in wonderen, het geloof in
onsterfelijkheid en het geloof dat God bestaat. Uit de bespreking blijkt
dat Phillips niet kan volhouden enkel de betekenis te verhelderen die
deze vormen van geloof in hun historische gebruikscontexten hebben.
Phillips’ beschouwingen zijn onorthodox aangezien ze bepaalde cruciale
elementen die traditioneel met de genoemde vormen van geloof worden
geassocieerd veronachtzamen. Phillips’ beschrijving van het geloof in
wonderen geeft de manier waarop wonderen functioneren als geloofsob-
jecten adequaat weer, maar laat geen ruimte voor de traditionele opvat-
ting van het wonder als rechtvaardiging en bewijs van het geloof. Zo
weerspiegelt ook zijn interpretatie van het geloof in onsterfelijkheid als
een boodschap van zelfverloochening een belangrijk element uit het
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christelijk gedachtengoed. Een minstens zo belangrijk gegeven verdwijnt
daarbij echter uit het zicht: de christelijke hoop op een lichamelijke
opstanding. Phillips’ analyse van het geloof dat God bestaat, tenslotte,
doet recht aan de noodzakelijkheid die met de realiteit van God wordt
verbonden en verschaft inzicht in de fundamentele rol die dit geloof
speelt in de religieuze praktijk. Aan de andere kant kan Phillips’ bewe-
ring dat waar het gaat om de realiteit van God er geen feiten in het geding
zijn, niet overtuigen. Daarmee zou een kloof ontstaan tussen het religi-
euze en het alledaagse, empirische discours. De vele pogingen om het
geloof dat God bestaat met natuurlijke redenen en feitelijk bewijs te sta-
ven dan wel te ondermijnen, worden dan zonder meer terzijde geschoven.
Phillips’ voorstel dergelijke pogingen als een misbegrijpen van het con-
cept ‘God’ te beschouwen, zo concludeert het hoofdstuk, is verre van
geloofwaardig.
Phillips’ resolute weigering om feitelijke, historische en/of metafysi-
sche componenten te incorpereren in het religieuze referentiekader ver-
raadt het onorthodoxe karakter van zijn godsdienstwijsgerig project. In
het negende hoofdstuk wordt getoond dat in Phillips’ werk de onmis-
kenbare neiging bestaat deze elementen als verward of bijgelovig van de
hand te doen. Het onderscheid tussen echt geloof en bijgeloof dat Phil-
lips introduceert is echter hoogst verdacht. De conclusie dringt zich op
dat door middel van dit onderscheid Phillips zijn lezers in plaats van
pure descriptie eerder een vorm van theologisch revisionisme verschaft.
Daar waar Phillips volhoudt de grammatica van het religieus geloof te
beschrijven is deze kritiek onvermijdelijk. Een meer bescheiden lezing
ziet in Phillips’ werk niet een verheldering van de, maar van een moge-
lijke grammatica te midden van een veelvoud van conflicterende en over-
lappende grammatica’s van het geloof. Al zou deze lezing Phillips dwin-
gen zijn kritiek op klassieke godsdienstfilosofie danig in te perken, dit
is, zo besluit het onderzoek, verreweg de meer vruchtbare lezing.
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